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ABSTRACT 
 
Performing One’s Own Death: Martyrdom, Sovereignty and Truth 
 
by 
 
John Soboslai 
 
This work develops a new understanding of the socials significance of martyrdom 
through a comparative analysis of the concept’s deployment in three distinct settings. 
Beginning by critically assessing the linguistic provenance of the term “martyr,” from the 
Greek word for a court witness, combined with a discussion of how such deaths are 
discursively shaped in opposition to the victim, soldier or suicide, I argue for a heuristic that 
centers on the opposition of interpretive frames at work in conflicts that create martyrs. To 
support such a model, I proceed by analyzing collected sets of texts said to be written by 
martyrs where they frame their intention and link their death to larger political and symbolic 
complexes. To establish a common lens through which to investigate deaths that occur in 
radically different contexts, I introduce the concept of the sovereign imaginary: a coherent 
ideal of cosmic order that configures moral judgments of right and wrong, delineates social 
boundaries, and provides processes of establishing legitimate authority. The contemporary 
political and religious authorities who rely on and propagate such imaginaries are responsible 
for shaping life for the communities under analysis, and their words are considered in tandem 
with those of the martyrs themselves. 
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The concept of the martyr as we understand it today originates in early Christianity, 
which has largely determined the contours of the term’s usage today. Second century 
Christianity in Asia Minor – the so-called cradle of martyrdom – provided much of the 
context for Christian martyrdom, and is the first case analyzed here. This area boasts 
members like Ignatius of Antioch and Polycarp of Smyrna, two significant voices that shaped 
the understanding of martyrdom in early Christianity. By examining the socio-political 
context between the early Christian communities, their Jewish counterparts, and the Roman 
state, I trace the developing conflict around the true sovereign authority in the world, and 
show how harm against the body was used as a means of shoring up such authority. Armed 
with their own ideas about legitimate suffering, and refusing to capitulate to the coercive 
measures of the Roman State, Christian martyrs gave their lives in a show of affiliation to the 
true power in the world and thereby became exemplars of the true way to live. 
A similar dynamic exists within the second case under study, the Shi’a Islamists of 1980s 
Iran and Lebanon, from whence the modern phenomenon of “martyrdom operations” or 
“suicide bombings” springs. Looking explicitly at the Iran-Iraq war – where huge numbers of 
young men walked willingly into bullets to overwhelm their enemy – alongside Hizbollah’s 
resistance to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon where human bombs were first employed as a 
tactic toward Islamist ends, I show how the repeated invocation of mytho-historical persons 
led to the experience of re-living history. Attending to the Shi’a roots of what will largely 
become a Sunni phenomenon, I show that the self-sacrificial violence was seen to be a 
necessary act in order to bring about the only truly just rule of God, one incumbent upon all 
true Muslims. The ability of one group to determine the requirements of a social group, I 
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argue, resulted in the willingness of young men and women to place the ends of community 
over their own lives. 
My last case leaves the Abrahamic context to examine the way martyrdom discourse is 
employed in regards to the self-immolations that have been occurring in twenty-first century 
Tibet. Though an explicitly Buddhist culture, here too I discover conflicts around legitimate 
sovereignty and political self-determination – issues at the heart of all cases under analysis – 
compel a discourse that encourages self-sacrifice through reference to sacred narratives. By 
tracing the language employed by the self-immolators in tandem with the ways the struggle 
with the People’s Republic of China is framed by the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, I demonstrate 
how the same dynamic is evident in labeling the auto-cremations martyrdoms: a historic, 
political, and religious truth is expressed and cemented in the bodies of those willing to die 
rather than act against it. 
In conclusion I articulate a new theoretical model by which to understand martyrdom as 
performance suffering, acts of voluntary affliction – contextualized in a symbolic world –  
that are seen to have the potential to change the situation on the ground by remaining true to 
the larger cosmic goals that would bring about a just existence. Maintaining that the 
operations of martyrdom occur on both personal and social levels simultaneously, I show that 
these deaths are used as pieces of evidence in support of a particular interpretive vision of 
truth, and that these deaths are particularly powerful and provocative due to the spectacular 
nature of a sovereign imaginary appearing in the flesh of those who suffer for it. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Concerning Martyrdom 
 
Standing before a camera in a quiet room, a man finished his videotaped testament 
saying “God is the greatest,” before strapping on an explosives-filled vest and going to die. 
Standing before an angry Roman judge condemning him to death, a man answered all 
questions by saying “I am a Christian,” before being devoured by wild animals. Standing still 
as flames engulfed her robes, a woman prayed “all-knowing Chenrezig (a term for the 
bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara), Tenzin Gyatso, may you stand firm until samsara ends,” before 
collapsing to the ground. Each statement was a confession of devotion, each spectacle 
horrifying to onlookers, and each person a voluntary participant in their own violent demise.  
Each individual is celebrated by their community as a paragon of virtue while being 
condemned by outsiders as irrational.  
And each person is a martyr. 
Martyrs appear throughout human history in a wide variety of contexts. Some have 
become firmly ensconced in our imaginary, like Joan of Arc, the maid of Orléans who battled 
against gender roles as well as the British and was burned at the stake when she was only 
nineteen. Others strike us as deviant or illegitimate, like Mohammed Atta who flew a plane 
into the North Tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, killing himself 
along with thousands of civilians. Both have been labeled martyrs, though they cause 
radically different reactions depending on who considers them. We respect and identify with 
some, while condemning and discounting others. The questions surrounding martyrdom can 
likewise both appear self-evident and startling: What cause these people to seek their own 
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destruction? Why are these deaths celebrated as models of ethical action? How do they differ 
from suicides? Why do such disparate contexts share such provocative similarities? What, 
ultimately, is martyrdom? Answering these questions will aid our understanding about what 
it means to speak in terms of martyrs, to say someone sacrificed themselves for something 
that exceeded them. 
The specific label of “martyrdom” comes out of early Christianity, and the term 
“martyr” originally meant a witness who provided testimony during a legal trial.1 Greek texts 
used the term in reference to Christians sentenced to die by adversarial power structures – be 
they Rome or the Jewish Sanhedrin – referring to these individuals as witnesses, martys, to 
Christ. Speaking of martyrdom in terms of “bearing witness” or “testifying” recalls this early 
character. As those texts were translated as they spread through the Roman Empire, the term 
was transliterated, signaling that suffering and death in service to something was early on a 
distinctive category. First millennium Syriac and Arabic scholars returned to the root for 
“witness” for their terms, sohaido and shahid respectively.2 The latter is etymologically close 
to shahada, the confession of faith required of all Muslims and first pillar of Islam. Had the 
concept of the legal witness continued to suffice for the complex of meanings that 
characterized the martyr in these settings, we might be left without such a label today. 
Ultimately, martyrs are not found, they are made, constructed by a hermeneutic move 
that connects martyrdom to a wider complex of symbols and practices aimed at providing 
meaning for these deaths. It is a death contextualized, a death interpreted. Martyrdom is a 
way of speaking about death by reference to power relations, informed by particular 
knowledges about the right way to live in the world. While our current idea of martyrdom 
has largely been determined by its original Christian context, its language is deployed in 
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settings completely removed from Christianity. Any study of martyrdom must therefore 
allow for the Christian form while attending to the ways other communities use the term to 
make death meaningful. Doing so will avoid formulating a normative definition that declares 
some necessary and sufficient conditions for “authentic” martyrdoms, which would thereby 
exclude others thereby constructed as deviant. As Paul Middleton has shown, such attempts 
serve only to replay historical disputes without advancing our understanding of the concept.3 
The goal of this analysis will not be to protect one particular usage, but rather understand 
why the term is used in such a variety of settings.  
Traditionally martyrdom has been articulated through religion: a martyr is one who 
dies for their religion.4 However that relationship depends on what we mean by religion. As 
scholars have repeatedly shown, the category of religion has been created in Western 
contexts as something set apart from the sphere of power, separating religious concerns from 
political considerations and forming the category of religion on the model of Western 
Christianity.5 Moreover, relying on ‘death for religion’ as determinant of martyrdom 
excludes dying on behalf of a nationalist configuration, which disregards some stridently 
atheistic settings where the term has found great purchase. Mao Zedong’s revolution for 
instance saw the creation of sprawling “Martyr Memorial Cemeteries” found in urban 
settings throughout the People’s Republic of China. So if we resign martyrdom to the realm 
of religion alone, we predetermine its character.6 
 The Oxford English Dictionary (whose definition is taken for granted by too many 
studies of martyrdom) recounts the Christian context first, marking martyrdom as a death for 
the Christian faith, then offers the more general “one who undergoes death (more loosely, 
one who undergoes great suffering) on behalf of any religious or other belief or cause, or as a 
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consequence of his devotion to some object.”7 Not only does this inherently equate sacred 
and secular causes and beliefs on the level of devotion, but it places the emphasis on the why 
of the deaths. Martyrs die on account of something: they are attached deaths.8 
 At the same time a host of questions are left open, both logistical and conceptual. 
How does one suffer on behalf of something? What kind of devotion leads to death? The 
term “cause” can be so broad as to nearly lose meaning, and could include ideological goals 
as much as material ones, social as well as personal. Could any cause create martyrs? If so, 
what would precipitate it? If not, what are the core differences between those that can and 
those that cannot? Moreover, there is an open question as to the means by which death is 
seen to serve the cause. Are they necessary for the cause to continue? Are they martyrs like 
cogs in a larger machine, with their blood providing the oil? Such assertions tell us less than 
we might like. 
With this in mind, this work will attend to the significance of martyrdom by first 
examining cases where the discourse of martyrdom is used. Attending to the variety of 
contexts that employ the concept of martyrdom, I will compare cases ancient and modern, 
theistic and non-theistic, coming from settings constructed as “political” and “religious.” 
Looking for common patterns of usage over diverse contexts, we can come to a better 
understanding of martyrdom’s import in social affairs. Rather than focusing on the 
theological promises or discussions surrounding martyrs, I will look to what social 
significance is drawn from these deaths, and how their form connects to existing symbolic 
complexes. Drawing on discussions of religious violence, I will approach martyrdoms as 
performances that are purposefully reaffirming sacred scripts laying at the core of their 
communities.  
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At the same time, I will treat martyrdom as a composite concept that sees multiple 
components revolving constantly in symbiotic tension, mutually exerting influence and never 
appearing in isolation. Individual consciousness is shaped by social expectations; people seek 
martyrdom but require the group to determine martyrs; political situations are read through 
religious frames; the past reappears in the present, which in turn is built on projections into 
the future. These levels are all heavily interrelated, and changes to one effects both. Only by 
attending to both levels simultaneously can we illuminate what we mean by calling someone 
a martyr.9 
 
 
Introduction to Cases 
 The three cases that will occupy me are: 1) Christian martyrs from the area of Asia 
Minor (modern day Turkey) during the second century C.E., the period and place from which 
the concept of martyrdom originated; 2) those engaged in “martyrdom operations” (a.k.a. 
“suicide bombings”) around the Middle East during the last decades of the twentieth century, 
when this tactic first appeared in groups inspired by a burgeoning pan-Islamic identity and 
reconstruction of the concept of jihad; and 3) the self-immolations that have been occurring 
throughout the traditional lands of Tibet (now placed within the geographic boundaries of 
China), an area with no culture of martyrdom as such, but which sees the term widely used in 
reference to these individuals. These cases were selected by identifying diverse settings 
where the terminology of martyrdom has been employed, intentionally selecting cases that 
appeared to differ radically from one another in hopes of determining what gives the concept 
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unity in all sites. As different as they appear, each context sees some deaths labeled explicitly 
as martyrdoms.10  
Early Christian martyrs have had the biggest impact on how martyrdom has been 
conceived, so to begin I will examine the context that spawned the concept. Early 
Christianity was far from a unified theological field; it is better described as what Peter 
Brown has called a network of “micro-Christianities,” each having its own philosophical 
nuance and authority structure.11 Rather than try to unify such a diverse field of 
interpretations and political experiences, I will concentrate on what has been called the cradle 
of martyrdom: the province of Asia Minor, which existed on the margins of power during the 
early Roman Empire and spawned noteworthy martyrs like Polycarp and Ignatius of Antioch. 
These men not only provided a model for martyrdom that would gain ascendancy during 
Christianity’s formative years, but also helped shape the way contemporary Christian 
communities made meaning from these acts.  
The main data for this chapter will come from the quasi-historical accounts of 
martyrdoms found in the acta Martyrum – martyr acts, short stories recounting the trials of 
martyrs before Roman authorities. Though such texts are of questionable historical accuracy, 
they will be read for the way they present these individuals confronting a power structure that 
demanded their obedience. I will also look to the letters of Ignatius of Antioch composed on 
the way to his own martyrdom in Rome, where he reflected on his impending death and its 
significance for him. These letters and acts were circulated to a network of churches 
throughout Christendom, resulting in their broad influence. This place and period saw a 
Christian group still engaged in distinguishing themselves from their Jewish roots, which led 
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to a feeling of being entitled to determine life based on a reconceived covenant with God. 
Those same bases also produced a means of seeing dying as an act of the highest devotion.  
The next chapter examines those who die in istishhad, the Arabic word meaning a 
martyr’s death and routinely applied to jihadis who kill themselves while killing others. The 
most well-known such attack took place on September 11, 2001, perpetrated by the 
transnational terror organization known as al-Qaeda. However by that terrible day the 
strategy of “martyrdom operations” – which are better known as “suicide bombings” or 
“human bomb attacks” – were already firmly established. This stratagem originated in the 
Islamist12 context of the mid-twentieth century, first employed by Hezbollah (whose name 
translates as “Party of God”) against Israeli soldiers invading southern Lebanon. Soon after a 
number of other groups, most notably Hamas and later the so-called Islamic State, began 
routinely employing human bombs as a strategy toward their political goals. Those goals can 
be both national and supranational, but are always anchored in the need to reimagine society 
in line with the dictates of Islam.  
The doctrine of shahid, martyrdom, was invoked to explain the self-sacrificial nature 
of such an attack, which was in turn linked to a larger reimagining of the doctrine of jihad, a 
term meaning the striving for God but is often understood as violent holy war. Many young 
men and women left wills and videotaped testaments before their deaths speaking to their 
hopes for their families, their people, and Islam itself. The evocation of these concepts 
resulted in the sacred character of political activity, and a new batch of popular intellectuals 
promoting jihad– such as Sayyid Qutb, Abul A’la Maududi and Ruhollah Khomeini – led to 
the spread of an identity rooted in Islam that transcended political boundaries. I will trace the 
parallel trajectory of the anti-colonial forces seeking to regain self-determination for Muslims 
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throughout the Middle East and South Asia, and the development of the istishhad discourse. 
Only by moving beyond the organizational boundaries of participating groups, I contend, can 
we appreciate the ways martyrdom takes hold of the imagination of people sharing an 
experience of defeat and humiliation. 
 My last case investigates the rash of self-immolations13 that have taken place in the 
lands of Tibet in the twenty-first century. Beginning in earnest in 2009, over one hundred and 
forty men and women have set themselves on fire throughout the Tibetan plateau. Their act 
has widely been recognized by Tibetans as altruistically performed on behalf of Tibet, and 
self-immolators are referred to as pawo, a word translated consistently into English as 
martyr. Tibetan Buddhism has no tradition of martyrdom as such, but the stories connected to 
the pawo highlight Buddhist forms of self-sacrifice that serve the community and Buddhism 
itself. 
Most reports on these acts tell of self-immolators shouting slogans demanding the 
return of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama from exile, and a number have left written and recorded 
testaments that echo such calls while lamenting the suffering they experienced under Chinese 
rule. During his exile the Dalai Lama has remained both the political and spiritual head of the 
Tibetan people; in Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama is seen to be an incarnation of the 
bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, whose presence is crucial for life in the world. His absence from 
Tibet is seen to pose an existential threat to the people, the country, and the very existence of 
Buddhism. The act of self-immolation does not have a significant tradition in Tibet, but it is 
what Tibetans have repeatedly turned to in hopes of righting what they see as a significantly 
out of order situation. 
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Delineating the Martyr 
These cases have been selected based on a predetermined characteristic – each sees a 
group using the appellation of martyr to label some who have died. Martyrdom is a social 
construction, a communally established representation of death that appears differently in 
different contexts. There is no single form of martyrdom, no essence that determines its 
shape above cultural considerations. However examining how the discourse of martyrdom is 
employed in diverse settings will illuminate congruencies between situations where the term 
finds traction, congruencies that form a network of what Ludwig Wittgenstein called family 
resemblances: groups of phenomena that are related not on the basis of essential 
characteristics but on account of overlapping similarities where no single characteristic may 
be evident in all cases.14 No single set of necessary and sufficient conditions can determine a 
martyr. Martyrdom is a multifaceted and multivalent concept, taking different forms for 
different groups at different times. 
That being the case, it will serve at the outset to draw some conceptual boundaries 
around the type of martyrdom that will concern me here, not in order to determine or exclude 
forms of death that might be labeled martyrdom, nor even to assert a “core form” of 
martyrdom, but merely to orient the discussion that will follow. While this project begins by 
looking at where this label is used, certain congruencies amidst these cases help distinguish a 
martyr’s death from others, such as that of the victim, the suicide, etc. I stress that these 
distinctions remain dynamic and fluid, and are meant only to sketch the conceptual shape of 
martyrdom in service to my theoretical goals.  
The martyr’s death is linked to contexts of power. These deaths occur in situations 
defined by politics. Two groups seeking to determine the form of life of a group come into 
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conflict, and one group is able to marshal much more force than the other. In the cases 
considered here, a dominant power that opposes the martyr’s collective has the ability to use 
violence and inflict suffering in service to its ends. The resources available to the martyr are 
usually vastly outmatched by their opponents, leading to a common theme of labeling their 
enemy as oppressors, persecutors or colonizers, intent on – and capable of – utterly 
exterminating the martyr’s way of life. Were there equivalent recourse to force, we might see 
war, both sides attempting to batter the other into submission.  
This characteristic can establish a distinction between the martyr and the soldier. 
While soldiers often bear numerous resemblances to martyrs, particularly on missions from 
which they likely will not return, those similarities stem from the overwhelming power the 
soldier faces in the moment. Dying in service to others is certainly part of the martyr 
discourse, and the soldier who knowingly brings about his death (e.g. throwing himself on a 
grenade to save the lives of his comrades) may act as a martyr in that moment, as acting 
selflessly is certainly an attribute ascribed to the martyr. They face an enemy that has them 
overpowered, and they stand firm nonetheless; they do not surrender, they do not flee, they 
accept their death. However the martyr enters the situation that will result in his death with 
awareness that he will not emerge, that his life will be lost. It is not a mere possibility as it is 
for the soldier, it is a certainty due to the overwhelming imbalance of coercive power. Rather 
than bowing to those coercive measures, the martyr refuses to comply, preferring to suffer 
and die rather than continue life under an unjust regime. 
 The martyr has agency in their own death. The need for a martyr to choose their fate 
is central to the way those analyzed here speak of martyrs. Choice is a broad spectrum; 
complicity may be as little as refusing to defend themselves knowing it would lead to their 
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death (as in the Christian case) or as great as physically performing acts that they hoped 
would result in death (like exploding a bomb strapped to one’s body), but some intention 
must have been the catalyst for their suffering and death. We can consider this to distinguish 
them from the victim, who has no desire to suffer and die and would choose otherwise if 
given the chance. The victim, if given a choice, would choose life.  
Consider Cassie Bernall, the young woman who was murdered during the 1999 
massacre at Columbine High School in Colorado. Confronted by the shooters, Cassie was 
asked whether she believed in God, and when she replied yes, she was killed. She has been 
recognized as a martyr by some Christian congregations, who link her confession of faith to 
her murder.15 Like the martyrs that form the foundation of the Catholic Church, Cassie chose 
death rather than betray her faith. This issue of agency, however, would here place Cassie 
into the category of victim, as she undoubtedly would have desired to live through that 
horrific day. Moreover, the other students who were murdered that day did not appear to owe 
their deaths to an affirmation of their religious persuasion, ruling out a program of murder 
based on such concerns. None of this is to challenge her status as martyr, nor to belittle in 
anyway the extraordinary courage she showed in her final moments, only to help clarify the 
conceptual relationships at work in this particular form of martyrdom.  
Another issue worthy of note in this vein is the point Jewish philosopher Arthur A. 
Cohen made when he argued that the deaths during the Holocaust are not generally 
considered martyrdoms, not out of a lack of tragedy but because the Nazis based their 
murders on biological factors, not cultural ones.16 One was Jewish, Romani, or Polish, no 
other option was available to them. Their death was not brought about by an intransigent 
decision to be part of a collective, their belonging was seen to be determined by genetics. 
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Those who were murdered at the camps were prohibited from choosing a martyr’s death 
(which is certainly not to say they did not live or die nobly) because they were not offered 
any way to avoid their annihilation by giving up the identity that defined their lives. 
The martyr intends to die. Death appears as the specific goal of the martyrs under 
examination. They do not use their suffering in a coercive way, which sets them apart from 
hunger strikers who die as a consequence of their voluntary suffering. For example, Bobby 
Sands, the famous member of the Irish Republican Army who wasted away in a British 
prison, was willing to die, but hoped his suffering would be end once the ruling power was 
moved by his determination.17 Had he been recognized as a prisoner of war as he wished, 
Sands would have had no reason to continue his starvation. The obstinacy of the British 
authorities led to his death, and due to that he was able to foist responsibility onto England; 
though Sands brought about his own demise, this colonial power could have prevented it at 
any time, making them responsible. Some have recognized him as a martyr, because his 
voluntary death was certainly linked to a political cause, but his death was not explicitly 
intended.  
Alternatively, those under analysis here aimed to die. While like Sands they hoped 
their deaths would change the situation of their collective, continued life would be perceived 
as a failure. Death seals their sacrifice, it appears as their goal. Such is certainly not a 
ubiquitous characteristic of martyrdoms, but is common to the cases under study. 
 These few borders help shape what will concern us going forward. The preceding 
discussion sought to delineate an ideal type of the martyr, which is more or less evident in the 
“real-world” examples of martyrs upon which it is based.18 The early Christians, Islamist 
jihadis and Tibetan self-immolators all share these similarities: they are political in nature, 
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active agents in their own demise, and intend to die. What I have delineated here serve as 
some of the family resemblances they share, but it must be remembered that ultimately the 
decision on who qualifies for martyrdom is the prerogative of the group, not the scholar. 
 
 
On Suicide 
As these martyrdoms incorporate an intentional, active courting of death, in many 
cases it is discussed as a type of or at least alongside the concept of suicide. Martyrs often 
face accusations of suicidal behavior, which takes on even greater importance since the same 
traditions that celebrate martyrs condemn suicide. In the scholarship too this distinction is at 
issue. Some, like Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin, hold that martyrdom is merely a 
category used by communities seeking to “glorify acts of suicide and homicide,” an attempt 
to disguise these repellent acts.19  Carole Cusack and James L. Lewis, the editors of a volume 
entitled Sacred Suicide, argue that martyrdom is a species of the genus suicide.20 It will be 
productive then to briefly take a moment and consider the conceptual relationship between 
martyrdom and suicide. 
Emile Durkheim’s sociological study of suicide offers a starting point. In what is 
perhaps the best known treatise on the topic, Durkheim labels as suicide “all cases of death 
resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he 
knows will produce this result,” certainly pertinent for martyrs.21 Moreover, he outlines a 
three-fold typology of suicide: anomic suicide, which stems from a lack of social regulation 
regarding activity, due to the loss of a purpose that guides activity;22 egoistic suicide, which 
springs from “excessive individualism” on account of an individual’s lack of integration into 
14 
 
her society; and altruistic suicide, coming from the opposite pole where the individual is so 
integrated into the society that they do not adequately appreciate themselves as possessing 
self-worth apart from the group. Durkheim and those who follow his work place martyrdom 
in this last, a kind of egoless suicide that springs from altruistic roots. 
Perhaps the crux of Durkheim’s study is also most problematic when it comes to the 
treatment of martyrdom. The categories he evinces stem from his attempt to establish 
“productive causes” of suicide separate from their individual instantiations. He articulates his 
stance thusly: “Disregarding the individual as such, his motives and his ideas, we shall seek 
directly the states of the various social environments (religious confessions, family, political 
society, occupational groups, etc.), in terms of which the variations of suicide occur. Only 
then returning to the individual, shall we study how these general causes become 
individualized so as to produce the homicidal results involved.”23 Explicitly excluding the 
agent’s own reasoning for their death as merely an “apparent cause” is troubling for 
discussions of martyrdom as well as Durkheim’s own analytical consistency. For the latter, it 
necessitates a normative move, as it seeks to understand the act solely through an assessment 
of the individual’s level of incorporation into their social group which must be judged against 
a level considered “normal” integration. Suicide is therefore impossible for those 
“appropriately” integrated with those around them, and the act of suicide necessarily marks 
one as aberrant in terms of integration. For Durkheim, suicide is ontologically a deviant act. 
Speaking about martyrdom within this frame is troubling. It may be the case that 
martyrdom, as a form of altruistic suicide, does stem from an embeddedness in a “collective 
conscience,” to use his language. However his next interpretive move to assert that the act 
intrinsically ignores self-worth does not follow; it only allows for a determination of self-
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worth based on worldly aspects, excluding the possibility of taking religious conceptions 
seriously. Each of the martyrs under discussion here understand their act as serving their true 
“self” that is understood to extend beyond the physical realm, and the act of martyrdom 
merits a positive existence after death. In that way, they are egoistic actions. 
Furthermore, the act itself is highly valued by their social cohort, showing how self-
worth is conditioned by the group. Another French theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, saw this occur 
in the habitus of the agent, those structured structurings that give shape to our experiences of 
self and other.24 Durkheim composed his text within a liberalist French society that 
demanded individuals participate fully in the social project but remain free individuals. 
Losing oneself in the group is asserted to be no better than those who cannot be integrated 
into society at all.25 Hence his study seeks to impose categories of 19th century French 
society upon all human social groupings. It may be that our current neoliberal society based 
in the global North will, like Durkheim, judge all such actions to be deviant since they do not 
operate within an individual-focused frame. That may be, but such judgments are culturally 
situated and open to the same critiques that are made against the groups studied here who 
disagree. 
Like its siblings homicide, regicide, or genocide, suicide denotes criminality. Joining 
the Latin suffix –cida, indicating a killer or cutter (and related to caedō, caedere, to 
slaughter, strike, or cut to pieces, with some connections to sacrifice) to the reflexive sui (as 
in sui generis, created of itself), it represents an inappropriate killing. Rather than a killing of 
self, the full weight of suicide may better be understood as a murder of oneself, which places 
the death within a moral and juridical structure. The charge of murder can be administered 
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and prosecuted by the legal authorities, since the act transgresses the prohibitions codified in 
law.  
In this vein, the negative connotations that accompany suicide are in part determined 
by the term’s implicit construction of the death as transgressive. This negative construction is 
not stable across time, as evidenced by contexts as varied as the 18th century Romantic 
Movement in European literature, or ritualized seppuku in 17th century Japan, both which 
found something laudable in suicide. Its negativity is likely a consequence of the biopolitical 
care for all life that is understood as the domain of modern institutions of government, but 
such concerns hide the fact that those regimes likewise hold places for legitimate suffering 
and death. The execution of criminals and the loss of life during war are only two examples 
of such sanctioned deaths (and both can resonate with martyrdom). This will be further 
explicated below. 
Suicide, then, is not wrong because it results in the loss of life, but is wrong because it 
results in an unauthorized loss of life. Martyrdom, on the other hand, is a label for a self-
induced death that is authorized, even celebrated, by the guiding system of valuation. In each 
case under analysis, there is a conflict around which is the appropriate term: the Romans 
were baffled by the Christians’ apparent love of death, the People’s Republic of China 
designates the self-immolators as tragic suicides, and the ubiquity of the term “suicide 
bombers” discloses the same concerning frame in Western discourse. Such appellations 
necessitate judgment, a taking of sides to determine a) whether these deaths ought to be 
sanctioned at all, and b) which institution has the ability to make such determinations, 
revealing our own biases around who has sovereignty over the life in question, necessarily 
inculcating us into issues of power.  
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The role of judgment points to the fact that a hermeneutic distinction lies at the core 
of this discussion. The readiness of religious traditions to condemn suicide in the same breath 
that celebrates martyrdom shows that they perceive these deaths as ontologically different. 
The phenomenon of a self-induced death becomes suicide or martyrdom through an 
interpretive act.26 Two people commenting on the same death can and do assign radically 
different labels. In fact, I will contend it is in part the very ability to determine such 
hermeneutical frames that lays at the core of the martyrdom discourse.  
In keeping with such insights, throughout this work I will use the labels of the 
martyr’s group, save when I examine the opposing side’s discourse. I will refer to martyrs 
and not suicides while being aware that such determinations mean that the analysis will 
thereby appear flawed to a significant portion of people. At the core of martyrdom is a 
conflict about how to categorize the person, the person’s obligations, and who has the ability 
to make such decisions. However this is a study of martyrdom, so in order to understand how 
these deaths are made meaningful and significant, I will look to those who create that 
meaning rather than those who oppose it. 
 
 
Performing Martyrdom 
 As martyrdom is a concept in tension, issues of social categorization have their 
counterpart in individuals who seek their own martyrdom. For these, martyrdom is a 
performance, aiming to impress through their spectacle of suffering and death. These acts of 
theater are meant to draw their audience into the narrative world they inhabit by conforming 
their lives in line with their tradition, which provides the model of right action during trying 
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times. Gavin Flood uses the phrase “the performance of tradition” to describe how a 
cosmology is internalized by, and demonstrated through, the actions of religious ascetics, but 
the concept works just as well for martyrs.27 By interiorizing the cosmologies of their textual 
traditions and forming their subjectivity in conformity to the origins and teloi those traditions 
promote, martyrs likewise conflate the real and symbolic worlds. Their strategy for dealing 
with their social situation is anchored in religious symbolism.  
Along with asceticism, martyrdom shares significant similarities to the terrorist acts 
analyzed by Mark Juergensmeyer in Terror in the Mind of God, which he labelled 
performance violence: acts that are both performative in that they react to the situation on the 
ground, and performance events in their attempt to make a symbolic statement.28 The 
martyrdoms analyzed here actively resist a political institution that seeks dominance, while 
promoting the tradition-based interpretive frames through which they understand their 
predicament.  
 When we speak of performance, it may suggest individuals who take up a certain role 
during certain moments. What martyrs present, in the words of Eugene and Anita Weiner,  
is not an actor, someone 'who comes forward to play certain parts on the stage of 
society,' [but rather] 'someone irretrievable within the play.'  The character lives 
within the play, and the play comprises the essence of his or her reality.  'The actor 
leaves the stage; the character really may not do so.  The actor belongs to the same 
world as the author, and participates in the making of a fiction; the character is in a 
closed world.29 
The analogy of an actor that has no existence outside the play syncs nicely with a person 
whose very existence is bound up in an ideological framework. The closed world of the 
martyr forms the boundaries of their understanding and provides the rationales for their 
action. To understand them, we must not attempt to discover how the play can seem so real, 
but look to the logics that guide the performance.  
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 Those logics are often spoken in terms of scripts, or in anthropologist Victor Turner’s 
terms, root paradigms of action. Turner highlights moments of social upheaval (which he 
terms times of “anti-structure” or “communitas” following Arnold Van Gennep),30 and 
believes we can discover not only when actors will look to these scripts but also the function 
they are meant to serve.  In doing so he takes a significant step forward in comparative work, 
resulting in a statement that sounds very much like his contemporary Pierre Bourdieu: 
actors nevertheless guided by subjective paradigms – which may derive from beyond 
the mainstream of socio-cultural process with its ensocializing devices such as 
education and limitation of action models in stereotyped situations… Actors who are 
thus guided produce in their interaction behavior and generate social events which are 
non-random, but, on the contrary, structured to a degree that may in some cultures 
provoke the notion of fate or destiny to account for the experienced regulation of 
human social affairs.31 
Reference to notions of fate and destiny move the register of discussion to the symbolic 
realm, and point to the way subjective interpretations of existence can dictate action. 
 Hans Kippenberg takes up Turner's basic stance in his examination of the connection 
between religion and violence.  Recognizing that “a religious community has more than one 
practical paradigm at its disposal [when it faces] a practice that it regards as evil,” he argues 
that the framing of the events is decisive in the decision of the actors.32 Kippenberg’s 
Violence as Worship uses the language of scripts, stating “the situation of one’s own 
religious community is defined with the help of traditional eschatological scripts. In keeping 
with this, believers were told that they must find orientation for their action in scripts about 
how to acquire salvation and in exemplary fighters for the faith.”33 I will follow his focus, but 
argue that his emphasis on the eschatological presents an argument that only applies to 
traditions with some corresponding mythic – or in Gavin Flood’s terms, cosmological – 
discourse.34  I think this is unnecessary, and relies on the belief in an afterlife as a driving 
force. Instead, I argue the projection into the future is secondary to the need for orienting 
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scripts at hand in the moment that death threatens, and that a variety of future hopes could 
serve the same purpose. 
 These related discussions all see cultural scripts housed especially in sacred 
narratives, which provide both the framing for action and divine or semi-divine models of 
behavior.35 John R. Hall explained narratives construct reality “by enveloping people in 
accounts of events beyond their own personal knowledge.”36 These cultural scripts help 
determine the way situations are understood and what the appropriate reaction should be, 
while also marking them as culturally recognizable actions that resonate with others.37 Where 
the appropriate response is to choose death over life, such narratives are reaffirmed by a 
powerful public sentiment that interprets the current moment in terms of a sacred past. 
 By approaching martyrdom as a culturally structured performance, my work will 
offer a better method of apprehending and understanding actions that seem at odds with basic 
human inclinations.  Seeing martyrs as ultimately defined by roles that are based in their 
cultural heritage and brought on by their social, political and cultural contexts illuminates the 
practical ways they dealt with the conflicts they experienced, and what they hoped their 
deaths would accomplish. With this in mind, I will use the category of performative suffering 
to acknowledge where pain and death are mobilized in service to a political goal by orienting 
the conflict through symbolic frames and perceptions – who is the aggressor and who the 
oppressed – and making a statement about the reality of the interpretive frames through 
which they perceive the world. Their goals, the forms of pain and death, and the frames that 
are reorganized all vary with context, but this dynamic consistently appears in all types of 
martyrdom under examination. 
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The Politics of Martyrdom 
 These martyrdoms all stem from conflict; they are contextualized in violent conflicts 
that are part of political struggles where one institution claims dominance over the martyr’s 
group, and seek to establish that authority through a deployment of overwhelming force.38 At 
the same time, the martyr’s group bases their opposition and their very constitution in an 
imagined cosmic authority that holds the power of life and death and established codified 
ethical systems defining sanctioned and forbidden behavior in the world. They are subjects of 
a different sovereign power, and it is from this place that they launch their resistance.  
 There is no single kind of collective that creates martyrs. Apart from the need to 
combine aspects we would label “religious” with those that appear more “political,” the 
social configuration of groups varies. Early Christian communities were spread around the 
Roman Empire, but recognized a common identity with others that saw Jesus as the Messiah 
(however his appearance and the covenant he established were understood). The Islamist 
martyrs saw themselves connected in national (Hezbollah in Lebanon), subnational (Hamas 
and the Palestinian cause), and transnational (on the basis of submission to God inherent in 
Islam) levels. The Tibetans recognize themselves as a common people bound by common 
culture and language, but now exist partially inside the political borders of China. These 
forms of imagined communities39 all share a self-understanding, and a sense that they should 
enjoy self-determination based on their own laws. 
In order to discuss the significance of martyrdom, we need to appreciate that it is not 
merely a matter of who rules, but who can legitimately rule. Greater force does not equate to 
legitimacy, as it can only ever be a temporary measure hoping to coerce through fear, which 
risks anger and opposition.40 However where physical force is placed in a frame of 
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legitimacy – such as self-defense or just punishment – it ceases to be perceived as coercive. 
Hence Weber’s well-known assertion that the state claims the monopoly on legitimate 
violence.41  
However, in referring to this insight, too many scholars omit that Weber saw this as a 
claim made by the state, not an inherent attribute of statist institutions. The state does not 
possess this monopoly, it declares it alone can use violence legitimately, a contention it 
backs with that very violence. That claim is contested in these cases. The associations that 
define the martyr’s identity have at their core assertions about who can impose suffering in 
what situations. For example, Christians may oppose Rome’s violence, but see the pains of 
hell as right recompense for evil actions. The Islamists refuse the authority of any state not 
based in Islam, but have no trouble exercising violence they see to be in defense of their 
religion. What we have in these cases a disagreement about the ends towards which force 
could be an acceptable means. It is a contest of sovereignties.42 
Sovereignty has of late become an increasingly contested term. Modern interpreters 
have eagerly resuscitated the discussion of Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt (shorn of its particular 
context) in trying to understand our commitments to national governments.43 Michel 
Foucault famously contended against sovereignty as appropriate for our current experiences 
of state authority, and more recently Dmitris Vardoulakis has discussed three separate forms 
of sovereignty operative throughout history.44 This last text contains an axiom that my 
analysis will also rely upon: sovereign power consists in the ability to justify the imposition 
of suffering.45 
The political contests that create the ground for these martyrs revolve around the 
particular institutions of power, but more centrally they revolve around the ideological 
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structures supporting authority. As it is a matter of ultimate authority, discussions of 
sovereignty have been taken up in terms of political theology, in order to recognize the 
political issues at stake along with their basis in metaphysical assertions. Here again we are 
faced with martyrdom’s hybridity, operating simultaneously on both levels, making political 
theology a useful frame for its analysis. These acts conflate the “real” and the “symbolic,” 
where the symbolic provides the imagined structure through which to understand and act 
within the world.46 
For that reason, I will use the phrase sovereign imaginary to refer to imagined 
coherent framework that gives meaning and shape to experiences, by providing ethical 
guidelines for right action in the world, and is seen as the ultimate font of authority.47 These 
imaginaries offer a vision of order – social, political and cosmic – that would ultimately 
result in a world of peace, stability and fellowship if enacted. It is always a project to be 
completed and actualized through human activity, but it serves as the organizing principle for 
living an authentic life. 
These imaginaries are what come into conflict during periods of imperial conquest 
and colonization. Those who die as martyrs do so through an act of resistance shaped by their 
sovereign imaginary against another sovereign imaginary. The Christian imaginary faces that 
of the Roman Empire, the Tibetans the People’s Republic of China, and the Islamists the 
neo-liberal order of the West. Each has a conception of order that discloses how people 
should act and why, and in these moments both attempt to determine individual action along 
their guidelines by coercion, discipline or inspiration. Understanding the rationales that led 
martyrs to die in service to a sovereign imaginary necessitates investigation into the ways 
24 
 
these imaginaries are constructed within particular settings, how they come to be perceived 
as legitimate, and why the norms they espouse exceed the drive for self-preservation. 
 
Approach – Comparative Sociotheology 
Taking into consideration the tension that martyrdom is a goal sought in ways 
conditioned by cultural understandings and practices, and that the ultimate avowal of 
martyrdom relies on a social group that extends beyond the martyr, any analysis of 
martyrdom has to be a dialogical reading between the ways martyrs orient their action, and 
the ways the group gives its approbation. At the same time, the designation of “martyr” needs 
to be understood within the context of power relations that creates it. Attending to these 
issues means considering a series of interrelated questions about our conception of 
martyrdom and its deployment in various contexts. Why do martyrs choose to die? How is 
the category of martyrdom constructed symbolically and socially? What criteria is used to 
determine martyrs? What situations see recourse to the discourse of martyrdom, and what are 
some common attributes of those contexts? How are these deaths structured by cultural ideas, 
and how do they structure those systems in turn? 
By taking seriously the words ascribed to martyrs within their social, cultural, 
political and religious context, I will bring to light the performative logics behind self-
sacrifice that makes sense of how such disparate phenomena as executions (Christians), acts 
of war (jihadis) and fiery protests (self-immolators) can be drawn together into an 
identifiable group. By performative logics I mean the rationales by which such extreme acts 
appear as reasonable and appropriate to their agents, guided by interpretive moves that read a 
current situation in terms of a sacred past. Delineating the imaginative landscapes that anchor 
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the identity affirmed by martyrs in the face of death, I will seek to understand the social and 
symbolic significance attached to these deaths, by which I mean the ways these acts in turn 
structure the experiences of others, and contribute to the same hermeneutic frame that shaped 
their performative logics.48 
Dealing with these issues means understanding the interplay of social, cultural, 
political and symbolic realms, which necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. At the same 
time, in order to have explanatory power beyond their particular contexts requires a 
comparative framework that can speak to similarity without obfuscating difference. To do so, 
I approach martyrdom through the lens of religious violence, as a death performed with 
reference to cosmological understandings and engrained in questions of power. The overall 
strategy I will employ to attend to such a complex object of study will be a comparative 
worldview analysis combined with a focus on practice and performance.   
The comparative endeavor has a troubled history in the academic study of religion. 
While the earliest attempts can be traced back at least as far as James G. Frazer’s 19th century 
Golden Bough, the process of comparing religious beliefs, rituals and myths often served to 
promote the superiority of Christianity in service of missionizing and colonial campaigns. 
Reducing cultural expressions to common characteristics often resulted in symbolic 
hierarchies that reinforced political structures. In the words of Wendy Doniger, “essentialized 
difference can become an instrument of dominance,”49 where members of the theorist’s 
culture are thereby coded as appropriate ruling agents, as they are seen to represent a “better” 
way of life.50 Lifting phenomena out of their particular contexts for comparison resulted in 
some provocative theses, however those theses relied on methods that overrode specifics in 
preference of surface similarities.  
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The perception of similarity often initiates comparison, but cultural differences are as 
informative and cannot be elided in responsible scholarship. Claims to universalism must be 
avoided while at the same evading the nihilism that comes from absolute cultural 
particularity.51 Comparison requires what Gavin Flood described as dialogical, attending to 
“the particularity of voice while acknowledging what is common for the theoretical, moral or 
political task at hand in a specific comparative study.”52 Only by holding both the general 
and particular in tension can comparison yield the kind of mutual understanding sought. 
Modern interpreters of comparative religious violence who form my own intellectual 
genealogy, particularly Juergensmeyer, Kippenberg and Flood, attend to these concerns by 
firmly anchoring such phenomena within their socio-political context.53 Their studies derive 
common dynamics about how religious symbols and practices interact with, support, and 
oppose power relations through the legitimation of violence against self and other. Politics is 
not treated as a sphere separate from religion, but rather the two are considered in their 
ongoing interaction; religious sentiment channels political action, and politics can determine 
the context for religious voices. Moreover, politics and religion both operate through 
symbolic language which captures hearts and provokes passions, resulting in similar public 
expressions. By recognizing this, the comparative work modeled by these scholars more fully 
describes and explains those social worlds that are created, and the momentous consequences 
they engender.  
I approach these cases in a “sociotheological” mode, a methodology outlined by Mark 
Juergensmeyer and Mona Sheikh.54 This method understands social reality through religious 
eyes, moving the level of analysis from the specific people, actions or beliefs to their 
epistemic worldviews, the structures that form the basis for an understanding of – and 
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perspective on – reality.55 Epistemic worldviews blend Foucault’s idea of an episteme, a set 
of understandings about the basis of true knowledge, and Bourdieu’s habitus, the structured 
structurings that give shape to the interpretive frames through which we perceive the world.56 
In sociotheology, “an epistemic worldview is a framework for thinking about reality and 
acting appropriately within a perceived understanding of the world.”57 For a study that looks 
to comprehend how an imagined structure can be seen to hold a legitimate claim over life 
that individuals willingly seek their own destruction, looking to the structures that frame 
experience and guide behavior must be central.  
At the same time, both method and subject require genealogical inquiry into the 
nature of each group’s operative concept of self-sacrifice and the narratives that contain 
models of such action. Historical and anthropological inquiry must be combined with a social 
scientific analysis of the modes of power operative at the moment of martyrdom. Those who 
become martyrs see themselves obliged to absolute resistance, while those in the opposing 
camp see these acts as unconscionable and even wasteful. The job of the analyst of 
martyrdom is to try to comprehend the meaningfulness of these actions, even where we 
vigorously disagree with the act itself.  
The practice of placing religious actors within their interaction with political, social 
and historical context has also been called “neo-Weberian” by Ceclia Lynch,58 who argues 
that to understand acts of religious violence “we must first assess what religious guidelines 
suggest for particular situations, and then look more deeply into how religious actors 
interpret those guidelines – how they bridge the gap between religious rules and particular 
situations to decide how to act.”59 Such has been developed further in the work of Hans 
Kippenberg, who looks to the idea of “situation” as described by Hans Joas and the Thomas-
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Theorem to argue that in order to understand an act of religious violence, we must both 
recognize the model by which it is engendered, and the way the situation is understood by the 
actor.  
Every action presupposes a definition of the situation. This is not generated of 
necessity by the situation itself, however, but is ‘imposed’ on the situation by the 
subjects. If they then act in accordance with this definition, this ‘imposition’ has real 
effects. It is true that routine usually save subjects from having to come up with a 
definition on their own. When a definition becomes less plausible, however – for 
instance, as a result of disappointed expectations – the actors can suddenly become 
conscious that they have still further possibilities of defining the situation in which 
they find themselves… When they undertake a new ‘framing’ of the situation, one 
criterion of its success is whether it is communicable and recognizable. Here, the 
availability of the various scenarios plays a role. Esser speaks of ‘framing’ or ‘the 
selection of the referential framework.’ When the actors create a definition, they rely 
on established concepts of action and choose one of these as binding. The choice of 
an ‘action’ can be oriented to purposive rationality, to tradition, or to feelings. The 
framework can also be established in accordance with vales whose validity is based 
on its opposition to a completely different reality, as it happens above all in the 
constitution of individual or communal identity.60 
Several things are worthy of note in this passage. First, there are multiple models available to 
any social actor. These can spring from religious texts, histories, or legends; what Ivan 
Strenski calls “cosmic dramas,” stories that contain sacred models of action.61 These 
narratives encode appropriate modes of behavior by offering imaginative settings where the 
ethical values of a tradition are played out. We are never confined to a single interpretation, 
but rather choose our path based on a number of considerations, including political context 
and chance of success, which serve to promote one form of action. In Lynch’s words, 
“people’s ongoing development of phenomenological and hermeneutic understandings – 
their melding of experience and consciousness, and interpretation of sacred texts and text-
analogues – becomes an integral part of the process of deciding what is required to do for the 
common good.”62 Actions and significance are only made sensible through an appreciation of 
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the way the actor understands their situation, their goals, and the symbolic world they 
inhabit.    
   In what follows I will (a) look to the last statements given by, or at least attributed to, 
martyrs prior to their death, where they explain in their own words their reasons for dying, 
offering insight into the ways they made sense of their situation. To understand that 
interpretation, I will begin each case study by (b) examining the historical trajectory of the 
conflict within which these deaths take place, in order to appreciate how these individuals 
constructed their sense of identity, and how death could appear as a reasonable choice. At the 
same time, the language martyrs use in these statements are heavily laden with symbolism, 
which requires (c) understanding the symbolic complexes that they – and those who claim 
them as martyrs – use to make sense of their decision to die. These complexes include but are 
not limited to mytho-historical narratives, ethical imperatives, and understandings of cosmic 
dynamics, along with bases for legitimate authority that are both political and theological.63 
In order to understand how these specific complexes are selected and mobilized to construct 
an understanding of their situation, I will (d) analyze the statements of contemporary 
religious and political authorities. Doing so will show how the martyrs were operating within 
a broader interpretive framework, and their decisions to die were made sensible and 
significant.  
 
 
On Using Testaments 
If we are to discover how martyrs made their situation meaningful, their actual words 
should drive the study. Each of the cases under study have a genre of testimony particular to 
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them: the early Christian churches circulated tales of trials and deaths of their martyrs – 
known as acta Martyrum, “martyr acts” – that focus on the words spoken by the martyrs in 
their defense against Roman authorities; many Islamist jihadis who embarked on martyrdom 
operations routinely left wills and videotaped testimonies that sought to explain their 
motivations; a number of Tibetans left written testaments – khachem – that detailed the hopes 
that led to their self-sacrifice. These texts will provide the core data for the following 
analysis. 
There is a surprising lack of such material in many studies of martyrdom, particularly 
those attending to modern incarnations, and especially regarding martyrdom operations.64 
While John Hall was certainly correct noting that any case of self-directed violence “can be 
regarded as either a testament of ultimate commitment or a demonstration of how far a 
practitioner has fallen under the sway of psychic coercion,” the implicit consensus in 
scholarship is that texts attributed to martyrs support the latter to the near exclusion of the 
former.65 Such an absence highlights certain concerns over the usefulness of such texts, and 
an implicit belief that such texts do not reflect the “actual” feelings/intentions/understandings 
of these individuals, but rather regurgitate the language of the group.66 Charges of 
brainwashing, scripting, coercion or outright dishonesty are practically taken for granted. 
Such apprehensions raise concerns about the extent to which we can access “authentic” 
motivations through such material. Most studies find it sufficient to identify the group that 
claims the martyr, and implement their purpose as the martyrs, serving to do exactly what 
they see as disqualifying the martyr’s words. 
In the extant scholarship, these concerns appear with varying intensity depending on 
the case in question. Early Christian studies take as given that we cannot trust the words 
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attributed to martyrs in the martyr acts, considering the millennia of redrafting and translation 
they have undergone.67 Constant filtering erodes historical reliability. For Islamist martyrs 
we have precisely the opposite case, in that we possess the filmed words where we can see 
and hear the words coming from the soon-to-be martyr’s own mouth. Concerns here revolve 
not around alterations after the fact, but rather prior procedures that homogenize such 
statements, resulting in accusations of the organization speaking through the individual.68 
The critique is the same however, namely that in both cases we cannot take for granted the 
words accurately reflect the inner mental states of the individual. Tibetan khachem do not 
suffer from such concerns in the scholarship (an uncritical acceptance which suggests an 
orientalist perception of naturally trustworthy Tibetan Buddhists), though political attacks by 
the People’s Republic of China echo accusations of brainwashing and see these self-
immolators as victims of the Dalai Lama’s separatist programs.69 
Such charges are always the result of a particular belief about what is appropriate in 
these circumstances. Consider for example the deaths of members of the People’s Temple, 
better known as Jonestown: many commentators were all too keen to explain these suicides 
(a term I use intentionally, as no one currently claims them as martyrs) as the effects of 
brainwashing, because it seemed impossible that rational, thoughtful individuals would want 
to end their lives in such circumstances.70 Such assertions stem from a position that sees no 
moral substance in the claims of the group, utterly denying Jim Jones’ doctrines possessed 
any merit whatsoever. We likely agree with such a perspective, however such judgments 
always come from a situated place. Had Jonestown spawned an ongoing tradition, we – or at 
least some – might have very different memories of the events of 1978, and see those who 
perished as martyrs. What one group sees as inappropriate activity, another sees as necessary 
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and obligatory. Claims of brainwashing are therefore normative claims, seeking to impose a 
single evaluative framework on such cases.  
In response to these worries, I would begin by stating that this is not a study of self-
killing in general, but of martyrdom in particular. While individuals can seek martyrdom, it is 
ultimately those who remain alive that apply the label of martyr to the deceased. That being 
the case, it is important to recognize that groups label certain deaths martyrdoms in large part 
based upon the alignment of the martyr’s intent with the groups goals. This aspect will be 
further explored below, but at the start it would seem self-evident that if the martyr’s words 
did not align with the expectations of the group, they would not be considered a martyr. I 
know of no cases where the label is applied reluctantly. Therefore it is not a problem that 
certain words, phrases, and complexes repeat and reflect ideals promoted by the group – it is 
precisely these commonalities that help us see their significance as martyrdoms. 
Ultimately (as my psychotherapist wife reminds me), we can never hope to perceive 
the “true” motivation of these actors, because our real motivations are rarely fully evident to 
us. Few of us are completely self-aware. What these texts do offer is the opportunity for these 
individuals to create the persona they want people to see – to write themselves as they wish 
to be seen. This self-writing provides a way of manifesting oneself to others, of offering a 
delineation of their reasoning that would otherwise remain invisible to the onlooker, shaping 
a public face by drawing attention to certain aspects of the self while disguising the others.71 
To what extent such a façade can be construed as “true” is largely left to individual 
judgment, and resonates with aspects that will become central to this study. 
It is difficult to ascertain someone else’s intention. The only way to be sure of 
intention is where action follows to verify it. A private, “real” self that tells the truth about 
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the person regardless of their actions is a constructed idea of identity, an in opposition to the 
public persona that is created and verified through public activity. The story they choose to 
tell about who they are is certainly framed within structures that are meaningful to others, 
and undoubtedly shaped to gain positive regard from those they respect, and such 
interestedness can certainly raise questions to the “authenticity” of the statements given. 
However here, there words are supported – proven – by the most extreme actions 
conceivable. The severity of these acts mark them to some extent as self-verifying as the 
person’s very being is expended in support. 
 
Previous Approaches to the Question of Martyrdom 
Martyrdom has been approached in a number of veins through a host of disciplinary 
perspectives. A brief search of academic databases brings up over three thousand articles 
alone, excluding books, with nearly eight hundred coming from the last five years. Moreover, 
in the last decade academic journals as varied as Social Research (2008), Mortality (2014), 
and the Journal of Religion and Violence (2013) have all published volumes focused 
explicitly on martyrdom or religious suicide. Yet understanding this concept has proven a 
challenge for social analysts. Rational choice theory is baffled by choices that do not seem to 
be rational in worldly calculations but have a far more distant time horizon and a more 
imaginative sense of rewards than most materialist calculations support. Strategic analyses 
flounder when the strategies do not seem to yield immediate benefits. Organizational theories 
falter when the communities of support are diffuse, unstructured, and lack a palpable chain of 
command. 
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The vast majority of studies focus solely on particular contexts. Early Christianity 
certainly leads the way, with other eras of Christianity following in a close second.72 Those 
latter include examinations of martyrs in various locales from modern Chechnya to the 
creation of martyrs by the National Socialist party in the 1940s.73 Appropriate studies will be 
addressed in their place, but by remaining focused on individual contexts of martyrdom and 
generalizing from there has led to seeing martyrdom in radically different ways. Such results 
in assertions about the concept of martyrdom similar to the way the blind men describe an 
elephant: those feeling the legs describing it as a tree, those with the trunk as a snake, with no 
one gaining an accurate picture of the whole. This shortcoming has inspired my approach of 
intentionally bringing together disparate cases to understand our concept of martyrdom that 
can be so variously applied. Here I will deal with several broad categories, acknowledging 
that there is a great deal of overlap in the studies discussed. 
     Honor and Noble Death 
 Many have treated martyrdom as determined by traditions of noble death, pointing to 
a desire for honor as the martyr’s driving motivation.74 Such honor depends of a culture of 
sacrifice that shape the life of those who would be martyrs, something that certainly seems to 
be present in the cases under consideration here. The celebration of such deaths require at 
least a selection of the collective seeing self-destruction as an honorable act. These studies 
are noteworthy in their recognition of the crucial importance of a surrounding culture that can 
identify with and encourage such self-sacrifice, and the recognition that numerous collectives 
construct such a culture. However, they do not sufficiently explain how one goes from a 
participant in such a culture, of which there are necessarily many, to actually becoming a 
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martyr, of which there are few. Nor does this give any insight into the aims of martyrdom 
apart from reconstituting the same culture that formed them.  
 A batch of studies that deal with cultural representations of pain share many 
similarities with this group, while articulating a stance that has more cross-cultural promise.75 
These often only deal peripherally with martyrdom, approaching it as but one type of 
representation. Scholars like Talal Asad and Judith Perkins detail the ways particular shaping 
of painful experiences, largely through narrative framing, contributes to individual 
understandings of self and appropriate uses of pain. Martyrdom is certainly a matter of 
representing suffering in order to make pain meaningful, however it merits treatment as a 
special case that exceeds other forms of pain-centered activity. The martyrdoms under 
analysis here have death as their goal, not mere suffering, which marks them as ontologically 
different (though related to) other representations. Many may be willing to suffer in a 
meaningful way, but voluntarily losing one’s very life is markedly different, and should be 
treated as such. In doing so, I will not lose the connection to nobility that these studies 
highlight, but rather reveal how that connection is developed in radically different ways in 
different cultural arenas.  
     Secular vs. Religious Self-Sacrifice 
Many others look at martyrdom from the perspective of a sharp distinction between 
religious and secular spheres. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi exemplifies this stance when he 
argues that the label of martyrdom gives death “a cosmic meaning, while death in the service 
of a secular ideology, national or supra-national, can only have a historical meaning.”76 
Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin reflect this sharp distinction of religious and secular 
self-sacrifice, asking “what sets dying for faith apart from dying for freedom, dying for one’s 
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country, or dying for the moral values of a secular democracy.”77 This position has led some 
like Lacey Baldwin-Smith to treat it as an archaic institution that will vanish as secularization 
slowly continues its unstoppable march across the world. Ignoring the data that has shown 
religion reasserting its power as a social force has resulted in analyses that treat martyrdom 
as a way of cloak to disguise more fundamental political motivations and a means of 
“making death easier.”78 Ultimately, these scholars see martyrdom as a label that hides the 
reality of a conflict that costs lives by talking about it in religious terms. As a result, they 
contend a) martyrdom will vanish as religion does and more reasonable minds take over, and 
b) liberal societies will find no place for martyrs.79  
Some scholars have maintained those distinctions while approaching those who die 
for secular causes through the lens of martyrdom. Suffragette Emily Winding Davison,80 
President Abraham Lincoln81 and those who fell during the French Revolution82 are just 
some who have been treated as secular, political martyrs.83 While laudable, these texts too 
often rely on and impose a conception of martyrdom taken directly from Christianity, leading 
them to draw broad conclusions about the category of martyrdom from a Christian 
perspective. I contend more could be brought to light as treating martyrdom as something 
both fully religious and fully political, showing that the boundaries between the religious and 
secular spheres are unstable and can be drawn in different ways in different contexts, often 
disappearing entirely (this latter has been taken up by scholars like Emilio Gentile and 
Carolyn Marvin along with David Ingle).84 Here I will contribute to such a destabilization of 
spheres by carefully attending to the political concerns referenced by martyrs, their 
communities and their opponents in the context of the symbolic worlds they inhabit. 
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    The Ethics of Suicide Bombers  
Thanks to the perceived close relationship between martyrdom and suicide discussed 
above, many have approached the topic through an ethical lens, seeking to determine the 
conditions for a moral self-killing.85 These have become legion in the years following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 which brought to light a tradition of violent martyrdom 
seemingly disassociated with the more Christian passive and peaceful constructions.86 Many 
of these works will be engaged with in chapter three, but a few things can be articulated at 
the outset. Recent volumes like Diego Gambetta’s Making Sense of Suicide Missions and 
Dominic James and Alex Houen’s Martyrdom and Terrorism focus largely on the 
legitimation of violence and suffering and how discourse can construct two different people 
(the martyr and the terrorist) upon the same body.87 Where the nation-state claims to be the 
only institution that can sanction violence, terrorist organizations engage in attacks 
condemned by their opponents but seen as legitimate to their allies. The very term 
“martyrdom operations” carries the means of its own interpretation, and causes many 
commentators to seek a way to distinguish these vile acts from the high ethical standard 
ascribed to martyrs. 
These studies point to something fundamental to understanding martyrdom’s social 
significance, but too often they let the question of violence dictate the terms of the discussion 
spawning an implicit acceptance of nonviolent/passive self-sacrifice and a discrediting of 
violent/active ones.88 Martyrs are not really martyrs, these contend, if they’re killing others, 
especially noncombatants and civilians. Not only does such a move impose normative 
categories upon the discussion, but it creates a hierarchy of action which can be typologically 
useful but can obscure the overall significance of martyrdom by discounting certain forms. 
38 
 
My hope in explicitly including the martyrs of groups that have earned their “terrorist” label 
is to discover the significance that marks a martyr as a martyr, no matter the religious or 
political setting. Moreover, while studies in this vein provide useful insights into how 
morality is articulated in troubled circumstances, I will demonstrate that either sides ethical 
perspective is understandable if we appreciate the long history that has led to the conditions 
that create martyrs. 
     Psychological Approaches 
After those dealing with Christian martyrs and suicide bombers, those looking at 
martyrs from the perspective of psychology may be the most numerous. A majority treat 
martyrdom as a form of suicide, seeking to detail the conditions for the recruitment and 
mobilization of these ultimately unhealthy individuals.89 Both G.E.M. St. Croix and Glen 
Bowersock saw pathology and abnormality in the actions of martyrs, and the eminent 
historian W.H.C. Frend characterized the zeal for death martyrs seemed to display as a kind 
of “mania.”90 Rona Fields’ work sought the “psychodynamic engine that drives” self-
sacrifice, asserting that the martyr’s level of commitment “obscures [the] perception and 
sensation of noxious experience.”91 Yuval Neria and colleagues rely on the social 
psychological construct of the Authoritarian Personality to explain martyrs' behavior, which 
includes a set of motivational needs and a cognitive style in which feelings of being 
threatened, intolerance for ambiguity, dogmatism and religiosity are determinants of 
individual beliefs.92 Such studies often assert that religious language, affect and symbolism 
serves as a means of allowing individuals to overcome their innate opposition to violence and 
self-preservation. By and large this is seen as a problem to be solved, rather than an 
expression of a “normal” human activity.  
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Worth special mention in this context is Adam Lankford’s recent The Myth of 
Martyrdom, where he contends that martyrdom gives a cover for those who already want to 
die.93 All those who offer themselves through martyrdom operations, Lankford contends, 
were already seeking a way to end their life and simply latched onto a socially approved 
means of doing so. Using a technique he refers to as “psychological autopsy,” which 
examines the mental states of the deceased after they have already died (which makes it very 
easy to disregard their words and supplement your own), he argues those considered martyrs 
were in fact mentally ill. Consider his diagnosis of Mohammed Atta, one of the perpetrators 
of the 9/11 attacks:  “psychological autopsy has revealed that Atta’s struggles with social 
isolation, depression, guilt and shame, and hopelessness were very similar to the struggles of 
those who commit conventional suicide and murder-suicide.”94 Martyrs have fooled 
everyone according to Lankford’s treatise, and simply found a way to serve their own self-
destructive tendencies without incurring disapproval from others. 
By lumping martyrs – solely those who die in suicide bombers – in with rampage 
shooters and other “self-destructive killers” Lankford predetermines the conclusions he can 
draw by the selection of cases,95 and exclusively considers psychological factors to the utter 
and open disregard of socio-cultural factors including religion, ideology and experiences of 
oppression.96 This way of thinking about martyrdom revels in the liberal demand to place the 
individual in their isolation at the core of any researches, allowing him to discount any 
positive aspect of such self-killing. Lankford, like many others approaching martyrdom 
through psychology, assumes a constant appreciation of the individual at the core of 
understandings of the self, ignoring the numerous places, historical and modern, where the 
community is placed at the center of self-understanding.97 Moreover, he argues that the 
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sacrifice inherent in discourses of martyrdom is absent because these people do not value 
their lives, and sacrifice means giving up something of value.98 He does not assess these 
assertions by speaking to those who have failed to die in such operations, but one gets the 
sense that even if he had he would approach the issue with an already determined conclusion. 
Lankford’s reasoning ultimately appears circular: suicide bombers are mentally ill because 
they seek their own death. Though he deals with only one form of martyrdom in suicide 
bombings, his work seems aimed at discrediting certain individuals rather than coming to 
terms with understanding a complex and multifaceted phenomenon.  
The major flaw in psychological approaches is the attempt to generalize mental 
structures between cultures and time periods. Treating psychological aspects as identical 
across time and culture alleviates the necessity of understanding particular cultural logics 
operating at different historical periods. In Bourdieu’s terms, it is to imagine a single 
psychological habitus that all people exist within. Such arguments rely heavily on the 
liberalist environment that spawned them. The focus on the individual that pervades political 
and psychological discourse in the West makes it difficult to deal with self-destructive 
activities, leading to the assertions of deviancy that are rampant in these treatments.99   
The sheer volume of settings where the discourse of martyrdom finds traction, I 
would contend, is reason enough to challenge these assumptions. While there are certainly 
mental illness and self-destructive tendencies evident in all cultures, the dynamic of 
martyrdom continually appears, and is consistently celebrated. To simply designate it a form 
of mental deviancy or manipulation is to implicitly aver that all people who see in martyrdom 
something laudable are fools. If we can imagine a scenario where our own death would 
41 
 
confront us as a viable, even preferable option, we must attend to martyrs as rational actors 
who find their own good in the ending of their life.100 
    
  As a Rational Choice 
Remaining in a liberal frame, some sociologists have attempted to use rational choice 
theory to come to grips with martyrs, particularly Rodney Stark.101 In the past economic 
models have been troubled by actions that intentionally cause death, as they complicate 
understandings about what constitutes a good being sought; rational action, according to 
Stark, means “weighing the anticipated costs and benefits of an action and then seeking to act 
so as to maximize new benefits.”102 Theorists of this bent have sought to integrate 
metaphysical benefits into their models to help understand the individual rationales of those 
willing to die.103 To over-simplify, an eternal afterlife of bliss is a benefit which could 
reasonably merit the cost of life.  
Treating martyrs as actors following particular rationales is an important step in the 
right direction, though the economic model simplifies the multiple considerations that go into 
the martyr’s choice to die.104 But I want to acknowledge a bigger concern at issue with such 
attempts, one that appears repeatedly in discussions of martyrdom operations in the popular 
media. Wherever martyrdom is invoked by a group, including those considered here, it is 
seen as an altruistic act done on behalf of or in reference to something that exceeds the 
individual, be it cause, faith, or social group. Rational choice eliminates that possibility, 
because it reframes everything in terms of the individual seeking their own good. Even this 
act that appears to so radically disregard one’s own concern becomes self-serving. Such an 
approach is most evident in colloquial discussions of suicide bombing that look to the 
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Quran’s promise of seventy-two dark-eyed virgins awaiting martyrs in the afterlife as a 
driving reason for their acts. 
Two main issues stem from this. First, in order to understand why some people seek 
their extinction as their good when the majority of others in their culture do not necessitates 
asserting a high level of conviction, which is not measurable as a mental process or 
characteristic. “They just believe more” is not analytically productive, and recalls a Pascalian 
type of wager: my goal is heaven, martyrdom is the way to that goal, therefore I choose to 
die. Such ideas are ultimately tautological as they confirm that martyrs place a high value on 
the afterlife because they will die for it, and since they die for it they must have placed a high 
value on it. All this ignores the fact that heaven is the compensation for a selfless act, 
therefore to kill oneself in order to gain heaven as one’s own end would forfeit heaven since 
it would not be done with the correct intention, a theological paradox. 
Second, and more importantly, articulating martyrdom as a self-serving act serves 
many to delegitimize them as a morally commendable act. If it is done to gain heaven or 
virgins, aiming to trade momentary pain for eternal pleasure, they are not worthy of respect; 
if they are altruistic acts, they are respected above all precisely because they are at odds with 
inclination but done out of duty.105 To use the language of this study, if the act is motivated 
by personal interest, it cannot be a sacrifice, and it is the sacrifice that is celebrated. The 
sacrifice is made impossible by cost-benefit rationales, not because those rationales are not 
part of the actors’ understanding of the cosmic dynamics and the consequences of their 
action, but because by promoting them as the catalyst for these actions highlights only the 
selfish nature of such acts, rather than the necessary tension that exists between the 
individual desserts and the selfless act. 
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Some scholars have begun productively reexamining assumptions of rational actor 
theory based on the ways such acts of self-destruction are made sensible in particular 
worldviews. Robert Brym has led the way in considering how actors operate with multiple 
rationalities dependent of historical and cultural valuables.106 Catalina Kopetz and Edward 
Orehek reorient ideals of goal-oriented behavior by examining martyrdom not as self-
defeating behavior but rather as a form of self-realization that requires an accurate appraisal 
of ideas of the self.107 These scholars revitalize theories of rational choice through an 
appreciation of such acts, rather than imposing normative values of individualism upon them 
or excluding them altogether. Without taking on the same categories that drive the work of 
these scholars, I agree with their determination to not dismiss martyrdom as necessarily 
resulting from unstable minds; in fact, I will take as axiomatic that it is in part the resonance 
individuals of any social group feel with acts of martyrdom that inspires the celebration of 
martyrs, and aver that martyrdom looms as a possible requirement of any group member if 
the times call for it. 
     Collective Memory-Making 
As opposed to those who look to the martyr as an individual, numerous scholars in 
recent years have looked to explain martyrdom as a way to explicitly shape the collective 
memory of a group.108 (The framework for collective memory is most associated with 
Maurice Halbwachs and echoed in the work of Daniele Hervieu-Leger.)109 To approach 
martyrdom through the vein of collective memory is fundamentally to attempt to discover 
how social groups constitute their identity by recalling a common past of suffering and 
relating it to the present. The social memory of a collective becomes the lens through which 
the present is made meaningful. Elizabeth Castelli argued that early Christians placed their 
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martyrs into a wider framework of meanings drawing upon metanarratives of sacrifice 
coming from the cultural context of their time.  This led her to focus on the retelling of the 
narrative around the martyr’s death, its interpretation and the meaning-making activities 
associated with the community.110 Michaela DeSoucey and her colleagues look to the 
reclamation and use of the martyr's physical remains, by what they call “reputational 
entrepreneurs,” who manipulate the history and the body of the martyr to intentionally create 
a collective history for the group.111 Texts of this sort largely look to the way the title of 
martyrs can be manipulated or become a locus of contention between rival factions of an 
ideology.112 
Such considerations of the role of martyrdom in social formation resonate with 
scholars who place the drive to convert as a main impetus for martyrs.113 This idea of the 
martyr dying to convert stems, I believe, in part from attempts to grapple with the ascent of 
Christianity from a Roman cult to the religion of the empire.114 Origen’s famous assertion 
that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church focuses on the inspiration quality of 
martyrs; the martyr's death shows that the ideals they 'died for' are worthy of respect and 
allegiance.115 In contrast to those who rely on collective memory as a way to guard social 
boundaries, scholars focusing on conversion see martyrdom as overcoming those boundaries 
due to their perceived nobility. Such moves rely on a common appreciation for self-sacrifice, 
regardless of specific cultural content.116 
The attempt inherent in such studies to overcome a sharp bifurcation of “memory” 
and “history” is necessary, as it recognizes that all history is perceived through a frame of 
interpretation.117 The way scholars have used the frame of collective memory to show how 
martyrdom serves to construct social and political boundaries have proven exceedingly 
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instructive.118 However such only attends to one side of martyrdom, the social establishment 
of a martyr, without adequately attending to the ways the actor themselves understood their 
act. Are we to think that because the rhetorical representation of martyrdom so effectively 
serves to shore up social boundaries that such was the intent of the martyr? One would have 
to say no.  
I would agree that there is something about self-sacrificial actions that transcend 
cultural milieus, in fact that is a central idea of the comparison that motivates this work. Nor 
would I challenge the contention that the purpose of martyrdom texts were often circulated in 
hopes for bolstering allegiance for those suffering at the hands of foreign elements. But while 
martyr narratives likely were effective in gaining adherents, the idea that conversion provided 
the motivation for martyrs seems unlikely.  Conversion aims outward to gain adherents, 
while I will argue one of the main functions of martyrdoms was to strengthen the loyalty and 
resolve of those within the group. 
Whether the focus is on internal boundary-strengthening or external inculcation into 
the group, the studies in this category all only focus on the social consequences of the 
martyrdom discourse without attending to the impetus behind such acts. This is not to 
contend that the martyr’s intention and the group’s purpose be one in the same; surely they 
are not. However, an analytical frame for understanding martyrdom as a concept should 
attend to both aspects. By looking at martyrdom as a cultural performance, this work will 
consider the reconstitution of the social mores that takes place in martyrdom without 
ignoring what provokes martyrdom. 
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     Cosmic War 
Most studies of religious violence that analyze martyrdom do so through the frame of 
cosmic war, made famous by Mark Juergensmeyer in Terror in the Mind of God. There and 
elsewhere, Juergensmeyer develops the idea that religious people engaged in conflict link 
their current political situation to a sacred history, resulting in the perception of a political 
engagement as the latest battle of a war of good versus evil that has raged since the dawn of 
time, and likely will continue beyond the warrior’s life. Through this symbolic alignment, 
those who commit religious violence partake in a Manichean existence, demonizing their 
opponents and accepting that though they may die in the attempt, their side will ultimately be 
victorious. Conflict thereby becomes a sacred duty rather than a struggle over resources, and 
partaking in that conflict offers a way for the humiliated to regain their lost honor. “The idea 
of cosmic war is compelling to religious activists because it ennobles and exalts those who 
consider themselves a part of it – especially those who have been desperate about their 
situations and defiant in resisting them” according to Juergensmeyer.119 The modern cases of 
religious violence Juergensmeyer examines see a religious group dominated by a political 
structure seen as explicitly hostile to the resisting group.  These groups, and by extension all 
groups fomenting religious resistance, see the world in severe disorder, and yearn to return 
the world to order by declaring war on the oppressive regime they are engaged with.   
Cosmic war provides Juergensmeyer the frame for understanding the sacrifice of the 
martyr; as he says, “War is the context for sacrifice.”120 The worldview of the martyr creates 
a sharply divided world of good and evil, and those who are evil have brought about the 
current situation of denigration. By aligning him or herself completely with the side of good 
to the point of their death, the martyr is endowed with a sense of purpose and destiny that 
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empowers them. Many scholars have taken up the cosmic war framework and applied it to a 
diverse number of cases.121 Stuart Wright talks about the importance of frames of “war 
framing” that elevate violence to a moral imperative.122 Bruce Hoffman argues this linkage to 
a sacred narrative makes the religious warrior more dangerous than their secular 
counterparts, who battle solely in history, as it is the religious beliefs of the terrorist that 
allows them to overcome the psychological barriers to mass murder and suicide.123  
These also link to the significant number of studies that explain martyrdom by 
reference to an impending apocalypse, an orientation inaugurated by John R. Hall.124 Those 
that understand themselves facing the imminent end of the world are less willing to allow for 
compromise and see only victory and/or their own glorious deaths as an acceptable 
outcome.125 When confrontations leads to or uses violence, the more likely such groups 
would respond with violence and at the last collectively take their lives in a final act of 
refusal to submit to another authority.126  
 Both models have a great deal of usefulness, as they attend to the ways religious 
sentiment can change the stakes of confrontation. Moreover, both serve as a useful means of 
comparing diverse cases, as most religious traditions have a concept of the ends times and 
ways of determining good and evil. I am also taken by the suggestion that seeing the current 
moment in terms of sacred time changes how time itself is experienced, though that can 
rather refer equally to the situation of war, divinely caused persecution or the like. In such 
moments ethical requirements shift, which I believe is inherent in the arguments of such 
scholars. And I follow both models in seeing such actors not as irrational, but operating 
amidst particular rationales. 
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 War and apocalypse as absolute determinants of religious violence seems incomplete, 
however, particularly when addressing acts of dying rather than killing. Many early Christian 
martyrs had their actions explained in the hagiographic and theological texts without 
reference to a cosmic battle, focusing instead on the necessity of abiding by the dictates set 
out by God. A contest was certainly still evident, but it was not framed as a war, neither were 
they considered to be soldiers. Likewise, the Buddhist tradition has a series of means to 
validate self-sacrifice, some but by no means all of which look to war as a guiding metaphor. 
As we will see, the groups under consideration here did see their opponents as posing a threat 
to the coherence of the group and its founding principles, but that does not result in war. War 
is a context for sacrifice, but not the only context for sacrifice.127 Conflict is evident 
throughout these cases, but we must look beyond the frame of war to appreciate the way the 
groups themselves understand the predicament that can lead to dying in service to the cosmic 
order. 
 
Sovereignty and Political Theology 
The question of sovereignty – the ability to determine the shape of life, the laws that 
serve as guidelines for that life, and the conditions under which those laws are enforced – 
will be a central concern of this work. This stems not only from the base contest over self-
determination that appears as a central feature of each case examined here, but also from the 
necessity to contend with institutions seeking authority over the life and death of a discrete 
group. Not only has sovereignty been routinely placed at the heart of modern discussions of 
power, but it has also spawned a revitalization of the concept of political theology which 
places sacred ideals at the core of our political existence. Certainly the most well-known 
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theorist of political theology is Carl Schmitt, whose work done in 1920s Germany asserted 
that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”128 Schmitt defines the exception as 
where the law is determined to not apply, where its operations are suspended due to the will 
of certain individuals, individuals thereby labelled sovereign. Dimitris Vardoulakis, author of 
the exemplary Sovereignty and Its Other which examines and analyzes various historical 
incarnations of sovereignty (though largely remaining within Western European 
imaginations) articulates, “the operation of sovereign power consists in the justification of 
violence.”129 It is a question of what forceful means of harm are seen as legitimate 
mechanisms of justice, not transgressing law but directed by and in support of law, and how 
violence upon bodies can be seen as appropriate means towards certain ends. Both Schmitt 
and Vardoulakis see sovereignty as a question of state rule, violence, and the means to justify 
deployments of force in service to a particular ideological pursuit. 
Vardoulakis, like Michel Foucault before him, showed that the shape of sovereignty 
varies with cultural context and character of the collective at issue, but in all cases revolves 
around the question of legitimate authority and the foundation of such authority. Foucault 
contrasts ancient sovereignty displayed upon the scaffold of capital punishment – where the 
state’s power was deployed against an individual body for all to see – to the disciplinary 
mode of power that attempts to force the internalization of mores through a system of 
surveillance seeking to transform “docile bodies” through a discourse of improvement and 
normalcy.130 Vardoulakis extends Foucault’s discussion through a close analysis of three 
historical constructions of sovereign power distinguished on the basis of their means-end 
relation: ancient sovereignty that looks first to violent means to determine appropriate ends; 
modern sovereign power where the means of power themselves justify particular ends, and 
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finally biopolitics (a label he takes from Foucault) where the justification of violent means is 
formed in reference to further means that promise a better life for all. On top of Vardoulakis’ 
nuanced and important distinctions, legal theorist Paul Kahn further developed the contours 
of sovereignty as it is exercised within post-modern democratic nations, where sovereign 
power is bound in a Constitution and (ideally) only exerted through processes expressing 
popular will. Kahn goes on to show that all political orders see their Constitution 
fundamentally based in an exception to law that is interpreted as a revolution.131 Kahn’s 
insight about the central role interpretation plays when vying sovereignties come into conflict 
forms the backbone of this study’s theoretical approach, and fruitfully expands the revitalized 
category of political theology. 
In Schmitt’s Political Theology, he argues: 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts 
not only because of their historical development - in which they were transferred from 
theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent god became the 
omnipotent lawgiver - but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which 
is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in 
jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy 
can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the 
last centuries.132 
While Schmitt’s simplistic historical trajectory incorrectly essentializes “secular” and 
“theological” spheres, and suggests an uncomplicated evolution from the latter into the 
former, he does identify a crucial dynamic at the core of our juridico-political institutions. 
The similarity between the political and divine lawgiver leads Schmitt to see our political 
commitments to be based in theological assertions, since authority over life and death relies 
upon ideas of cosmic order that directs human life. Decades after Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben 
elaborated on these ideas by examining the figure of the homo sacer, a figure of Roman 
religious law (lacking extensive historical evidence) who is able to be killed but not 
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murdered, a body excluded from both the physical order that administers murder as a crime 
and from the divine order to which sacrifice is offered. Such a person exemplifies the 
operations of sovereignty as they are created in relation to – or included in – the social order 
while excluded from the juridical protections that define such an order (which he calls the 
“sovereign ban”). Such a life, Agamben asserts, that is open to the whims of sovereign power 
can be a political subject, thereby forming the basis of the sovereign order.133 
 Taking up this trend, I will look to political theology as the necessary frame through 
which to understand martyrdom. The tendency of studies to look at the religious aspects of 
martyrs to the exclusion of political considerations err in not taking into consideration the 
necessary relationship between the two spheres in the conditions of sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the martyr will be seen to be the counterpart to the homo sacer, complementing 
the body vulnerable to sovereign decision in a body voluntarily exposing itself and taking on 
the violence forming the foundation of state institutions. By attending to these insights, I will 
show that communal life organized around a common identity and recognition of authority 
over life and death requires an appreciation for the place of the sacred in our political life. 
Only sacred categories can make possible an adequate appreciation of what is at stake when 
seeking to understand constructions of legitimate power over life and death. Ultimately, I 
contend understanding a willing act of self-sacrifice necessitates an appreciation of how 
institutions of power achieve a legitimacy that is based in and concurrently exercised upon 
bodies. Rather than earlier discussions of sovereignty that focused on killing technologies, 
the reimagination of sovereignty made possible by these theorists will show that power 
depends on individual acceptance, and where people refuse to accept authority no matter the 
outcome monumental shifts of rule can take place. 
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Volume Outline  
 The next chapter begins the analysis of particular cases by investigating how 
martyrdom comes to be used in the Christianity of second-century Asia Minor. I begin by 
delineating the social and political situation within which Christianity was practiced, a 
context that saw the Roman Empire reaching its greatest expansion to date, accompanied by 
a sharp increase in demands for displays of obedience. Amidst these circumstances, 
Christians were relegated to the social periphery on account of their perceived deviant and 
dangerous doctrines. Their unwillingness to show allegiance to Rome marked them as public 
threats, and I will proceed to expose the ways the legal system was used as a tool against 
these marginalized individuals. The acta martyrum (which often take the form of trial 
transcripts) along with the letters of Ignatius demonstrate the ways Christian communities 
appropriated the violence inherent in Roman systems of justice for their own ends, framing it 
as serving injustice and fulfilling the promise that followers of Christ must suffer. Doing so, I 
conclude, provided Christians an opportunity to assert themselves as a self-determining 
faction, and frame their deaths as a piece of evidence in support of their perspective on the 
world and their place and rights therein. 
 Chapter three applies this same heuristic to the context that spawned the tactic known 
as suicide bombing or martyrdom operations. While Sunni groups later become the majority 
employers of this strategy, it originates in the Shi’a awakening of the 1970s with the 
emergence of Ruhollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. The first human bomb attacks 
take place in Lebanon, but the chapter begins by demonstrating the inherent links that 
connect the coastal country to the nation of Iran through networks of religious schools and 
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scholars. I will proceed to show the reconstruction of doctrines in this context, and the way 
jihad takes on a militaristic bent due to the ubiquitous experience of Western imperialism and 
oppression. By reading the wills left by Iranian martyrs of the Basij in tandem with the 
transcripts of Hezbollah’s martyr wills, I show how the giving of life in seeking to overcome 
enemies became a celebrated means of resistance that lent personal and social dignity. Those 
same wills disclose a common goal of bringing about a state governed on Islamic principles 
and symbolized by the millennial Mahdi, the hidden Imam who will institute such an 
existence. The chapter closes with an examination of how martyrdom exceeded its context 
within jihad to become a means of averring the truth of a perspective on existence and 
justice. 
 The same frame guides the analysis of Tibetan self-immolators comprising chapter 
four. Beginning in a similar vein as the previous chapters, I begin by examining the long 
relationship between the Tibetan people and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Relying 
on the testaments of self-immolators along with modern reports, I go on to discuss how the 
programs of the PRC have led to the experience of a state of siege in Tibet, and how the 
traditional boundaries of the country led to different experiences for Tibetans in different 
areas. All experiences are based, I show, in a common sensibility of a right to self-determine 
their life in alignment with Buddhist teachings that place the Dalai Lama as the guardian of 
justice on earth. Such a sensibility encompasses appropriate means of suffering, including 
models of sacrifice that form the understandings of the act of self-immolation. I conclude by 
looking to describe the way self-immolators and the larger Tibetan community understand 
the act as attempting to firmly establish the truth of Tibet as a sovereign nation. 
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 In the final chapter I look to pull from the preceding analyses what congruencies can 
be drawn from all cases to determine a new theory of martyrdom that looks to performance 
and a sovereign imaginary as the guiding structures. Beginning by elucidating what results 
from comparing discourses of martyrdom, I go on to formulate an idea of performance 
suffering and what I term a fundamental ontology, a mode of life that is asserted above all 
others in the midst of a contest between institutions seeking to determine what life looks like 
in an area and over a people. I conclude the fundamental contest is over a hermeneutic truth, 
the basis upon which to determine justice and right action in the world, and these deaths 
serve as the most effective means of providing evidence for one interpretive frame over 
others. An epilogue examines what this theory of martyrdom offers our understanding of 
sovereignty and political theology, since all cases operate amidst spheres that are both fully 
political and fully religious. Second century Christianity provides the first instance of such a 
blend, and it is to there we now turn. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Witnesses to Christ:  
Constructing Christian Martyrdom in Second Century Asia Minor 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the New Testament book the Acts of the Apostles, the story is told of Stephen, a 
learned man and deacon in the Jerusalem church. As a result of his teachings about the 
messiah, Stephen was arrested and brought before the Sanhedrin, the governing council of 
the Jewish community, where he delivered an elaborate history lesson on the patriarchal line 
from Abraham to Solomon. To this lineage he appended the name of Jesus, whom Stephen 
saw as continuing and completing the project of revealing God’s law (Acts 7:2-50). In doing 
so, Stephen aligned God with the Christians, while chastising his Jewish audience for 
deviating from the law of God (Acts 7:52-53). Furious, the Jewish council had Stephen 
dragged out of the city and stoned to death for his hubris and dangerous speech. As he died, 
Stephen prayed for those who killed him in words reminiscent of his savior: “Lord, do not 
hold this sin against them” (Acts 7:60; cf. Lk. 23:34).134  
This tale is said to describe the creation of the first Christian martyr. Stephen is often 
referred to as the “protomartyr,” an odd term apparently first used by the theologian Gregory 
of Nyssa in the fourth century (Encomium in sanctum Stephanum protomartyrem 2), 
suggesting that his was the model all Christian martyrs would follow. Experiences of 
persecution define the first four centuries of the Christian tradition, and those who were 
killed during these persecutions are remembered and celebrated by nearly every significant 
theologian, including Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, and Thomas Aquinas. “The blood of 
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martyrs is the seed of the Church” according to Tertullian, the influential theologian writing 
in North Africa at the close of the second century (Apologeticus, 50). With Stephen, this core 
doctrine begins; however, if this is where the concept of martyrdom begins, it is striking that 
the general understanding of martyrdom as “dying for a cause” does not seem to make sense 
in reference to Stephen. It is not a cause, but rather his knowledge that is the catalyst for his 
death. The first martyr, then, does not fit the commonplace idea of a martyr.  
Stemming from the Greek martys, a term meaning a witness in a court, martyrdom is 
a multifaceted phenomenon that has resonated with Christianity from its birth to its present. 
For the first four centuries of the Common Era, stories circulated about individuals tried in 
Roman courts for the crime of being Christian, and being executed when found guilty. Those 
who suffered and died while maintaining their Christianity were heralded by their 
communities as martyrs, ideals of morality celebrated for their “nobility, their courage, [and] 
their love of the Master” (M. Poly. 2.2). Some hold the first martyr was Jesus of Nazareth, 
but it is more commonly used to refer to those whose death was seen to be in imitation of 
their savior’s.135 W.H.C. Frend, for instance, held martyrs “were seeking by their death to 
attain to the closest possible imitation of Christ’s Passion and death.”136 The death of a 
Christian witness is one that is performed in a way that brings to mind the model of their 
Savior himself. 
Deaths of martyrs riddle the pages of early Christian texts. No conclusive number of 
early Christian martyrs exist, and nearly all tales about their creation come from religious 
texts of questionable historical accuracy. We do know that concerns about Christians are 
evident during Nero’s rule (c. 54-68 C.E.), but that the most concentrated persecutions of 
Christian happened during the reigns of Decius in the third century and Diocletian at the start 
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of the fourth. These latter operated as sanctioned, empire-wide institutional attempts to 
discover and execute all Christians who would not sacrifice to the emperor. Under such 
programs, Christians were encouraged not to lose faith, but to remain constant and loyal 
throughout suffering, just as Jesus, the apostles and those martyrs who followed them did. 
Scholars have largely defined early Christian martyrdom in terms of connection and 
conviction, be it Elizabeth Castelli’s characterization as “willing, self-sacrificing death on 
behalf of one’s religion, one’s political ideals or one’s community,”137 or Joyce Salisbury’s 
assertion that martyrs are “people who held fast to their faith and were killed for refusing to 
renounce their principles.”138 In order to recognize the interpretive move necessary in 
distinguishing martyrdom from other deaths, some like Candida Moss speak of martyrdom as 
“a set of discursive practices that shaped early Christian identities, mediated ecclesiastical 
and dogmatic claims, and provided meaning to the experience described by early Christians 
as persecution, and in doing so produced a new economy of action.”139 Or, in Daniel 
Boyarin’s more direct formulation, martyrdom is “a practice of dying for God and talking 
about it.”140 
Some scholars, such as de Ste. Croix and E.R. Dodds, have approached martyrdom as 
an issue of pathological death-seeking, akin to psychological deviancy and mental illness.141 
In these studies martyrs desire to die, and seek a meaningful way to satisfy such a craving. 
Such approaches have difficulty separating martyrdom from its phenomenological neighbor 
suicide, distinctions that have continued to demand space in modern texts on the subject.142 
Others, like Joyce Salisbury and Rodney Stark likewise look to the inclinations of the 
individual striving to gain the promised rewards for martyrs.143 Stark goes as far as to explain 
acts of martyrdom through rational choice theory, arguing that “religion supplies 
58 
 
compensators for rewards that are scarce or unavailable,”144 and the high value of religious 
rewards (i.e. heaven, life everlasting) justifies – moreover, creates – the high “cost” (here, 
death) necessary to gain them. Stark sees in martyrs the “most credible exponents of the 
value of a religion,” in that they believe so much in the promised rewards they see it as 
necessary to give their lives for them.145 
While I agree with Stark on the weight given to the martyr’s testimony through their 
deaths, I disagree with the emphasis he places on the “religious goods” being sought. Much 
like de Ste. Croix and Dodds, he seeks to understand an act of martyrdom only through 
reference to what it gains for the individual. Such perspectives reduce the social aspect of 
martyrdom to the act of an individual seeking her own benefit, thereby privileging the 
personal over the communal aspect. The act is reduced to self-satisfaction, which seems 
inadequate to understanding such a phenomenon. Not only do such theories require 
assertions about the mental state of such people, but they also fail to appreciate that the label 
of martyr comes from the community, and not on the basis that they adequately sought their 
own good.  
Many academic discussion of martyrdom move beyond the focus on individual 
intentionality to look at martyrdom through the lens of noble death, a cultural ideal borrowed 
from the Greek and Roman cultures that bred Christianity. Scholars like Arthur Droge and 
James Tabor have used an evaluative framework to portray martyrdom as a valorous choice 
to die, linking the Christian martyrs to a tradition going at least as far back as Socrates.146 
G.W. Bowersock too, in his well-known Wiles lectures, placed martyrdom in the noble death 
trope, contending that it was thanks to this cultural heritage that martyrdom occupied such a 
high place for Christianity.147 His “archaeological analysis” led him to insist that the term 
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“martyr” first abdicated its root as witness during this period, coming to refer to something 
irredeemably Christian.148 
Such arguments however tend toward absolutizing a single cultural context, which a) 
makes it difficult to treat such phenomena cross-culturally and b) tend to establish 
unconditional boundaries around ideas like “religion,” which are then always and forever 
opposed to spheres of “secular” power.149  Such is evident in Bowersock’s contention that the 
concept of martyrdom had a “clear sense of death at the hands of a hostile secular 
authority,”150 and in the work of Friedrich Avemarie and Jan Willem van Henten. These 
latter categorize martyr texts based on an explicit religion/secular dichotomy, looking at the 
“cosmic orientation” where pagan confronts Christian, obfuscating the substantial overlap 
between those identities and characteristics.151 Anachronistically and inconsiderately 
applying a single understanding of religion and religious identity outside its immediate 
context colors our understanding of relationships between other social groups and institutions 
of power.152 Moreover, arguments that favor cultural explanations often treat the political 
circumstances of these events as unimportant, merely an opportunity for these cultural forms 
to appear. 
W.H.C. Frend, in his magisterial Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church 
likewise preferred a cultural argument to political ones and operating on a sharp distinction 
between religious and secular social arrangements. The result is his contention that 
martyrdom is a death for a religious faith stemming from apocalyptic concerns.153 While the 
Christian focus on the imminent Parousia certainly was evident, such a narrowing of 
martyrdom significantly limits the cases to which the term can be applied, reducing I believe 
the explanatory power of the term in expressly secular cases that rely on universal claims but 
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remain focused on the here and now. However, the way he articulates the situation of 
persecution the Christians faced as at heart a contest between equally universal claims about 
theocratic sovereign orders will be central to this study as well. 
Frend’s focus on competing sovereignties and their attached social identities appear 
fundamental to understanding acts of martyrdom. This latter was also analyzed by Daniel 
Boyarin, who deftly articulates how the Christian discourse of martyrdom helped establish a 
distinct Christian social group from its Jewish family.154 He places the experience of Roman 
antagonism as central to what he refers to as “Jewish Christians” of the period, but while 
Christians prided themselves on their unswerving loyalty to God to death, their Jewish 
contemporaries celebrated tales where Rabbis used “trickster speech” to fool Roman 
authorities into thinking they were complicit with the hegemonic scripts of Roman law while 
in fact subverting that power.155 Labeling this opposition as the difference between 
Greek/Jewish metis (wisdom) versus Roman/Christian virtus (strength), Boyarin asserts that 
these opposing responses to persecution did not reflect two communities but rather helped 
enact the boundaries separating them.156 His conclusions make it necessary that when dealing 
with early Christianity, we cannot operate on the “assumption of phenomenologically, 
socially, and culturally discrete communities of Jews and Christians and of an absolute 
opposition between Judaism and Palestine on the one hand, Christianity and the Greco-
Roman world on the other.”157 Like many other social identities in the Roman Empire, there 
is significant overlap between and among such labels. 
The former lay at the center of a pair of article by Matthew Recla, whose insistence 
that martyrs be allowed agency in their own deaths is as compelling as his assertion that the 
martyr can be understood as homo profanus, a complement to Giorgio Agamben’s homo 
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sacer.158 The homo profanus confronts the Roman power structure with a symbolic 
interpretation of their death as resistance to sovereign power, refusing to relinquish the 
individual’s right to determine their own modes of life and death. Such work is not only 
welcome for his engagement with political theology – which has too long neglected the 
figure of the martyr – but also in its advancement of our understanding of the ways 
individuals relate to structures of power. That said, Frend’s analysis directs our attention to 
the need to see dueling sovereignties, both seeking to lay claim upon lives. In his zeal to 
show the opposition of the martyr, Recla did not expound on how the martyr speaks truth to 
power by speaking the truth of another power. 
In that sovereignty is at least in part about the justification of violence, both Candida 
Moss and Elizabeth Castelli are leaders in studies that seek to establish the ways a martyrs 
suffering is understood and constructed in reference to larger complexes of meaning-
making.159 Castelli’s examination showed how martyrdom helped shape the collective 
memory (a term she borrows from Maurice Halbwachs) of early Christians into a culture that 
interpreted their suffering through sacred narratives. She provides a detailed examination of 
how the Christians reshaped and refined available symbolic complexes to construct a power 
structure based on suffering. Moss similarly explores the ways such complexes may have 
been internalized by Christians through a mimetic dynamic – dying in imitation of Christ’s 
passion – which is regularly referred to by martyrs. While the evidence supports such 
conclusions, Castelli relies on the analysis of exemplary figures and texts throughout the first 
several centuries to speak to a generalized early Christianity, and Moss’ intent is to make a 
contribution to the history of ideas, causing her work to remain at the level of doctrine.  
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These are effective approaches, but the attempts to totalize martyrdom in early 
Christianity can neglect the political situations each faced (a methodological problem 
addressed in part by Moss in her Ancient Christian Martyrdom). In what follows I will 
expand upon the insights of both scholars, and provide evidence to buttress their conclusions 
by elaborating on one particular network of power relations in the ancient world. Doing so 
will allow for a greater appreciation for the ways local catalysts influence global phenomena. 
 
Methodology and Scope 
 There was no single, unified “Christianity” in the early centuries of the Common Era. 
The Christian discourse of “one Church” long remained at the level of ideal, and 
understanding the Christians of the period requires appreciation for the multiple ideologies of 
early Christian martyrdom based in what Peter Brown has called “micro-Christianities.”160 
This diversity, however, should not lead us to approach particular settings as completely 
independent or isolated from others. Enhanced by a steadily improving infrastructure, 
networks of pilgrimage and missionary activity crisscrossed the Roman world, and an 
extensive epistolary complex shared ideas between churches. The world was being drawn 
more closely together than it had ever been, reflecting several features of our current period 
of globalization. The Roman culture was infiltrating every locale within their broad borders, 
and changes to social status and hierarchy had thrown traditional understandings of identity 
into flux. Increased ease of travel was drawing people together in sustained contact, bringing 
from disparate cultures a host of new answers to questions of life and death that influenced, 
and were influenced by, those already present. 
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Therefore unlike many of these other studies seeking to elucidate a general concept of 
martyrdom in early Christianity, any analysis of martyrdom in early Christianity therefore 
needs to be focused both geographically and temporally. With that in mind, what I will 
investigate here is how a particular confluence of religio-political discourses and power 
relations led to interpretations of religious narratives encouraging individuals to seek their 
own death as a sacred act. This chapter will look specifically at what Moss terms the 
“sociohistorically grounded ideologies” of Christians in Asia Minor during the second 
century C.E.161 It was during this period that Bowersock identifies the shift where the term 
martyr itself went from meaning a witness in a court to taking on the meaning that remains 
attached to it, dying for a cause.162 That century begins with Christianity as an embattled 
minority and ends with the group’s emergence as a notable player on the world stage (as the 
intense persecutions of Decius and Diocletian in the third century testify). This period is in 
the liminal space between the preaching of an itinerant Jewish preacher in Galilee, and the 
establishment of those teachings as the religion of the Roman Empire by the emperor 
Constantine. Accomplishing so much in a few short centuries was no doubt thanks in 
significant part to the stories of the religion’s martyrs.  
Asia Minor is often called the “cradle of Christian martyrdom.”163 Encompassed today by 
much of modern Turkey, Asia Minor was the site of some of the earliest Christian missions 
and communities. Paul is known to have visited the area and communities there were 
addressed in the beginning of Revelation.164 Following the destruction of the Temple in 
Jerusalem, this area became the de facto home of Christianity.165  
The earliest tales of martyrs come from this era and this area.166 Centering this study on 
second century Asia Minor has the added benefit of several reliable sources of information, 
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including the letters Pliny the Younger wrote to the emperor Trajan when the former served 
as provincial governor in the area. Apart from those missives, the material that makes up the 
bulk of data for this chapter comes from two main sources: the letters of Ignatius, Bishop of 
Antioch, believed to be written on his way to being executed in Rome, and the so-called acta 
martyrum – tales of the trials and deaths of martyrs that were popular in the early churches. 
These Greek (and in a few cases, Latin) texts can tell us a great deal about the social 
significance these Christians bestowed on martyrdom.167 
Of all letters ascribed to Ignatius, seven have been determined to have a high level of 
authenticity: To the Ephesians (hereafter Ig. Eph.), To the Magnesians (hereafter Ig. Mag.), 
To the Trallians (hereafter Ig. Tral.), To the Romans (hereafter Ig. Rom.), To the 
Philadelphians (hereafter Ig. Phil.), To the Smyrneans (hereafter Ig. Smyr.) and To Polycarp 
(hereafter Ig. Poly.).168 The work of Ignatius has been approached in a number of veins, often 
in terms of the continuing separation of Christian and Jewish communities during his life, 
while others have examined his place in the battles around authority in early Christian 
circles.169 Ignatius is well known for elevating martyrdom as the perfection of Christian 
existence, believing one’s nature as a Christian was only fully established in their deaths.170 
(One can hear a certain prefiguring of Origen’s thought, who himself would desire 
martyrdom to be perfected as a Christian.)171 
The martyr acts that were so popular in early Christian churches were aimed at 
providing a frame for early Christians to understand their own lives in terms of the gospel 
narratives, replete with ethical obligations and a sovereign discourse about the origin and 
basis for those obligations. Although the gospel narratives and Pauline epistles are often 
treated as a class above all other texts, we must remember that the canonization of the New 
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Testament occurred hundreds of years after the period under consideration, and came about 
as a result of power negotiations between communities. The provocative, heroic tales of 
martyrs occupied a vital means of communicating the Christian doctrine, and were read 
publicly in liturgical and educational venues within the early churches. 
Martyr acta are “quite palpably the product of the non-Jewish Graeco-Roman society 
of Asia Minor, Greece and North Africa,”172 and can provide “true insight into second-
century Christianity.”173 The complete collection of martyr texts span the first four centuries 
of the Common Era,174 but us here I will only analyze those texts appearing to date from the 
second century. Those include: The Martyrdom of Polycarp (hereafter M. Poly.),175 the 
Martyrdom of Ptolemaeus and Lucius (hereafter M. Ptol.),176 the Martyrdom of Carpus, 
Papylus and Agathonicê (hereafter M. Carp.),177 the Martyrdom of Justin and Companions 
(hereafter M. Just.),178 the Martyrs of Lyons or Lugdunum (hereafter M. Lyons),179 and the 
Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs (hereafter M. Scill.).180 It is possible that though dated from the 
second century, these texts were revised by third century editors, especially since many come 
from Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History written at the end of Diocletian’s reign, but “if we 
discount every martyrdom account potentially tainted by the hands of later editors, we will be 
left with no sources.”181 Composed in various areas around the empire, these texts all 
contributed to the place of martyrdom in the minds of Christians in Asia Minor.  
There has long been a “historical/literary binary” that appears in the textual selections 
of scholars studying early Christian martyrdom.”182 Those looking for historicity – specific 
datum about who died, how many, where, etc. – favor trial acta as more reliable in 
transmitting these kinds of information. These texts are largely shorn of description and 
contain only the dialogue between the Christian defendants and the Roman authority that 
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conducted their trials. On the other hand, those investigating Christian ideology tend to use 
the more literary passiones due to their focus on the ethical structures that buttress power, 
though these were the minority prior to the third and fourth century. What follows favors 
neither form of martyr narratives, as both aim to communicate certain ideological truths 
about the Christian existence. Passion narratives like Polycarp’s provide a means by which 
the audience can see the ethical models of their imaginary play out in the world, while the 
trial transcripts make powerful rhetorical use of the judicial context that attempted to 
discover truth in a frank and unadorned way.183 As I will elaborate below, part of the 
ingenuity of martyrdom was to appropriate the power of the judicial establishment in 
establishing social truths for their own ends.  
Seeking the ways these tales inspired others to seek their own death, we first need to 
set aside our own perspectives and beliefs to seek the internal logic that guided their 
worldview, coming to terms as much as possible with how the early Christians understood 
and celebrated the act of martyrdom. Toward that end, this chapter will look to contemporary 
Christian literature to answer several interrelated questions: How did the Christians perceive 
their social, political, and legal situation during the second century? To what extent are those 
categories exclusive in their experience? What did they see at stake in their resistance to the 
Roman legal and political structure? Why did they feel they needed to die to give their 
‘witness’, and how was that need shaped by their interpretation of Christian doctrine?  
Finally, what significance did they attribute to the testimony of the martyr? While relying on 
texts will give insight mainly into the thoughts of elite, literate Christians, it will allow 
discovery into the perspectives of those who determined the overall shape of Christian life in 
this area during this period. 
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Rather than challenge the veracity of the claims of martyrs, I will take seriously the 
perception of these agents that they were speaking the truth. A situation was seen to have 
arisen where the maintenance of one identity superseded the need to stay alive, because to 
deny their identity was seen as participating in the destruction of the guiding ideology. In 
fact, as will become clearer throughout, I will contend that it was precisely in an affirmation 
of an existential and ontological truth that these individuals understood the need for them to 
die. 
 This chapter begins by examining the social, cultural and political situation amidst 
which the second century churches of Asia Minor formed. Considering both the centrifugal 
and centripetal dynamics of power in the blossoming Roman Empire, I will show how 
Christians were seen as arrogantly holding themselves apart from the rest of the populace, 
raising concerns about their character and fears about their possible subversive intent. I will 
proceed to analyze the legal structure that was used to address and suppress those fears, and 
inquire about the nature of the charge of the nomen Christianorum, the crime of being a 
Christian that led to the martyr’s execution. Such understanding is necessary, I contend, to 
understand the use of sacrifice as a determinant of guilt, and the resilience of those who 
refused to perform the ritualized act of allegiance.  
 After looking at Rome’s perspective on the Christians, I will look to what lay behind 
the statement “Christianus sum” – “I am a Christian” – which accompanies all martyrdoms 
and simultaneously served as the confession of faith and the confession of guilt. Blending 
concepts of ethnicity, race and nation, I show how the Christian identity revolved around not 
only a belief in Jesus as Christ, but more importantly the willingness to sacrifice one’s own 
will to the will of God. Looking to an outside source that determined right action challenged 
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the sovereignty of Rome, which is evident in the similarity of language used in reference to 
both Christian and Roman imaginaries. In the face of this, Christians constructed their own 
sacrifice, one that took up from Jewish and Greco-Roman templates, and inverted the logic of 
the imperial cult. This sacrifice was based in the model of Jesus’ own passion, and advanced 
a sense of speaking the truth of the Christian dogma during moments of extreme pain and 
death to prove one’s commitment. I conclude by showing how the core of Christian 
witnessing revolved around a mode of truth-telling known in the ancient world as parrhēsia, 
a subject which was elaborated upon by Michel Foucault in his last lectures and can reorient 
our understanding of the function and form of martyrdom. Such speech communicated an 
existential truth through an ontological truth, identifying the speaker as a truth-teller due to 
the visible compatibility of their speech to their mode of life. 
 
 
The Socio-Political World of Second Century Christianities 
Following the reign of Domitian (81-96 C.E.) and the short rule of the Emperor Nerva 
(96-98 C.E.), Trajan became emperor and ruled to 117 C.E. Trajan was a much celebrated 
emperor, said to favor justice over power and known for achieving the largest area of Roman 
imperial control in the history of the empire.184 He was also known for great public 
spectacles of death, including gladiatorial games and public executions, the latter of which 
likely included the Christians put to death during his reign. In the 120s Hadrian’s rule 
reversed Trajan’s expansionist policies, reimagining the empire as a commonwealth of 
diverse ethnic communities and resulting in a keen interest in maintaining peace between the 
cultures being brought together.185 Hadrian allowed for greater cultural self-expression under 
the governance of Rome, and his rule saw a hiatus in the persecutions of Christians and Jews. 
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However when Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus ascended to the station of joint emperors 
in 161 C.E., “persecutions again disturbed Asia” according to Eusebius (HE iv.15.1). Power 
relations were continually shifting, and Roman subjects had to contend with an increasing 
centralization of power in Rome that was reproduced across the empire’s provinces. 
 This centralization occurred both on institutional and social levels; institutionally, the 
presence of Roman authorities was increasing in provincial areas, bringing a concomitant rise 
in displays of loyalty to Rome.186 Socially, there was a growing concentration of political 
power and influence into the hands of a handful of elite families, particularly in the Greek 
speaking Eastern part of the empire of which Asia Minor was part, where legal systems were 
used as a means to perpetuate that dynamic.187 The combination of these elements resulted in 
periodic aggression against groups like the Christians, who existed on the peripheries of 
power networks.188  
Christian communities appear to have been formed somewhat irrespective of cultural 
and economic considerations. According to Robert M. Grant, the socio-economic situation of 
Christians was as varied as the cultural contexts within which they were found.189 Some 
scholars contend that literacy rates set the early Christian churches apart to some extent, 
allowing them both to depend heavily on scripture and participate in the epistolary networks 
between churches.190 That would be particularly significant at a time when an estimated four 
out of five people in the empire were illiterate, thereby excluding them from the arenas of 
power that required understanding written Latin.191 Literary and archaeological evidence 
points to congregations made of educated and non-educated, citizens and slaves, Latin and 
Greek speakers.192 Polycarp speaks of his community in Smyrna as a tight knit community 
composed of literate and wealthy members as well as a large proportion of slaves (Letter to 
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Philip, 6 and 10), and his assertions are echoed in the writings of both Tertullian and Irenaeus 
(both said to be students of Polycarp). Ignatius of Antioch even suggests that true Christians 
should seek to free slaves who share in the faith (Ig. Poly. 4). Such groups would have 
contested against a great number of social and cultural stigmas, and likely had organized 
themselves on the basis of their radical social agenda.  
For centuries, one’s city had provided the locus for individual identity; urban centers 
competed for glory through elaborate games and spectacles made possible by contributions 
of wealthy, which elicited a sense of local pride through regional competition.193 These city-
based identities were complemented by a wider cultural distinction between Latin West and 
Greek East, and both were increasingly confronted by the pan-empirical identity promoted by 
the Roman Empire.194 At a time when power was becoming more centralized in Rome, the 
people in the more rural provinces would have likely felt increasingly dislocated, and 
vulnerable to new understandings of self that united them with others across the expanding 
known world.195 At the same time, in the urban centers where Christianity would be 
established, there were the same things that plagued cities in the modern era: overcrowding, 
filth and disease. The high mortality rate and poor health conditions of those who lived in 
these areas brought a willingness to look beyond the physical world. Many found in 
Christianity a new way to belong based in attractive ideas about the better world to come for 
anyone who believed, be they slave or senator.  
The shape of Christian identity was being worked out in this context, where 
traditional conceptions of selfhood were being contested.196 For the first three centuries of the 
Common Era, however, Christians by and large were understood as a Jewish sect, with the 
populace unaware of – or unconcerned with – what distinguished Christianity from (the 
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anachronistically constructed) Rabbinic Judaism. Both groups were furthermore seen as 
excluding themselves from traditional practices that were expected of all Roman subjects, no 
matter their other identities. This perceived estrangement from what it meant to live in the 
Empire troubled their neighbors, with significant consequences. And even within the groups 
who maintained a distinct Christian identity there was a great deal of diversity; the 
“orthodox” variety that Ignatius and Polycarp champion exists at this point as one sect among 
many, each vying for dominance. Understanding the context for Christian martyrdom in 
second century Asia Minor therefore requires that we understand the events that helped shape 
their experiences vis-à-vis their Jewish contemporaries, their Roman neighbors, and other 
Christians. 
Rather than any significant distinction between the Jewish social groups and the more 
predominantly ‘gentile’ Christians, the writings of the second century repeatedly show 
concern over the distinction between the two groups.197 Daniel Boyarin offers the label 
“Jewish Christians” for the amalgam in order to destabilize any easy distinction between the 
two.198 The complete history of the Jewish people’s relationship with Rome has been dealt 
with elsewhere,199 but the Iudaeorum, Rome’s name for the Jewish community, had been a 
distinct social group within the Empire for many years, marked by their modes of dress, 
dietary restrictions and tendency to live in concentrated areas apart from the rest of the 
populace.200 During the first century, the Jewish community found itself beset on one side by 
the Christians seeking to appropriate their traditions and ideological structures, and on 
another by the increasingly stringent measures of the Roman Empire. They responded to the 
former by establishing an inviolate canon of texts meant to exclude the Christian scriptures 
and generally seeking to exclude Christians from participation in the community. 
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Large-scale revolts were the response to the latter, with the first occurring amidst 
protests against unfair Roman tax practices in 66 C.E. Four years later, the Temple in 
Jerusalem was razed by Roman forces, decentering Jewish life.201 Jewish insurrectionists, the 
Sicarii, maintained a guerilla war until 72 C.E. when they were cornered in the desert fortress 
of Masada. When the Roman military broke the siege, they discovered that the nine hundred 
and sixty defenders of Masada had chosen death rather than accept defeat, establishing their 
place in Jewish legend and providing a seed for the developing martyr discourses (though 
they themselves do not seem to have been labeled “martyrs”).202 The fall of the Second 
Temple began the radical reformulation of Jewish existence, and the memory of the uprising 
would foul the relationship between Judaism and Rome – and therefore Christianity and 
Rome – for decades to come. 
A period of relative calm followed,203 but the situation of Jews vis-à-vis Rome 
continued to slowly deteriorate. Hadrian’s pro-Greek programs were seen as making 
unacceptable incursions into Jewish geographic and ideological spaces, including a Temple 
Tax levied against the Jewish community and the creation of the city Aelia Capitolina atop 
Jerusalem replete with a temple to Zeus on the Temple Mount. These actions infuriated the 
Jews and fueled growing apocalyptic expectations, leading ultimately to another revolt which 
began in 132 C.E. under the leadership of Simon bar Kochba, who (like Jesus) was thought 
to be the Jewish messiah. Bar Kochba was able to establish an independent Jewish state for 
two years, until the Roman legion severely put down the rebellion three years later. 
Following Rome’s victory, Simon Bar Kochba was tortured and executed by the 
Roman authorities as a rebel. He is still remembered by Jewish communities as one of the 
Ten Martyrs (Aseret Harugei Malchut), whose stories are still ritually remembered during 
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Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement.204 Their designation as Kiddush ha-Shem, sanctifiers of 
the divine name, stemmed from their willingness to suffer death rather than violate the law, 
as well as their efforts toward a self-governing home for the Jewish community. Such aspects 
certainly played a role in the development of a Christian concept of martyrdom, as the story 
was part of their shared tradition and the doctrinal development of Kiddush ha-Shem took 
place largely during the second century.205  
The ultimate consequence of the Bar Kochba revolt was the loss of the lands of Judea 
until they were reestablished in the twentieth century, and an increased concern in Roman 
circles of separatist powers in potentia based in alternate social identities compounded by 
ideologies seen to present a rival authority.206 Since they had determined Jesus of Nazareth to 
be the messiah, the Christian communities refused to participate in the Bar Kochba revolt, 
which did much to establish them as a separate and distinct group. However, the ongoing 
ambiguity around the groups is evidenced by the dual facts of the Christians exclusion from 
Jerusalem (alongside the Jews) following the revolt, along with the relative calm Christian 
communities experienced in the years after the uprising. 
Following the fall of the Temple in Jerusalem, the heart of Christianity shifted from 
Judea to Asia Minor, which had long been a prime area of Christian proselytization resulting 
in a significant and long-established population of Christians as well as Jews.207 Years of 
missionary success positioned Christians for greater coherence following the shift of power 
center after the wars. That province had a particular cultic character in those years, housing a 
proliferation of initiation cults focused on securing a better existence after death.208 The 
Eleusinian Mysteries were for a long time the most well-established Greek cultic formation, 
of which Hadrian himself was said to have been an initiate and which read cosmic mysteries 
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into a grain of wheat which was ritually presented to the highest initiates, symbolizing the 
cycles of life and death evident in the cultivation of crops.209 The deity Mithras, the 
Unconquered Sun, shared several attributes with Christ, including the transformational power 
of blood during a ritual meal, and the promise of salvation to those in its ranks.210 Whatever 
claims it made to uniqueness, Christianity was part of a larger religious amalgam during the 
first centuries of the Common Era which influenced their ideas about life and death, and 
served to urge adherents to look beyond this life for the truth of their existence. The cultic 
landscape of Asia Minor served as fertile ground for such beliefs, rife as it was with so many 
lenses reflecting hope for the afterlife, keeping the gaze of its inhabitants firmly on the life 
after. 
Within contemporary Christian circles, although there was a unity between sects on 
the basis of a common acceptance of Jesus as Christ, communities differed radically in their 
interpretations of gospel texts (and the texts they preferred, as the New Testament canon will 
not be established for decades), how to understand their present, and even what the Messiah’s 
appearance meant. Apart from the proto-orthodox211 strain of Christianity represented by 
Ignatius and Polycarp, a number of other schools of Christian doctrine existed in the 
immediate area. Of particular importance were Docetism (which Ignatius railed against) and 
Montanism which originated in Asia Minor and would be influential there for centuries to 
come. This latter, led by the eponymous Phrygian prophet Montanus – who had formerly 
been a priest of the goddess Cybele and therefore likely a eunuch – and his prophetesses 
Priscilla and Maxima, based itself in ecstatic trances and ongoing prophecies given through 
their leaders.  
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The Docetists, Ignatius’ main theological opponents, held that Christ’s suffering on 
the cross was not “real,” but only “apparent.” Working from the premise that speaking of the 
Messiah (or God himself, depending on the Christology of the group) as physically suffering 
was irrational, the Docetists held that Christ’s passion was illusory – that he only appeared to 
suffer – turning his death into a morality tale, but not one that should be emulated. From their 
perspective, other Christian sects misunderstood the very nature of Christ’s appearance on 
earth. Like their Gnostic contemporaries who sought the development and elaboration of a 
secret knowledge, the Docetists denied that Christian perfection could only be a result of 
continued moral and spiritual development.212 These and many others sought to make sense 
of existence and the experience of persecution through reference to the Christian story, 
resulting in significant variations in doctrine and ideas of what it meant to be “Christian.”  
Alongside the general recognition of Jesus as Christ, apocalyptic expectations were 
fairly common throughout the early Christian churches. The expectation of Parousia, the 
coming Kingdom of God when the final judgment would determine who would forever 
reside with God and who would be cast from His sight resonated throughout the Christian 
world. Many had read in the gospels the promise that the kingdom would come while the 
apostles still lived (“Truly I tell you, some who are standing here will not taste death before 
they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom,” [Mt. 16:28; cf. Mt. 24:34, Lk. 21:32]), and 
those in the second century were trying to deal with the frustrations caused by its delay. 
Moreover, apocalyptic expectations gave urgency to the need to act in alignment with 
Christian teachings, however they were interpreted.213 Martyrdom would become seen by 
some to be a shortcut, a way to ascend directly to the side of God without passing the 
proverbial ‘Go’ of judgment.  
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At the turn of the millennium, the Roman emperor Augustus was seen by many as 
inaugurating a Roman “Messianic age.”214 The Imperial Cult had long existed side by side 
with these other cultic organizations; Smyrna in Asia Minor housed one of the earliest cults 
of the Goddess Rome, at least as far back as the second century B.C.E.215 Under Domitian 
the cult took Caesar as its focus, but when the temple to the Emperor’s genius was built in 
Pisidian Antioch, it merely gave architectural substance to ideas that had long been held in 
that part of the Empire.216 The emperor’s deification was seen as a natural metamorphosis of 
the pax Deorum, the sacred treaty between Rome’s political establishment and the sacred 
foundation of their social order. It was also under Domitian that it became a requirement for 
all loyal Roman subjects to offer wine and incense in sacrifice to the emperor, a demand that 
will figure significantly into the discussion of Christian martyrdom.217  
The imagined arrangement between Romans and their gods was not a matter of 
inward faith and conviction, but a relationship where the former performed their duties in 
exchange for the latter’s protection of the people. The pax Deorum defined social life in 
Rome, was seen as its guarantor and enforcer, and it was not uncommon for people to see 
plague or pestilence as the result of angering the gods.218 The demand for Romans to 
sacrifice to the emperor was part of a broader understanding of the people’s obligations in 
maintaining peaceful conditions. As a result of its expanded place in the maintenance of 
social life, the Imperial Cult gained prominence as the Republic gave way to the Empire.219 
The middle of the second century saw the height of devotion to the Emperor coincide with 
the development of Christianity, resulting in a competition for devotion that characterizes the 
experience in Asia Minor. 
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The “religious” nature of cults combined with the cosmically anchored essence of the 
Roman order and the religio-nationalist concept of Judaism provided the context for 
Christian identity, blending a religious ideology with political commitments. Relying on their 
self-conception as the ‘chosen’ of the God who created the universe (M. Carp. 10; M. Just. 
1.5) Christians saw themselves different than their contemporary salvation-based cults. Their 
attempts to distinguish themselves from the Jewish communities of the time increasingly 
marked them as not-Jewish. Simultaneously, faced with the increasing concentration of 
power in the Empire, the Christian resistance to Roman cultic practices marked them as not-
Roman. They were something novel, and therefore seen by Roman subjects as potentially 
subversive. 
Such a concern largely stemmed from their estrangement the mos maiorum, the 
unwritten assemblage of ancestral customs of the Romans that structured social life and gave 
shape to their sovereign imaginary. It was transgressions against this that seemed to inflame 
Roman passions, not on the basis of the transgressive teachings themselves but the effect 
those teachings were feared to have on public morality.220 Christian anti-social tendencies 
combined with their unwillingness to participate in religious practices marked them as 
outsiders to a broader community that scapegoated such outsiders for all sorts of misfortunes. 
They were not the only group to suffer on account of such concerns, as Kate Cooper has 
shown, and the perception that they were the only minority group suffering suspicion and 
suppression sprang from the success of their rhetoric.221 
This isolation was not only seen as insulting to the common sensibilities, marking 
them as untrustworthy, but showed them to be practitioners of prava religio or religio illicita: 
illegal, depraved or false religion opposed to those practices sanctioned by Rome. Any nation 
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or collective that had been practicing their particular traditions for many years – and whose 
practices did not interfere or disturb Romans – were religio licita, deemed acceptable once 
incorporated into the larger religious context and determined to pose no danger to the Roman 
order.222 ‘Licit’ religions united people under Rome, illicit ones created a place for anti-
empire sentiment and negative attitudes towards fellow Roman subjects.  
‘Wrong’ religion was not only seen as out of keeping with contemporary 
metaphysical knowledges, but was seen as a direct threat to the state and proper authority 
according to those like Tacitus and Livy (who both designated Christianity a prava 
religio).223 Other authorities resisted such an extreme label, such as Pliny, imperial governor 
in Asia Minor under the Emperor Trajan, who referred to Christianity as a “degenerate 
superstitio carried to extravagant lengths” (Letters, X.96.8).224 Tacitus, writing a few decades 
before Pliny, also famously used superstitio in describing the Christians (Annals XV.44.5). 
While related to religio, the use of superstitio has led some scholars to assert that Romans 
thought very little of Christianity in the early Empire.225 The murkiness is reflected the 
inconsistent status awarded to Christianity in texts of this period. 
The conflict between the Christians and the Romans was not about religious beliefs – 
orthodoxy – as much as it was about proper and appropriate religious practices – 
orthopraxy.226 Groups that engaged in ‘illicit’ religion were thought to take part in black 
magic, conspiracies against the state and disloyal oaths. Foreign cults were of prime concern 
in this regard; the Bacchanalia had been outlawed by Senate decree in 186 B.C.E due to its 
designation as a prava religio and the belief that the practices inspired a massive conspiracy 
against Rome. Such activity carried a sentence of death for those found guilty. When 
recalling the event, Livy reminds his readers that “men wisest in all divine and human law 
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used to judge that nothing was so potent in destroying religion as sacrifices performed by 
external and foreign ritual.” (Livy, History of Rome, 39.16.9)  
However, while the history of Christianity until the Edict of Milan in 313 C.E. is one 
of repeated public anger and attacks against Christians, the extent and institutionalization of 
those persecutions was often exaggerated.227 As Candida Moss has suggested, the label 
“persecution” relies on modern ideas of the mechanisms of violence that the state directs, and 
anachronistic appellations can be troublingly inaccurate.228 That does not mean that the trials 
of Christians were completely imagined, only that the accusations of concentrated and 
systematic persecutions of Christians by Rome at the turn of the second century were likely 
more a result of Christian rhetoric than actual substance.229 Or, in the words of W.H.C. 
Frend, the Christian claims of persecution in the early second century are met with a “conflict 
of evidence.”230 
Rome would engage in systematic persecution against Christians in the following 
centuries, particularly under Decius and Diocletian, but during this period we see decentered 
outbursts of anger against an isolationist group in isolated areas across the empire. We have 
seen that Christians had set themselves apart in numerous ways: they were intimately 
connected to an ethnic group that had rebelled against the Empire several times in recent 
memory, but insisted they were distinct from that group, which in turn excluded Christians 
from the allowances made for to the Jewish communities on account of their antiquity. They 
did not respect the cosmic order upon which the Roman order was founded, making them 
transgressors of the pax Deorum as well as the unwritten customs of the mos maiorum. As 
practitioners of depraved and illicit religion, their commitment to the social order was 
suspect. The centripetal forces drawing political power into the center further differentiated 
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any social outliers amidst a culture of ostentatious allegiance. All this resulted in regular 
eruptions of suspicion and anger against a group that made ready scapegoats for social ills. 
That anger found its release not through mob violence, but rather through the auspices of 
Roman law.  
 
 
 
Legal Recourse against Christians 
The tales of early Christian martyrdoms have a common setting: the legal forums of 
Rome. This is a site where opposing parties settled disputes, and more importantly where the 
legal order was reasserted and made plain on the bodies of Roman subjects. The Roman legal 
system distinguished between private crimes, those that were directed against an individual 
party, and public crimes that threatened Roman life more generally. Even crimes Western 
countries today would consider to be public, like theft, assault or even murder were held to 
be “private” offenses in the early empire of Rome. Public crimes, which apparently included 
the crime of Christianity, were understood to have been committed against the whole of the 
community, transgressions that demanded the reaffirmation of the political order’s 
foundations.231 All Roman subjects were thereby inculcated into the ritual of justice, since 
they had a stake in their order’s reestablishment, and those found guilty were marked as 
outsiders to social order, requiring acts of atonement before being readmitted to the body 
politic.232  
Trials for criminal, or “public” offenses were just that, public – held in open venues 
often as part of larger spectacles, which let the populace – those who were symbolically party 
to the suit – observe the rectification of the wrong.233 During the trial Roman solidarity was 
ritually reinforced, and witnessing the penance reassured law-abiding spectators were living 
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rightly. The Roman arena where trials took place was a central site for reiterating the cultural 
and cosmic truths upon which Roman order and identity rested.234 They were designed 
explicitly as spaces for the ritualized assertion of Roman power, providing what Castelli 
called “spatial, performative, and symbolic idioms for defining, articulating and reinscribing 
social identities and hierarchies, power relations and public allegiances.”235  
The trials themselves provided a physical means by which to re-enact Rome’s power 
before a large audience. Judith Perkins notes that the public activities put on under the 
banners of Rome demonstrated the social hierarchy which “became reified through other 
public enactment… Participation confirmed the person’s allegiance with the worldview and 
concomitant political structures”236 They provided the scaffolds where Roman power was 
made visible, surrounded by rituals which produced the awe that transformed their violence 
into power.237 Other displays that took place in the arena during gladiatorial contests and 
mock battles conflated the real and the imaginary, creating a space where the worlds flow 
into each other and actual events replicate the legendary. The trial settings were symbolically 
laden venues, where the Roman imaginary was made one with reality.238 
Though it was the Roman imaginary given shape and actuality in these venues, a too 
idealized view of Roman law would be misleading. The deployment of the legal system 
depended on the will of provincial officials, and that will was at least as influenced by local 
elites and popular sentiment as it was by the central Roman regime.239 As Cicero had 
asserted, “salus populi suprema lex esto” (“the health of the people should be the supreme 
law,” De Legibus 3.8.), which allowed for a broad justification for legal action against any 
group suspected of harboring ill will against the Roman populace. Ramsay MacMullen 
affirms that those of high socio-economic status were able to manipulate the law to reaffirm 
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their status and its concomitant perks,240 and Elias Bickerman has gone as far to suggest that 
second century innovations in Roman law contributed to a setting where Christians could be 
tried and convicted on that account alone.241 His argument is persuasive especially 
considering the biopolitical nature of any state’s interest in maintaining the health of its 
populace and dealing with threats to that health. Justice was directed by prevailing attitudes, 
and the might of Rome was deployed by the presiding authority in the name of the populi 
Romani. 
While the emperor was the sovereign of the Empire, it would be a mistake to assume 
the power over life and death was confined to him alone. Localized provincial powers were 
authorized to make their own decisions on law and order, making the proconsuls, prefects 
and governors functionally as sovereign as the emperor. The provinces are better understood 
as semi-autonomous local governments that looked to encourage and evoke Roman 
sentiments while maintaining peace. Trial processes varied widely between Rome and the 
peripheral provinces242 and criminal proceedings relied not on a professionalized 
prosecutorial corps, but rather on the local magistrates to inquire into the charge.243 While 
recourse to the higher authorities was possible, and Roman citizens merited judgment in the 
capital (evidenced in both Ignatius’ letter and M. Lyons 1.44, where the provincial authority 
waited on orders from Rome before executing citizens) as well as preferential means of 
execution (rather than being consigned to the beasts, they were humanely beheaded, see M. 
Lyons 1.47), a great deal of power remained with the provincial authorities. Smaller numbers 
therefore could have a significant impact on the cases brought before authorities, and exerted 
disproportionate pressure on those rendering judgment.  
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This localization helps explain how the legal structure was deployed against 
Christians. Though the legislative basis for trying Christians likely originated in Nero’s 
scapegoating the group for the great fire of 64 C.E., during the second century the basis for 
Christianity’s illegality was not entirely clear.244 There is evidence in the writings of Pliny 
that the contemporary authorities knew that to be a Christian was to be a criminal, but were 
unclear on basis for that criminality. Pliny routinely wrote letters to the emperor Trajan about 
complications he faced during his administration, and in several he confessed ignorance as to 
how to proceed when Christians were brought before him. He was unsure, he confided to 
Trajan, “what offenses it is the practice to punish or investigate,” and even “whether the 
name [of Christian] itself, even without offenses, or only the offenses associates with the 
name are to be punished” (Letters, x.96.2). Provincial authorities appear to have been 
confused by Christians who seemed exemplary citizens in one moment, then flagrantly 
disregarded the gods and disobeyed Roman officials.245 Pliny was apparently faced with a 
plague of people being denounced as Christians, and though he was not clear on the basis for 
their illegality, he did affirm that their “obstinacy and unbending perversity deserve[d] to be 
punished” (Letters, x.96.4).  
Trajan advised his counselor to use the courts to prove any illegal activity, but to not 
rely on anonymous accounts or the feeling of the crowd.246 Not only does this support the 
popular rather than institutional nature of the persecution – the emperor did not demand Pliny 
investigate further to root out all other Christians – but the reliance on a criminal trial could 
be construed as an attempt to provide some protection for Christians against the mob. The 
emperor did not expressly affirm that being a Christian in itself was a crime, but rather 
focused on proving other crimes to merit punishment. The result was capital trials of 
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Christians, but in a very decentered and disorganized fashion, much different from the 
systematic persecution constructed in Christian texts. But the question remains, under what 
legal criteria were Christians tried?  
Christian writers appear baffled by this question, showing confusion at what laws 
were behind Christian prosecution. Athenagoras of Athens wondered in his Legatio pro 
Christianis why Christians “are hated for our name” (1). In this text, composed around 176-
177 C.E., the apologist pleads with the emperor for toleration on philosophical grounds, 
assuring the emperor that though they have been persecuted they harbor no ill will for the 
empire or its leader, and remain faithful and loyal members of the Roman community.247 
Prior his death, Lucius was reported to have questioned the arrest of Ptolemaeus, who was 
“merely asked whether he was a Christian” by the prefect Urbicus (M. Ptole. 11). Lucius 
asked “What is the charge? He has not been convicted of adultery, fornication, murder, 
clothes-stealing, robbery, or of any crime whatsoever; yet you have punished this man 
because he confesses the name of Christian?” (M. Ptole. 16-17). Urbicus responds only by 
accusing Lucius in words aimed at recalling the accusation of Peter in Mark’s gospel: “I 
think you too are one of them” (M. Ptole. 17; cf. Mk. 14:70; Mt. 26:73). In Polycarp’s acta 
the author suggests that the Romans carrying out the persecution themselves were confused 
by the program, even feeling pity that they had to arrest the aged man (M. Poly. 8.1).  
Athenagoras notes that three charges are often leveled against Christians: “atheism, 
Thyestean feasts [eating children], and Oedipodean intercourse [incest]” (Legatio, 3), charges 
that are echoed in the second century Martyrs of Lyons (1.9, 14, 26; see too Minucius Felix, 
Octavius, ix.5-7). Mary Beard and her colleagues appropriately characterize these kinds of 
accusations as “fundamental breaches of the code of humanity,” aimed at placing the 
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activities of Christians so firmly outside the bounds of decency that no one would consider 
objecting to their arrest.248 Such excessive and acerbic accusations appeared regularly in 
Christian accounts. Athenagoras of course dismisses the charges with prejudice, asking the 
emperor to rely on his own observations of Christian character. 
Since Tertullian, two main formal charges have been associated with the second 
century Christian trials: maiestas and sacrilegium (Apologeticum, 10.1). The first is often 
understood as treason, actions against the Roman state or emperor, but which fully meant 
diminishing the majesty of the Roman people.249 Sacrilegium originally meant the theft of 
sacred things but later came to refer to those “who through ignorance or negligence 
confound, violate and offend the sanctity of a divine law” (Codex Justinian 9.29.1). Here we 
return to concerns around the pax Deorum; both maiestas and sacriligium are offenses 
against the divine foundation of Rome, and both were charges reserved for exceptional 
circumstances.250  
The charge of maiestas does not appear to have been explicitly leveled against 
Christians prior to Decius’ more concentrated persecution in the middle third century.251 
However the ways the bodies of Christians were treated is consistent with convictions for 
treason,252 and in a system where “the health of the people should be the supreme law,” 
explicit allegations of sacriligium can implicitly insinuate maiestas in the attitudes of some 
officials. In addition, sacriligium plays a role in Roman law parallel to the role played by 
atheous in Greek law: neither can be considered a strictly religious offense because both 
carry important political ramifications, and suggest some sort of disloyalty, even danger, to 
the state.253 So even if maiestas was not a formal charge against the Christians in this era, it is 
86 
 
reasonable to suppose the idea exerted some influence on people’s attitudes towards 
Christians.  
Either way, the relationship between maiestas and sacrilegium and even atheism is 
instructive for the relationship between Christians and Rome. There was no separation of 
religion and politics in the Roman Empire, and religious law was treated as a subcategory of 
public law. Roman law, civic identity and religious obligations all overlapped in the ideology 
of the empire.254 Atheism was seen as a rejection of the common basis of Roman identity and 
the metaphysical provisions for the maintenance of Roman order.255 The Roman republic had 
long been famous for their religio, their devotion to their gods. As far back as the second 
century B.C.E., the Greek historian Polybius averred “the quality in which the Roman 
commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my opinion, the nature of their religious 
convictions. I believe that it is the very thing which among other peoples is an object of 
reproach, I mean superstition, which maintains the cohesion of the Roman State.”256 The 
relationship between religion and state authority helps illuminate the ambiguous charges 
against Christian identity, and the repeated appearance of charges of atheism in Christian 
texts (e.g. M. Poly. 3.2; M. Just. 3.4), mystifying a group that defines its core identity through 
religion. Believing in the Empire’s gods meant accepting the state’s authority, and those 
preaching against those gods thereby spoke against the state power. At issue was not a matter 
of faith in things unseen, or personal devotion to a godhead, but rather the traditions, 
practices, and models of behavior oriented by ascriptions to Rome’s gods. 
 The ambiguous nature of the charges against Christians – and if the Roman 
authorities were unclear as to their nature how much less clear must it have been to the 
populace – was put to good use in Christian rhetoric. In the words of Elizabeth Castelli: 
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the absence of a precise legal foundation for the prosecutions of Christians here is 
simultaneously, then, a likely historical reality and an ideologically useful narrative that 
actually serves Christian rhetorical interests. It allows for an indictment of the ruling 
authorities as themselves not governed by “law” and for the vindication of Christians as 
embodiments of innocence – hence the repeated assurances by figures in the narrative that, no 
matter what the accusation, Christians are always innocent of it.257 
Castelli’s assertion is certainly borne out in the writings of Tertullian, where he averred the 
nomen Christianum composed the core of the charges against Christians (Apol. 2.10-18, 4.11, 
21.3). He repeatedly rails against the injustice of legal punishments based solely on the name, 
irrespective of whether or not the illicit activities associated with the name have any merit.258 
The Roman legal authorities are repeatedly the foil in the texts that claims to recount 
trials of Christians, where the laws of Rome were decried as mechanisms of injustice 
opposing the just system of the Christian God. Polycarp’s tale recounts the actions of 
Germanicus, who pulled a reticent lion on top of his body “to be freed all the more quickly 
from this unjust and lawless life” (M. Poly 3.1; cf. Ig. Rom. 5), while Polycarp himself 
angrily shouts at the “lawless pagans” attending his trial (M. Poly. 9.2). The martyr Carpus 
and the martyrs of Lyons both explicitly link the workings of the Roman law to the designs 
of the Devil (M. Car. 6-7; M. Lyons 1.5-6),259 and the Martyrdom of Ptolemaeus and Lucius 
begins with a story of a woman who divorces her husband to avoid “becoming an accomplice 
in his crimes and injustices” (M. Ptole. 6).260 This is unsurprising considering the place of the 
legal system in maintaining the Roman order, and the manner in which the legal system was 
used to reinforce social hierarchy.261 Moreover, these unjust deaths could be read as 
confirmation of the end-time promised in Christian prophecies and fueled by apocalyptic 
fervor. 
The Christians also made great rhetorical use of the charges of atheism. For a start, it 
provided a way for Christian apologists to align the martyrs with the familiar tale of Socrates, 
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whose noble death also came by way of charges of atheism.262 In Plato’s dialogue the charge 
of atheism is framed not as the absence of belief, as it is in the modern age, but rather in the 
wrong belief, not believing “in the gods the state believes in” (Apology, 24b). More 
importantly, charges of atheism allowed Christians to invert the symbolic system of Roman 
justice. When Polycarp is told to recant his transgressions, swear by the genius of the 
emperor263 and say “Away with the atheists!” he “looked at the mob of lawless pagans who 
were in the arena, and shaking his fist at them, groaned, looked up to heaven, and said: 
‘Away with the atheists!’” (M. Poly. 3.2-3. See too M. Lyons 1.26 where the Roman and 
Jewish audience are referred to as “blasphemers.”) The Christian affirmation of the God that 
“made heaven and earth” (M. Carp. 10) places the Christian God over those of the Romans, 
thereby asserting a relationship with divinity that is not subject to the pax deorum, or rather 
affirms a separate and superior pax Deī.  
Inverting the charge of atheism gave the Christians the means to assert that they alone 
had access to the true religio.264 The affirmation of a separate and superior relationship to 
divinity contributed to the social isolation experienced by both Christians and Jews. Their 
stubborn separateness led to a situation where, as Frend puts it, “even those who were 
prepared to disbelieve the popular charges against the Christians regarded their arrogant 
assertion of a unique God whose ear they possessed, and their demand for special 
recognitions as His true servants as both sacrilegious and insane.”265 Pliny’s disgust in the 
face of their perverse obstinacy stems from this same source (Letters x.96.4). The foggy 
nature of the crime of Christianity provided Christian apologists with a symbolically charged 
legal setting by which to affirm the truth of their own pax Deī by inverting the existing 
dynamic that established the Roman political and theological system.  
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Tales of Christian trials came to a crescendo with the demand to sacrifice, a ritualized 
demonstration of allegiance to Rome meant to settle the charges of separatism and anti-
Roman sentiment. In a letter to Trajan, Pliny describes the place of sacrifice in the process he 
used when those accused of being Christian appeared before him: 
I interrogated these as to whether they were Christians; those who confessed I interrogated a 
second and a third time, threatening them with punishment; those who persisted I ordered 
executed… Those who denied that they were or had been Christians, when they invoked the 
gods in words dictated by me, offered prayer with incense and wine to your image, which I 
had ordered to be brought for this purpose together with statues of the gods, and moreover 
cursed Christ – none of which those who are really Christians, it is said, can be forced to do – 
these I thought should be discharged. Others named by the informer declared that they were 
Christians, but then denied it, asserting that they had been but had ceased to be, some three 
years before, others many years, some as much as twenty-five years. They all worshipped 
your image and the statues of the gods, and cursed Christ. (Letters x.96.3-6, emphases 
added)266 
Pliny thus creates the quintessential situation for martyrdom. Those confessed Christians see 
themselves faced with a command to transgress divine law and live, or remain constant and 
perish. The Romans, on the other hand, saw the requisite sacrifice as “signal[ing] one’s 
commitment to the shared enterprise of collective life and one’s participation in and 
submission to the complex bonds of allegiance and protection that linked the social and 
political world to the realm of the divine.”267 It was a literal embodiment of the system that 
guided an individual’s action, giving reality not only to the ‘fact’ of an individual’s belief in 
the system, but to the system itself within the bodily movements of the accused. 
The requirement that Christians sacrifice also helps illuminate the kind of threat the 
group was seen to pose. Roman religio was centered on the act of sacrifice; the Roman 
philosopher Macrobius went as far as to define Roman piety as the knowledge of how to 
sacrifice.268 In its performance, the relationship between the gods and the social system was 
established in full view of citizenry; it was a credo expressed in action, an action that showed 
what one believed.269 Sacrifices in Rome were always accompanied by prayers for the 
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Roman people, reaffirming the divine nature of their social connections through reference to 
a shared Roman identity. In times of war and crisis, particularly, sacrifice was linked to the 
need for unity among Roman subjects, serving as a powerful symbolic reminder that the 
many were in fact one.270 It demonstrated the consenting actor who recognized the divine 
nature of the social order, helping further inculcate it into the minds of the populace.271 
This is what necessitated the public nature of the sacrificial performance. Witnessing 
an individual destroying something in accordance with a perceived obligation communicated 
through an authority of cosmic order demonstrates that the one sacrificing a) believes such an 
agent controls their destiny and b) that their relationship to the cosmic authority supersedes 
their relationship to their own physical desires.272 Through the visible practice of sacrificing, 
Roman domination was cloaked in voluntary submission. Power ceased appearing as being 
determined by threats of physical violence, and was instead perceived as operating on the 
basis of consent.  
As Rome’s relationship with the gods lay at the foundation of their system of justice, 
it is unsurprising that sacrifice appeared as the means of rectifying accusations like those 
against the Christians. Condemnations of opposition to the social order could be alleviated by 
a public acceptance of the order’s legitimacy; the public nature of the crime demanded a 
public confession. Roman sacrifice, then, served as a religious ritual of allegiance that 
reaffirmed anthropological concepts (linking man to the gods), sociological concepts 
(reaffirming status and class) and the symbolic system itself (reinforcing the values attached 
to the gods). 
While the requirement to sacrifice was generally applied to the populace of the 
empire, it should be noted that on account of their antiquity, Jewish communities enjoyed an 
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exemption from sacrificing to the emperor’s genius. Because of their traditions established 
for generations, some Jewish communities enjoyed a level of self-governance under their 
own laws. The Roman civil law, the ius civile, applied to all Roman subjects, but some 
groups in the bricolage of ethnic communities were allowed to settle issues on the basis of 
their traditional laws, their ius gentium (N.B. where the two systems collided Roman law 
would still take precedence). Sacrificing in the Roman style would be transgressive of Jewish 
religious obligations, so a substitute was arranged where the emperor would be honored in 
the Temple sacrifice rather than in Rome’s sacred spaces. The act of sacrificing itself was 
still a requirement of loyal subjects; it was in fact the refusal to continue sacrifices honoring 
Caesar that established the Jewish people as in revolt.273 Christians therefore likely felt they 
too should enjoy such an exemption, but they were excluded thanks to their blatant efforts to 
distinguish themselves from their Jewish contemporaries, leaving them without a history or 
acceptable alternative practices.274 The novelty of Christianity meant they had no means of 
avoiding their obligation to publicly honor the emperor.275 
At the directive to sacrifice, Christian martyrs uniformly refused. In the Acts of 
Carpus, Papylus and Agathonicê, Papylus proudly states that in his long service to God he 
“never offered sacrifice to idols,” (M. Carp. 34), while Carpus avers “it is not possible 
(adūnaton) for me to sacrifice to these demons with their deceptive appearances. For those 
who sacrifice to them are like them” (M. Carp. 6). It is not the case that he chooses not to; he 
cannot, it would be against his identity as a Christian, which fundamentally defines him.276 
He has his life through Christ, and “the living do not offer sacrifice to the dead” (M. Carp. 
14). The religio-political obligations of Romans were confronted with the commitments of 
Christians; to uphold one meant rejecting the other. Those Christians that decided to forego 
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their responsibilities to Christ and sacrifice as Roman authorities demanded (as many did, see 
M. Lyons 1.11-12, M. Poly. 4.1),277 perpetuated the hegemony of Rome.  
Polycarp acknowledged that Christians were commanded to “pay respect to the 
authorities that God has assigned us” (M. Poly. 10.2), following the Apostle Paul’s 
recognition of the basic, but not ultimate, authority of the state (e.g. Rom. 13:1-7) and Jesus’ 
ambiguous statement “Give therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to 
God the things that are God’s” (Matt. 22:21; cf. Mk. 12:17, Lk. 20:25, 1 Pet. 2:17). But the 
position of the Christian martyrs may be better described by the martyr Speratus, who 
asserted that his community does not “recognize the worldly empire” of the Romans, because 
his ruler is the “emperor of kings and all peoples” (M. Scill. 6). Sacrificing acknowledged 
authority, and the martyrs denied Roman legitimacy by demonstrating that while any agent of 
Rome could impair the body, action itself could not be forced. Rome may have the ability to 
punish, but that does not equate to the right to command. 
Added to the command to sacrifice was the requirement to “curse Christ.”278 As Pliny 
noted, Christians were thought unable to do these things; a person could not simultaneously 
curse the supreme authority of their group and continue to be considered a member of that 
group.279 Two outcomes were possible: either the accused would perform the sacrifices, curse 
Christ and thereby eschew their Christian identify, or they would not and show that the 
accusation is valid and merit their punishment. When this demand was issued in the 
Martyrdom of Polycarp, the eponymous martyr responds by confirming Pliny’s belief. 
Remaining unmoved by the Roman officials’ plea to sacrifice and curse Christ, Polycarp tells 
them that it is not in his power (dūnemai) to blaspheme against his king and savior (M. Poly. 
9.2-3). This appears in the Acts of Carpus too, where Carpus responds that it is “impossible,” 
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(adūneton; M. Carp. 6, 21, 22). Blending the religious and political rule of Christ, this use of 
dūnemai is instructive: the term not only points to strength, but more so to ability. Such 
actions are outside the realm of activity available to Polycarp as a Christian – he could not 
do as they say and consider himself a Christian, and Polycarp in this moment is asserting 
himself as ultimately defined by his obeisance to Christ. It is not something he chooses not to 
do, it is something he is fundamentally unable to do.280 These affirmations of impossibility 
have a relationship to Paul’s assertion that “no one speaking by the Holy Spirit ever says ‘Let 
Jesus be cursed’” (1 Cor. 12:3). The demanded denial would demonstrate the separation of 
the speaker from the Holy Spirit.281  
When Christians were confronted with the demand to sacrifice to the emperor and 
curse Christ, two outcomes were possible: either the accused would do so, thereby 
reaffirming their identity as a Roman, or they would refuse and confirm themselves as 
Christian, validating the charges against them and earning their punishment. We are faced 
with what Elaine Scarry called the fundamental political situation, “one in which two 
locations selfhood are in a skewed relation to one another or have wholly split apart and have 
begun to work, or be worked, against one another.”282 By not participating in the ritualized 
reaffirmation of the social order, Christian martyrs attempted to assert their own conception 
of order, one based in the symbol of Christ whose voluntarily suffering and death corrected 
the situation made out of order by the first man’s sin against god. In both cases the logic 
involves the correction of an act that has transgressed the world’s order. Just as the Roman 
gods anchored the Roman order, the Christian God and his sacrifice established the Christian 
order. And just as the individual Roman benefited from an act that heralded his loyalty to 
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Rome and solidarity with his fellow Romans, so the Christian sacrifices demonstrate their 
allegiance to their God and the ultimate act of solidarity with their fellow Christians. 
 
Constructing Christian Martyrs 
In tales of Christian martyrs, the refusal to sacrifice was not the end of the story. 
Rather it served as the catalyst for the vivid descriptions of torture that befell those that 
refused. Pliny’s missives to Trajan do not mention using torture – his bureaucratic turgidity 
would likely have been repulsed by such a suggestion – and while there would have been a 
good deal of freedom at the local level for torture to be applied, the ferocity attributed to 
Roman authorities was likely largely a rhetorical tool of Christians. Tales of torture make a 
good story. Not only do the gory details rivet listeners (a technique that resonates with John 
Foxe’s medieval Book of Martyrs or the fictive passio of William Wallace in Mel Gibson’s 
Braveheart), but descriptions of torture illustrate the lengths of suffering the martyrs endured 
without recanting their allegiance to Christ, precisely what traditionally was seen to 
characterize these tales as “martyrdoms” in the eyes of Christians. 
Many martyrs were portrayed as remaining utterly silent throughout the ordeal, 
seemingly unmoved by the machinations of torture. Papylus remained completely silent 
during his ordeal (M. Carp. 35), as did Alexander (M. Lyons 1.51) and many martyrs recalled 
by the author of Polycarp (M. Poly. 2.2). Polycarp’s chronicler interestingly asserted that 
their silence stemmed from their being “not present in the flesh,” likely an attempt to assure 
those Christians hearing these tales that were they themselves to be tortured they would not 
actually suffer.283 Their ability to control what comes out of their mouth while enduring the 
greatest pain imaginable was a central trope in these tales.284 
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While audience can marvel at the resilience of the silent martyrs, most martyrs had 
something to say before and during torture. If there is a common thread joining all of the 
martyr acta, aside from a painful death, it is the declaration of identity that accompanies 
every martyr’s death, most simply affirming “I am a Christian.” The martyr Sanctus falls into 
this category, repeating “Christianus sum” over and over while being tortured (M. Lyons 
1.20, 39) as did Carpus (M. Carp. 23). The declaration was even said to reverse the effects of 
torture for Blandina, whose affirmation of Christian identity “brought her refreshment, rest, 
and insensibility to her present pain” (M. Lyons 1.19).285  
“I am a Christian” functioned as a kind of slogan for Christian martyrdom. 
Christianos eimi appears in nearly every act written in Greek, while the Latin phrase 
“Christianus sum” appears almost like an incantation throughout early Christian churches. 
The Greek text Martyrs of Lyons and Vienne goes as far to record the martyr Sanctus 
responding to questions about his birthplace, nationality and name by repeatedly affirming 
his Christianity using the Latin formulation (M. Lyons 20, 39; cf. M. Carp. 29-34). Justin and 
his companions each profess that identity in turn (M. Just., 3.4, ff.), as does Polycarp (M. 
Poly. 10.2), and the martyr Carpus declared his “primary and highest name is Christian” (M. 
Carp. 3). Being recognized as a Christian was clearly the most important aspect of the self-
understanding of individuals, supplanting any other social identity.286 Their ability to control 
their speech amidst agony demonstrated that no amount of pain could bring these martyrs to 
speak against the truth of who they were; they are Christian, they will either live as a 
Christian or dies as a Christian. This ability to maintain speech through agony is a common 
part off the martyrdom trope, and gives some insight into why martyrdom is often thought to 
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be death for a belief; it is not the belief itself, however, but rather the public confession of 
that belief that is at issue. 
The question then needs to be asked: what is this identity? What did it mean to be 
Christian in the second century? This may appear to have a simple answer: Christians are 
followers of Jesus. But who it a follower of Jesus, or to phrase it as a second century 
Christian would, who is a true follower of Jesus. Such is neither a simple nor a 
straightforward question. If we rely on the level of dogma, “Christian” immediately 
fragments into Docetists, Montanists, Gnostics, Marcionites, Manicheans, along with what 
will become “orthodox.” The first few centuries of Christian history are defined by power 
struggles over who can determine what it is to be a true “Christian.” The ecumenical, 
‘catholic’ nature of the faith is still only a hope. Who was the appropriate agent of God’s 
will, and who spoke with Christ’s authority were contentious issues until the Roman bishop 
was able to achieve dominance (and for many years following). 
Moreover, social identities are in flux during the second century. Terms used to 
socially classify early Christianity vary widely in primary texts, as well as scholarly 
literature. In Greek texts we regularly find ethnos and politeia, while Latin texts often use 
genus or natio. In today’s terms these could reference ideas of an ethnicity, political 
community, nation, or class. The Martyrdom of Polycarp describes the Christian community 
as a “pious and devoted race,”287 (genou; 3.2) and Aristides’ Apologia uses the same term 
(2:1-15). Many scholars have likewise approached the burgeoning community on the basis of 
ethnicity and race, arguing these concepts best capture self-understanding as part of a group, 
particularly one with such close ties to the Jewish community.288 However we are again 
faced with the problem of splintering. Aristides’ idea of race places Christians alongside 
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Greeks and Jews, Africans and Egyptians and even Barbarians. None of these flush easily 
with any of our social classifications, blending as they do cultural, political, religious and 
national identity, all which would give us a different view of how people in the second 
century understood themselves to be “Christian.”  
Moreover, most of these labels rely heavily on geographic locale as a main 
determinant. Yet Christian texts make it clear that was not a factor in their community. As 
one recension of the Martyrdom of Justin and His Companions makes clear, “the saints did 
not have the same native city… their only city was God’s, the free city, the heavenly 
Jerusalem” (M. Justin, rec C, 1.2-3; cf. Rev. 7.9). Space and one’s relation to space was 
shifting in its relationship to identity, allowing for the idea of an omnipotent and omnipresent 
God who could not be “circumscribed by place” (M. Justin 3.1). Such a move was only 
possible after significant shifts in the understanding of ‘place’ resulted from the imperial 
Roman imperial conquest.289 
As the Roman Empire spread throughout the Mediterranean world, people found 
themselves having to reimagine their place in a much wider context, adjusting their self-
understanding to account for expansive new networks and their accompanying 
relationships.290 Nascent Roman subjectivities had to locate themselves in a cosmopolitan 
space very similar to 21st century identities, no longer anchored in a single locale. While 
today it has become common to speak of “transnational” identities, the identity of Christians 
(and, for that matter, Romans) were what Judith Perkins has called “trans-empire social 
constructions.”291 This is a period in which subjects were encouraged to maintain multiple 
associations that we would respectively categorize as social, political, civic and religious. In 
Asia Minor, we could expect to find subjects who understood themselves as members of the 
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Roman State, culturally Greek, initiates into multiple soteriological cults, and members of 
their smaller local communities.292 
The martyrs who affirm their identity as Christian place their position vis-à-vis God 
above all other configurations of social relations. It surpasses their local, cultural and even 
biological relations, as evidenced by the testimony of the martyr Papylus; when asked by the 
Roman proconsul if he had any children, Papylus proudly stated he had many, at which point 
a helpful member of the crowd explained that he has no biological children but refers rather 
to his children in Christ, those who he brought up in the ways of Christianity (M. Carp. 29). 
Aristides extends this into social class as well, holding that any Christian whose slaves 
convert to Christianity should be considered “brethren without distinction” (Apologia, 2.15). 
When one became a Christian, every other matrix of the self was exceeded. The gospels 
prefigured this situation when Jesus declared “whoever comes to me and does not hate father 
and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and even life itself, cannot be my 
disciple” (Lk. 14:25-27; cf. Mt. 10:37, Jn. 12:25).293 In the context of the Roman Empire, that 
meant to become Christian was to “exuere patriam,” disowning and forsaking their 
relationship to their fatherland in preference of their new identity.294 The command to place 
the “Christian” life above all other relationships was formulated through the acta as the 
fulfillment of gospel law, establishing a fundamental ontology determined by the Christian 
symbolic order.295  
Letters by Ignatius of Antioch support that interpretation, regularly encouraging his 
flock to recognize fellow Christians as their first and foremost neighbors (Ig. Magn. 6.2) who 
are also “servants of God” (Ig. Poly. 6.1; Ig. Phil. 8.1). There are suggestions that 
participation in the Eucharist, the central Christian ritual meal was the touchstone of 
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Christian identity (see, for example, Ig. Eph. 5.2), as was the expressed belief that Christ 
truly died on the Cross and was resurrected (e.g. Ig. Smyr. 3.2-3). Still, the commonplace 
scholarly move to eschew considerations of orthopraxy in order to assert orthodoxy as the 
determinant relies too much on later competitive doctrinal interpretations.296 Ultimately both 
are necessary, but neither sufficient to establish “true” Christian identity. Ignatius stresses 
that ritual constancy and proper belief are both important because those result in living 
properly according to the will of God, the ultimate determinant of Christian identity (Ig. Eph. 
1.1, 3.2; Ig. Trall. 2.2, 6.1-3; Ig. Smyr. 7.1-2). Ignatius answers the question “who are the 
Christians” by asserting they are the obedient members of a specific power hierarchy that has 
Jesus at its head. Loyal members of this religio-political configuration believe in the divinity 
(and thereby authority) of Christ,297 and therefore act in ways deemed proper. Public activity 
that demonstrates obedience to God lay at the core of those who understand themselves as 
Christians. 
Christian identity was determined on the basis of a symbolic order that gives shape to 
self-understanding and provides guidelines of action. For Ignatius, the ekklēsia was a direct 
reflection of the will of God.298 His letters are largely urgings toward unity with their 
Christian brethren under the authority of the (sanctioned) bishop who could transmit that will 
(see for example Ig. Poly. 1.2; Ig. Phil. 1.4).299 The fundamental nature of Christian identity 
was – like Jewish identity – that of a chosen people, bound to follow the laws of a sovereign 
God who stood above the cosmos but who had incarnated on earth to serve as a model for 
true life and lead His followers to everlasting life. Fully appreciating the nature of this social 
group requires that we cease approaching Christianity as a religion that is somehow separate 
from questions of power.300 As Perkins has it, “whatever else Christian discourse was doing, 
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it was forging the space for a new power site outside the oversight of the imperial gaze.”301 
Using terms like “the faith” as a label for the institution of Christianity leads modern readers 
to consider it only in terms of an internal connection of belief, signaling a differentiation of 
the religious sphere from other spheres of power.302  
Early Christian writings repeatedly warn against any separation of religious identity 
from political authority. When speaking about their relationship to Jesus, the same blend of 
concepts that are used in reference to Rome and its political theology are used in reference to 
Christian divinity. References to God as the Father were made at a time where the emperor 
was known as Pater Patriae, Father of the Fatherland. Ignatius repeatedly referred to Christ 
as his kurios, a term meaning lord or master, as well as basileus, a king. Lucius calls Him the 
“king of heaven” (M. Ptole. 19), while the Scillitan martyr Speratus goes as far as to assert 
that the God of the Christians is the “emperor of kings and all peoples” (M. Scill. 6).303 The 
“kingdom of God” expected to be inaugurated by the Parousia was not merely a metaphorical 
monarchy.304 These titles of divinity are as much political designations as spiritual ones.  
This is reinforced by the concept of blasphemy (blasphēmian), which found purchase 
in reference to opponents of Rome and Christ alike. Polycarp declared that blasphemy 
against his king and savior was beyond his power (M. Poly. 9.3), which is mirrored in the 
concerns of the martyrs of Lyons about the “sons of perdition” blaspheming against the way 
of God (M. Lyons 1.48).305 At the same time, the martyr Carpus was accused of blaspheming 
the Roman gods and emperors (M. Carp. 21).306 Such similarity may be due to Christian 
rhetoric rather than reflecting Roman understandings, but it still sheds light on how 
Christians understood their relationship to the divine, mirroring the politico-theological basis 
of Christian criminality and reinforcing the need to approach both systems in the same vein. 
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The contest taking place upon the bodies of the martyrs was between vying divinities: Christ 
and the Roman pantheon.307 Speaking and acting in ways one demanded meant blaspheming 
against the other; abiding by the laws of one meant being a criminal in the eyes of the other. 
The Roman demand to sacrifice was part of the system that reinforced that 
conception, as it served as a demonstration of how those of good character act. It affirmed 
that those performing sacrifice accept the symbolically represented cosmic order, and was 
concerned with acting in accord with principles derived therefrom. Moreover, the sovereign 
imaginary itself was publicly created in the act of sacrifice, be it by the destruction of 
incense and wine, or life itself. At issue was a struggle between the Roman reality, grounded 
in the Roman pantheon and affirmed in performing a sacrifice, and the burgeoning Christian 
reality, one that was assured by the appearance of the Messiah, and confirmed in participants 
becoming a sacrifice. 
The acknowledgment of power that was inherent in Roman sacrifice was anathema to 
Christians. They could not curse Christ, nor could they sacrifice to the idol of Caesar. To 
sacrifice would be to deny that Jesus had been the last sacrifice needed for the salvation of 
mankind. The gospel passage that graces myriad signs at sporting events is John 3:16: “For 
God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may 
not perish but may have eternal life.” This speaks in the language of sacrifice; Christ was 
sacrificed for mankind. Paul’s letters make this most explicit, celebrating Christ’s willingness 
to “give himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God” (Eph. 5:2). The messiah’s 
appearance on earth, Paul affirmed, was to “remove sin by the sacrifice of himself” (Heb 
9:26; cf. 1 Jn. 2:2).308 The expiatory sacrifice accomplished in Christ’s death in a great sense 
is the fundamental Christian dogma (for only a few salient examples, see Rom. 5:6, 8:32; 1 
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Cor. 15:3-4). However, the Christian belief that Christ’s incarnation removed any further 
need for sacrifice did not preclude them from making great use of sacrificial discourse.309 
The Christian conception of Christ as sacrifice was influenced by both Jewish and 
Greco-Roman conceptions of sacrifice.310 From the former, the resonance of the Passover 
sacrifice of the lamb is evident in Paul’s calling Jesus the “Paschal Lamb” (1 Cor. 5:7), the 
numerous references to Christ as the “lamb of God” (Jn. 1:29, 1:36 cf. Rev. 5:6, 21:14) and 
the atoning power of the “blood of the lamb” (Rev. 7:14).311 Also significant were ideas 
provided by Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the only day when the Temple’s central 
room – the Holy of Holies – could be entered (this is mentioned in relation to Christ’s 
deliverance, e.g. Heb. 9:12). On this day, the sins of Israel were ritually transferred to the 
lamb’s Caprinae cousin, a goat. This expiatory rite provided the Jewish community with a 
dynamic of social redemption and a release from sin, precisely what Jesus’ death was seen to 
accomplish for Christians. In fact, there is good reason to suspect that the atoning nature of 
Jesus’ crucifixion and death was part of the earliest ideas of the Church, and is evident in 
Ignatius’ letters (e.g. Ig. Eph. 19.1).312  
Christian sacrificial discourse also has parallels in the deaths of the Maccabean 
brothers in the Jewish apocryphal text IV Maccabees. The story tells of brothers who, like 
Christian martyrs, preferred death to transgressing God’s commandments, in their case by 
eating pork as commanded by the Greek king Antiochus Epiphanes. Seven brothers are 
tortured and killed by the tyrannical ruler for disobedience while their mother proudly 
watches her before she too is executed. It is not surprising that the text was likely composed 
in the first century C.E., during the same period that Christian martyrology was being 
constructed in Paul’s epistles and Luke-Acts.313 It is also unsurprising to find several clear 
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allusions to the Maccabean martyrs in Christian characters, such as Blandina who was “like a 
mother encouraging her children” (M. Lyons 1.55) and Agathonicê whose words also recall 
the tale (M. Carp. 42-44).314 
Ironically, the Imperial Cult’s sacrificial system likely provided as many symbolic 
components for the Christians as their close theological brethren, and may have been the 
central model the Christians built upon.315 Like the Jewish conceptions, it blended social 
concerns with political demands based in religious ideals.316 Roman sacrificial logic (and that 
of the Greeks before them) recognized the ascendancy of the gods through a public act of 
voluntary loss, a willing renunciation that ensures the favor of the gods. It was an act that 
made the invisible and infinite divine present in the destruction of the finite. 
However here again we see the Christian discourse inverting the logic of the Roman 
system, asserting that Christians do not sacrifice to idols or demons (M. Carp. 22, 34) 
because “those who sacrifice to them are like them” (M. Carp. 6, 8). There are multiple 
levels to this inversion, but foremost is altering the nature of the performance itself. It was 
the Roman priests who operated as mediators to the gods by performing proper sacrifices (the 
same role the High Priest served for Jewish sacrifices); Christ is the only way to God for 
Christians, and is therefore the only possible mediator (cf. Jn 14:6 – “I am the way, and the 
truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father except through Me.”). This idea is evident in 
the epistle to the Hebrews attributed to Paul (cf. Heb. 2:17, 4:14-16, 9:11) and in martyr acta, 
such as where Polycarp offers praise through the “eternal and celestial high priest Jesus 
Christ” (M. Poly. 14.3; cf. Ig. Phil. 9, where Ignatius likewise discusses Christ in relation to 
the Roman high priests).317 
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This inversion goes beyond the issue of who is the appropriate agent of sacrifice, of 
course. As is evident from the passages above, Christ was both sarificer and sacrificed, and 
the atoning nature of his death reoriented the traditional sacrificial dynamic. Aristides argued 
that God “requires not sacrifice and libation, nor even anything visible”, and declares it a 
deficiency that any god “requires burnt-offering and libation and immolations of men, and 
temples. [For] God is not in need, and none of these things are necessary for Him” (Apology 
1.2). The pleasing odors rising from the altar that Romans believed fed their gods had no 
effect on a Godhead that was utterly complete within Himself. Rather, as the gospels make 
clear, actions in accordance with God’s will are what is pleasing: “‘to love [God] with all the 
heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the strength,’ and ‘to love one’s neighbor 
as oneself,’—this is much more important than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices” (Mk. 
12:33). Adherence to the new commandment is how Christians please God and fulfill their 
side of the covenant (Mt. 9:13, 12:7; these passages look to Hosea 6:6 for precedence). This 
is what supports Carpus’ assertion that “the living do not offer sacrifice to the dead” (M. 
Carp. 11; cf. M. Carp. 6, M. Lyons 1.53). The true Christian sacrifice was the sacrifice of 
individual will to the will of God.  
Jesus communicated the demand to act in accordance with God’s will, no matter what 
the outcome, while also being the model of behavior himself. He warned his followers that to 
follow him would require the same sacrifice that he performed, and would suffer the same 
fate, which would in fact be a mark of his disciples (see, for example, the imperative to “take 
up your cross” in Mk. 8:34; Mt. 10:38, 16:24; Lk. 9:23; Jn. 16:33). Paul’s frequent allusions 
to the need to suffer with Christ likewise recognize that connection (e.g. Rom. 8:17, 2 Cor. 
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11:23), and the Book of Acts follows the apostles evangelization after Jesus’ death to make 
clear the connection between suffering and preaching in the face of persecution. 
In the second century martyrs took this command to its extreme and literal 
conclusion, affirming themselves as the true disciples and imitators of Christ. For these, 
demands to pick up their cross and suffer like Jesus did were absolute injunctions, were read 
as law.318 It was demanded that those who would follow Christ and inaugurate God’s 
kingdom imitate the sacrifice of their savior. The anguish to which Christian martyrs were 
subjected was interpreted as the same that Jesus endured in order to serve penance for the 
human race.319 Ignatius brazenly makes it clear he operates upon this premise throughout his 
letters (even beginning his missive to the Ephesians with it, Ig. Eph. 1.1), and the second 
century acta often sought to make this dynamic clear in the minds of the ekklēsia (e.g. M. 
Poly. 2.1). In her work on early Christian martyrdom, Candida Moss contends that framing 
bodily suffering as a means to imitate Christ was a process by which to commend a particular 
mode of life to Christians that brought them into the Christian story itself. Jesus was made 
real again in the actions of those who based their comportment on his model.320 
 Second century discussions of martyrdom routinely used the language of imitation. 
Ignatius repeatedly uses the frame to discuss his own martyrdom, pleading with his Roman 
audience to allow him to be an imitator of Christ’s passion (Ig. Rom. 6.3; see also Ig. Tral. 
1.2; Ig. Smy 12.1, 4.1; Ig. Eph. 10.1). Polycarp’s actions are framed as an attempt to make all 
his audience imitate Christ’s behavior (M. Poly. 1.2), while Blandina was seen to have “put 
on Christ” as she suffered her ordeals (M. Lyons 1. 42; cf. Rom 13:14, Gal. 3:27). The 
relationship between suffering and discipleship is perhaps made most explicit in Ignatius’ 
letter to the Romans, when he holds that only when his life ends in the same manner as 
106 
 
Christ’s would he be a disciple of God (Ig. Rom. 4.2). It is clear that “for Ignatius, 
discipleship is martyrdom.”321 Disciples are the exemplary followers of God, those who carry 
the Word forward following Jesus’ execution. Reading and creating the stories of martyrs in 
the frame laid out by Christ’s own passion both reinforces his model as the template for 
Christian life, and demonstrates the limits of Christian belonging. Like Christ, the martyrs 
were interpreted as becoming the victims of sacrifice while concurrently sacrificing 
themselves for God.322 
Sacrificial metaphors riddle Ignatius’ letters, such as where he pleads that the 
Christians in Rome “not seek to confer any greater favor upon me than that I be sacrificed to 
God while the altar is still prepared.” (Ig. Rom. 2.2; cf. Ig. Trall. 7.2, Ig. Ephes. 5.1). The 
instruments of torture that Ignatius was eager to embrace he saw as the means of his sacrifice 
(Ig. Rom. 4.2), and allusions to his own life as ransom for Christian lives abound as well (e.g. 
Ig. Eph. 21.1, Ig. Smyr. 10.2, Ig. Poly. 2.3, 6.1).323 Ignatius imagines the effects of his 
martyrdom mimicking the effects of Christ’s, which is unsurprising considering the 
importance he places on imitation. 
Polycarp too uses such sentiments, telling his captors there is no need to nail him to 
the stake (M. Poly. 13.3) which interestingly diverges from the imitatio Christi that so often 
dominate discussions of Polycarp’s death. Instead he is bound like an animal selected for “a 
holocaust to be made acceptable and received by God” (Μ. Poly. 14.1).324 The martyr’s life 
concludes with his request that he be received “as a rich and acceptable sacrifice, as you, God 
of truth who cannot deceive, have prepared, revealed, and fulfilled beforehand” (M. Poly. 
14.2).325 Similar allusions appear elsewhere, such as the martyrs of Lyons described as 
having been sacrificed after their lengthy endurance (M. Lyons 1.40, 1.51, 1.56). This motif 
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carries even unto the deaths themselves; Polycarp’s burning body was said to have smelled 
“as though it were smoking incense” (M. Poly. 15.2), and Attalus gave off a “sacrificial 
savor” as he burned (M. Lyons 1.52). Described in terms intentionally calling to mind the 
Roman system of sacrifice, these martyrs take their place alongside other innocent sacrificial 
victims like Christ or Isaac.326 
The shift of focus to the martyr as sacrifice has several consequences, foremost being 
the emphasis on the pure and incorruptible nature of the Christians being executed. By 
coloring the martyrs with the purity necessary for a sacrifice they symbolically contend 
against the Roman classification of Christians as criminals. It further reiterates the 
importance of moral action for all Christians, making it a popular theme for Christian 
preaching. Guy Stroumsa argued that through the reinterpretation that linked Jesus to 
sacrifice and changed the focus from the sacrifice to the innocent victim, sacrifice became 
both the central provocation for martyrdom and the central purpose of Christian life.327 
Some support for his contention exists in the sacrificial connections drawn between 
martyrdom and the central rituals of Christianity, the Eucharist and baptism – both ways in 
which death was reconfigured in the minds of early Christians. The ritual meal resonates in 
the story of Polycarp, where his body appearing as baking bread (M. Poly. 15.2) and certain 
similarities between his exhortations and Eucharistic prayers.328 Ignatius sees his body as 
“God’s wheat… ground by the teeth of wild beasts [to] be found pure bread [of Christ]” (Ig. 
Rom. 4.1, see also 7.3).329 Baptism too was a ready metaphor for the sacrifice of 
martyrdom;330 Tertullian refers to martyrdom as a “second baptism” in his early work Ad 
Scorpiace (6.9), and Origen picks up the thread in his third century Exhortation to 
Martyrdom (see esp. chap. 37). In keeping with the idea of martyrdom as perfection that 
108 
 
Ignatius and Polycarp hold to, these authors see the final initiation into the Christian faith 
coming through martyrdom, the ultimate baptism in blood. By this means alone can 
individuals “not only be called a Christian, but also be found to be one” (Ig. Rom. 3.2). 
Sacrifice itself it not one thing. Katherine McClymond highlighted the polythetic 
nature of the category, noting that any giving up qualifies as sacrifice only when it is framed 
within other actions bearing a sacrificial relationship, where loss “gains sacrificial authority 
by being performed within the context of other activities, which reinforce sacrificial 
authority.”331 Sacrifice is generally associated with some level of destruction, but the 
particular form of destruction that communicates an understanding of order where the act of 
sacrifice results in a benefit for the one sacrificing. The teachings and passion of Jesus 
provided Christians with the means by which to construct an obligation to die rather than 
renounce Christ’s teaching. A constructed discourse of sacrifice provided them with the 
means to sacralize the loss of their lives to the violence of the Empire. 
Although there is little evidence that the Romans had any interest in systematically 
persecuting Christians during this period, the gospel narratives added to the apocalyptic 
expectation in Christian life made it a moot point. Persecution was expected as part of the 
end of the world and the inauguration of the Kingdom of God, and every story of Christian 
prosecution served as a piece of evidence that the time was nigh. With the end so near, 
nothing was gained by protecting the physical body; everything was gained by giving that 
body in sacrifice. Armed with such images, the Christians understood themselves faced with 
a requirement to die when faced with demands to transgress what was required of a Christian, 
and an understanding that suffering in imitation of Christ’s suffering is what made one a 
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Christian. Christ’s own suffering and death provided the model true Christians would imitate 
and thus be glorified. 
While the relationship to sacrifice is radically different in the Roman and Christian 
systems, a similar relationship lay at the core of both. Where Christians gained salvation for 
themselves through their sacrifice, for the Romans sacrifice inculcated subjects into their 
sovereign ban on violence.332 Both were earned by a public demonstration of allegiance to 
their social group and the cosmic order that supported it. Sacrifice connects the personal 
sphere to the political sphere by means of a symbolic act of destruction that demonstrated the 
individual’s obligation to a system of ethics based in an understanding of cosmic order. The 
Christian’s ability to reframe the situation by asserting an opposing sovereign imaginary was 
powerful, and ultimately sought to reorient their audience’s understanding of the world. It 
makes use of a legal setting meant to determine the truth of a person and a situation, while 
supplying a contrary perception of order and justice. As the confession of guilt is transformed 
into the confession of salvation, the Christians invert the hegemonic understanding of the 
position of the individual (the agent of sacrifice), the victim (the sacrifice itself) and the 
purpose of the sacrifice (the obligations owed to the divine). Sacrifice to the emperor was the 
means by which Christian were exposed and condemned, and sacrifice to God through the 
imitation of the Messiah was the means by which Christians promoted a different way in 
which to perceive the world.333 By inverting the symbolic system of Rome, martyrs were able 
to transform the punishment for a crime into a means by which to achieve salvation and 
eternal life.334 
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Violence and the Law 
The legal arena was more than simply the place where Christians were prosecuted; it 
is the context where the official truth is established and violence is sanctioned. Rome was 
able to impose their vision of social, political, and cosmic order through an institution that 
marshalled legitimate violence in support of its normative ends, enforcing behavior by 
imposing suffering as a consequence for transgressions.335 According to legal theorist Robert 
Cover, legal orders exist upon fields of pain and death, and “a legal world is built only to the 
extent that there are commitments that place bodies on the line.”336 All manner of 
consequences can come from the transgression of ethical codes (social isolation, feelings of 
guilt/shame), but only the law is supported by physical repercussions recognized as 
legitimate.  
The torture described in Christian texts demonstrated the sovereign’s power to 
punish.337 Ideally the law balances punishment with wrongdoing, but it also can reinforce the 
imbalance of power wielded by the governing institution in relation to the individual. Such 
demonstrations are often meant to be deterrents to behavior considered particularly 
dangerous or deviant. In his Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault saw in torture the 
articulation of sovereign power, used so all present could witness the ability of the rulers to 
impose their will upon the bodies of their subjects.338 Ensconced in ritual and trappings of 
wealth and power, these displays led to the awe of the sovereign, transforming the violence 
into a sacred presence, and leading the audience to internalize the sanctioned moral code. The 
resulting conformity comes from respect amplified by fear.  
Demonstrations of such force need to be seen as legitimate inflictions of harm, 
consistent with law; without the acknowledgement of legitimacy, such force would be seen 
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as tyrannical. Physical coercion was therefore couched in public, ritualized activity that lent 
an aura of validity and sacrality, without which torture could produce fear, but not awe.339 As 
we saw above, the arenas where public trials took place were designed explicitly for the 
reiteration of power relations, and perhaps the most important relationship was that of the 
sovereign to its subjects. The shows of power that took place were the manifestation of the 
emperor’s sovereignty, which in turn delimited the social field under his rule.340 Those 
witnessing such spectacles of agony saw power verified in the broken bodies of its victims. 
Torture in Rome was more than punitive – the consequence of transgressing the law 
and the price of readmission to the body politic. The beaten body was a symbol of dishonor 
and servility, and showed a loss of social status.341 Torture is an act of vengeance, one that 
allows for no concomitant acts of revenge because a) the state wields a disproportionate 
amount of violence and b) the ritualized aspects cloak the proceedings as justice, allowing for 
the misrecognition of violence.342 Since criminals showed their deviancy in their body when 
acting in ways opposed to state sanctions, they needed to show their allegiance on their body 
as well, and the resultant wounds must be accompanied by authentic repentance and the 
acceptance of the sovereign’s ability to determine right and wrong. Acting in ways that 
transgressed Roman laws was enough to bring a person to trial, but once there the court 
required more than obedience; it required public recognition of its power. 
The situation of the second century martyrs saw two opposing sovereign structures 
seeking reality, both of which demanded recognition in the body of the subject by voluntary 
enactment of their directives.343 (As Foucault points out, the disappearance of the body in 
modern incarceration functions in much the same way.)344 It is the sovereign prerogative to 
evaluate, judge, and punish action, and whatever order is imagined to legitimately possess 
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that power is established as dominant over the individual body through performances in 
conformance with those judgments. In accepting oneself as guilty of a crime, the victim 
explicitly validates the sovereign juridical code along with their place within it, establishing 
that a) the one confessing is what the authorities say he is (i.e. a criminal), and b) he has 
transgressed against that which he was obligated to obey. As Leonard Thompson put it 
regarding Polycarp’s case, "for the state's control to be effective, Polycarp must acknowledge 
the rightness of the proconsul's actions, preferably by becoming a Christian apostate, the 
intended aim of the governor. If not that, then even a cry of pain or eyes cast down during the 
torture would vindicate the justness of the state's coercion. The criminal would accept his 
criminality, the deviant his deviancy."345 
While the infliction of bodily pain may appear as a necessary part of this process, 
Christian rhetoric focused on the excesses of torture to argue that its purpose was not to 
extract the truth, as was the accepted Roman juridical belief, but rather to force them to deny 
the truth. Tertullian says the torture of Rome were meant to ironically force Christians into 
denial, while the torture of (other) criminals was to draw out a confession (Apol. 2.11).346 
The writer of the Acts of the Martyrs of Lyons asserted that the tortures heaped upon martyrs 
were devices of the devil to “have some word of blasphemy escape their lips” (M. Lyons 
1.16). It was seen as a means to cause them to speak against the truth of God’s coming 
kingdom, denying that the messiah had truly come to earth and obliged his followers to abide 
by divine law. In the tale of Polycarp, the purpose of torture was made explicitly clear while 
providing a link to the gospel accounts: “those who were condemned to wild beast endured 
terrible sufferings, being spread out on trumpet-shells and suffering with other various kinds 
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of torture in order that, if the tyrant was able, he might turn them through their continual 
suffering to denial” (M. Poly. 2.4).347  
Here “denial” translates arnēsin, which is regularly used in the gospel narratives in 
the sense of denying the truth and speaking falsely about what one knows to be true, and is 
precisely the same term used to describe Peter’s thrice denial of Christ (Mk. 14:66-72; Lk. 
22:54-62; Mt. 26:69-75; Jn. 18:13-27). After witnessing Jesus’ arrest, Peter attempted to 
covertly follow Jesus to the Sanhedrin but was discovered by the crowd, at which point Peter 
said he was not with “the man from Nazareth.” Twice more they pressed, and twice more he 
denied, until the cock’s third crow fulfilled  Jesus’ prophecy and reminded Peter of his 
promise to follow Jesus even though it cost him his life (Mk. 14:31; Lk. 22:33; Mt. 26:35; Jn. 
13:37). The disciple’s betrayal is presented as the consequence of his fear of capture, 
subsequent imprisonment, torture and possibly death.348 Peter’s denial is revealed to be an act 
of apostasy, and the apostle laments.  
Writing in the name of the Paul, the author of 2 Timothy explained the reason for the 
lament, saying “if we deny [arnēsometha] Him, He will deny [arnēsetai] us” (2 Tim. 2:12; 
cf. Matt. 10:33, Mk. 8:38, Lk. 12:9, 1 Jn. 2:23). As the Christian doctrine revolves around the 
need to be recognized by Christ before the Father, Ignatius writes: “Ignorant persons deny 
[Christ], or rather have been denied by Him, being advocates of death rather than of the 
truth” (Ig. Smyr. 5.1). The dichotomy is between the truth that Jesus represents and promises, 
and the death that awaits those who do not accept him as their savior. Suffering’s place in 
that acceptance is reinforced by Jesus’ dictum “if any want to become my followers, let them 
deny themselves [aparnēsasthō] and take up their cross and follow me. For those who want 
to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the 
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gospel, will save it” (Mk. 8:34-35; cf. parallel passages noted above). The denial under 
discussion is intentionally linked to the need to put oneself second to their relation to Christ.  
It is no surprise then that this scriptural complex is mirrored in texts around Christian 
martyrdom. The author of Ptolemaeus and Lucius’ acta explains in an aside that “a person 
who denies [arnoumenos] something either deliberately denies [exarnos] the fact, or else 
(aware that this is unworthy and alien to him) avoids any admission of it. But such conduct 
does not befit the true Christian” (M. Ptole. 14). The martyrs of Lyons go as far as asserting 
the torture that is meant to turn them to denial actually serves Christians in the opposite way, 
waking up those who had previously denied the Christian truth and returning them to the fold 
(M. Lyons 1.25, 1.45-6). Maintaining constancy through pain and death served to highlight 
the crucial importance of publicly acknowledging that truth which gives form to an 
individual’s identity. At least that is the hope of those who spread the tales of these martyrs 
to bolster Christian fidelity. 
Furthermore, the verb arnēomai is regularly contrasted with homologeō, meaning to 
confess, witness or acknowledge, which regularly appears in the martyr acta (e.g. M. Lyons 
1.18 1.35, M. Ptole. 13, M. Poly. 12.1). Such a concept is not fully covered by verbal 
profession, but requires an alignment of character with speech.349 “To say” is different than 
“to confess.” Confession is to say something about who one is, and how one understands 
their obligations to that which shapes their life; confession confesses the truth of power. The 
confession that torture seeks is the confession of sovereign power as distinct from mere 
violence. Hence Paul Kahn’s assertion: “Torture was a practice of producing truth.”350 
Torture’s aim, Kahn argues, is: 
to make law real in the body of the subject. The failure of sovereign power was not the 
absence of consent, but the refusal of the victim to speak. A torture victim could ‘choose’ to 
become a martyr and thereby defeat the sovereign claim. He could, in other words, refuse to 
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surrender, maintaining faith in his own god. What was unimaginable was that he could 
withhold speech simply because he did not consent. Those without faith, confess easily. In a 
sacred world, only one faith can displace another. For this reason, torture is associated with 
the struggle between faiths.351 
While Kahn is speaking to the place of torture in current democratic systems, he could be 
speaking directly to the Christians under discussion. Two powers, anchored in metaphysical 
assertions supporting conceptions of proper action, seek embodiment in the broken body. 
Herbert Musurillo, in his authoritative translation of the martyr acta, attempts to name 
that truth torture sought to produce: the tyrant employed torture in an attempt to make 
Christians “deny the faith.”352 However the meaning of ‘faith’ in this passage is ambiguous. 
While Musurillo incorporates ‘faith’ into his translation (e.g. M. Lyons 1.35), we should not 
take this as a reference to a state of mental belief; rather he references the faith, the 
fellowship determined by commitment to the Christian sovereign imaginary. Peter denies that 
which is true and that he knows to be true, that he is a follower of Jesus.353 The same is at 
stake in the acta, where the martyr refuses to falsely negate who they are, to betray their 
relationship with the divine. The “faith” Kahn sees being identified in torture is the 
connection of the individual to that which directs their life and gives meaning to their pain 
and deaths.354 For Christians, denying the faith means no longer participating in the project of 
making the world align with the will of God, and rejecting that a worse penalty awaits those 
who ignore their obligations to God.355 To allow pain and fear to change what you confess is 
to implicitly state the sovereign imaginary does not “really” reflect the cosmic order of 
things.  
These martyrs opposed one power through their free adherence to another power, one 
they recognized as legitimately commanding obedience.356 Minucius Felix, a Christian 
apologist of the second century, revels in how “mocking the noise of death, [the martyr] 
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treads underfoot the horror of the executioner when he raises up his liberty against kings and 
princes and yields to God alone, whose he is” (Octav. 37.1).357 In the face of Roman 
violence, Christian power was being established, and it was precisely the same form of power 
that Rome sought through torture. Christian martyrs effectively stole the awe surrounding the 
power of Rome by showing the force deployed in torture to be ineffective without the 
complicity of the actor.  
Again we see a contest evident in the moments of torture. Meaning is being inscribed 
on the suffering body, but it remains an open question as to whose meaning. These victims’ 
bodies are ‘read’ in accordance with particular symbolic systems of order, transforming 
public violence into a system of signs that communicate a message about cosmic order.358 
Judith Perkins eloquently contends “All power ultimately is reduced to the vulnerability of 
the body to be hurt, destroyed, dissolved, and obliterated and the opportunity to coerce that 
this vulnerability cedes to the powers that be. By denying the vulnerability of their bodies to 
pain and death and looking forward to their coming life, Christians preempted contemporary 
structures of power.”359 In the moments of torture spectators wait to see whether the afflicted 
will change their relationship to the power structure, or atone for the infractions that led them 
to suffer so. On trial for the crime of being a Christian, the martyrs’ confession was the 
catalyst of their painful deaths, and simultaneously an affirmation of the charges against 
them. 
The martyrs remained in the same symbolic relationship between pain and truth; 
torture is premised on a belief that a person will lie until agony reveals the truth, while 
martyrs show that nothing at all was preferable to avowing the truth was a lie. Confessing to 
a crime implicitly accepts that the activity is a crime, which condones the entire ideological 
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structure that deems the activity to be transgressive. By asserting an alternate theological 
base for appropriate actions, Christian martyrs subverted the basis of Roman legitimacy, and 
by not succumbing to the force Rome wielded they showed it to be ultimately impotent in 
forcing action. Their resilience demonstrated their character, and that character was 
mobilized in testimony to the true, legitimate power that governed Christian life. 
 
  
   
The Testimony of Christian Witnesses 
 
It is no mistake that the original term for martyr, had a legal origin, as courts are a 
significant venue for defining the shape of social order.360 The court’s decision on a case 
before it serves as a speech-act that establishes the official, legal truth of the 
circumstances.361 It is also no mistake, I would contend, that so many of the early martyr acta 
take the form of trial transcripts; by maintaining the context where social truth is determined, 
Christian authors continued to coopt a symbolically laden arena of the Romans to their own 
ends. What need to be made clear is how precisely these deaths serve as witnessing, and what 
exactly it is they witness. 
Witnesses are those who have had relevant experience of an event, and are called 
upon to publicly share that experience to aid in the court’s decision.362 In reality what they 
offer is their interpretation of their experience, how they made sense of what transpired. 
Even testimony as simple as “he ran away” relies on classifying movement as having 
sufficient velocity for the qualifier “run,” the perception of a center of activity to judge 
direction of movement and perhaps even the physical characteristics that mark an individual 
as male. Any and all of these may be opposed by a witness with a different means of 
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categorizing. The witness is mobilized in hopes of having their interpretation become the 
official – “true” – interpretation. 
The quality and therefore potency of a witness’ testimony is determined largely on 
the basis of his/her character. As the second century Roman jurist Modestinus put it, “the 
value of testimony depends on the dignity, faith, morals and gravity of the witnesses” (Rules, 
bk. 8. Dig. Just. 1.22.5.2). Where that character was questionable, Roman law utilized 
character witnesses who could speak to the witness’ virtues, and sometimes used torture to 
assure honest testimony.363 Testimony by those of reputable character (which higher class 
citizens were naturally assumed to be) was given far more weight in trials than that of slaves 
or other lower class individuals. Writing in the early third century, Roman jurist Arcadius 
Charisius wrote of witnesses: “If the matter is such that an arena-fighter or similar person has 
to be called as a witness, his evidence should not be believed without torture… What is 
decisive is not numbers but sincere and reliable testimony that illuminates the truth” (Dig. 
Just. 1.22.5.21). If pain reveals witnesses to be lying, their testimony is questionable. If, 
however, in the face of extreme agony and death they hold fast to their testimony, it must be 
accepted that they are fully committed to their perception of the truth.  
Refusing to alter one’s speech in the face of death not only serves to demonstrate the 
veracity of testimony; it was seen to fundamentally change the nature of that testimony. 
Where the crowd had cried for blood during Agathonicê’s speech in defense, when she 
remains constant through torture the crowd turns on the Roman court, siding with the 
Christians (M. Carp. 45). The author of Justin and his Companions acta saw suffering as 
essential for qualifying their words as “testimony” (martyrion; M. Just. 6.1), perhaps because 
it was only “through their perseverance the infinity mercy of Christ was revealed.” (M. Lyons 
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1.45). Ignatius exhorted the Roman congregation not to plea with him to save his life, telling 
them “if you remain silent and let me be, I shall be a Word of God (logos theou), but if you 
love my flesh, I shall again be a mere voice (phōnē)” (Ig. Rom. 2.1). Entreaties from 
supporters to save his life (which are also found throughout the acta) threaten to weaken 
Ignatius’ resolve, and if weakened to the point of denial his word would lose its potency. The 
martyr Blandina shared a similar concern that her bodily weakness would prevent her from 
making a “bold confession” (M. Lyons 1.18). 
Herein lies the core of Christian “witness.” A “martyr” must have their speech 
accompanied by extreme, coercive, and ultimately ineffective harm deployed against their 
body. It is only amidst such suffering that such a “bold confession” of Christian faith and 
identity was possible. These martyrs confronted the dominant Roman framework that sought 
to explain these executions as just recompense for transgressions against the empire and the 
gods, and opposed it by proffering their own interpretation of a necessary trial expected to 
test the limits of their obedience. In doing so they troubled Rome’s ability to determine the 
truth of who they are and what power had control over their life. Their “boldness” pulled 
back the curtain of hegemony and revealed that it was only force that lay at the heart of 
Roman power. And force can be resisted. 
Sovereign institutions are defined by their ability to justify physical force, and the use 
of physical force becomes violence when it is perceived as outside accepted frameworks.364 
Justice is one such frame, where harm is legitimated as appropriate recompense for 
transgression. The violent killing of Christians is authorized force if the Christians indeed 
had committed a crime.365  Those who accepted this thereby accepted the entire symbolic 
system supporting this interpretation; in fact, the freedom displayed by the martyrs in their 
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resistance suggests that whoever accepts the interpretation is thereby complicit in its 
machinations. By refusing to “confess” that they are guilty of criminal activity, the testimony 
of these martyrs recasts the force as serving injustice, evident in numerous moments in the 
acta where non-Christians cry that these are “unjust ordinances” (adika prostagmata, M. 
Carp. 45. See too 36, M. Poly. 2.2), and the many Christian accusations of injustice discussed 
above. The revelation of the Christian God defines justice, thereby determining Roman 
dictates as unjust. Christian doctrine communicated the true moral power in the world, and 
that power was made evident – was made witnessable – through the martyrs’ continued 
commitment in their throes and death. Their “bold” testimony gave reality to their guiding 
system of appropriate and moral action. 
The Greek words that are translated as Blandina’s “bold confession” are homologian 
parrhēsiasathai. Homologeō and its derivatives meaning “confession” were discussed above, 
which leaves us with parrhēsia as the descriptor for the “boldness” that is evidenced by the 
bodily testimony of the martyr. The Greek concept of parrhēsia is characterized by a 
communicating something understood to be dangerous and subversive, and that poses a risk 
to the speaker. The speaker recognizes that risk, but sees it as her duty to speak out, 
regardless of the consequences. Inherent in parrhēsia is the innate freedom and right of every 
person to speak what they see as the truth – situations where the ability to do so is stymied is 
by definition tyrannical. This understanding is what leads Euripedes to contend that the lack 
of parrhēsia is the lot of the slave (Phoenissae, 390-92).366 
Michel Foucault devoted his last lectures to analyzing the operations of parrhēsia, 
where the speaker establishes himself as a truth-teller by “open[ing] his heart and mind 
completely to others through his discourse.”367 According to Foucault, 
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parrhēsia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relationship to truth 
through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of 
relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism of criticism of other 
people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, 
parrhēsia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, 
and risks his like because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people 
(as well as himself).368 
Parrhēsia is at its core speech about the speaker: “he says what he thinks, he personally 
signs, as it were, the truth he states, he binds himself to this truth.”369 Foucault holds that “the 
decisive criterion which identifies the parrhēsiastes is not to be found in his birth, nor in his 
citizenship, nor in his intellectual competence, but in the harmony that exists between his 
logos and his bios.”370 Where their way of life conforms to the content of their speech, the 
parrhēsiastes is established as possessing truth: an ultimate commitment to a certain way of 
perceiving the world and one’s place within it made evident in bodily activity. 
 Although Foucault centers his discussion on the ascetics who had previously 
concerned him (and specifically on the figure of the Cynic), he recognized that the Christian 
martyr “is the parrhēsiast par excellence.”371 Though he has a problematic understanding of 
martyrdom,372 he cannot avoid the recognition that the martyr “has suffered, endured, and 
deprived himself so that the truth takes shape in his own life, as it were, in his own existence, 
his own body.”373 His purpose is “making the truth burst out to the point of losing one’s 
life.”374 Each aspect of the preceding discussion is evident in Foucault’s analysis of how 
parrhēsia signifies a truth-teller.  
 Apart from Blandina’s statement, other texts support placing this mode of truth-
telling at the heart of early Christian martyrdom. Though it rarely appears in the synoptic 
gospels (although Jesus does speak with parrhēsia when he first “openly” lays out the 
teaching about the Son of Man’s rejection, crucifixion and resurrection, Mk. 8:31-33), it 
appears fairly frequently in John’s gospel (e.g. Jn. 7:13, 10:24, 16:25, 18:20), as it does in 
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Paul’s epistles where it is consistently linked to speech in the face of persecution (e.g. Eph. 
6:19-20; Phil. 1:20; 1 Thess. 2:1-2). This supports G.W. Bowersock’s contention that in the 
New Testament witnesses were those who literally witnessed Jesus’ teaching and death, and 
the term “martyr” was interchangeable with “apostle.”375 Speaking powerfully in hopes of 
advancing the Christian truth communicated a sense of having experienced the teachings and 
wonders of the Christ first-hand. 
In Luke-Acts, this sense of the term finds its apex. Parrhēsia is the means by which 
apostles are recognized by non-believers as possessing or being possessed of the Word of 
God. It applies to all of the heralds of apostolic authority: Peter and John are recognized as 
companions of Jesus by speaking with parrhēsia even though they were “uneducated and 
ordinary men” (Acts 4:13), while Barnabas (whose own authority is shown through 
parrhēsia in Acts 13:46) proves Paul’s authority by telling how the latter spoke “boldly” in 
Damascus (Acts 9:27-28). Moreover, parrhēsia is bestowed upon true Christians in a 
Pentecost-like scene: 
And now, Lord, look at their threats, and grant to your servants to speak your word with all 
boldness (parrhēsia), while you stretch out your hand to heal, and signs and wonders are 
performed through the name of your holy servant Jesus. When they had prayed, the place in 
which they were gathered together was shaken; and they were all filled with the Holy Spirit 
and spoke the word of God with boldness (parrhēsia). (Acts 4:29-31) 
The special place such speech held in the regards to authority, risk of suffering and speaking 
the Word of God makes it reasonable that the Book of Acts closes with the apostles going out 
into the world of the gentiles to speak with parrhēsia (Acts 28:31).  
 It is therefore no surprise that the martyr acta likewise make important use of the 
concept. The trope of authority is taken up by the martyr Alexander who is said to “possess a 
share in the apostolic charisma” based on his speaking with parrhēsia (M. Lyons 1.49),376 
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while Justin and his companions connect the form of speech with their refusal to turn “from 
piety to impiety, from light to darkness” (M. Just. 4.6, rec. C).  
At the climax of Polycarp’s famous narrative, this form of speech is pivotal. After the 
proconsul insists for a third time that Polycarp sacrifice to the emperor, the martyr replies “If 
you imagine in vain that I shall swear by the Genius of Caesar, as you say, and pretend not to 
know who I am, then listen openly and I will tell you plainly [meta parrhēsia]: I am a 
Christian” (M. Poly. 10.1).377 Linking his free speech to his confession of identity, Polycarp 
is sharing a truth about himself, and in speaking about himself he is speaking a truth about 
the world. His ontological truth reflects an existential truth, spoken in hopes of realigning 
perceptions of the true life, and what institutions should be understood as custodians of that 
life.  
Parrhēsia is also placed at the core of martyrdom in the Martyrs of Lyons and 
Vienne: “While they displayed the power of the martyr in their deeds, speaking with 
parrhēsia before all the people, and while their nobility was made clear through their 
endurance, fearlessness and courage, still they declined the title ‘martyr’ be used of them 
among Christians, due to their fear of God” (M. Lyons 2.3-4).378  For Irenaeus’ Christians in 
Lugdunum, at least, the ability to speak boldly demonstrated in bodily testimony was the 
very essence of martyrdom. 
In Foucault’s words, to speak with parrhēsia in such contexts “is to question [the 
Roman] mode of life, to put their mode of life to the test and define what there is in it that 
may be ratified and recognized as good and what on the other hand must be rejected and 
condemned. In this you can see the organization of the fundamental series linking care, 
parrhēsia, and the ethical division between good and evil in the realm of bios.”379 Aligning 
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the Romans with injustice and evil and affirming the Christian life as ethically good is made 
true by Polycarp’s self-possession amidst their suffering and torture. 
  For Christians, the witnessing of martyrdom is intrinsically related to this form of 
speech. Reorienting discussions of Christian martyrdom to focus around a speech that tells an 
existential truth – about what power determines true right action – through an ontological 
truth – about how the martyr understands him or herself – makes sense of the conflicting 
claims about sovereign authority respectively made by the Christians and the Romans, and 
why the martyrs held such a high place in the imagination of the early Christians.380 By 
refusing to divert from the truths that guide their lives as Christians even amidst the most 
painful coercion, these martyrs show their commitment to understanding themselves in 
accordance with divine revelation and their willingness to deny the legitimacy of the Roman 
system literally at all costs. By telling the Christian truth in the face of efforts to establish the 
Roman truth, martyrs give the Christian narratives reality in their broken, dying bodies.  
   
 
Conclusion 
The contest between the Christian and Roman imaginaries did not take the form of a 
metaphysical battle, or a religiously inspired war. Rather, the context was juridical, where 
martyrdom “witness[es] to the greater jurisdiction of God’s power and justice, which 
supersedes that of the mere temporal authority.”381 At the center of the conflict with Rome 
were competing legal codes, systems of ethical obligations and prohibitions reinforced by 
regimes of punishment. While the Roman punishments were swift and physical, the 
punishments awaiting those who sinned against God (though deferred) were considered by 
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Christians to be equally assured, and greater in impact. The two were at loggerheads, with 
individuals unable to fulfill, or at least avoid transgressing, both simultaneously.  
What we see in the second century then is a contest of laws and the metaphysical 
supports that assured the just nature of those laws playing out on the bodies of these 
martyrs.382 The Roman’s theocracy charged Christians with belonging to a group that did not 
recognize the basis of the law, and who therefore were dangerous to Rome and her subjects. 
To show they were loyal members of the populi Romani, those brought up on such charges 
were required to ritually demonstrate that allegiance by sacrificing to the genius of the 
emperor. Christians in turn averred the radical injustice of the Roman legal system that 
explicitly favored the elites while being used as a means to oppress the poor and 
marginalized. In his Stromata written at the end of the second century, Clement of 
Alexandria wrote that martyrdom was a “confession of faith in God, and every soul that is 
purely constituted in recognition of God, obey[s] His orders” (iv.4).383  The social order that 
confronted them, along with the demand to worship the emperor as a god led to a perception 
of a world out-of-order, in chaos. In its place, they affirmed a normative system of ethics that 
was, like the Roman’s, based in theological ideas. 
The sentiment that right behavior was that which was in conformance with God’s 
commands delivered through Jesus’ preaching defined Christian identity, while authorities in 
Rome’s provinces insisted subjects recognize the Roman system as alone possessing the 
ability to determine appropriate behavior, and sanction harm in its support. The command to 
publicly sacrifice wine and incense to the emperor’s genius aimed to establish which of those 
systems an individual was committed to, while torture and exposure to ferocious animals 
were extreme manifestations of the means by which the Empire sought to ensure theirs was 
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ascendant.384 When martyrs refused to capitulate even in the face of such coercion, the 
audience witnessed sovereign institutions seeking to establish their reality through the painful 
marking of the body. However, the meaning of those wounds remained open to 
interpretation, depending on the symbolic system that provided the hermeneutic. As much of 
the judicial setting as the Romans controlled, the interpretation of its outcome was out of 
their hands; they could only offer a narrative frame and hope the audience would understand 
what they saw through that frame. 
This necessary weakness enabled the Christians to apply their own narratives to an 
extant ritualized means of determining truth. Their development of an ideology of martyrdom 
ironically located their resistance in their compliance with the Roman legal system. In order 
to invert the system, the system must function. By constructing their own understanding of 
sacrifice that played off the Roman system, Ignatius, Polycarp and the other martyrs of the 
second century were able to transmute these acts of execution into rituals of martyrdom. 
Their confession of Christian identity enabled them to overturn the foundations of the Roman 
system itself. 
Ultimately the contest between Roman and Christian imaginaries revolved around 
what would be established as truth. This truth is not limited to a single sphere of experience. 
It is political in that it speaks to the identity of individuals in relation to a system of law that 
establishes the grounds by which to judge force as legitimate or transgressive; it is religious 
in that it links that political identity to a conception of cosmic order and responsibilities of 
man vis-à-vis divinity that are based in sacred narratives; it is social in that it is being enacted 
and aimed at life with others while anchoring those relations in a sacred conception. The 
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truth is fundamentally a question of meaning, what hermeneutic frame will be used to 
understand individual obligation and direct action in the world. 
The Christian conception built on Greek and Roman ideas that link character to 
suffering for truth in witnessing. By maintaining self-possession in the face of extreme 
coercion, and by speaking the truth of their perception of the world by speaking the truth 
about themselves qua Christians, the martyrs served to offer a truth that conflicted with the 
hegemonic Roman perspective, and sought to reorder ideas about normative morality during 
the second century. Maintaining their voice throughout the coercive means of the state 
allowed them to be perceived as truth-tellers, communicating an existential truth that altered 
perceptions of legitimacy and authority and ultimately gave their sovereign imaginary reality 
through their bodies. They do in fact speak truth to power, but they do so by speaking the 
truth about another power that gives shape to their identity and the ethical conceptions that 
guide their lives. 
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Chapter 3 
 
“Suicide Bombings” and “Martyrdom Operations:” 
Constructing Martyrs in 20th Century Shi’a Islam 
 
 
Introduction 
 On November 11th of each year, the Lebanese Shi’ite group Hizbollah celebrates 
Martyr’s Day, when they remember the act of Ahmad Qasir, a seventeen-year-old who in 
1982 drove an explosives-laden truck into an Israeli military barracks. Waving yellow and 
green flags and chanting, hundreds line streets around areas of Beirut and Southern Lebanon 
in remembrance of a young man’s sacrifice of himself in an attack against an invading force. 
His smiling visage graces posters hanging amidst those featuring Hizbollah’s leaders and 
evocative images of soldiers in battle. While much of the world sees him and the group 
celebrating him through a lens of terrorism, on these days, in this setting, Qasir is recognized 
as a martyr.  
Official estimates vary as to the number killed in his attack, but all counts begin with 
Qasir himself who with his act inaugurated the modern tactic of suicide bombing. While the 
most infamous suicide attack to date must be the September 11, 2001 attacks, the technique 
of detonating explosives in the middle of a crowd has been seen on every continent across the 
globe. Even though this method has used by non-religious associations such as Russian 
anarchist groups and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, it is most often linked with extremist 
interpretations of Islam attached to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the so-called 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (also known as ISIS or Da’esh). The global media’s 
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constant coverage of such groups has challenged all people to question the limits of rational 
behavior, the assumptions of liberalism and the idea of martyrdom itself. 
 This new frame sees contradictory labels placed upon a single actor. For the majority 
of the world’s population, members of al-Qaeda or ISIS are terrorists, modern instantiations 
of evil responsible for innumerable horrific tragedies. Suicide terrorism is perhaps the biggest 
concern for security regimes during this period of history, and unprecedented steps have been 
taken in hopes of thwarting such actions, as anyone who has removed their shoes in an 
airport security line can attest. However, for those supporting the causes and organizations 
initiating such destruction interpret these acts as martyrdoms, laudable self-sacrifices 
performed against an agent of tyranny and oppression, and earning an eternal reward for 
those brave enough to give their lives in struggle.385  
Any attempt to understand how such diverging labels can sensibly be applied to a 
single individual demands that moral judgments be suspended in order to approach such acts 
on their own terms. Ethical suspension does not, and should not be seen to suggest 
approbation or support for such actions. I am firmly against violence of all kinds, particularly 
when exercised against unsuspecting civilians. But I also believe that any solution for a state 
of affairs like that which we face in the twenty-first century is impossible if attempts only 
allow one side of the conflict as valid. Therefore, in what follows I will seek to uncover the 
performative logics behind these acts, and how taking one’s own life in an attempt to kill is 
justified, made sensible, and made meaningful.  
To understand how a discourse of self-sacrifice was constructed to support such 
operations, in what follows I will investigate the setting where it first emerged onto the scene 
as a tactic in support of Islamist goals.386 For Islamism, I rely on Roxanne Euben and 
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Muhammad Qasim Zaman who define it as “contemporary movements that attempt to return 
to the scriptural foundations of the Muslim community, excavating and reinterpreting them 
for application to the present-day social and political world.”387 While the movements that 
can be gathered under this term vary in terms of structure, area of operation, and ideological 
lineage, the term does connect groups that seek to order societies based on their interpretation 
of Islamic shari’ah. 
Popular discussions name acts like Qasir’s and others in the Islamist context “suicide 
bombing,” which explicitly calls attention to the killing of self in the killing of others. 
“Suicide” is a contested term in this context, however. Not only does it inculcate the observer 
into questions of power as I discussed in the first chapter, but Islam itself has strict 
prohibitions against self-destruction – tahluka, or intihar. Suicide is explicitly forbidden in 
the Qur’an 4:29-30: “do not kill yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever 
Merciful. And whoever does that in aggression and injustice – then We will drive him into a 
Fire.” Such proscriptions stem from seeing life itself as a gift from God, and the need to 
endure suffering when it strikes. Suicide is a problem for Muslims because it serves the 
individual at the expense of God; God created life, and that gift is discarded in despair.388 In 
that sense, the disgust felt at “suicide bombings” in the West are shared by Muslims 
everywhere who see it as blasphemy to take one’s own life in desperation and depression. 
Of course the label of “suicide bombings” – al-‘amaliyyat al-intihariyya – is not how 
the communities celebrating such attacks refer to them.389 Some see the very label of “suicide 
bombing” stemming from a colonialist legacy that seeks to discredit and delegitimize local 
cultural categories.390 Rather, they are called “martyrdom operations” – al’amaliyyat al-
istishhadiyya – a phrase that links their strategic intent to a celebrated discourse of sanctified 
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self-sacrifice that appears in Islam just as it did in Christianity, and bestows the appellation 
on such actors, ishtishhadi or martyrs. Martyrdom, in the words of Deputy-General of 
Hizbollah Na’im Qasim, “is a voluntary act undertaken by a person who has every reason to 
live, love life and cling to it. It is thus an act of one who does not suffer from any reasons 
compelling him to commit suicide.”391 So someone who is content in life and yet seeks to 
end his or her life in service to something else cannot be considered a suicide, because they 
are lacking the central attribute of despair. They are, or hope to be, a martyr.392 
Historically, the figure of the martyr – shahid (pl. shuhada) in classical Arabic, 
coming from the Syriac sohaido which was used to translate the Greek root martys and 
having the same meaning of “witness” – can be traced back to the life of the Prophet 
Mohammed and his followers. The witness performed by shuhada was not always connected 
to military matters; in the term’s early appearances in the Qur’an, it often referred to the 
Prophet Muhammad as the one who “bears witness” to the Muslim faith, providing testimony 
about the true Will of God to those ignorant of it.393 In a well-known hadith – the term for the 
collected sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that play an important role in the 
Islamic canon – the term referred to myriad forms of death, including plague victims, victims 
of drowning, those who succumb to torture and women who die in childbirth.394 David Cook 
suggests early Islamic texts “reflect[ed] a process of widening the definition of martyrdom to 
the point where it began to lose all meaning and simply came to cover anyone who had died a 
worthy death and should be admitted immediately into paradise.”395 Designations of a 
“worthy death” exceeded the bounds of violent conflict alone, and became attached to those 
who died during a life lived in line with the dictates of Islam. 
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The blissful existence awaiting shuhada are assured in the Qur’anic verses 3:169-71, 
which are often referenced in the context of martyrdom operations: 
And do not think of those who have been killed in the way of Allah as dead; they are rather 
living with their Lord, well-provided for. Rejoicing in what their Lord has given them of His 
bounty, and they rejoice for those who stayed behind and did not join them; knowing that 
they have nothing to fear and that they shall not grieve. They are jubilant at the favor from 
God and His bounty; indeed, God does not destroy the reward of the Believers. 
These verses are often repeated to assure those preparing for martyrdom; a similar purpose 
inspires the repeated presence of perhaps the most-referred to Qur’anic verse: “and some 
people sell themselves for the sake of Allah’s favor. Allah is kind to [His] servants” (2:208). 
These and similar places in Muslim scripture urge Muslims to be confident in sacrificing for 
God, because they are assured paradise in exchange for their struggle. 
Martyrs in Islam are usually spoken of in the context of jihad, a term usually 
translated as “holy war” but is better understood as “striving in the path of God.” As I will 
explain below, jihad traditionally referenced a variety of activities, but in part due to the 
operations considered here its connections to warfare have increasingly been highlighted. 
The focus on the “battle martyr,” the mujahid or “holy warrior” who dies in the fight to raise 
the word of God to the highest (cf. Qur’an 9:41), as the primary mode of martyrdom is the 
result of a long history that gradually elevated violent death above other deaths occurring in 
service to God. One significant shift came in the work of Abdullah Ibn al-Mubarak (d. 797), 
who first elaborated on the sensual pleasures awaiting such martyrs in the afterlife, most 
well-known being the seventy-two houris, the dark-eyed virgins who so often appear in 
commentaries on these acts.396 As the experience of Muslims increasingly resonated with al-
Mubarak’s focus on martial symbols, the Sunnah (a term for the collected Islamic traditions) 
that put military forms of dying above others began to outshine the Qur’anic proscriptions 
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that previously placed them on equal footing with others kinds of deaths deserving of 
paradise.397 
The modern phenomenon of suicide attacks begins with two tales of young men 
giving their lives in operations against those they saw as oppressors and enemies. The more 
well-known origin point is that which started the chapter, Ahmad Qasir’s 1982 attack on the 
Israeli military barracks following Israel’s invasion of Southern Lebanon. The lesser known 
is thirteen year-old Mohammed Hossein Fahmideh, an Iranian youth who strapped rocket 
propelled grenades to his chest and exploded himself beneath an Iraqi tank during the Iran-
Iraq war of 1980-88.398 Both were declared martyrs on account of their sacrifice; Qasir would 
be claimed as a martyr of the Lebanese group Hizbollah, Fahmideh by the nation of Iran.399 
Both are organizations affiliated with Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the once 
Supreme Leader of Iran and leader of the Islamic Revolution that first established a modern 
Islamic republic. 
Attempting to understand these burgeoning forms of martyrdom during this period, I 
will approach the two conflicts – the Iranians war against Iraq and the Lebanese resistance 
against Israel’s invasion, both Islamist groups opposing Western imperial agents – in 
tandem.400 Both groups stemmed from the “Shi’a awakening” under Musa al-Sadr (d. 1978) 
in the 1970s, and together formed what Lara Deeb terms the hala islamiyya, the “Islamic 
sphere” that came about from the political mobilization aimed at improving the lot of Shi’ite 
Muslims, historically a minority marginalized both economically and politically.401 When the 
revolution in Iran takes on an Islamic character in the early 1980s, it connects with people in 
both regions through a Shi’ite network of religious schools and the circulation of pamphlets 
urging resistance based in a reinvigorated religious ideology. This context is widely 
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considered to be the root of modern suicide bombing; in Diego Gambetta’s words all the 
human bombings to follow are “fruits of the same tree.”402 Seeking understanding of this 
extreme tactic that is employed by radical groups across the globe therefore should begin 
with an understanding of this context. 
There is no shortage of scholarly work written on the topic of suicide bombing, most 
of which looks at them as an act of terrorism and seek to explicate the strategic logic they 
follow, best exemplified by Robert Pape’s Dying to Win which has become the benchmark 
for political studies of “suicide terrorism.”403  By and large such studies group suicide attacks 
as a bloc, regardless of cultural particularity or religious persuasion, leading to a 
marginalizing of such considerations. Some scholars like Robert Brym and Bader Araj have 
sought to reintegrate religious and cultural concerns, leading to more nuanced studies that 
still treat religious affect as cloaking more fundamental social or political goals.404 By 
looking specifically at a single cultural context I will look to take these religious ideas 
seriously, and recognize how the models religions provide take on lives of their own as 
determinants of action.405 
Some others like Ariel Merari and Adam Lankford attribute a psychopathology to 
suicide bombers, asserting that discourses of martyrdom disguise a desire to takes one’s own 
life out of despair.406 Not only do such attempts project motives onto their subject, but in the 
words of Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual father of the Lebanese group Hizbollah 
which will concern us in this chapter: “attempts to study the phenomenon of martyrdom from 
the [psychological] perspective… refuse to admit that certain things can be understood only 
through labor and pain. You can never be capable of appreciating freedom if you do not 
come to grips with enslavement. You can appreciate the crises of the starved only when you 
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come to grips with the pangs of starvation.”407 How, Fadlallah seems to ask, could Western 
academics snug in their well-appointed offices understand the resistance of the oppressed and 
disenfranchised? In recognition of this fact, this analysis will be based in the words left 
behind by martyrs rather than any assumptions about their mindsets and how those may 
deviate from some normative ideal. Surprisingly this is an uncommon approach, but one I 
hope will allow for understanding of the particular political, cultural and religious contexts 
from whence these bombers spring.408  
This work will look to build off and reorient social scientific studies of these attacks 
while avoiding the trend of approaching them a) as first and foremost acts of terrorism, and 
b) using a rational actor theory framework. The former characterizes the political science 
works mentioned above, but also prefigures the kinds of questions able to be asked about 
such acts. The latter has become very much in vogue in the last decade, but struggles to in 
trying to understand how self-destruction can be spoken of as an act of self-interest. The 
market logics that permeate such studies only allow for a liberal actor who must be seen to 
pursue his or her own end, precluding the possibility of altruistic or collective action (save 
where a more individual purpose lay beneath it). Too often the conclusions of such studies 
merely show, in Roxanne Euben’s assessment, that “martyrs have a revealed preference for 
martyrdom.”409 While these studies are certainly an improvement from previous structural-
functional attempts that asserted suicide bombings as a compulsive reflex against modernity 
(something that still influences psychological approaches), the rationales they rely on do little 
to elucidate how such actions are understood within their native setting. 
Several social scientific scholars have pursued programs of study that recognize 
cultural particularity and the significant role of religion in suicide bombings. Mark 
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Juergensmeyer’s work in Terror in the Mind of God continues to be a central study in this 
context, which seeks to understand the goals stated by the individuals performing the 
operations and the symbolic goals their acts are thought to serve. Also of note are Domenico 
Tosini’s quantitative study where he articulates what he calls an “axiological rationality” as a 
means of approaching these acts as following a rational logic based in a commitment to a set 
of values that supersede other concerns.410 Tosini’s axiological rationality has much in 
common with the “individuated rationality” expounded upon by Michael Roberts, who 
focuses on the witnessing function of these attacks, something very much at issue in this 
study. By grouping suicide bombings in with no-escape attacks, suicide protests and even 
theatrical assassinations, “embrac[ing] a whole range of suicidal operations that express 
justificatory testimony,” Roberts mirrors Juergensmeyer’s focus on the performative 
dimensions of these acts.411 I am also sympathetic with his conclusion that the goal of suicide 
bombing is the “affirmation of the justice of their cause.”412 
In order to attend to the ways these particular settings spawned young men and 
women eager to die as martyrs, in what follows I will examine a series of wills and last 
testaments left behind by martyrs of both groups. Hizbollah started the now common 
tradition of martyrs recording videotaped final testaments explaining their intent and hopes in 
performing an operation where they will lose their lives. Al-Manar, the group’s web portal, 
contains an online database of videos and transcripts, from which most of those texts used 
here were taken save where otherwise noted.413 Fighters for Iran in the war with Iraq likewise 
left written statements speaking to their hopes and pride in struggling for Islam and Imam 
Khomeini, which were collected and distributed all around the area by the Iranian 
government in compendiums called Vasiyyat-namehha-ye Shuhada – “Testaments of the 
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Martyrs.”414 Meir Hatina sees such testaments “constituting a sub-genre of morality 
literature” where “the martyr is presented not merely as an operative player executing a 
violent act but rather as a pedagogic agent, a preacher, and role model setting a sacred 
example for the living and, thereby, invested with moral authority to guide the reader or 
viewer.”415 It was likely this educational function combined with their bloody sacrifice that 
led Khomeini to say of them, “these wills make one shudder and wake up.”416 Analyzing the 
content of these testaments will offer insight into the symbolic frames that made both 
situations meaningful, and portray a sacred duty to die bringing about Islamic rule that alone 
was seen to promise salvation oppression. Furthermore, as we will see, these groups of texts 
support the intent to treat them as extensions of a single politico-religious conflict. 
In what follows I will first trace the historical awakening of political Shi’ism in the 
Middle East, paying special attention to the ways sacrifice became linked to ideas of self-
determination and how a once quietist tradition helped establish the first independent Islamic 
Republic. I will then look at how a common experience of oppression and imperialism led to 
the multifaceted practice of jihad taking on the particular shape of divinely-sanctioned 
combat during this period. Along with this renewed focus came the promotion and 
celebration of sacrifice, and I will examine the scriptural and mytho-historical bases upon 
which the martyrdom operation rested. Analyzing the words of martyrs will lead me to a 
discussion of the intention behind these sacrifices, namely to bring about a legitimate and just 
“kingdom of God.” Finally, I will describe how the witness of martyrdom was seen to exceed 
jihad due to its role in establishing an Islamic truth in the world. 
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The Shi’a Awakening 
The period under consideration was a turbulent one in the wider Muslim world, when 
stories were circulating about victories achieved by Muslims from Afghanistan to Egypt. In 
the same decade that saw Ruhollah Khomeini ascend to power following a revolution against 
the secular government of Shah Reza Pahlavi, Anwar Sadat was assassinated in Egypt (an act 
encouraged by a fatwa [Islamic legal opinion] written by Abdul al-Rahman, an Afghani 
jurist), in Pakistan Zia ul-Haq rose to power on the back of a tide of Islamic sentiment after 
the assassination Benazir Bhutto, in Afghanistan the religious warriors known as mujahidin 
emerge victorious against the occupying Soviet Union forces, and the first Palestinian 
uprising (often referred to as intifada) would become best known for the martyrdom 
operation. Across the globe Muslims rose up against governments that sidelined religion to a 
sphere separate from politics, and sought to reinstitute a government based in Islamic 
doctrine. 
Tracing the developments of martyrdom at issue here could extend all the way back 
to the seventh century when, following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim 
community divided over who held legitimate rule. One group saw the station passing through 
the Prophet’s relatives, specifically his son-in-law Ali, resulting in the “Party of Ali” Shia-
ne-Ali, which was shortened to Shi’a. The others, while also recognizing Ali as the fourth and 
last legitimate ruler (caliph), saw authority passing to those most aligned with the traditions 
of Islam – the Sunnah, from which comes their name, “Sunnis.” The Sunnis remain the 
largest sect, and have established caliphates and empires throughout history, while the 
minority Shi’a rarely engaged in politics for most of their history. That would change with 
the ascension of Khomeini, but it is important to note that all those under consideration in 
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this chapter are of the Shi’a denomination, while the majority of other Islamist groups who 
would perpetuate martyrdom operations are Sunni.417  
Imami or “Twelver” Shi’ism, the most popular Shi’a sect, was noted for its practices 
focusing on spiritual development rather than political activity, and claims Khomeini as an 
adherent along with significant populations in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan apart from 
Lebanon and Iran.418 Such quietism was shared by certain segments of Egyptian and Syrian 
Sunnism as well as some salafi practices in Saudi Arabia, but Shi’ite non-involvement was 
based on millennial hopes of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam from whom they derive their name 
and who went into hiding in the ninth century.419 According to the Shi’a, when the time is 
ripe, the Mahdi will emerge from his seclusion (along with Christ) and establish an 
everlasting reign of justice according to the dictates of Islam. Until this “kingdom of God” is 
established, Shi’ites see all governments as illegitimate and debased, and they abstain from 
participating in such systems.420 
Doctrines of martyrdom have been much more the provenance of Shi’ite Muslims 
than Sunni communities where jihad has had a much more powerful effect (likely helping 
institute the focus on battle martyrs in the modern period).421 However in the twentieth 
century a certain amount of what Ivan Strenski calls “cross-fertilization” occurred, a product 
of the popularity of Islamism and a shared experience between of oppression at the hands of 
foreign western colonial powers. This experience provided a common enemy against which a 
new, or at least resuscitated, pan-Muslim identity was forged.422 Many during this period 
sought to overcome sectarian identities in the face of the new enemy; Ali Shariati, foremost 
theologian of the Iranian Revolution whose work plays a large role shaping the modern 
Islamic concept of martyrdom, spent time publicly retracing an Islamic lineage to show a 
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common Muslim identity and demonstrate that martyrdom was never a Shi’a issue alone.423 
Struggle against an enemy necessitates the possibility of suffering, and a common identity 
based in Islam provided the foundation for a reimagining of the shahid, the holy martyr. 
That cross-fertilization evident in Islamism works both ways, and the ideas of several 
important Sunni thinkers would substantially influence on the advent of martyrdom 
operations. Perhaps the two most notable would be the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and the Indo-
Pakistani Abul A’la Maududi, both of whom are foundational theorists of twentieth century 
Islamism and responsible for the reinvigoration of jihad.424 Although neither was a 
traditionally trained religious scholar (alim, pl. ulama), their political ideals and devotion 
resulted in significant popularity.425 Moreover, while the two contemporaries were separated 
by geography, they both faced a situation where Muslims existed under secular rule, and 
lacked any opportunity to self-govern. Both consistently and convincingly argued that the 
liberation of all Muslims required governments that implemented Islamic law – shari’ah – as 
the basis of their political practices.  
Shi’ite political abstention changed with the emergence of Khomeini onto the clerical 
scene. He had been outspoken against the government of Shah Reza Pahlavi since the 1960s, 
declaiming it as atheist, bolstered by Western imperialist interests, and Satanic. For his pains 
he was arrested and exiled in 1964, spending much of his exile in Najaf, Iraq, a place of 
utmost religious importance and one of the leading places of Shi’a learning. While there 
Khomeini would oppose quietism and declare “Islam is politics, or nothing at all.”426 In a 
1970 lecture he asserted that the religious scholars were the deputies of the hidden Imam, 
charged with upholding righteousness and just governance. He promoted the doctrine of 
wilayat al-faqih, the guardianship of the jurisprudent, where the most accomplished alim 
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should direct government since they were most familiar with the law of Allah.427 This would 
become the core political ideal in both Iran and Lebanon, before being spread through the 
networks of Islamist jihadism. 
As Khomeini gained notoriety, the most well-known and revered scholar of Islam 
was Baqir al-Sadr, founder of the Islamic Dawa Party who was also actively trying to 
modernize the clergy at Najaf to respond to the perils of his time.428 Like Khomeini, al-Sadr 
believed the Western sovereign nation-state system could not fulfill Muslim expectations of 
just government, and an explicitly Islamic government was required. Rather than the doctrine 
of wilayat al-faqih, Al-Sadr sought to establish the highest clerical post of the marja, who 
was in his words the “main witness (shahid) of the revelation and essential guide  for the 
believers after the Prophet and the Imam.”429 Both clerics sought to anchor political office in 
religio-legal knowledge and the reasoned consideration of Islamic law – an activity known as 
ijtihad430 – but in 1970 al-Sadr threw his support behind Khomeini beginning the 
consolidation of Shi’ites. The guardianship of the jurisprudent increasingly meant the 
guardianship of Imam Khomeini. Khomeini remained in Najaf until 1978, and over the next 
two years would achieve something thought impossible at the time: overthrowing a strong 
secular government and establishing a nation with an explicitly Islamic charter. 
While the ascendancy of Iran’s Shi’ite religious elements came about through 
political struggles rather than unanimous support, the basis for a religious experience had 
been paved by several acts of the Shah’s government. In the years prior to the revolution, the 
secular regime had revoked the clergy’s exemption from mandatory military service, reduced 
the religious presence in educational and legal arenas, subjected religious institutions to state 
oversight, and prohibited both traditional religious garb and some Shi’a rituals.431 Adding 
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this to the atheist character of the government, these acts were seen as an attack on Islam 
itself rather than a simple political dispute.432 Iranian propaganda presented the war as a gift 
to Iranian Muslims, an opportunity to demonstrate their faith through participation in violent 
confrontation.433 Such moves made it easy to see the government as repressing religion, 
connecting with a long-standing Shi’ite motif of dispossession under an aggressive and 
spiteful regime. It also laid the groundwork for a heightened focus on an individual’s 
willingness to sacrifice. 
In protest to such moves, on January 9, 1978 a large demonstration broke out in the 
city of Qom, a sacred site in Shi’a Islam. In a show of support the clergy of Qom joined the 
protestors, expanding their already significant numbers, before the crowd was violently 
dispersed by police forces resulting in several deaths and scores of injuries. Forty days later, 
when people gathered in accordance with Shi’a tradition to memorialize those who died as 
martyrs, the police again used violence to disperse the crowds, creating the first links of what 
Hans Kippenberg calls a “chain of martyrdom” on which the old Iranian order was carried 
away. The mass rallies opposing the Shah’s rule were put down violently, leading to more 
rallies forty days after which brought more repression, spawning more martyrs, et cetera. 
Khomeini, who had given a long speech on the fortieth day extolling the virtues of those first 
martyrs, declared that anyone who died in the struggle against the atheist and Satanic forces 
of the Shah earned the status of martyrdom, which connected with some of the deepest held 
connections to noble sacrifice and selfless death available.434 
It is important to note that the revolution in Iran had many non-religious labor-
focused movements that interacted with its religious elements. Communism was present 
throughout the Middle East and must be considered a co-instigator of the Revolution. The 
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communist Tudeh Party for instance had long been harassed by the Shah’s regime and 
consequently established an underground infrastructure that was essential in organizing 
Iran’s discontents.435 Their socialist influence is evident in many of Khomeini’s speeches 
which focused on the lower classes facing off against the elites, and they would participate in 
the revolutionary government until marginalized by Khomeini and his cohorts as they 
struggled for a religious basis to the new state.436 When the first president of post-
revolutionary Iran, the secularist Abolhassan Banisadr, left Iran in 1981 for fear of his safety, 
the religious base was able to oust the leftist and modernist bodies, consolidate their own 
power, and firmly ensconce the Islamic character of the new Republic.437 
At the same time Iran’s religious was perceiving their faith as under attack, Saddam 
Hussein’s secular government in Iraq was growing increasingly concerned with the fervent 
religiosity shown by the Islamists in neighboring Iran. The success of the Iranian Revolution 
exacerbated fears of an unstable, sectarian Middle East, and the Ba’athist Party governing 
Iraq worried about their own large Shi’a population. On September 22, 1980, supported by 
the U.S. and other Western governments, Hussein executed Baqir al-Sadr and launched an 
invasion into Iran. Many Iranians saw Western forces using Iraq’s regime to do their dirty 
work and doling out punishment for the overthrow of the Shah, and read these forces as 
threatening the utopia promised by a government led by a Muslim jurist and administering 
Islamic law. 
Iraq possessed technological superiority over Iran, but that dominance came up 
against the willingness of Iran’s population to sacrifice for their cause. Nowhere was this 
devotion more on display than in the special corps known as “The Organization for 
Mobilization of the Oppressed,” better known as the Basij. Composed of men aged between 
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eighteen and thirty, this volunteer militia was renowned for their devotion and 
fearlessness.438 Set up by Khomeini in 1979, the paramilitary group gave the revolutionary 
regime a force independent of the official Iranian army which had previously served the 
Shah. According to Iranian estimates, at its peak the Basij claimed one hundred thousand 
active members, and they were responsible for suppressing dissidents and managing a 
complex recruitment structure, as well as their most well-known exploits, the so-called 
human wave attacks.439 
Human wave attacks were exactly what the term suggests: huge numbers of men 
marching forward into enemy forces only to be slaughtered en masse. But for every line that 
fell, endless waves came up behind, overwhelming and disturbing enemy forces. As one Iraqi 
officer recalled, "They come toward our positions in huge hordes with their fists swinging. 
You can shoot down the first wave and then the second. But at some point the corpses are 
piling up in front of you, and all you want to do is scream and throw away your weapon. 
Those are human beings, after all."440 Shi’a symbolism permeated the Basij, many of whom 
wore plastic keys around their neck to open the gates of heaven at the moment of their 
martyrdom. In a culture of sacrifice, these scores of young men stood out as models of 
commitment, and were credited with offsetting the technological superiority of their 
enemies.441 Their overt religiosity also helped color the revolution as explicitly Islamic. 
 After two years of bloody warfare within Iran’s borders, Iraq’s armies were repelled, 
and Iran launched a counter-invasion into Iraq in Operation Ramadan (in reference to the 
holy month when Muslims fast to remember the revelation of God), seeking to liberate Iraqi 
Muslims from another imperialist government. The incursion quickly led to a stalemate, but 
Iran persisted for several more years until hostilities finally ended in 1988. The Islamic 
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Revolution would not be extended into Iraq, but would find root in Lebanon, particularly in 
its capital of Beirut and the Southern Bekaa valley. 
Lebanon’s experience that led to human bombings was distinct from the cultural 
situation of Iran, one that was more shifting and unstable. The country itself was established 
by the French and English colonial governments when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved at 
the close of World War I. In the chaotic years following its creation, insular Shi’ite 
communities congregated mostly in South Lebanon and areas of Beirut. Marionite Christians 
and Sunnis comprised the Lebanese elite and were disproportionately represented in 
government; when economic deprivation hit the Bekaa Valley, even more Shi’ites shifted to 
the capital where shanty towns had been set up to house those seeking solace.442 Palestinians 
who had been displaced by Israel were the other major population in these shanty towns, 
forging connections with Shi’ites on the basis of common adherence to Islam and 
experiences of displacement.  
This was the situation in 1978, when the Iranian Revolution sent shocks through the 
Middle East and eastern coast of the Mediterranean.443 That year would see the first invasion 
of Lebanon by Israel, ostensibly done in pursuit of Palestinian groups who had launched 
attacks against Israelis. Four years later, and less than a month before Iran launched its 
counter-invasion, Israel expanded their presence into the Bekaa Valley and Beirut, bringing 
them in direct contact with Lebanon’s core Shi’a population. Israel’s occupation gave 
another common experience to unite the Palestinians who were influenced by the likes of 
Qutb and Maududi and the Shi’ites who now shared a common enemy.444 Like in Iran, a 
significant communist presence was present in Lebanon, particularly in the poorer sections. 
Their activities influenced an interpretation of Islamic doctrine increasingly concentrated on 
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social justice and defending poor and marginalized believers.445 As opposed to Iran’s clerics 
who excluded communists from power, Lebanon’s socialist groups connected with Shi’ites 
on social goals and a commitment to an almost millenarian concept of a just society to come.  
At the time of the incursion, Lebanon’s leading Shi’ite clerics were attending an 
annual conference in Tehran. Receiving the news that their home had been occupied by a 
Western-backed imperialist force while they were engaged with esteemed ulama and jurists 
of newly Islamic Iran could not have but connected the experiences of the two groups.446 At 
the same time, the Marionite Christian contingent was seeking to reestablish their dominance 
in Beirut, leaving Shi’ite communities with an intensifying sense of powerlessness and lost 
dignity. In hopes of increasing political recognition and asserting a just order to be 
established, a group of religious and secular grassroots organizations mobilized by 
overlapping social goals became active.447  
The most famous and infamous of those groups was Hizbollah, a Shi’ite group whose 
leadership had ties to Iran both culturally and ideologically.448 Their founders and main 
organizers came from the same place as those driving the Iranian Revolution – the 
institutions of Shi’a learning in Iraq – and hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards – 
known as Pasdaran – traveled to Lebanon in hopes of securing a sort of Islamic franchise.449 
Hizbollah’s name references a verse in the Qur’an that reads “and whoever takes God and 
His messenger and those who believe for a guardian, then surely they are part of the party of 
God [hiz b'Allah] that shall be triumphant" (5:56). Hassan Nasrallah, a founding member of 
Hizbollah and its third Secretary-General, arrived in Lebanon in 1978 from Najaf, coming 
from the same time and place as Khomeini at the start of the Revolution. Moreover, 
Nasrallah was a student of Musa al-Sadr, who collaborated with Khomeini on the 
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transformation of Shi’a Islam into a revolutionary ideology.450 From the start Hizbollah was 
committed to the rule of the jurisprudent Khomeini, which Nasrallah fully acknowledged: 
“the faqih is the guardian during the absence of the Twelfth Imam, and the extent of his 
authority is wider than that of any other person… We must obey the wali al-faqih… [as] the 
guardianship of the faqih is like the guardianship of the Prophet Mohammed."451 To deal 
with Hizbollah therefore necessitates understanding the way religious authority was being 
structured and centralized in Iran.452  
The same year Israel began conducting sorties into South Lebanon, seventeen-year-
old Ahmad Qasir drove his explosives-laden truck into the Israeli barracks. For the next 
decade and beyond individuals attached to Hizbollah would kill themselves in the struggle 
against the forces of oppression and occupation and be declared martyrs. Three years after 
the first suicide bombing, Israel would withdraw from Lebanon almost completely, which 
many attributed to the success of this new tactic. In the span of a few short years devout 
Muslims in two different countries, facing two different enemies who were both seen as 
imperialist forces of oppression, began intentionally sacrificing their lives in tactics aimed 
combating an imperialist foe and securing a level of self-determination. Both were inspired 
by a common religious ideology, and located legitimate power in the Islamic order and Imam 
Khomeini who was its guardian and representative. Coming to terms with how the modern 
phenomena of martyrdom operations took hold must begin with an understanding of how the 
people in these areas during this period came to perceive their own existence as one of 
oppression, and how they came to see jihad as the solution. 
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The Jihad against Oppression 
 A common experience of oppression and occupation united these actors in Lebanon 
and Iran. Both groups blamed their suffering on the forces of a colonial, imperial, and secular 
West, amalgamating the “Zionist” programs of Israel, the cultural hegemony of American 
culture and the colonial governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, among 
others.453 These institutions all sought to exclude Islam from the administration of the nation 
by relegating the faith to a private sphere in line with the secularization model that used 
Protestant Christianity as its standard. Islam, however, was not seen as solely a personal 
faith. Rather it was a complete social system, with its own structures of authority, ethical 
dictates and ideas of just governance.454 The privatization of religion and exclusion of Islam 
from the state’s juridical foundation was seen as a distortion of Islam brought about by 
colonialist powers, and in fact it was. Hizbollah railed against an imported ideal of religion 
that separates ethical values (determined according to religious standards) from legitimate 
rule, seeing it as subjugation that disregarded popular and cultural traditions.455  
In Lebanon the issue was compounded by disproportionate sectarian representation in 
government. Since 1943 the highest state offices in Lebanon were allocated by a set pattern: 
the President was a Marionite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the largely 
ceremonial position of President of Parliament to Shi'ites.456 Had the assignments been 
proportionate to their populations, Shi’ites should have enjoyed much greater representation.  
Moreover, the Marionite Christian community could rely on support from Western imperial 
powers (which resulted in such a political distribution) and Lebanon’s Sunni community on 
Arab nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, leaving only the Shi’a at the bottom of the 
pecking order with no external support. That changes with the Iranian Revolution. 
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 Though Iranian Shi’ites had a radically different experience with secular Western 
powers, they still saw the Shah as an agent of Western oppression. Khomeini often used the 
rhetoric of slavery to describe their situation, an outcome he saw coming out of the financial 
power wielded by the U.S. 
If some American’s servant, some American’s cook, assassinates your marja [leading 
religious scholar, viewed as the ‘object of emulation’ by lay Shi’a] in the middle of the 
bazaar, or runs him over, the Iranian police do not have the right to apprehend him… [The 
members of the Iranian parliament] have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that 
of an American dog… Why? Because they wanted a loan and America demanded this in 
return… The government has sold our independence, reduced us to the level of a colony, and 
made the Muslim nation of Iran appear more backward than savages in the eyes of the 
world.457 
A state of affairs that neglects the highest of Iran in favor of the lowest American is one 
where Iranians had lost dignity along with the ability to self-rule. It appeared to many that 
Iran had sold itself into bondage. 
 Ideas of slavery resonated with the work of Sayyid Qutb, who decades before had a 
close encounter material culture during his time in the U.S., an experience that led him to rail 
against the forces that keep men enslaved to other men.458 True freedom, according to Qutb, 
comes only with complete submission to God, the very meaning of the term “Islam.” It was 
only this devotion which could tear men from their self-imposed servitude to atheists and 
polytheists, who he grouped under the label of jahiliyya, which traditionally referred to the 
period of idolatry before the Qur’an was revealed to Muhammad. Qutb revitalized the term in 
reference to the ignorance of God and applied it to all regimes that were not based in Islamic 
law. Ignorance would become one of the dominant tropes used to describe the situation 
Islamists faced, including the Iranian martyr Nasrullah Shahabi who declared in his will “I 
fight against ignorance as did our Prophet.” As Muhammad combated the ignorance of 
jahiliyya by spreading the word of Islam, Shahabi and his martyr associates use their lives to 
do the same. 
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 Since oppression came about at the hands of those ignorant of God’s will, Islam 
appeared as the solution to their predicament. That led to the mobilization of concepts of 
jihad while providing an overarching identity that applied to people regardless of their nation 
or sectarian character. As Maududi put it in his Jihad in Islam, “Islam is a revolutionary 
ideology and programme which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild 
it in conformity with its own tenets and ideal. ‘Muslim’ is the title of that International 
Revolutionary Party organized by Islam to carry into effect its revolutionary programme.”459 
All Muslims are called to act against the forces of oppression, which is a theme consistently 
referred to in the testaments of martyrs who heeded the call. Nearly every Hizbollah martyr 
references their hopes of liberation from repression, like Sanaa Mheydleh who affirmed that 
“liberation needs heroes who sacrifice themselves,” and implored her family “don't be sad for 
me, but be happy, laugh for the world as long as in it there are heroes and hopes for 
liberation." Sanaa counted herself fortunate that her death would serve her people, as did 
Ahmad Sanezadeh, an Iranian martyr who in his final testament shared his hopes for “the 
liberation of people from polytheism and ignorance.”460 These and many of their cohort 
outlined hopes for freedom and the ability to determine their form of life for themselves, 
which required the struggle symbolized by jihad. 
 Briefly, it is important to note that oppression was not solely a consequence of non-
Muslim rule. The fury directed at outside forces of imperialism was complemented by anger 
toward hypocritical Muslims who followed Islam in the kind of privatized form urged by 
secular forces. The latter posed perhaps a greater danger than imperialist forces, since they 
were able to lead people astray from (what was thereby constructed as) the “true” Islam that 
ruled every aspect of life.461 Such a concern is visible in the popular text The Neglected Duty, 
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written by the Egyptian Abdel Salam Faraj during this period, where he states "The basis of 
colonialism in Islamic countries is these [so-called Muslim] rulers… the first battleground of 
jihad will be the eradication of those same infidel leaders and the establishment of a 
comprehensive Islamic order in their place."462 The same concerns would later appear in the 
work of Ali Shariati, who saw two necessary models for liberation: the Prophet Muhammad 
who manifested Islam’s victory over jahiliyya, and his son-in-law Ali who led to its victory 
over Muslim hypocrites who said one thing but did another.463 This bifurcation resonated 
with people struggling against their own governments as well as outside agents. 
That struggle was framed as jihad, a term as fear-inspiring as it is misunderstood. A 
term that means “striving in the path of God,” jihad is a multivalent term that has multiple 
roots in both the Qur’an and Sunnah.464 In the same way that the battle martyr became more 
popular over time, jihad in the twentieth century owed its martial shape to the specific 
sociocultural background of the period. The term carried a sense of suffering in a divinely 
sanctioned suffering throughout Islamic history, but at various times was used in reference to 
plague victims, those who die in torture and even mothers who perish in childbirth.465 
Ignoring this to only focus on the military context "reifies and dehistoricizes jihad, erasing 
the contradictions and ambivalences that have characterized its complex history, effacing the 
changing understandings of political action that history in part reveals" in the words of 
Roxanne Euben.466 She argues that in the hands of Islamists "jihad is neither simply a blind 
and bloody-minded scrabble for temporal power nor solely a door through which to pass into 
the hereafter… [but] a form of political action in which, to use Hannah Arendt's language, 
the pursuit of immortality is inextricably linked to a profoundly this-worldly endeavor – the 
founding or recreation of a just community on earth."467 Jihad links the temporal to the 
152 
 
eternal, removes the distinction between political and religious action, and gives a new 
interpretive frame through which to understand one’s obligations.  
Foremost for contemporary constructions of jihad was the need to realize God’s 
sovereignty, hakimiyya in Arabic, on earth. Such a hope lies at the core of these struggles that 
seek to recapture an ideal life as conveyed by the Qur’an and the traditions that compose 
Sunnah; only when God’s law fully governs all action can justice truly be realized.468 
Establishing the rule of God was so imperative that early in Islamic history the struggle to do 
so was placed on equal footing with the five pillars of Islam.469 Twenty-five years after the 
Prophet Muhammad’s death Muslim groups were justifying revolt on the basis of jihad as a 
sixth pillar, and in early collections of hadith it became standard to find chapters discussing 
jihad immediately following sections devoted to the five pillars.470 These provided the 
foothold for those like the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder Hassan al-Banna who argued at 
length for jihad to be considered as obligatory for Muslims as prayer or pilgrimage. The 
same was evident in Hizbollah martyr Samir Mohammad Mattout’s final statement, where he 
said the one who “adds [jihad] to one of the branches of religion, which in some cases 
becomes one of its pillars… he hastens death, the meeting with Allah, and the assembly with 
Imam Hussein (as)471 and his household. Hence, he'd earn the great honor that could only be 
earned by the fortunate ones, which is the honor of Muslims, martyrdom." Participating in 
jihad was seen by Islamists to be a demonstration of devotion and commitment, which easily 
translated into the honor gained by dying in the battle against oppression. 
While realizing God’s sovereignty has consistently been the goal of jihad, 
experiences in the 1980s focused on certain aspects of classical jihad doctrine while 
dismissing others. Traditional doctrine held a tripartite vision of the world: there is the abode 
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of Islam (dar al-Islam) where Islamic laws and norms govern, the abode of war (dar al-harb) 
where jihad is authorized in the pursuit of the dar al-Islam, and the middle ground of the 
abode of truce (dar al-sulh) where diplomacy regulates relations between Muslims and 
others. During the period under consideration, radical interpreters of Islamic doctrine argued 
that no true dar al-Islam existed because nowhere was a state administered fully on the basis 
of shari’ah law (at least not as they interpreted it). If no true Islamic state existed than 
everywhere was dar al-harb, and jihad was not only permitted but obligatory.472  
In Islamic tradition, the jihad of violence and warfare is known as the lesser jihad 
(jihad asghar), which is traditionally considered secondary to the greater jihad (jihad 
akabar) that takes place internally as a person vies with their sinful nature and aligns their 
actions with the dictates of God.473 Historically Shi’a Islam focused on the greater to the 
exclusion of the lesser, but as Khomeini and his cohort sought to integrate political struggle 
into Shi’ism, a new relationship was imagined where the greater jihad was seen as 
preparatory for those who would risk their lives in the “lesser” struggle. This idea appears as 
early as the work of Maududi and Faraj, but was taken up by the leaders of the 1980s.474 In 
Khomeini’s “Lectures on Surat al-Fatiha” he said “All forms of jihad that may be waged in 
the world depend on this greater jihad; if we succeed in the greater jihad, then all our other 
strivings will count as jihad, and if not, they will be satanic.”475 Since success in the greater 
means that all actions are in line with Islamic teachings, then the successful jihadist will 
enact God’s law in all they do. Nasrallah too saw that “Before being a battle with guns and 
weapons, [jihad] is a battle of ideology, faith, loyalty, truth, reliance on God, aspiration to 
martyrdom, renunciation of worldly pleasures, the love of others, and the desire to serve 
them.”476 This same sentiment was evident in the words of Hizbollah martyr Ali Munif 
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Ashmar, who recognized "our jihadi path… is long, tough, and filled with difficulties and 
tribulations; this is why it requires good and righteous spirituality, as well as patience." The 
fluid relationship between jihad asghar and jihad akabar solidified into the latter being 
championed as what readies Muslims for the former, and therefore the one who loses their 
lives in political jihad is verified as a victor of the personal jihad and a model of Muslim life, 
something that echoes in the period’s constructions of martyrdom. 
Moreover, while the greater jihad was incumbent upon every Muslim in bending their 
will to God’s law, the lesser jihad was not. To struggle towards establishing an Islamic state 
was not always compulsory, which is what allowed the quietism of Shi’ism before Khomeini. 
Even during times of turbulence, a distinction was made between political jihad as a 
collective obligation (fard kifaya) and as an individual duty (fard ‘ayn); when a group acted 
to expand the domain of Islam, Muslims were responsible for supporting such efforts, but 
were not required to physically and personally participate. Support could come in a variety of 
forms, from providing money or supplies to those on the front line, and as long as an 
individual provided some form of backing to the cause they responsibility was fulfilled. If, on 
the other hand, Islam itself was perceived to be at risk, taking up arms against forces seeking 
its destruction became obligatory for all individually. That meant every Muslim was 
expected to take up arms against those who threatened their religion and way of life, and 
those who did not were, in the words of Maududi, apostates (murtadd).477  
The struggle to establish God’s kingdom was therefore an honorable task to 
undertake, as it was the fulfillment of Muslim duty, and offered a means by which to regain 
some of the dignity lost during the years of oppression. The desire to recover lost dignity is 
one of the most common themes in the writing of Islamists and the martyrs under 
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consideration here. Not only did these people feel unable to control their own destiny amidst 
repressive governments but, as Farhad Khosrokhavar notes, daily life brought numerous 
“fiddles” that soiled existence. “The black market, smuggling, precarious jobs, and petty 
crime, or a shameful collaboration with the enemy’s intelligence services leading to a feeling 
of degradation and humiliation.”478 He saw jihad offering “A religious logic [that] transforms 
this internalized loss of dignity into a sense of sin and a possibility, through death as martyrs, 
of redemption.”479 Words for humiliation such as dhill or hawan were rife in the writings of 
contemporary clerics,480 and most believed like Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, that 
"Resistance allows man to feel human… to feel alive. It allows man to feel he is not a 
negligible quantity manipulated by his enemies."481 Risking one’s like on the field of jihad 
necessarily meant that he or she had taken control of their life and were willing to risk it for 
truth.482 The struggling of jihad necessitated the sacrifice of martyrdom. 
Joseph Alagha contends that in both Islamist and secular spheres of the period 
martyrdom was seen as not only a way to regain personal pride but also uphold the honor, 
pride and dignity of the entire Islamic community, the umma (‘izzat wa karamat al-umma).483 
Originally used to refer to the actual followers of Mohammed in the seventh century, the 
umma sees all believers in the Islamic faith as part of a common social community based on 
the adherence and submission to God’s law. The umma is without boundary, existing 
anywhere devout Muslims lived. Rhetoric around the pride of the umma was employed by 
Khomeini in a famous speech during the throes of the revolution where he declared "Today, 
great nation, you have come to a fork in the road: one way leads to eternal dignity and 
splendor, and the other (God forbid) to perpetual humiliation and degradation."484 Such an 
idea is certainly present in the wills of martyrs in both settings, though the theme is more 
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prevalent in the testaments of Hizbollah’s martyrs, which makes sense considering those 
Iranian Basij dying in the war with Iraq had already experienced the successful revolution. 
Still, Mohammed Ali Amir Sandjabi of Iran declared his intent “to either come out victorious 
or die with dignity,” something that Sanaa Mheydleh echoed in her testament while noting 
that her family would certainly want the same thing. Hizbollah martyr Jamal Sati’s is 
emblematic of Lebanese wills when he stated "I saw how our enemies, the Zionists,485 
destroyed our villages and towns; they humiliated us, forced our people to leave their houses 
and villages… I decided to regain my national pride and dignity.” In line with Alagha’s 
insight, Sati saw his act as producing both personal and communal dignity. As Asma 
Afsaruddin, one of the leading scholars on jihad put it, “under such disquieting, even 
cataclysmic, circumstances, violence deemed to be in the service of human freedom and the 
reclamation of human dignity can be regarded as a highly redemptive act of religiosity, even 
its apotheosis.”486 Afsaruddin intimates that the deeper the shame, the greater the honor 
gained by the death in jihad that is martyrdom. 
During these years the entire Western world was colored as hostile to Islam, and since 
nowhere shari’ah law ruled, everywhere Islam was under attack. As Na’im Qassem, 
Hizbollah’s deputy secretary-general and founding member put it, "We see ourselves as a 
people whose rights have been taken away and so we need to have a force to help us. It is 
impossible for us to relinquish this. Jihad is a fundamental basis for us. We do not use it as a 
means of imposing our views on others, but consider ourselves in a state of jihad to defend 
our rights.”487 Jihad became both offensive and defensive: it sought to protect Islam from 
those hypocrites and outsiders who would destroy it by making it a mere personal faith, while 
at the same time seeking to establish an Islamic state through conquest.488 Jihad became so 
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fundamental to the experience of oppressed Muslims that all were expected to actively 
participate in order to prove their devotion, their moral fortitude, and their commitment to 
Islam. Inspired by this amalgam that reimagined deeply rooted cultural beliefs and practices, 
Ahmad Qasir and Mohammad Fahmideh felt confident that their attacks on their enemies 
were necessary and justified their homicidal self-immolation. Their acts of self-sacrifice in 
the struggle to establish God’s sovereignty had been constructed as the central purpose of 
Muslim existence. 
In the struggles of the 1980s, experiences of oppression result in the projection of a 
lost past where life had been, but is no longer, based in Islam. Consequently, the secular 
regimes of the contemporary age were seen to be tyrannical, and categories of Islam were 
revitalized to oblige struggle in the path of God. Participating in such a struggle was seen as 
incumbent upon each individual and a means to regain some dignity that was lost under such 
conditions. It was a small step from this focus on honorable men and women willing to give 
all in the struggle, to an encouragement for those to give their own lives in an operation that 
insures their enemies’ deaths and their own martyrdom. Incipit the martyrdom operation. 
 
 
Constructing Martyrdom Operations 
 One Sunnah in Islam holds that there are three types of men: the first wants neither to 
kill nor be killed, merely to live in peace. The second is ready to kill for Islam, but fears 
losing his own life in battle. The third type is one who fights jihad looking to kill and be 
killed. It is this last type, according to David Cook, whose every “drop of blood [dripping] 
from him is atonement for every sin; he will come to the Day of Resurrection with a drawn 
sword, [able to] intercede.”489 Nothing could more accurately describe this new kind of 
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martyr, this istishhadi, the human bomb who desires his own death and his enemy’s death 
with equal fervor. Forming his or her subjectivity within a culture of sacrifice and seeking a 
way to regain honor and freedom from oppression along with a chance to be placed among 
the best of Muslims, individuals in these settings using their own lives as a means to defeat 
their enemy.  
 Though jihad’s focus is often spoken of as a willingness to deploy violence, a greater 
emphasis in these arenas began to be placed on the willingness to suffer in service to Muslim 
goals. While change may require violence, acting violently always – and especially in 
contexts of domination and oppression – necessitates the risk of violent blowback. For this 
reason, in the words of Khomeini, blood is more important than the sword. Inaugurating In 
1978, Khomeini explained to audiences that the sacred month of Muharram, when Shi’ites 
celebrate the festival of Ashura in memory of the “Master of Martyrs” Husayn, was "the 
month in which blood triumphed over the sword, and the month in which truth condemned 
falsehood for all eternity… the month that proves the superpowers may be defeated by the 
word of truth; the month in which the leader of the Muslims taught us how to struggle against 
all the tyrants of history, showed us how the clenched fists of those who seek freedom, desire 
independence, and proclaim the truth may triumph over tanks, machine guns, and the armies 
of Satan, how the word of truth may obliterate falsehood."490 The symbols of the festival of 
Ashura, remembering the sacrifice of the revered figure of Husayn and his followers who fell 
to an overwhelming enemy force in the land known as Karbala, dominate the symbolic scene 
of the period and affirmed that blood, not the sword, assures victory over the forces of evil. 
 The culture of sacrifice that took hold in Lebanon and Iran filtered down into most 
aspects of life. One of the most popular books circulating in these areas of the period was a 
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compilation of poems celebrating the martyrdom of a famous Syrian martyr,491 and daily life 
was infused with sacrificial symbolism. People ended letters with idioms like “your 
sacrifice” (qorban-e shoma), and sayings like "I sacrifice myself for you” or “I’ll die for 
you” became standard expressions of pity or gratitude.492 The celebration of self-sacrifice ran 
so deep that Khomeini was able to declare with pride that “primary school children of seven 
or eight stand ready to sacrifice themselves and shed their blood for the sake of Islam and the 
nation.”493 Such a statement may elicit horror in modern Western audiences, but was seen as 
an illustration of the deep pride and dignity of an Islamic nation, where even children are 
ready to sacrifice for God’s truth. It renders clear what martyrs Azim Motuli Habibi and Adel 
Karami meant when in their wills they praised the “martyr-nurturing” people of Iran. 
Apart from the Qur’anic verses and hadith already noted, the religious texts most 
often referred to in the context of suicide bombing speak of it as an exchange of life for 
something better. Rather than the seventy-two virgins often said to inspire those who become 
human bombs (who have no basis in the Qur’an) many bombers reference verse 2:208: “And 
some people sell themselves for the sake of Allah's favor. Allah is kind to [His] servants." A 
large proportion of religious rulings cite this verse as well, which frames the act as one that 
serves the divine and therefore is looked upon with favor by God. While God’s pleasure may 
appear as a given, the label of martyr is ultimately bestowed by God if he is pleased with the 
act performed. Another popular Qur’anic verse that uses the language of exchange is 9:111: 
“Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return for paradise; they 
fight in the way of Allah, kill and get killed. That is a true promise from Him in the Torah, 
the Gospel and the Qur’an; and who fulfills His promise better than Allah? Rejoice then at 
the bargain you have made with Him for that is the great triumph.” Not only does this 
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provide an interesting link with Judaism and Christianity while assuring heaven for the 
martyr, but it also implicitly sanctions it as a legitimate act of jihad. However, it is not 
scriptural interpretation but rather the reimagining of a sacred past that provided the central 
frame for martyrdom operations.  
In Islam the great model of martyrdom is the abovementioned Husayn ibn Ali, 
nephew of the Prophet. The seventh century saw the ascension of Yazid I to the Ummayyad 
caliphate, the Islamic power structure that arose following the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Their power was contested from the start, as this is the period when the question 
of who legitimately governed Muslim communities was at issue, resulting in the division of 
Sunni and Shi’a. Husayn was the son of the last caliph to be accepted by both sects, leading 
to his refusal to pledge allegiance to Yazid.  
 Days after this refusal, while Husayn was on Hajj in Medina, a plea for his help and 
protection came from Kufa, which was previously a capital of his father Ali’s caliphate. 
Husayn left to support his father’s people, but only two days from Kufa his small band was 
intercepted in Karbala, which exists today within the political borders of Iraq, by part of 
Yazid’s army. Battle was not joined for nearly a week, and in the meantime the Ummayyads 
prevented Husayn’s small troupe from accessing drinking water in the Euphrates. Water’s 
importance in the Arabian Desert resonated then as well as now, and a tradition continues 
today where water is offered to all travelers in Iraq in memory of Husayn and his 
companions’ thirst. When battle was finally joined, Husayn’s vastly outnumbered group 
knew defeat was certain. Rather than submitting to illegitimate authority of the Ummayyad 
rulers, Husayn rallied his people in support of Islam (even turning one of the Ummayyad 
commanders to his side) and battled until none were left alive. Seventy-two warriors were 
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beheaded, all of whom are recognized as martyrs by both Sunni and Shi’ites, along with 
Husayn who is the “Martyr of martyrs” (shahid al-shuhada).494 
 When Ali Shariati looked upon Husayn, he saw someone obliged to fight against 
oppression without any hope of victory. Husayn knew he fought a losing battle, but felt the 
fact of his certain death did not remove his responsibility to resist forces hostile to “true” 
Islam. It was this dynamic Shariati thought lay at the core of why Husayn was so respected as 
a paradigm of Muslim action. He saw the martyr as having the “responsibility to perform the 
jihad against all that is corrupt and cruel. He has no other means at his disposal for his jihad 
but his own death… his shahadat… will bear witness to the fact that he carried out his 
responsibility at a time when truth was defenseless and unarmed. He bears witness that 
nothing more could be done.”495 The Battle of Karbala was important and remembered in the 
annual Ashura festival not because it presented an opportunity for Islam to spread, but rather 
an opportunity for those devoted to Islam to show their commitment. Husayn knew he would 
die, and yet was duty bound to fight. He went into the battle bearing witness to the truth of 
Islam through his death, and showed people that resistance always remains an option if one is 
willing to give their life. 
Husayn’s example dominates Shi’ite collective memory, providing a collective 
experience of loss, and a model for Muslim action in the direst circumstances. Moreover, 
Shi’a tradition recognizes a shared guilt inherited from those who recognized Husayn’s 
authority but did not help during the battle.496  Through Shariati’s and other’s reimagining of 
Husayn, death in service to Islam changes from something to be avoided when possible –the 
dominant perspective of Sunni jihadis to this point – to something intrinsically desirable and 
worthwhile.497 For most of Shi’a history, however, the holy death of martyrdom was limited 
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to the holy saints who were worthy of such an honor and therefore beyond the reach of most 
Muslims. During the struggles of the Iranian Revolution, according to Meir Hatina, 
martyrdom was “democratized” and became accessible to all.498 This was likely largely a 
result of the Basij corps’ creation, which provided a means for young men to offer their lives 
in a sacrifice that was reminiscent of Husayn’s, and linked up to the personal duty of striving 
in jihad. Sacrifice provided the avenue for individuals to ascend to the highest echelons of 
respect, surpassing even the leaders of the community, which Khomeini himself noted when 
he declared “I am embarrassed in front of you who are shedding your blood for the sake of 
freedom and Islam.”499 All people were equally presented with a ready-made means to 
achieve redemption, honor, and regain their lost dignity, at the low cost of their life.   
On January 15, 1979, Khomeini gave a speech celebrating those martyrs killed during 
the Ashura riots the year before, those that began the “chain of martyrdom” leading to the 
success of the Iranian Revolution. Making use of the ready-made symbolism inherent in the 
myth of Karbala, Khomeini said “It is as if the blood of our martyrs were the continuation of 
the blood of the martyrs of Karbala, and as if the commemoration of our brothers were the 
echo of the commemoration of those brave ones who fell at Karbala. Just as their pure blood 
brought to an end the tyrannical rule of Yazid, the blood of our martyrs has shattered the 
tyrannical monarchy of the Pahlavis.”500 This connection with Karbala ritually remembered 
during Ashura provided the narrative frame through which Iranians and Lebanese Shi’ites 
understood their contemporary situation.501 Remembering the central sacrifice of Husayn 
when faced with death or disobedience gave Muslims during this period a means to 
understand what was at stake in their plight and how they should respond. The motto of the 
Revolution became “Everyday Ashura, Everyday Karbala,” leading to an ongoing experience 
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of participation and reenactment as well as a connection to the yearly rituals commemorating 
Husayn and his companions.502 Those celebrations became ideological training, providing 
scripts for action when confronted with systems of oppression and injustice like those of 
Hussein’s Iraq. 
When the Basij marched towards their death, wearing their keys that unlocked the 
doors of heaven, they shouted “Ya Karbala! Ya Husayn! Ya Khomeini!”503 Their human 
wave attacks themselves were named Karbala IV and Karbala V, further implicating 
Husayn’s experience into their sacrifice, something that resonates in their wills. Karbala and 
Husayn provide the central motifs of Iranian wills, nearly all of which reference the symbolic 
complex in some way.504 Alsighar Noori and Shahid Mirzapur both connect the imperial 
forces supporting Iraq with Yazid, conflating the symbolic enemy with the real enemy, while 
Bijam Muhammadian framed his actions as historically linked to Karbala, saying "if we were 
not in Karbala to assist Hossein, we have aided his child and this was our duty." Such 
statements both linked to Khomeini’s framing of a direct connection between Karbala and 
Tehran, as well as connecting to expressions of collective guilt experienced by Shi’ites 
during the yearly rituals of Ashura.  
These connections were further invigorated by speeches repeatedly organized 
thematically and temporally around Ashura. As it was a moment of heightened religious 
sentiment that carried an intrinsic sacrificial character, it is unsurprising that those seeking to 
direct such energies towards a political goal planned accordingly. Speeches led to 
demonstrations of increasing size, which were routinely dispersed with violence, leading to 
further commemoration and further demonstrations. As far back as 1963 an Ashura 
celebration brought thousands to the streets of Tehran and were broken up by the Shah's 
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agents, and women's diaries of the period recall their experience as living Karbala again.505 
Twenty years later over fifty thousand gathered during Ashura, and at the height of 
ceremonies an Israeli convoy drove through the ritual processions leading to violence and the 
death of several Lebanese Shi’ites. As a direct result the Shi’a high council in Lebanon 
issued a fatwa exhorting all Lebanese to use all means to resist such forces.506 The timing of 
such demonstrations was not experienced as accidental but fated, reaffirming the duty of all 
Shi’ites to resist dominance and oppression just as Husayn and his companions did.  
Lebanon, particularly the south spaces, became symbolically linked to the sands of 
Karbala along with the occupied lands of Palestine.507 Just as Khomeini made great use of 
Karbala symbolism, so did the leaders of Hizbollah. Nasrallah held that those who died 
martyrs "epitomized the events at Karbala… as if you were that same Hussein, the 
commander on the battlefield, Hussein the rebel in the face of oppression and despotism, and 
Hussein who rejected humiliation and shame… epitomiz[ing] all that Karbala represented, 
from resistance to enthusiasm, to the path, to the tragedy.”508 Likewise the martyrs of 
Hizbollah latched onto such symbols; before leaving on his operation, Salah Ghandour asked 
that "God to grant me success in meeting the master of martyrdom, Imam Hussein, this great 
Imam who taught all the free people how to avenge themselves on their oppressors." The 
symbolic conflation of the Bekaa valley with Karbala also helps make sense of what martyr 
Ali Munif Ashmar meant by his hopes that his "blood merged with the soil of Holy Karbala." 
The martyr’s blood consecrates the land it falls upon, a theme echoed by the martyr Sanaa 
who states "I am now planted in the earth of the South watering it with my blood and love for 
it," and which was a central characteristic of posters encouraging resistance in Lebanon.509 
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By connecting their land with Karbala and their acts with Husayn, these martyrs were 
encouraged that sacrificing themselves for Islam would be seen favorably by God.  
At the close of his well-known speech “Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness,” 
theologian Ali Shariati divided the people of Iran into three types: “Those who died 
committed a Husaynic act. Those who remain must perform a Zainabic act. Otherwise, they 
are Yazids." While Husayn provided the model for those engaged in the fighting, and Yazid 
the paradigm of injustice to be fought against, the patience of those who held strong during 
the months of struggle recalled the figure of Zainab bint Ali, sister of Husayn, granddaughter 
of the Prophet and a symbol of resistance in her own right. Inverting the stoicism displayed 
by the mother of Maccabees IV who watched her sons be killed, when Zainab’s nephew was 
sentenced to death she threw herself upon him in protection, and earned him a reprieve from 
his captors. That nephew was Zain al-Abidin, the only of Husayn’s sons to survive the Battle 
of Karbala and the sole male who perpetuated the Imam’s line, imparting a significant status 
upon Zainab. Many other stories are told of her defiance, and her name also recalls the eldest 
daughter of the Prophet Muhammad himself and renowned throughout the Islamic world for 
her patience. 
In the 1980s Zainab’s name was regularly invoked, particularly in reference to the 
mothers and wives of martyrs. Khomeini begins his speech “In Commemoration of the 
Martyrs of Tehran” by linking her virtue to that of Iranian women, and the Basij martyr 
Mohammed Ali Amir Sandjabi pleaded with his wife to remember Zainab and take her as a 
model. Hizbollah’s Salah Ghandour said Zainab "has been the role model for all women for 
centuries." Creating these symbolic resonances not only provided reassurance for the need 
for resistance, but also offered an avenue for women to participate in greater numbers than 
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they otherwise could.510 Women related to martyrs were also given “noble citizenry status” 
and those who lost a husband in the conflict rarely went back to traditional roles. There was a 
sense that if their husbands were chosen to bear witness like Husayn, they too were chosen to 
display the constancy of Zainab.511 
Perhaps even more than the wives of martyrs, the mothers of martyrs saw their 
suffering linked to Zainab and experienced an elevated place in these societies. Often they 
were given credit for inspiring their son’s martyrdom, like Salah Ghandour and Iranian 
martyr Mohammed Ali Amir Sandjabi who told his mother “you were the mother who taught 
her son the lessons of martyrdom.” Others attributed the mere possibility of their martyrdom 
to their mothers, like Hizbollah martyr Wadji al-Sayegh and hi Iranian comrade Said 
Fatahalla Araji who wrote “Mother, you must be proud that your son shall not refrain from 
fighting Saddam and his followers [as long as] there is blood in his veins, and he shall 
continue to protect his Imam, as that is your wish also.” A few like Hizbollah’s Samir 
Mohammed Mattout beg their families for forgiveness, but many more express their 
confidence in the pride their parents must feel that their children were willing to take such 
action.  
This sentiment extended to the interactions others had with the mothers of martyrs. 
Ethnographers who interviewed such women were taken aback when they discovered the 
expectation was not to offer condolences for the loss of their child, but rather congratulations 
that their son attained the holy state of martyrdom.512 Such praise was also evident in the 
ways some mothers spoke about their sons, such as one who described her son as an “altruist 
whose greatest duty and source of pride is to sacrifice himself for the well-being of his 
country by killing as many as possible of his enemies.”513 If parents didn’t express pride at 
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their child’s martyrdom they would be guilty of what Christoph Reuter called a “double 
betrayal: first, of the child, who would otherwise have died for nothing; and also of his 
faction, or even the community as a whole which for its part is flattered that its struggle is 
now seen as so important and sanctified by the self-sacrifice it inspires.”514 When Hassan 
Nasrallah gave a speech remembering his own son’s martyrdom by Israeli soldiers, he 
embraced such a discourse admitting his son “consciously, willingly and independently chose 
this path. If I, his mother, or any martyr’s father have played any role in this, it was to 
facilitate and not object to or prevent this or any other young man from going where he 
wished, or doing what he thought right.”515 These were not perceived as desperate acts, but 
acts of unbelievable courage and heroism, fighting when they knew they would die, but 
fighting nonetheless. 
Social support for the families of martyrs went beyond statements by their leaders. In 
both Iran and Lebanon special services existed for the families of those who died fighting 
imperialist forces. The Basij and their families had access to special subsidized stores 
reserved for them alone, and Hizbollah’s “Martyr’s Foundation” was created in 1982 to 
provide social services to the families of those who die for the cause.516 Certificates of 
martyrdom – known as shahadah – were distributed to these families to mark who could 
legitimately receive benefits.517 All these ensured that concerns about what would happen to 
those left behind would not interfere with those who wanted to sacrifice themselves, and also 
linked with what would be expected of a legitimate Islamic government in such a period.  
The family’s central place was appropriated by aligning the martyr’s family with the 
family of Husayn. This conflation resulted in the language of union and marriage being one 
of the dominant themes of martyr wills, particularly in Lebanon. Sanaa Mheydleh crowns 
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herself as “the bride of the South.” While Jamal Sati asks his family to “rejoice and dance as 
you would at my wedding, for I am the proud groom of martyrdom, and that is the happiest 
wedding I could hope for.” The responsibilities of a young person when they marry are 
displaced onto the struggle; it is to become the husband or bride of Islam itself, and giving all 
in its service just as one would be expected to give all to their families. This displacement 
allows Nasrallah to remind his audience “we are still holding wedding ceremonies for our 
martyrs, rejoicing in them and envying their lofty status, their badge of honor and their good 
fortune. We congratulate them on this honorable fate, take pride in them, and are more 
worthy and proud for having known them.”518 More and more becoming a martyr took on a 
higher regard that becoming a spouse or parent, and a parent’s dreams were to be fulfilled by 
children who took on this sacred duty to protect Islam with their lives. It was further 
reinforced by the intercessory qualities martyrs possessed; Islamic tradition holds that on the 
day of Judgement the martyr can speak for seventy-two of his or her family members, saving 
them from hell on account of their own sacrifice.519 This was granted to martyrs due to the 
extreme act of devotion they committed in service of bringing God’s kingdom into reality.  
With these symbols being filtered into the whole of society, the willingness to risk 
one’s life tipped over into the explicit seeking to end one’s life. When faced with an inability 
to determine life on the basis they chose, these martyrs were determined to end their lives in 
an act of resistance. Feeling secure in the approbation of their peers and families, and 
confident those close to them would be cared for, these warriors ferociously courted their 
own demise by killing their oppressors. The operations they carried out – whether they be 
individuals detonating themselves in crowds, or part of a crowd walking into gunfire – were 
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not seen as acts of despair-fueled suicide but noble acts of the greatest sacrifice of which they 
were capable; they were not suicide bombings, but martyrdom operations. 
This novel strategy quickly became popularly associated with the Islamist movement, 
but no consensus reigns in the Islamic community at large nor in among the best known 
religious jurists. Many, like the famous traditionalist Nasir al-Din al-Albani, hold that these 
acts are suicides; many others agree the evidence provided in Nawwaf al-Takuri’s most 
authoritative fatwa “Martyrdom Operations in the Legal Balance,” that they are legitimate 
acts of jihad performed in accordance with Islamic law.520  
Such dissension is likewise visible in the context under examination. While Khomeini 
showered the Basij with accolades, Fadlallah was from the start more circumspect regarding 
the place of human bombings in Lebanon.521 He was careful to only authorize martyrdom 
operations against soldiers and never against civilians, and ultimately accepted only those 
that occurred in legitimate settings of jihad and performed in consultation with religious 
authorities. Fadlallah expressed a need to balance out the suffering experienced by the 
bomber with the potential strategic benefit: 
The martyrdom operations, supervised by a religious authority, who takes into account the 
requirements of the battle, the goals and the benefit of the Islamic cause, is one phase of 
Jihad, because God hasn’t defined specific means for Jihad, but He entitled the religious 
authority to lead the battle within the common rules that govern such a case. And the same 
evidence that implies the legitimacy of Jihad implies the legitimacy of martyrdom operations 
if the military conditions available lead to positive results. Just as in a combat or an attack.522  
In short, only when it could be firmly rendered in line with Islamic law by jurists could these 
be martyrdoms, as it was up to those jurists to use the rational legal methods of ijtihad in 
determining what was called for in the specific historical moment; otherwise they would 
remain suicides. 
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That said, the authors of Hizbollah’s “Identity and Goals” affirm that such attacks 
raise the morale of the entire Muslim umma through their demonstration of commitment and 
devotion.523 Confidence that they are in line with Islamic morality seems to stem from the 
extents to which they are willing to go on behalf of Islam, and the happiness with which they 
give their life in its service. Martyrs Jamal Sati and Ali Munif Ashmar explicitly refer to 
human bombing as a “sacred” or “divine duty” in their wills, and most express some level of 
happiness at embarking on such an operation. Sati for instance acknowledges his joy at 
participating in any attacks against Israeli forces, but says his “happiness was supreme when 
I was informed that I was to fulfill a suicide operation.” This selection process reflects the 
need for sanctioning in these attacks; it was not a case where anyone who desired could 
perform such an operation on their own accord. Nasrallah noted that many come seeking 
such an honor, and Maha Talib, the widow of Hizbollah martyr Saleh Ghandour, said of her 
husband “Even if I tried to stop him, it wouldn’t have worked. This was his path; he’d 
dreamed of it for so long; for three years he’d pleaded with the leadership to send him on a 
[suicide] mission, until they eventually let him have his wish – even though they usually 
don’t let fathers go... He believed that he had to defend his country, and that this was the best 
way to do so.”524 Very quickly individuals appear to have sought out the opportunity to 
perform such acts, and those acts were vigorously celebrated by those experiencing 
oppression at the hands of Western imperial powers. Communal spirit and Islamic doctrine 
combined during this period to construct a new idea of martyrdom that combatted concerns 
of suicide with a sacred duty to resist. Bravely taking up arms in jihad gave way to a new and 
extreme means of resistance, but one that continued the same project sought in jihad: the 
establishment of God’s just rule on earth. 
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Establishing God’s Kingdom 
 Everywhere in the words of leaders and martyrs we see rhetoric linking martyrdom to 
the creation of a social and political existence based in Islam.525 Appreciating the hopes of 
these martyrs and their contemporary politico-religious leaders necessitates allowing their 
words to elucidate the form of sovereign collective they seek. Their calls echo those of their 
intellectual predecessors; years before the Iranian Revolution, Abul A’la Maududi called for 
the kingdom of man – mamlakat al-bashr – to be replaced the kingdom of God – mamlakat 
Allah.526  
Establishing the kingdom of God means instituting hakimiyya, God’s sovereignty, at 
the core of the collective. Only when this was accomplished could humankind be freed from 
their servitude to other men, because only under God’s reign could a truly just system exist. 
The very idea of justice refers to a system of regulations that appropriately reflects the “true” 
world order, one where the devout lead, each receives their proper share, and the poor are 
provided for. This lies behind the Qur’anic verse that declares “We have made of you a just 
nation, so that you may bear witness unto the rest of mankind, and that the Apostle 
[Muhammad] may bear witness unto you.”527 The justice of the nation is linked to the same 
witness performed in martyrdom, which connects to martyr Azim Motuli Habibi’s contention 
that his path is “the way of justice against injustice.” Justice is inherent in Islam, a name that 
literally translates as “submission to God.” In their final testaments, these martyrs continually 
referred to their desires to bring about such a state, one that lies at the core of their political 
and religious hopes. Nasrallah himself identified this as their goal when he said “We pledge 
ourselves to these martyrs. We will persevere on their path, preserve their blood, and heal 
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their wounds until God makes His will manifest.”528 Martyrdom is part of a larger project 
that seeks to institute God’s law on earth. 
When Khomeini mobilized the Shi’a he tapped into the already extant idea of a just 
Islamic rule that would make God’s will manifest: the awaited return of the Mahdi. Shi’a 
tradition held the Twelfth Imam would reappear at the final apocalyptic battle that would 
lead to universal Islamic rule. Some martyrs referred to such millennial hopes, such as 
Hizbollah’s Salah Ghandour who hoped his "jihad, inshallah [God Willing], is the 
preparatory jihad for the anticipated Imam." He asked that God "guarantee the continuity of 
the nation until the appearance of Imam Mahdi who will spread justice in the world after it 
was filled with injustice and oppression. I ask Allah that you be the soldiers of Imam Mahdi." 
Likewise, Ghandour’s Iranian compatriot Sayyid Mahmoud Zargar asked that the people who 
buried him pray "Almighty! Protect the Imam until the revolution of your Mahdi!" Some 
martyrs awaited the reign of the Mahdi, while others saw themselves actively engaged in 
bringing about just governance here and now over the entire umma, under the righteous 
governor Khomeini, and based in the laws revealed by God through His Prophet Muhammad.  
While this chapter revolves around Iran and Lebanon, the collective at issue exceeds 
political borders. Muslims everywhere are defined by their submission to the will of God, 
and therefore the rule of Islam was meant for the entire community, the whole umma. (This 
will dangerously resurface with the caliphate sought by groups like ISIS that demand they 
speak for all Muslims, but a less restrictive and more inclusive idea of the umma is meant 
here.) References to the umma in the 1980s sought to reconfigure and reconnect with the 
global Muslim community that had been disseminated across the globe.529 Khomeini 
believed “In order to assure the unity of the Islamic umma and to liberate the Islamic 
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homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, 
it is imperative that we establish a government.”530 He also used ritual gatherings during 
times of heavy pilgrimage to reassert the connections existing between all Muslims, forging a 
common history and looking to overcome sectarianism based on the freedom inherent in 
Islam.531 The leaders of Hizbollah echoed this connection, stating in the manifesto which 
announced their existence: 
We are a nation interconnecting with all Muslims of the world. We are linked by a strong 
ideological and political connection – Islam. From here, what befalls the Muslims in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines or anywhere else verily afflicts the body of our Islamic 
nation of which we are inseparable part, and we move to confront it on the basis of our main 
legal obligation and in the light of a political view decided by our leader the wilayat al-faqih 
[the guardianship of the jurisprudent, namely Khomeini].532 
It was not only for the cause of Lebanon that they suffered and died, but for all Muslims 
everywhere who battled injustice and sought to actualize God’s will. 
This “ummic” identity was reflected in the wills of martyrs from both contexts. They 
not only identify with Muslims in specific areas – especially Palestine but also Syria, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and even America – but they use this identity to complicate 
the idea of a “nation.” Martyr Nasrullah Shahabi links the "trenches of the nation" within 
which he fought to the "service to Islam," Mostafa Saidi saw the nation of Iran as committed 
to establishing life according to Islam for all Muslims, and Wadji al-Sayegh said Israel was 
"not only the enemy of my country or the enemy of Lebanon - but the enemy of the whole 
nation." Samir Mohammad Mattout went as far as to ask his audience to "Commit to the 
nation of Hizbollah… don't turn it into a group or an organization… commit to it and be a 
manifestation of righteousness." Nations, these imagined or interpretive communities, are not 
timeless and unchanging, but are rather continually in the process of being constructed 
through recognition of social difference and sameness, which takes place here through the 
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acts of martyrs and those who claim them as their martyrs.533 In the words of Khosrokhavar, 
“Martyrdom… functioned as an act of witness, it engendered a shared feeling of belonging to 
one nation. Its sacrificial rites… [are] addressed to a sui generis community the martyr is 
trying to convince thanks to the fascination of the tragic and heroic nature of his act.”534 By 
connecting their sacrifice to hopes of a unified umma under Islamic rule, these acts not only 
spoke to the entire community of Muslims, it engaged in creating that very community. Any 
Muslim on the planet who recognized them as a martyr implicitly recognized the validity of 
their sacrifice and its goal. 
Just as an Islamic identity determined the community the martyrs spoke to, it also 
determined who had authority over this group. The same sovereign imaginary that provided a 
common experience of belonging contained ideas of authentic authority. The doctrine of 
wilayat al-faqih resulted in the ascension of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran, and linked to 
ideas of legitimate rule visible in Hizbollah’s manifesto above. Khomeini’s name likewise 
appears repeatedly throughout the wills of Iranian and Lebanese martyrs both: Hizbollah’s 
Samir Mohammad Mattout asked God "to prolong the life of Imam Khomeini, the leader, 
reviver, and honor of the Islamic nation” and asked his fellow Muslims to “Struggle for the 
sake of Allah, and let your jihad be truly on the path of Imam Hussein and your leader be 
truly Imam Khomeini." His comrade Assaad Berro advised "If you have the desire to meet 
Allah, you have to free yourself from such attachments and from your ego, set yourself free 
in Allah's wide world, and struggle for his sake on the path of the Leader who followed the 
path of the Supreme Leader, the great Imam Khomeini, who drew for us the path of jihad and 
taught us to move confidently." Even Ahmad Qasir, who perpetrated the first modern 
“suicide bombing” said "O brothers, you have to hold on to the course of the Great Imam 
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Khomeini, the establisher of the state of Islam, because he is the right path of Islam." 
Everywhere his legitimate authority is affirmed, and the desire and outright need for him to 
rule echoes throughout these testaments.  
Perhaps the most effective means to legitimate his rule is done by those martyrs who 
draw a clear link between Khomeini and revered past Muslim leaders. Iranians like 
Mohammed ‘Ali Amir Sandjabi reiterate the Mahdi’s guardianship entrusted to Khomeini 
implicit in his status as jurisprudent, and Shahid Mirzarpur avers "we must always be 
obedient to the Imam [Khomeini] for obedience to the Imam is submission to God, and 
disobedience to the Imam is disobedience to the command and orders of God.” On the 
Lebanese side too Khomeini was often linked to celebrated Muslims rulers. Samir 
Mohammad Mattout expressly linked Imam Hussein to Imam Khomeini, and Salah 
Ghandour explicitly connects Ali to Hussein to Khomeini through the martyrs who sacrificed 
themselves seeking divine rule, inculcating martyrs into the Islamic dynasty. While the 
circumstances in Lebanon were certainly different than they were in Iran, and Hizbollah’s 
ideologues staked out their own agency while acknowledging Khomeini’s authority,535 the 
doctrine of wilayat al-faqih drove conceptions of just rule in both settings.  
Meanwhile, Khomeini consistently articulated a stance that ostensibly placed him as a 
mere vessel of the law given by Allah. According to him it is the law that is highest and 
provides the foundation of life, not the rulers. In fact, the system Khomeini develops in Iran 
elevates the religious jurist above the political leader on the basis of his understanding of the 
law; the Supreme Leader’s job is to inform the political authorities on Islam’s demands, what 
divine law is and must be. Shari’ah law is the prevailing force, leading Khomeini to assert 
that not the jurist, the educated ulama or even the Prophet himself is exempt from its dictates. 
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This is what is meant by the authority inherent in hakimiyya, where only God is recognized 
as sovereign, and what lays at the core of both Khomeini’s government and Hizbollah’s who 
took the Qur’an as the constitution of the society they sought. For both, Islam is both religion 
(din) and legislative order (dawla).  
Just as Khomeini declared that all people were subject to the law of Allah, he also 
saw himself as a servant of those who shed their blood in the struggle to realize God’s will on 
earth. In a he gave in June 1979 he said "It was you who shed your blood, who went forth to 
struggle and do battle with the regime; I have no claims on our movements. I must serve you, 
not benefit from you by gaining some title."536 The jurist was educated to interpret God’s 
law, but the martyrs internalized that law into their being where it burst out at the cost of 
their lives. This provided them with a unique status, and significant authority (that 
paradoxically could never be exercised by them) that was appropriated by religious leaders 
who celebrated them. Hassan Nasrallah assured the martyrs “your voice, your wounds and 
your blood will ring in our ears and beat in our hearts as witnesses to what you have always 
told us. We promise to carry your rebellious voice to all the dispossessed people of this 
world, and to sprinkle your blood in every corner of the earth so jihad and resistance can 
germinate and grow.”537 Dying battling oppression and seeking to establish a just existence, 
these martyrs testify to their conception of justice and ideal of legitimate authority. The focus 
on blood over the sword put the focus less on jihad, and more on the obligations and 
expectations of Muslims who are determined to live according to the will of God no matter 
the cost. 
Dying while struggling in the way of God was a way to connect one’s death to the 
establishment of divine rule. One Qur’anic verse regularly pointed to in this context is 9:29: 
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“Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider 
unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the 
religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture.” Commenting on this verse, 
Sayyid Qutb noted that the “reasons for jihad which have been laid out in the verses above 
are these: to establish God’s authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the 
true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; 
[and] to end the lordship of one man over others.”538 Decades later, Mohammed Fadlallah 
would concur, affirming that the goal of the Islamic resistance “is to have mankind follow the 
teachings of true Islam,”539 and the first goal of all jihad is “working to build a life on the 
basis of belief in God, his Prophets and His laws.”540 While the impetus for martyrdom and 
jihad so often gets placed on personal belief, these statements show it is recognition of the 
law revealed by Allah as the true law that is sought. It is about justice, not belief. It is about 
following – and upholding – the law. 
 
Martyrdom beyond Jihad 
 In his reflections on the concept of martyrdom, Ali Shariati distinguished two models 
of the shahid. The first is Hamzah, the companion and uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, who 
died gloriously during the Battle of Uhud. The other is of course Husayn, the central symbol 
of the Revolution who welcomes death in service to God. As Shariati eloquently explains, 
Hamzah is a mujahid who is killed in the midst of jihad, but Husayn is a shahid who attains 
shahadat before he is killed. He is a shahid, not only at the place of his shahadat, but also in 
his own house. From the moment that Walid, the governor of Medina, asks him to swear 
allegiance [to Yazid] and he says, ‘NO!’ – the negation by which he accepts his own death – 
Husayn is a shahid, because shahid in this sense is not necessarily the title of the one being 
killed as such, but it is precisely the very witnessing aimed at negating an innovative affair. A 
shahid is a person who, from the beginning of his decision, chooses his own shahadat, even 
though, between his decision-making and his death, months or even years may pass.541 
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Having Hamzah as a model for human bombs would seem logical, since theirs is a violent act 
of jihad, but the martyr is more than just a fallen fighter. It includes but exceeds the context 
of jihad, and Shariati sees Husayn’s witness as “an independent 'rule' distinct from jihad. It is 
an alternative which remains after jihad."542 In order to understand how martyrdom exceeds 
jihad, it is first necessary to prod at the boundaries of jihad, and step back to try and perceive 
the overall pursuit of Islamism. 
  Writing from Tehran University in 1986, jurist Ali Ezzati wrote “The concept of 
shahadat in Islam can only be understood in the light of the Islamic concept of jihad, and the 
concept of jihad may only be appreciated if the concept of the doctrine of enjoining right and 
discovering wrong (al-amr bi'l-maruf) is properly appreciated.”543 Commanding right and 
forbidding wrong is repeatedly referenced in contemporary discussions of jihad; the sainted 
Imam Ali declared it the finest form of jihad, and one hadith named it the highest purpose of 
any Muslim: “you shall have to enforce good and curb evil and arrest the hand of the evil-
doer and turn it by force to do right or the inevitable consequences of the natural law of God 
will be manifested in this fashion that the intentions of the hearts of the evil-doers will 
influence your hearts and like them you shall also be damned.”544 In the Qur’an’s third 
Surah, the doctrine appears as the central character of the Muslim community: “You are the 
best community raised for the good of mankind. You enjoin what is good and forbid what is 
wrong, and you believe in God.”545 Such a succinct statement of the umma’s purpose 
likewise reflects the principle of juridical institutions of every system of positive law, 
religious or secular. Judicial mechanisms exist to command actions deemed “right” and 
through punishment discourage those deemed “wrong.”546 In this context, what is right is that 
which abides by the law of God, and that which is wrong is what transgresses that law. 
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The work of both Qutb and Maududi referenced these religious texts, giving them 
pride of place in the society they sought to create, and in the Islamic sphere of the 1980s this 
doctrine was linked to Husayn and the establishment of an Islamic government. Before 
leaving Medina on the journey that would take him to Karbala, Husayn announced he was 
going to those who pleaded for his help in Kufa to “invite people to the good and forbid 
evil,”547 which is the attribute Fadlallah places at the core of Husayn’s exemplarity.548 This 
same imperative that modern scholars see linked to the desire for a Palestinian homeland is 
what Shariati believes "strict, responsible fundamentalist Muslims sense [as] their 
responsibility every moment."549 Khomeini too saw his purpose as “establishing an Islamic 
government that will apply shari’ah law and fight the Westernisation of morality by resorting 
to the Islamic principle of imposing Good and forbidding Evil (mar bil ma’ruf wa nahy an al 
munkir).”550 This was reflected in the Iranian Constitution’s insistence that this same duty 
must be fulfilled “by the people with respect to one another, by the government with respect 
to the people, and by the people with respect to the government,” which both shows the 
importance of the doctrine and the role the populace played in maintaining the shari’ah law 
at the heart of Islamic government.551 In Michael Cook’s definitive study on commanding 
right and forbidding wrong, he asserts that modern interpretations have come to mean 
spreading Islamic values, moving from a focus on personal constancy towards the 
maintenance of a just society.552 Enacting the law of God lies at the core of this doctrine as 
well as jihad; as the Qur’an makes clear, right means to follow and affirm belief in the 
Prophet, and wrong refers to denying (takdhīb) him.553 Here we might see parallels to Peter’s 
act of denial against Jesus, explored in the last chapter. 
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Striving in political jihad during this period aimed at implementing an Islamic legal 
system in a place where a non-Islamic system holds sway. Any sovereign system has at its 
base a set of values thought to be transcendent and sacred, or perhaps “self-evident” in the 
American sense, whether they stem from shari’ah law bound in the Islamic divine order or 
Western conceptions of law that place individual freedom – itself a transcendent value that 
cannot be abated – at the core. 554 When two such orders come into conflict, part of the issue 
revolves around which is better disposed for governing over life, but such a concern exceeds 
rational calculation. It revolves around which is the “true” law, what is “truly” just. The 
parrhesia of Christian martyrs discussed in the last chapter circled around this same issue, 
and the “truth” they spoke was what they saw as their real obligations, both to the 
government and to God. Speaking truth to power requires a disagreement over what counts 
as “truth,” and an unwillingness to relinquish one’s conception of truth regardless of the 
consequences.  
Like early Christian texts, Islamic doctrine holds a special place for the bold truth-
speaking of parrhesia. One hadith holds “The finest form of holy war is speaking out in the 
presence of an unjust ruler, and getting killed for it.”555 At the heart of tyranny lies the 
inability of subjects to give voice to what one believes to be the truth without suffering dire, 
usually physical, repercussions. It was the extraordinary courageous who knew the penalties 
but were still compelled to speak and abide by the truth. The same function was discussed by 
Shariati, who ends his discussion of shahid by saying “For the eyes which can no longer read 
the truth and cannot see the face of the truth in the darkness of despotism and istihimar 
(stupification)… the blood of the shahid is a candle light which gives vision and [serves as] 
the radiant light of guidance for the misguided.”556 Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda, 
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would affirm the same years later saying human bombers represented “firmness in the truth, 
and boldness with the truth in the face of kings, tyrants and oppressors – even if this leads to 
death.”557 Such articulations are likely a result of direct transmission between Christian and 
Islamic ideas of martyrdom, but while such connections are not uncommon in relation to 
martyrdom operations, the words used by Islamist martyrs suggest a further relationship to 
what they perceive as the truth. 
Over and again the wills of istishhadi spoke of experiencing their conflict not 
between two opposing political structures but rather between truth and falsehood. The same 
is visible where Basij member Bijam Muhammadian affirmed “the present way is a conflict 
between truth and falsehood, and since truth is the victor, we are victorious. Since I wished to 
join the ranks of the combatants of truth, I entered the scene and this was my message.” Both 
Qutb and Maududi saw the fundamental purpose of jihad being the establishment of the 
truth, with Maududi baldly stating that “Jihad is but another name for the attempt to erect the 
truth.”558 Such assertions are supported in the Qur’an itself, where it is made clear that jihad 
occurs “so that [God] may cause the Truth to triumph and abolish falsehood” (8:8), language 
which recalls the doctrine of command right and forbid wrong. Fighting on the side of God 
meant fighting on the side of truth, as the two were considered one and the same. Scholars 
like Juergensmeyer and Kippenberg are not wrong in seeing the powers of falsehood ascribed 
to Satan, which is what allows the demonization of enemies resulting in widespread death 
and destruction, but at the same time it is instructive to look beyond the personification of 
falsehood to what lies behind fears of it. 
Satanic forces do not only aim to corrupt the souls of believers in the Islamic context, 
but also conspire to make life in accordance with the dictates of Islam impossible, inspiring 
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in people a willingness to transgress by obfuscating the truth from those who should be saved 
by it. The personal and the political are inherently linked; politically prohibiting prescribed 
practices requires the individual take a risk if they are to maintain adherence to a thus-
maligned system. It seeks to determine the “right” on its own terms. Following the “true” law 
in such situations necessitates a sacrifice, a willingness to suffer on account of what one 
knows is right. If a religious truth requires breaking the state’s law and suffering punishment, 
such trials are to be endured. Khomeini made as much clear when he warned “If God, 
therefore, had not appointed over men one who would maintain order and law and protect the 
revelation brought by the Prophet, in the manner we have described, men would fall prey to 
corruption; the institutions, laws, customs, and ordinances of Islam would be transformed; 
and faith and its content would be completely changed, resulting in the corruption of all 
humanity.”559 Without an institutional structure engaged in administering life on the basis of 
shari’ah, people would be tempted away from righteousness because they would be made to 
follow another system of obligatory actions, one at odds with divine will. 
Furthermore, a victory of the forces of falsehood would mean the end of Islam itself. 
Hizbollah martyr Ali Munif Ashmar made it clear that the martyrs who preceded him fell in 
the battle for truth, and he and his compatriots “must not let them down or waste their blood. 
We should rather continue the path that they had started… Never stop, because if you do, this 
candle will extinguish and it would be hard to light it up again." If the candle that illumines 
the truth about what is truly right goes out, mankind will be left forever groping in the dark 
of transgression, unable to escape from sinning again and again. Those engaged in the 
struggle carry the flame (a symbol linked since Plato with self-realization and enlightenment) 
that makes the truth appear, revealing the false for what it is, and showing that abiding by 
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Islamic rule is more important than a comfortable life. This is the fundamental purpose of the 
shahid. 
 The foremost Islamist thinkers of the 1980s routinely explained that the paradigm of 
martyrdom Husayn was tasked with this very duty. It was precisely what Fadlallah saw as 
exemplary in the actions of the “martyr of martyrs,” as did Murtada Mutahhari who was one 
of the foremost ideologues of the Iranian Islamic Republic and who himself was martyred in 
1979.560 His colleague Ali Shariati made the point with typical skill, asking: “What is 
[Husayn’s] responsibility? It is his responsibility to fight against the elimination of truth, the 
destruction of the rights of people, annihilation of all the values, abolition of all the memories 
of the revolution, destruction of the message of the revolution, and to protect the most 
beloved culture and faith of the people.”561 What was at stake in his resistance against 
oppression was the utter elimination of the system of Islam, and while the jihad of Islamists 
aims to maintain that truth politically, Husayn’s act was one of personally maintaining 
allegiance to the truth. The battle he waged was between his desire not to suffer and die, and 
his obligation to determine any life he had in conformance with Islam. Herein lies the 
attribute that marks Husayn’s self-sacrifice as significant; the need to sacrifice one’s own 
desire in order to abide by the law is a common experience, but the discussion changes when 
that desire is to avoid pain or stay alive. It is at this extreme limit that the lengths of 
commitment are determined, and the martyr is the one whose devotion is unbound by any 
concerns of the flesh. 
 When Sayyid Qutb discussed martyrdom in his influential work Milestones, he saw 
the martyr as inextricably connected to truth. According to him the martyr 
is with the truth – and what is beyond the truth but falsehood? Let falsehood have power, let 
it have its drums and banners, and let it have its throngs and mobs; all this cannot change 
anything of the truth. Indeed, he is with the truth, and nothing is beyond the truth except 
184 
 
error, and the Believer cannot prefer error to the truth. He is a Believer, and whatever be the 
conditions and the situation, he cannot exchange error for the truth.562 
Qutb holds that the martyr, if he or she is to be a martyr, must hold to the truth no matter the 
consequences. It is this constancy that marks them, like Husayn, as exemplary, and their 
unyielding connection to Islam determines their merit. People willing to stay true to that 
which they profess always serve as models of ethical action, but in moments that see a 
perceived threat to the very source of their values their necessity is heightened. Situations of 
oppression and persecution threaten these sources by employing violence against those who 
refuse their demands because they believe themselves to be otherwise obligated. Such 
measures coerce through fear, literally forcing each individual to decide whether they too are 
willing to sacrifice well-being for their true duty.  
This contest between individual desire and sacred duty is laid out by Hizbollah martyr 
Asaad Berro who told his family “I entrust you to stay away from following your desires and 
having interest in worldly pleasures. If you have the desire to meet Allah (which is the result 
of constancy in His path) you have to free yourself from such attachments and from your 
ego, set yourself free in Allah’s wide world, and struggle for his sake.” The struggle for 
Islam – in both its greater/individual and lesser/political forms – is the struggle against 
individual ego satisfaction. It is no wonder such ferocious actions are taken up against a 
hegemonic corporate power that bases its own values in the freedom to pursue precisely such 
desires. 
 The system imposed by imperialist forces in the Middle East is construed as seeking 
to deny justice to the Muslims under their rule. It is this denial that defines oppression and is 
seen to have led to the economic and political inequities experienced both in Iran and 
Lebanon. True Muslims, it follows, do whatever it takes to expose that injustice and bring 
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about a just system of governance. This is precisely the role that Husayn and all martyrs who 
follow him fulfilled. Such a framework is likewise evident in statements by martyrs 
recognizing that justice only exists in the system revealed by God. When Hizbollah martyr 
Jamal Sati lamented about “how principles and morals fell apart,” and wondered “how 
someone might martyrize for the sake of these principles,” it was the system of Islam he 
spoke of. It is also visible in the above references to the kingdom of the Mahdi whose rule, in 
the words of Hizbollah martyr Samir Mohammad Mattout, “will spread justice in the world 
after it was filled with injustice and oppression.” Belonging to God obliges martyrs to act 
according to the law He gave to mankind; it obliges them to act as befits a Muslim, no matter 
the circumstances. It just so happens that in this historical moment acting as a true Muslim is 
constructed to mean striving for a free community separate from imperialist rule, even if that 
means sacrificing one’s life in the struggle. 
 Demands to act Muslim, defined as according to the system of behavior laid down by 
God through his Prophet, lie at the center of calls to martyrdom and many testaments of 
martyrs themselves. It is this connection that leads Iranian martyr Sayyid Mamoud Zargar to 
link his act of martyrdom to his mother’s educational efforts, his brother’s faith and his 
sister’s hijab, the headscarf “which is her attire of war.” All these things, Zargar holds, are in 
line with the true requirements of Islam and therefore take part in the same battle. It also 
gives context to the statement made by his compatriot Mostafa Saidi, who reminded his wife 
“our union began with the motto of Islam and faith, and henceforth we tried to live every day 
differently and to implement the commandments of Islam. You know well that my life has 
been devoted to realizing the faith in Islam… It is in confronting the calamities and 
difficulties of life that we appreciate the pleasure of devotion to God.” Islam must direct all 
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activity, Saidi intimates, and their level of difficulty is proportionate to the level of devotion 
displayed. However, all are equal in that they are what are required of a Muslim.563 
 Accurately understanding those requirements is what leads to the importance of the 
scholars and the jurists that gained authority in Khomeini’s activation of Shi’ism. Repeatedly 
throughout his public speeches Khomeini praised the scholars and jurists as agents of justice, 
a sentiment reflected in the testament of Samir Mohammed Mattout on the Lebanese side and 
Ahmad Sanezadeh on the Iranian. The scholars and jurists who have studied the Qur’an and 
Sunnah are most fit to determine “true” Islam. Focusing on the authority inherent in those 
with the greatest level of knowledge of Islam is what inspired Aliasghar Noori to contend 
“those who today disagree with the Imam [Khomeini], they would have disagreed with Imam 
Hossein too had they lived in his time, and should the Mahdi arrive, they would continue to 
disagree.” A direct link of legitimacy is drawn from the Prophet to Husayn, and from Husayn 
to Khomeini, and, for some Hizbollah martyrs like Qintar, extends to the leadership of 
Hassan Nasrallah. Legitimate authority stems from the perceived ability to accurately and 
effectively interpret the commands of God laid down in Islamic doctrine. Authority is a 
product of knowing how to be a good Muslim. 
 Martyrs are committed to establishing a just society, and equally unwilling to act in 
any way that may participate in bringing about an existence of injustice and oppression. Such 
participation not only comes from actively proselytizing for imperialist rule, but also comes 
as a result of those unwilling to oppose such a rule. Shi’a quietism before Khomeini could be 
interpreted as just such an act, as their dismissal of the political world could be seen to have 
paved the way for illegitimate governments dominating Muslim communities. Shariati 
reminded people that the Ummayyad regime had offered Husayn the option to peacefully 
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retire into study in Damascus, but Husayn knew to do so was to abandon his responsibilities 
to his fellow Muslims. His duty as a follower of Islam was to combat oppression wherever it 
appeared, and that same duty was at issue in this period of history.  
The constant frame of Karbala served to represent all Muslims as facing the same 
choice, and the martyrs as those who made the same decision as Husayn. Shi’ites were 
reliving the situation of Karbala, where they either joined the side of Husayn and used their 
lives in defense of the truth of Islam, or they sided with those who slaughtered their religious 
icon. Or in the words of martyr Shahid Mirzapur, "if we are not with the Imam then we are 
with the devil. Hence, we must always be obedient to the Imam for obedience to the Imam is 
submission to God and disobedience to the Imam is disobedience to the command and order 
of God." Khomeini is Husayn, Husayn is the Prophet, and obedience to the Prophet is 
submission to God. The martyr is therefore the one who witnesses the truth of the Islamic 
system by acting as they are commanded by the Islamic authority, who best understands the 
will of God laid down in shari’ah, no matter what the cost. They are celebrated for 
sacrificing any and all egoistic desires on the altar of duty. Martyr Salah Ghandour expresses 
it succinctly: “if the price of my love to You [Allah] was to be cut into pieces my heart shall 
always be devoted to you.” 
 Closing his discussion of the figure of the shahid, Ali Shariati argued that it is only 
thanks to the martyr that the nation of Islam could continue to existence.  
It is in this way that the dying of a human being guarantees the life of a nation. His shahadat 
is a means by which faith can remain. It bears witness to the fact that great crimes, deception, 
oppression and tyranny rule. It proves that truth is being denied. It reveals the existence of 
values which are destroyed and forgotten. It is a red protest against a black sovereignty. It is a 
shout of anger in the silence which has cut off tongues.564 
Shariati contends that the exposing power of the martyr, whose sacrifice of his life in his 
commitment to duty serves as a demonstration of the truth of Islam. The martyr’s death 
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communicates: “we have written [God’s] message onto the face of history with our blood, 
saying: in our time we were with our Imam” according to Bijam Muhammadian. They 
declare their affiliation with literally all they have, and in doing so become an example for all 
who seek to follow Islam.  
The power of such a message is undeniable, and many martyrs express their 
confidence that it will reach those they seek. Martyr Jamal Sati asks that “others soon follow 
my example in more suicide operations that will surely lead to victory.” Likewise, Sayyid 
Mamoud Zargar says “I shall give my life in ease knowing that you will continue in my 
path.” Having themselves been so moved by the tales of Husayn and other martyrs, these 
individuals feel confident about the perpetuation of their struggle. Their own acts become 
one more link in the chain of martyrdom that connects them to Husayn. And like him, it is 
the sign of the most upright fortitude, the virtue most desperately needed during their 
historical moment. 
 Nasrallah echoed Shariati’s words when he told an audience: 
The resistance lost martyrs, and so did the army, and these martyrs bore witness to how this 
resistance, steadfastness, presence and honor were displayed on the field. They are also the 
real witnesses to life. The blood of the resistance and of the army’s martyrs is calling out, and 
the echo of their voice is reverberating in all ears. Let no one believe that this nation has died; 
look at how life goes on in Lebanon, clamoring with power and blood, jihad and martyrdom; 
such a nation can never die.565 
The nation that springs from soil watered by the blood of martyrs is the one whose 
inhabitants follow the example of the martyr and act as befits Muslim men and women in all 
things. The character of the society sought is an existence based on the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
This is the goal of every religious authority and martyr discussed in this chapter. In order for 
such an existence to come about, people must be committed to enacting Islam, to bring it into 
existence by acting in the ways they believe they are compelled to by divine fiat. The Islamic 
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community can only be created if people are willing to sacrifice everything in its service. 
Individually they must choose to sacrifice their own personal desires – which exist on a 
spectrum from material comfort to physical existence – in preference of acting as God 
demands. 
 
Conclusion 
 Writing on American soil in 1787, Thomas Jefferson expressed his belief that “the 
tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”566 
Two hundred years later Ayatollah Khomeini said “The tree of Islam can only grow if it is 
constantly fed with the blood of martyrs.”567 A few short years later Hizbollah member Shadi 
Sleyman al-Nabaheen wrote "The tree of Islam is continuously nourished with the blood of 
martyrs so that it can provide shade to those who come after us."568 Different from the two 
political leaders, after penning his testament al-Nabaheen left to seek his own martyrdom by 
blowing himself up in an attempt to kill the enemies of Islam and a public demonstration of 
his commitment to the laws of Allah.  
 Each who relied on the metaphor of the tree recognized an exceptional power coming 
from those who sacrifice themselves: the continued existence of values that lay at the core of 
a just existence. As early twentieth century experiences of dispossession and oppression 
connected Shi’ites in Iran and Lebanon, along with displaced Palestinian Sunnis, a common 
Muslim identity began to be espoused, one that demanded life be administered in accordance 
with Islamic law. During the same period and responding to the same situation came Imam 
Ruhollah Khomeini, who invigorated a dormant Shi’a political fervor that led to the founding 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, administered by the most accomplished interpreters of the 
Qur’an and Sunnah. Inspired by a means to regain dignity lost under tyranny, members of 
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both Hizbollah and the Iranian Basij corps saw themselves obliged to battle against the 
secular governments that sought to make a blind faith of Islam, and determining life solely on 
egoist and materialist principles. Building upon constructions of jihad that had circulated in 
the Arab world for decades, and bulwarked by the sacred model of Husayn ibn Ali whose 
experience provided the frame by which to understand their own, men and women sought to 
use their own lives in sorties against the enemy who threatened the continued existence of 
God’s law. Their acts of sacrifice were dedicated to establishing an existence determined by 
God’s revelation for all Muslims, a goal that was worth their own loss of life. 
By publicly acting in ways believed to support and induce a system of governance 
based on God’s laws, they make of themselves a spectacle which draws attention and tries to 
dictate how their situation is interpreted. Both the image of the Basij human waves, calmly 
marching upon their enemies shouting for Husayn and Khomeini as bullets tore through 
them, and the spectacular and unexpected explosions produced by human bombs served to 
jolt people into facing what they may have ignored. They frame the circumstances 
confronting Shi’ites as a second Karbala where Husayn’s party can follow him in martyrdom, 
standing with him when their ancestors turned away. Doing so was seen to be nothing more 
than expected of dutiful Muslims. 
   The first pillar of Islam is the confession of faith, a public declaration that “There is 
no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his prophet.” With this statement an individual declares 
fealty to the Divine as revealed in the Qur’an, and dedicates themselves to a life in 
compliance with Islamic doctrine. It establishes one as a Muslim. However, a simple 
declaration does not insure constancy; only actions can do that, which is reflected in the other 
four pillars focusing on activity: prayer, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage. But at the core 
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of Muslim identity remains the profession of faith, known by the Arabic term shahadah, 
which possesses a linguistic connection to the shahid who have concerned us in these pages. 
Martyrdom is the highest act of devotion, the definitive performance of a commitment to the 
doctrine of God with all one has, regardless of the consequences. While professed Muslims 
could always prove their words a lie by becoming an apostate, the martyr forestalls any such 
possibility by ending their life in a way determined by Islam. By refusing to let any concerns 
come between them and their resolve to determine life on the basis of God’s revelation, the 
martyr provides an act of witness that serves as an example to others and a piece of evidence 
in support of their conception of the truth. Truth, if it indeed be truth, is always operative, 
and must be consistently followed by those who adhere to it.  
“Suicide bombings” are often framed as the antithesis of liberty, as they are seen to 
target those who claim to be representatives of freedom and justice. Those who give their 
lives in “martyrdom operations,” however, understand themselves as supporting a just system 
that will ultimately redeem all of society. The visions of cosmic order undergirding such 
beliefs vary, but adherents share an unrelenting attachment to their system. Martyrdom 
operations are largely determined in popular discourse by their deployment of violence, 
especially on civilians, but analyzing the symbolic complexes put to use in the last testaments 
by those who go to become istishhadi show such to be a byproduct rather than central aim of 
their performance. More fundamental is a desire to inaugurate God’s just kingdom on earth 
by the only means that are left to them, their own deaths. Engaging in obligatory jihad to 
defend the core of their version of Islam, they perform a spectacular act of resistance that 
inspires others to follow suit by symbolically enacting a sacred model of ethical perfection. 
If, as Khomeini routinely repeated, every day became Ashura, and everywhere became 
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Karbala, then every martyr became Husayn and knew good and well the stakes of the conflict 
– the truth – and what was required of them – their lives. In the next chapter we will see 
precisely this same dynamic at work in a context that is usually and contrastingly seen as 
nonviolent: the Buddhist country of Tibet which is the home of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 
a global symbol of peaceful resistance. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Burning Buddhas: 
Constructing Tibetan Self-Immolators as Martyrs 
 
 
Introduction 
 On the 27th of February 2009, a twenty-four-year-old monk from the Kirti Gompa569 
named Tabey walked to a busy crossroads of Ngaba Town in the Ngaba and Qiang Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture, doused himself in kerosene and struck a lighter. Angered at the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) canceling of a religious festival, the young monk took 
drastic measures to voice his anger in an area where dissenting speech is often silenced. As 
the flames engulfed him, he waved a Tibetan flag with an image of the Dalai Lama at its 
center and called for freedom in Tibet, until security forces shot him and extinguished his 
flames after he fell to the ground. Tabey became the first, but far from the last Tibetan to 
self-immolate in the 21st century.  
 Since Tabey’s spectacular death, over one hundred and forty more Tibetans have 
publicly burned themselves throughout Tibet. Their deaths occur amidst tensions on the 
plateau where the Chinese state has placed restrictions Tibetan religious cultural practices, 
exiled the Dalai Lama and imprisoned other religious leaders while increasing military 
presence in Tibetan neighborhoods and monasteries. Moreover, charges of secret detentions, 
torture and forced sterilization by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are exacerbated by a 
steady influx of Han Chinese workers settling in lands traditionally understood to be part of 
Tibet. Tibetans face travel restrictions and telecommunications are increasingly difficult and 
dangerous to transmit. Yearning to take action, Tabey and others have resorted to voluntary 
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suffering and death in self-immolation570 while yelling slogans decrying Chinese occupation, 
extolling Tibetan unity and demanding the return of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama. 
 A number of Tibetan expressions have been used to describe the act of self-
immolation, including “to burn oneself” (rang sreg), “offering fire to the body” (rang lus me 
mchod), “to give one’s body” (lus sybin) or “to burn [one’s body] as an offering lamp” (mar 
mer sbar).571 Across the board, Tibetans refer to self-immolators as pawo (W: dpa ‘bo), a 
term closely related to ‘hero’ but often translated into English as “martyr.” The Tibetan 
Youth Congress, an extreme nationalist group seeking political freedom in Tibet, commonly 
calls these men and women martyrs,572 and a main road in Dharamsala, where the Dalai 
Lama lives in exile with a large Tibetan community is known as “Martyr Street” (Pawoe 
Sanglam). The Tibetan National Martyrs’ Memorial and Tibetan Martyr Pillar stand in 
Dharamsala, with the word carved into stone outside the Dalai Lama’s domicile in the 
McLeod Ganj neighborhood. A compilation of information about the first twenty-eight self-
immolations by the Tibetan group the Domey Exile Solidarity Alliance, The Iron Hare: 
Flames of Resistance, is dedicated to “the brave men, women and children who died as 
martyrs to the cause of a free Tibet.”573  
 The term “martyr” has its roots in the Abrahamic religions already discussed, but in a 
Buddhist majority region the concept has also found purchase. Some scholarly commentators 
like Katia Buffetrille argue against calling the self-immolators ‘martyrs’, due to the term’s 
Christian context carrying the sense of those who die rather than giving up beliefs, thereby 
overdetermining our understanding of these actions.574 Likewise Margaret Gouin begins her 
analysis of the self-immolations with the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of martyr, 
seeking to discover whether the self-immolations could conceivable be understood by a 
195 
 
concept that has traditionally centered around theistic belief.575 Jack Lee Downey also seeks 
to use martyrdom as a window into the self-immolations, approaching these autocremations 
as manifestations of “communicative suffering,” a label to which I am sympathetic.576 
Consistent with my own purposes, Downey does not seek to determine whether or not these 
acts qualify as martyrdoms, but rather uses the term as a means to highlight the sacred 
aspects of their deaths and bring them into conversation with other forms of religious deaths. 
This chapter expands on those same conceptions, and I contend that using the lens of 
martyrdom to frame these deaths can both elucidate their performative logics and reveal 
similarities between social expectations in widely varying contexts. 
 In what follows I will examine why how the discourse of martyrdom is used regarding 
these self-immolators, and how these acts might function as ‘witness’ for the Tibetan 
collectivity. I will look to discover how calling these self-immolations “martyrdoms” 
prefigures them within a certain religious and/or political frame? What are these martyrdoms 
hoping to accomplish, and by what means? in what ways do these deaths and the context 
within which they are performed resonate with the other cases analyzed above? Why does the 
level of pain experienced – and the response to that pain – appear linked to their efficacy? 
The answers to these questions will increase our appreciation of the complexities and stakes 
of the situation in Tibet. 
 To answer these questions, I examine the last statements (khachem) left behind by 
self-immolators within their political and religious context to uncover the structures of 
meaning that guide their experience inspire and legitimize the fiery destruction of these men 
and women’s bodies.577 In 2012, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) published Storm 
in the Grasslands: Self-Immolations in Tibet and Chinese Policy, which contained over two 
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hundred and sixty pages of analysis, images and profiles of self-immolators, including 
translations of the statements left behind by those who grace their pages.578 Many of the 
khachem used here come from this resource, but many others have been taken from news 
sources, particularly Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, who operate both Tibetan and 
English webpages that make these texts available.  
 While others studies have looked to these texts for insight into the religious influences 
of self-immolation, many look only at texts written by religious professionals – Lama 
Sobha’s recorded final statement before he self-immolated on January 8, 2012 being perhaps 
the favorite of scholarly analysts. Delivered as a dharma talk, a kind of Buddhist sermon 
interpreting and elaborating on Buddhist philosophy, his statement is littered with Buddhist 
symbolism and sentiment. As one of only two Buddhist masters to have self-immolated (the 
other being Tulku Athup, who self-immolated with his niece on April 6, 2012), his words are 
extremely important and will be examined in several places below. However such preference 
has two main failings: first, it prefigures the place of religion in these acts on the basis of one 
actor – an actor who has devoted their entire life to their tradition and would therefore 
naturally accentuate such beliefs. It therefore marginalizes the reasoning offered by others, 
both religious and lay. Second, it plays into scholarly biases towards religious elites, which 
has in the past resulted in the minimizing of devotional forms of Buddhism in favor of more 
abstract philosophies promulgated by elites. 
 Rather than giving preference to any single statement, I focus the analysis below on 
symbolic complexes evident in the majority of extant statements. Including those printed by 
ICT, I have gathered a collection of nineteen khachem, along with text from pamphlets, 
interviews given by survivors after the fact, and other first-hand accounts. More weight will 
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be given to those written by Tibetans inside Tibet than those few Tibetans in the diaspora 
who performed the act, not to suggest these latter are inauthentic, but rather to elaborate upon 
a common experience of Tibetans under Chinese rule; those living in India and other areas of 
South Asia have different perspectives influenced by more cosmopolitan conversation 
partners which is reflected in their statements. In hopes of identifying a common thematic in 
these statements I will base my analysis in indigenous Tibetan self-immolations, but will use 
sources from outside the plateau to identify significant parallels. 
 For help contextualizing these statements I rely on popular Mahayana Buddhist 
narratives, and the statements of the XIV Dalai Lama. While Vajrayana Buddhism is the 
dominant school in Tibet, with a heavy focus on tantric ritual practices performed by 
religious elites, I will focus on Mahayana texts for two main reasons: first, Mahayana texts 
are known to a wider proportion of Tibetans, while the ritual manuals of Vajrayana are 
restricted to those with advanced spiritual training. Concentrating on tantric texts would 
predetermine self-immolation as an act similarly restricted, and therefore available to 
Buddhist masters alone. While two Buddhist masters have self-immolated to date, the 
majority of pawo have been laypeople (for reasons explored below). Determining self-
immolation as an advanced tantric ritual would exclude these or contend that they were 
deficient, an assertion utterly absent in the commentaries on the acts. Second, the moral 
narratives of Mahayana Buddhism are familiar to lay practitioners and elites both, providing 
a wider area of influence. Those texts examined here are known to all Tibetans, which means 
an expansive and flexible interpretive field within which self-immolation is understood.  
 Statements by Tenzin Gyatso, the XIV Dalai Lama, comprise the last major source of 
material for this chapter. From 1959 to 2011, he gave an annual address to Tibetans on 
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March 10th, the anniversary of his exile from Tibet. These statements provide not only his 
plans and hopes for Tibetans, but also shows the rhetorical frames he uses to situate the 
Tibetan plight. A variety of these annual speeches will be referenced below, all of which 
were taken already translated from the archives of the Dalai Lama’s official website.579 
 Self-immolation was not a common political or religious practice in Tibet before 
2009.580 Seeking to understand its place in the Tibetan imaginary, many scholars have sought 
to understand these acts within the horizons of Buddhism, the dominant religion of the 
region.581 Buddhism is often held to be a religion of peace, and these agonizing acts of self-
killing conflict with the image of saffron-robed monks sitting serenely in prayer. That 
juxtaposition, however, gained prominence in Malcolm Browne’s 1963 photograph of the 
Vietnamese monk Thich Quang Duc sitting calmly in the lotus position while burning in 
protest against the Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Duc’s act was done to 
demonstrate against the persecution of Buddhists, and the shocking image captured the 
imagination of Westerners who were focused on events in Vietnam while becoming 
increasingly fascinated by the spiritual practices of South Asia. Considering the prominence 
of Duc’s act in Western media, it is not surprising that some western scholars have sought to 
affirm him as the model for the Tibetan cases.582  
 Parallels between Duc’s act and the self-immolations in Tibet seem ready at hand; 
auto-cremation is the chosen form of self-killing in both cases, Duc was a Buddhist monk as 
were many of the Tibetan self-immolators, and both were acting against a government seen 
to be threatening their traditional way of life. However there are good reasons to look beyond 
Duc’s protest in trying to understand Tibetan self-immolation. As Robbie Barnett has pointed 
out, Duc’s strategy was based on the relative weakness of Diem’s government and his heavy 
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reliance on international support, and as a majority of Vietnamese citizens were Buddhist, 
charges of anti-Buddhism had a significant impact on Vietnamese and Western audiences 
who were showing an increased interest in Eastern spiritualities.583 
 Tibetan self-immolators, on the contrary, confront a strong centralized government in 
Beijing, largely independent of international support. Moreover, there is little reason to think 
that Browne’s photograph and Duc’s protest resonated in Tibet like it did in the east, due to 
less concern around the events in Vietnam and the scarce technology of communication on 
the plateau. Any argument that Tibetans merely copy Duc – giving their lives in sheer surface 
mimesis without any further considerations – would treat Tibetans as being without agency, 
copying foreign models rather than finding inspiration in indigenous models of action.584 
 Even apart from Duc, all media reports and most scholarly analyses have labeled these 
acts as a kind of protest.585 Auto-cremation’s place in what Tsering Shakya terms the “global 
repertoire of protest”586 has been reaffirmed by Jan Palach’s actions during Czechoslovakia’s 
“Velvet Revolution” and Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-burning in Tunisia which sparked the 
Arab Spring.587 Some scholars like Michael Biggs have sought to place Tibetan self-
immolation into this context of “suicide protest” rather than Buddhism.588 However, when 
the popular monk Thich Nhat Hanh tried explaining Duc’s self-immolation to Martin Luther 
King Jr., he contended that the act is not fully encapsulated by the category of protest, and 
exceeds our normative moral and political categories.589 Chinese intellectual and Tibetan 
commentator Wang Lixiong likewise found that protesting for international attention is rarely 
mentioned as the driving motivation in the final words of Tibetan self-immolators.590 The 
majority rather communicated that their deaths were intended as an act performed in support 
of rather than publicizing of the Tibetan cause.591  
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 While the Tibetans who have self-immolated in the 21st century vary in age, sex, and 
occupation, some trends can be noted at the outset. In terms of geography, the self-
immolations have been concentrated in the areas of Amdo and Kham of the eastern provinces 
of Tibet. These are Tibetan areas outside the traditional lands of Ü-Tsang, today known as 
the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The TAR and its capital of Lhasa is often 
considered “political Tibet,” while the areas of Amdo and Kham (which are within the 
borders of China’s Sichuan, Qinghai and Ganzi provinces) have been referred to as 
“ethnographic Tibet,” “eastern Tibet” or “traditional Tibet.”592 These are the lands at the 
heart of the self-immolations, which have a high concentration of ethnic Tibetans and have 
seen a huge influx of Han Chinese to the areas, reinforced by the high speed Qinghai-Tibet 
railway connecting the urban centers of China and encouraging further relocation.593 As far 
back as 1995 the XIV Dalai Lama expressed concern about Tibetans in these areas being able 
to maintain their distinct Buddhist culture and identity as minorities in Chinese provinces.594 
 At the heart of the self-immolations is Kirti Monastery, in Ngaba Town of the Ngaba 
and Qiang Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province (the traditional Tibetan land of 
Amdo). Not only was Tabey and approximately two out of three self-immolators through 
2011 from Kirti and its sister nunnery Mamae Dechen Chokorling, but the area was also the 
first to feel the brunt of many of the PRC’s programs.595 Founded in 1870 (though claiming a 
lineage as far back as the 14th century), Kirti is a monastery of the Gelug, or “Yellow Hat” 
sect of Tibetan Buddhism, that sees the Dalai Lama at its head.596 The monastery’s head, 
Kirti Rinpoche, went into exile where he remains alongside the Dalai Lama; his 
interpretation of Kirti’s centrality to the self-immolations stems from the fact that Kirti and 
Ngaba was the first to have contact with Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as 
201 
 
they followed the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek’s Red Army in 1935. From there members of 
the Kirti community (and the larger area of Ngaba) consistently felt themselves on the front 
line in the conflict with the PRC, which has become a point of pride for Kirti monks.  
 It is noteworthy that the first modern self-immolators including Tabey were religious 
ascetics, hailing from Gelugpa monasteries in eastern Tibet.597 From 2009 until February 
2012 all self-immolators were presently or previously members of the Buddhist clergy. 
During 2012, the year with the highest number of self-immolations (at the time of this 
writing), a shift began where laypeople began performing their deaths in the same way. Of 
the ninety-two self-immolations in that year, 39% were (or once were) monks or nuns, while 
42% were not, with 13% being from nomadic tribes who were being forcibly relocated 
through Chinese policy.598 In 2013, 43% of pawo were monks or nuns and 47% laypeople, 
including 10% nomadic persons.599 Pawo are not restricted to advanced students of 
Buddhism, suggesting the logics behind these acts are not dependent on advanced Buddhist 
training and competency. It is possible that this trend challenges the traditional connection to 
spiritual purity laypeople experience vicariously through Buddhist clergy, or it may stem 
from a continued legitimation of the act assured by spiritual elites.600 Here I just wish to point 
out that explanations of self-immolations relying on advanced tantric practices have 
significant explanatory problems. However, a too firm boundary between religion, political 
action and social belonging in Tibet will obfuscate more than it will elucidate. 
 Due to the prevalence of the Tibetan flags and pleas for rangzen, independence, by 
radical groups like the Tibetan Youth Congress, we may be inclined to link the self-
immolations solely to the movement for Tibetan independence. As we will see, the history of 
Tibet that the self-immolations take off from is one of continued negotiations of Tibetan 
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sovereignty, and the relationship with the PRC is certainly central to understanding the 
situation on the plateau. However, as both Wang Lixiong and Robbie Barnett have argued, to 
consider only independence as a motivator simplifies a complicated socio-political situation, 
and reduces many hopes to a single cause that fits nicely within larger scholarly frames of 
nationalism.601 Lixiong has further shown such a hermeneutic is not supported by the words 
left behind by self-immolators, which only occasionally speaks to a desire for independence, 
but show a much wider variety of goals.602 While there certainly is an independence 
movement that celebrates and seeks to claim the social capital these auto-cremations 
produce, there are also many who would accept meaningful autonomy under Chinese rule as 
long as certain facets of Tibetan cultural life are upheld. 
  These auto-cremations are multifaceted. Their opposition is simultaneously symbolic 
and direct, seemingly performed to highlight oppression in a spectacular way while also 
taking steps toward its solution. Elsewhere I have argued that these acts do not fit neatly into 
constructed categories of violence or nonviolence, as such classifications require affirming 
what authority structures can dictate prohibitions against suffering and what transgressions of 
those prohibitions are sanctioned. If we accept they are consistent with Buddhist principles of 
ahiṃsa, actions that do not harm, we must simultaneously deny the PRC’s perspective that 
these are transgressive acts of harm against Chinese subjects who the government is 
responsible to protect. Such determinations necessarily implicate us in questions of 
legitimacy and power; violence and nonviolence are descriptors of means towards ends, and 
the ability to determine what ends Tibetans can use their bodies towards is precisely what is 
at issue in this conflict.603  
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  In what follows I will begin by laying out the broad historical and political history 
that has shaped the relationship between the Tibetan people and the PRC that forms the 
context for the self-immolations. I then describe how a perceived state of siege that has been 
present in Tibet for decades resulted in interpretations of Tibetan suffering as necessary for 
protecting the Dharma from extinction.604 Following that I analyze the deep roots these 
conceptions have in Tibetan self-understanding and how they have been bolstered by an 
economy of legitimate violence that seeks to determine right conduct in alignment with 
Buddhist values. This sovereign imaginary provides rhetorics of sacrifice employed by self-
immolators and those who celebrate these deaths to qualify them as sacred deaths performed 
for the Tibetan people. I conclude by showing how these frameworks result in a perceived 
duty of Tibetans to enact the truth of “Tibet” by using their existence to bring it into reality, 
compounded by a perception that capitulating to the PRC’s program means participation in 
destroying the organizing principles of Tibetan life. By ending their lives in ways sanctioned 
by the Tibetan imaginary but prohibited by the PRC, self-immolators demonstrate their 
commitment to Tibet and commend their perception of reality through their burning bodies. 
 
The Conflict with the People’s Republic of China 
 For centuries the political authorities of China have played some role in determining 
the shape of life in Tibet, resulting in an infringed sense of identity and sovereignty that has 
characterized Tibetan life for a very long time.605 Nangdrol, a Tibetan who self-immolated in 
September of 2012, wrote: 
This evil China has invaded Tibet, 
It is not possible to live under this evil rule, 
The evil China having no love and compassion, 
Inflict us with unbearable beatings and pain, 
Ultimately to smother Tibet. 
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May His Holiness the Dalai Lama live for many ten thousand years.606 
Nangdrol believes life under Chinese rule prevents his and his fellows from living like 
Tibetans ought. The practices that are forbidden by the PRC are seen to define life as a 
Tibetan, therefore the choice facing Tibetans is to lose their lives, or lose that which gives 
their lives meaning. Calling life “unbearable” due to “immense suffering” certainly suggests 
the melancholy and hopelessness that leads to suicide, but those who are understood to use 
their deaths in service to something sacred show that Tibet exceeds Tibetans.607 Recounting 
some of the important developments in the relationship between the two collectives will help 
us understand the complex association that provides the foundation for Tibetans imaginings 
of themselves as historical, political and religious agents. 
 The relationship between Tibet and China is traceable at least as far back as the 7th 
century, when the first Tibetan King, Songtsen Gampo, was given a Chinese princess for a 
bride, officially linking the two societies for the first time.608 Early in its existence the 
Kingdom of Tibet commanded powerful armies, even conquering areas of China in the 8th 
century and negotiating treaties with the Tang dynasty in the early 9th century. In 1207 the 
Tibetans submitted to the army of Genghis Khan, setting up a ‘priest-patron’ relationship 
with the Mongols where the latter would protect the Tibetan people in exchange for spiritual 
guidance.609 This relationship with the Mongols continued in the 17th century, when the 
Mongol warlord Gushri Khan helped establish the V Dalai Lama (Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso) 
as the political power in Tibet. With the Khan’s help, the “Great Fifth” was able to bring his 
Gelug sect to the pinnacle of the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy and implant himself as leader of 
a now (loosely) unified Tibetan kingdom. As a reward for Gushri Khan’s support of the Dalai 
Lama, and thereby the Buddhist dharma itself, he was named Dharmarāja, a “Dharma King.” 
This was one of the key moments in Tibet’s relationship with the PRC, as the Chinese state 
205 
 
sees itself as the inheritors of the Mongol polity, while Tibet recognizes no such 
transmission.610 
 Following the ascension of the “Great Fifth,” Tibet experienced something of a 
reversal of fortune, and found themselves governed by China’s Manchu (or Qing) dynasty 
during the early 18th century. The extent to which China exercised direct control over Tibetan 
lands during that period is debated, but it seems clear that by the middle of the next century 
Chinese authority had mostly evaporated from the plateau, leaving the Tibetans largely self-
governing. Preeminent Tibetan historian Melvyn Goldstein qualifies such influence as 
“miniscule,” and supports that claim by reference to multiple wars fought throughout the 19th 
century that were engaged and settled by Tibetans completely apart from China’s input and 
influence.611 What relationship there was between China and Tibet at the time was 
understood by Tibetans as chōyōn, a symbiotic relationship between spiritual teacher (i.e. the 
Dalai Lama) and lay patron (i.e. the Chinese Emperor). This relationship saw the Tibetans as 
the authorities in the religious sphere (like the priest-patron relationship established with the 
Mongols), which counters the subject-ruler configuration averred by historians of the PRC.612 
Coming into the 20th century, therefore, while there was a recognized relationship with 
China, Tibetans still saw Tibet as sovereign unto itself.  
 It is the negotiation and contestation between vying political institutions during the 
20th century that is salient for understanding the self-immolations. This century’s first 
decades saw the Qing dynasty give way to the People’s Republic of China, while the British 
colonial project extended into the Tibetan plateau. These two incidents occasioned the Simla 
Convention of 1914, where officials from all three nations sought an answer to the question 
of Tibet’s governance and sovereignty. While never ratified by the PRC, Simla’s resolutions 
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divided Outer Tibet, where the Dalai Lama held full political sway, from Inner Tibet, which 
would be under Chinese rule but where Tibetans would have significant autonomy. 
Assurances were made that “nothing shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the 
Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high 
priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious 
institutions.”613 Simla also held the stipulation that Tibetans were not to consider China a 
foreign country, an ambiguous statement whose meaning will be worked out over decades. 
 In the 1940s Sino-Tibetan relations plummeted again, but China’s involvement in 
World War II along with British pressure resulted in the inability of Chiang Kai-Shek and his 
Kuomintang party to militarily impose their will in Tibet.614 Legitimate concerns about 
interference from the United States among other nations resulted in attempts of Chiang’s 
Chinese Nationalist Party to extend friendship to Tibet and even sending arms and munitions 
for the country’s protection in 1945.615 The chaos surrounding Japan’s surrender and China’s 
concomitant civil war gave the Tibetan government the opportunity to expel all Chinese 
officials from Tibet.616 However only a year after the Kuomintang lost control of China in 
1949, Chairman Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) declared their intention to 
liberate Tibet.  
 Although Mao would become infamous in Tibet, early on there was hope for peaceful 
diplomacy between the two governments. At the time the Tibetans were in no position to 
repel an army the likes of the PLA, but Chairman Mao opted for a gradual implementation of 
socialist institutions in Tibet, hoping to gain more by showing respect to Tibet’s cultural 
institutions.617 PLA soldiers were given instructions intended to belie any concerns of 
aggressive oppression, including being “taught the local religion, customs and language, and 
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they were under strict orders not to requisition even a cup of tea from local people.”618 In the 
meantime, Chinese ambassadors were in discussions with Tibetan authorities, looking to 
establish China’s suzerainty over Tibet on the explicit condition that Tibetans stipulate they 
are part of China.619 In 1950 the “liberation” of Tibet began, complicating future 
negotiations.620 That same year Tenzin Gyatso, the XIV Dalai Lama, officially took political 
power in Tibet, at a mere sixteen years of age. 
 On the 23rd of May, 1951, Tibetan and Chinese Communist Party leaders signed the 
“Seventeen-Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” a document aimed at cementing 
Chinese administration of the plateau while retaining the central structures of Tibetan 
identity.621 The language of the Plan included overtures to “Tibetan nationality,” and 
ultimately resolved to preserve Tibetan autonomy (Pt. 3), uphold the “status, functions and 
powers” of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama (Pts. 4-6), uphold freedom of religion (Pt. 7) 
and maintain Tibetan language education (Pt. 9). In exchange, Tibet would provide requisite 
funds for their administration (Pt. 16), the Tibetan army would be folded into the People’s 
Liberation Army (Pt.8) and assist in driving out imperialist aggressors (Pts. 2, 15), and first 
and foremost “the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland – the 
People’s Republic of China” (Pt. 1).622 In exchange for assurances that Tibetan life could 
continue largely as it had for centuries, Tibetans accepted the suzerainty of the PRC. With its 
signing, the Seventeen-Point Plan officially established Chinese rule over the Tibetan 
plateau, and marked the end of de jure Tibetan independence.623 
 Even with such an officially recognized agreement, there remains a perception among 
Tibetans that the Seventeen-Point Agreement was broken by the Chinese, and is therefore no 
longer binding. This view was supported by the XIV Dalai Lama who quickly grew 
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disillusioned with communism as a means of social change and argued that the actions of 
Mao Zedong and the CCP went directly against promises to protect the religion, culture and 
traditional values of Tibet.624 This was seen as particularly the case outside the TAR, where 
the CCP had been acting more directly, pushing through sharp “democratic reforms” and 
land redistribution in Sichuan and Ganzi in 1956. This led to the Khampa Uprising that year, 
which was focused in the same areas of traditional Tibet that today are witnessing self-
immolations.625 For years after armed rebels in Kham and Amdo battled the PLA as guerilla 
fighters, resulting in brutal reprisals by the CCP.  
 Reports of torture, starvation and sexual violence against Khampa supporters were 
rife, but the resistance continued into the 1960s and even enjoyed some support from the 
United States’ Central Intelligence Agency.626 Relations between the Dalai Lama’s 
government in Lhasa and the resistance organization had long been acerbic, and deteriorated 
further when officials in Lhasa refused to intervene, choosing rather to honor the Seventeen 
Point Agreement in the TAR. Kham and Amdo ultimately experienced the destruction of 
over 90% of their monasteries, which had served as communication conduits and power 
centers for the rebellion, along with the imprisonment and killing of hundreds of clergy.627 
Despite the government in Lhasa seeking to stay apart from the uprising, relations with the 
CCP worsened and ultimately resulted in the exile of the Dalai Lama from Tibet in March of 
1959. 
 The XIV Dalai Lama gave his first speech to the United States on the Tibet issue in 
September of 1987. In the following weeks monks and nuns took to the streets of Lhasa to 
show support for the Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way Program” that seeks meaningful autonomy 
for Tibet along much of the same lines of the Seventeen Point Agreement. On October 2 of 
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that year, twenty to thirty monks demonstrating in Lhasa were arrested, resulting in a full-
scale riot that saw a police station burn and claimed the lives of around a dozen Tibetans. 
Throughout the next year more nationalist uprisings took place, though none turned into the 
kind of violence experienced in October until the Great Prayer Festival of March 1988.628 
This festival, central to Tibetan Buddhism in general and the Dalai Lama’s Gelug sect in 
particular, brought thousands of monks into Lhasa. Tthe CCP allowed the festival to go on 
amidst concerns that the monks (seen as the main instigators) would use the opportunity of 
such a large gathering to launch further nationalist demonstrations. To the surprise of most 
observers, the festival was peaceful until its last day, March 5, when one monk’s demands for 
a prisoner’s release led to huge masses declaring Tibet’s independence from China.629 
 Melvyn Goldstein holds that the anti-Chinese riots that occurred on that day stemmed 
from a mix of causes, including bitterness over China’s actions thirty years prior, the 
economic programs being forced onto Tibetans and the ongoing restrictions on the practice 
of Tibetan Buddhism.630 Deng Xiaoping’s installation at the head of the CCP after Mao led to 
the reduction of some of the more stringent restrictions on the large monasteries of Tibet, but 
many still remained including limits on the number of monks allowed to study in the 
monasteries. Such restrictions will remain an issue for those who will self-immolate two 
decades on. 
 Six years later the PRC held its Third National Forum on Work in Tibet, aimed at 
delineating the improvement and development of Tibet through labor programs and out of 
which came the programs and tactics that appear to have sparked self-immolation as a 
reaction. Concerned about the “Dalai clique,” the perceived separatist authority under the 
Dalai Lama in exile, the PRC banned images of the religious and political leader, prohibited 
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the practice of Tibetan Buddhism for students and government workers, and required monks 
and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama in writing.631 The Deputy Secretary of the Communist 
Party in Tibet, Hao Peng, held that the separatist ambitions of the Dalai Lama justify such 
actions, and that “No sovereign country in the world would allow the hanging of a portrait of 
a person like that.”632 One could liken it to the recent debates over the flying of the 
Confederate Battle flag in the United States; for many, such a symbol of a separate 
governmental authority being proudly displayed was an offense against America. To rectify 
this, monasteries saw their pictures of the Dalai Lama replaced with mandatory images of the 
head of the CCP such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xioaping, and Xi Jinping. This is also in line 
with the “Nine Must-Haves” decrees of the PRC, which directs all monasteries and nunneries 
to prominently display the PRC’s flag and images of the leaders of the Communist Party.  
 These are acts of what Martin Riesebrodt labeled superposition, appropriations of 
sacred places by subsequent ideologies in order to channel the devotion afforded these 
images toward a different locus.633 The symbolic substitution is another attempt to reorient 
the Tibetan political imagination to the leaders of the CCP, who in their own right are 
pseudo-divinities for many in China. The so-called ‘Cult of Mao’634 has commanded as much 
obeisance and symbolic power in its atheistic setting as any religion could boast, and 
installing his images (and those who were conferred his charisma) in place of the Dalai Lama 
seems an attempt to replace one sacred figure with another. 635  
 Unsurprisingly, the Dalai Lama denounced such acts, arguing they amounted to an 
attack on the practice of Buddhism. With such programs, he held: 
China dropped all pretense of respecting the ancient religious and cultural heritage of Tibet by 
launching a large-scale reform of its religious policy. The new policy states that “Buddhism 
must conform to socialism and not socialism to Buddhism…” Under the pretext that religion 
would have a negative influence on Tibet’s economic development, the new policy aims to 
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systematically undermine and destroy the distinct cultural and national identity of the Tibetan 
people.636 
Tibet’s leader clearly understands such actions as counter to the promises made by the PRC 
to respect their traditions, but in his declamation we can also see part of what angered China. 
Speaking to his desire to preserve the “national identity” of the Tibetans is read by China as a 
denial of their Chinese nationality. At this period in the modern nation-state system, only one 
nationality was allowable, so while China could aver to protect ethnic identity, national 
identity was wholly the purview of the PRC.  
 Four years after the National Forum, members of the ultra-nationalist Tibetan Youth 
Congress (TYC) staged a hunger strike in India aimed at coercing the PRC into repealing its 
programs and gaining independence for the Tibetan people. One who planned to join the 
hunger strikers was an elderly man named Thupten Ngodup, a Tibetan ex-soldier turned chef 
whose small abode in Delhi was decorated with pictures of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan flags. 
In an interview with the Voice of America, he shared his frustration with the failure of the 
Dalai Lama’s Middle Way program, and his pride at taking part in the actions against the 
oppression of his country. His statements stressed his desire to maximize his suffering in 
hopes of maximizing his act’s efficacy: 
I do not have a hair of doubt or hesitation about giving up my life. This is my stand… When 
my turn comes to go on hunger strike I have decided to make it more effective. Many 
Tibetans are now determined to go on the hunger strike unto death... In my own case, I have 
decided not to accept any kind of massage treatment or drink any water… I am giving up my 
life to bring about peace and freedom to my unhappy people… I have one hundred per cent 
conﬁdence that the people inside Tibet will not only continue the struggle but will intensify it. 
They will never sit back and not struggle.637 
His ambitions were dashed when the Indian police, perhaps urged on by China, raided the 
TYC protest on the morning of April 27, 1998 and detained those on hunger strike. Evading 
the police, Ngodup slipped into a public bathroom, doused himself in gasoline, and ignited 
the gas upon his exit to become a torch in the middle of a Delhi street. Some report he called 
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for Tibet’s independence as he burned, others that he shouted for the return of the Dalai 
Lama from exile. Just before Ngodup was pushed to the ground and his flames smothered, he 
was seen calmly placing his hands together in prayer, ending the scene with a powerful 
spiritual symbol of discipline and dedication reminiscent of Duc’s act in Vietnam. With his 
death, self-immolation appeared as a means within Tibet to display protest and devotion.638 
 The XIV Dalai Lama visited Ngodup in the hospital, quietly asking that the self-
immolator not harbor any resentment towards the Chinese, as dying while experiencing such 
negative emotions would harm the man’s karma and result in a lower rebirth.639 After being 
assured that the hunger strikers arrested were not harmed, Ngodup stated that he was pleased 
and quietly passed away on April 27, 1998. Ngodup’s effect on the community of Tibetan 
exiles would be significant, and his linkage of extreme suffering to help for the Tibetan cause 
resonates in the actions of others who chose the same form of spectacular death. 
 The year of Ngodup’s death saw the “patriotic re-education” campaigns begin in the 
Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham. The program teaches a Chinese version of history, 
approved ways to understand the place of religion and appropriate respect of the proper 
authorities. It is often framed as ‘liberation’ from the dangers of religious belief, a common 
trope in Communist doctrine since Marx, and one heavily expounded on by Mao Zedong. 
This ‘education’ operates through “work teams” (gongzou dui in Chinese, ledonrekhag in 
Tibetan) travelling to monasteries and nunneries to discuss Tibet as part of the “Great 
Motherland” of China while at the same time identifying potential problem individuals. 
According to one source, the work teams demanded that monks and nuns agree to 1) oppose 
separatism, 2) work towards the unity of Tibet and China, 3) recognize the Panchen Lama 
that China has appointed (as opposed to the incarnation identified by Tibetans), 4) agree that 
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the Dalai Lama is a threat to the “unity of the Motherland,” and 5) deny that Tibet should be, 
or ever had been, an independent nation.640 We can hear the same issues that have been being 
negotiated in Tibet for centuries, and it is unsurprising that these teams focus especially on 
the monasteries, which the PRC sees as the power centers of the ‘Dalai clique’. It is not 
surprising that the monk Lobsang Tsultrim, who self-immolated in March of 2012 spoke in 
his statement of “the forced imposition of the deviant system of ‘Patriotic’ reeducation in 
monasteries, which no Tibetan can easily accept.” Removing religion from the core of 
Tibetan life fundamentally shifts the traditional understanding of what it means to be Tibetan. 
In 2008 the Olympics were held in Beijing, bringing eyes around the world to focus 
on China and providing a moment for Tibetans to communicate their plight to a wide 
audience. That year saw Tibetans rising up around the plateau, and on the March 10th 
anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile forty-nine years prior, the largest monasteries in Lhasa 
staged protests against the excesses of Chinese rule. Some of these protests spiraled out of 
control, and riots again filled the streets of Tibet.641 Anxious to quell disquiet at a time when 
it was seeking to showcase their economic and technological advancements, the PRC 
responded forcefully by mobilizing large numbers of security personnel, exacerbating 
tensions on both sides. Tibetans were perceived as the enemy by the Chinese state, and they 
in turn became more concerned about their eroding cultural identity and strengthened their 
resolve to maintain the traditions that define them. Tsering Woeser, the Tibetan poet and one 
of the leading voices on the self-immolations, believes that the auto-cremations continue the 
protests that began in 2008, as the issues raised in those demonstrations are repeated nearly 
verbatim by self-immolators.642 Placing the self-immolations in this longer historical 
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trajectory certainly supports her assertion, while seeing these issue extending much further 
into the past. 
While these are some of the broad strokes of a nuanced and complicated relationship 
around what institution has control over the Tibetan plateau, I do not mean to suggest that 
every Tibetan, or even every self-immolator is fully aware of the intricacies of historic Sino-
Tibetan relations. On top of the scores of monks who supported the PLA in the 1940s and 
1950s, there are still numerous clergy aligned with the CCP. There are those on both 
extremes that blame the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Program for the suicides.643 The 
foregoing is meant to provide the reader with the background for Tibetan perspectives on the 
PRC’s claim to sovereignty over their lands, and the means by which that sovereignty is 
sought.  
 
The State of Siege 
In the 21st century, plainclothes security officials roam Tibetan streets, and a 
surveillance grid has been established in neighborhoods and monasteries. I spoke to a 
Chinese scholar who had seen firsthand the surveillance implemented in ethnic minority 
lands throughout China and reported a program where areas as small as three square town 
blocks were assigned their own security team, and the comings and goings of individuals 
were closely monitored.644 Communication lines were established between teams, with a 
centralized administrative core allowing for fast decision making and mobilization between 
teams. The technological might of China has created a security state of monumental 
proportions, and it has been buttressed by the omnipresence of agents wielding violence. 
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For these reasons many commentators describe the Tibetan areas of Amdo and Kham 
as in a perpetual state of siege, where the boundaries between law and violence have become 
blurred.645 In 2009, the program of political re-education started being accompanied by the 
so-called ‘strike hard’ campaigns, where Chinese security officials questioned massive 
numbers of Tibetans suspected of anti-Chinese activity. Such has led the Dalai Lama to 
lament that Tibetans are being treated like criminals waiting to die merely for acting like 
Tibetans.646 These campaigns have resulted in statements like the essay by an exile from 
Ngaba County who wrote “Ngaba is under a kind of invisible martial law. Communications 
are closed down, roads are closed, people are prohibited from gathering, normal observances 
are suspended and so forth. The monasteries and schools have turned into prisons… and a 
broad crackdown imposed on all monasteries in the region.”647 Perhaps the most poignant 
description comes from Lobsang, an exiled monk of Kirti Monastery, who told the New York 
Times “The most uncomfortable thing was seeing soldiers pointing guns at you but not 
shooting at you. This has been daily life since 2008. For myself, I’d rather get shot than to 
have them pointing the guns at me every day, twenty-four hours a day.”648 Accusations of 
torture and extrajudicial killings are regular features of discussions with Tibetans, including 
many who charge the PRC with forcing sterilization in an attempt to accomplish their goals 
through reproductive administration.649 Whether or not the more severe of the charges are 
true, they shape the Tibetan perspective of their situation as what Giorgio Agamben termed a 
“zone of indistinction” where law and violence are nearly indistinguishable.650 
This state of siege is meant to reinforce the PRC’s demand that the laws of China 
must supersede those of any other power structure, and actions to the contrary are penalized 
with physical suffering and incarceration. Such action is founded on a kind of wager: in order 
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to avoid such physical pain, Tibetans will do as demanded and stop disobeying; by making 
the body crushingly present, agents of China hope to silent dissenting Tibetan voices, 
allowing only loyal speech to be heard.651 Toward that end, they have made the threat of 
punishment omnipresent, while also equipping security officials with fire extinguishers in an 
odd juxtaposition that illustrates the dual nature of sovereign duty; the same agents that 
inflict pain in support of normative ends are employed in upholding the PRC’s biopolitical 
responsibility of care.652  
It is this responsibility that has led to statements like that of a PRC security force 
member speaking to the Guardian after the self-immolation of Dorje Rinchen: “Self-
immolation is an extreme suicidal behavior that goes against humanity, society and the law, 
and deprives people of their right to life.”653 As the de facto caretakers of the Tibetan 
population, China’s role is to protect the bodies of those within their borders from 
unauthorized suffering (i.e. outside those sanctioned by authorized PRC officials). Deaths of 
self-immolators are an affront to Chinese rule, as they are unofficial killings of the PRC’s 
subjects, even though the perpetrator and victim are the same. Designating such acts as 
“suicides” brings them under the auspices of internal administration, while other statements 
by Chinese officials frame self-immolation as an action against the state. Raging against the 
Dalai Lama’s unwillingness to condemn the acts, one Security Official blasted the self-
immolations as “a disguised form of violence and terrorism” that “actively tried to pursue 
separatism by harming people,”654 and references to self-immolators and their conspirators as 
“terrorists” have become routine.655 A commentator for China’s The Global Times went as 
far to say that the Dalai Lama should not use young monks as “spiritual suicide bombers.” 
By coloring self-immolators with separatist motivation, and especially terrorism, officials 
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paint these actions as simply another form of rebellion from which any sovereign state has 
the right to defend itself. The prevailing prediction in the PRC seems to be that with the 
passing of the Dalai Lama, the problems in Tibet will likewise pass away. According to a 
Chinese-Tibetan official interviewed in 2011, “younger Tibetans are being educated in the 
proper way, so they won’t cause much trouble.”656 However the young men and women who 
are being so educated by Chinese re-education programs are the same ones who are 
sacrificing themselves or celebrating those sacrifices. 
In the contest between Tibet and China, the fundamental issue is which set of values 
will govern life and be seen as legitimate and enforceable. The practices that define Tibetan 
life are based in the dharma, which is the font of true life in the world. As Ashild Kolas puts 
it, for Tibetans “religion provides a more legitimate set of values than the Communist Party 
doctrine. Moral power lies with the congregation of monks and nuns, whereas physical 
power lies with the security forces.”657 Truth and values stem from the dharma, while the 
power wielded by the PRC is interpreted as a direct threat to the dharma’s existence. 
Capitulating to the PRC’s programs therefore becomes read as participation in a project of 
destroying the dharma. 
 This frame has long guided the conflict. During the 1950s the Chinese occupiers were 
called enemies of the faith (tendra), and the most well-known Khampa resistance force was 
the Voluntary Force for the Defense of the Faith (tensung thanglang maggar).658 Some 
resistance fighters even “claimed to be the reincarnations of King Gesar, the mythical hero-
king of Tibetan epic who fought for the Buddhist religion.”659 These fighters looked to the 
religious and political scripts for a model for their actions, and in following the paradigm laid 
out by one of the celebrated figures of Tibetan mythic history they join with them in a 
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common project. By the mere fact of aligning their actions with the mythical king’s, much 
less claiming to be direct reincarnations, their struggle takes on sacred significance. They 
fight as Gesar did, to protect the dharma from the agents who seek its destruction.  
 Such a frame resonates with other prohibitions like the banning of sacred protection 
cords (which often hold images of deities or spiritual teachers) and the expulsion of large 
numbers of clergy from monasteries by authorities for being ‘unregistered’.660 Unsurprisingly 
then, the XIV Dalai Lama has asserted that these injunctions are “intended to deliberately 
annihilate Buddhism,”661 and named Mao Zedong as the “destroyer of the dharma.”662 As far 
back as 1987 he expressed concern that China sought to create a “blind faith” of Tibetan 
Buddhism,663 and by 2002 he feared that the Buddhist culture would be completely 
obliterated.664 In the starkest terms, he declared that due to the Tibetan’s “depths of suffering 
and hardship … the lineage of the Buddhadharma was severed.”665 The dharma is the 
organizing principle of Tibetan life; without it, Tibet would not exist.  
 China’s actions are read through the lens of a sacred past, linking the experience of 
current Tibetans with their ancestors and providing a means by which to understand their 
experiences as well as their obligations in such a situation. Hans Kippenberg has shown that 
in order to understand any action with a religious component one must understand the 
meaning the actors themselves ascribe to it.666 “Every action presupposes a definition of the 
situation. This is not generated of necessity by the situation itself, however, but is ‘imposed’ 
on the situation by the subjects. If they then act in accordance with this definition, this 
‘imposition’ has real effects.”667 From this perspective, the PRC’s actual intent regarding the 
status of the dharma is not the determining factor of Tibetan response; it is rather the way 
which Tibetans perceive, explain and ultimately experience such actions.  
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  The perspectives of the self-immolators perpetuate this frame of understanding. As 
scholar of Tibetan Buddhism José Cabezón has noted, “Tibetans… see the motivation for the 
self-immolations in largely religious terms – for instance as an act motivated by the wish ‘to 
protect the Buddha’s teachings, the source of benefit for all sentient beings.’”668 Pawo 
likewise speak to the connection between the dharma and Tibet’s ultimate disposition. These 
references sometimes speak directly to the need to protect the dharma, like Ngawang Norphel 
and Tenzin Khedup (self-immolated together on June 20, 2012) who lamented that they 
“could not contribute significantly towards the Tibetan religion” or Choephag Kyab and 
Sonam who stated they lit themselves on fire “for the development of Buddhism.” Others 
speak to a need to act in accordance with Tibetan morality as defined largely by religious 
sources, such as the cousins Choephag Kyab and Sonam who asked those that mourned them 
to “follow the advice of the learned Abbots and Tulkus.” Monk Tenzin Phuntsog distributed 
religious leaflets prior to his auto-cremation where he spoke against the depleted kind of 
religion the CCP was trying to create, and asked his “co-religionists, you who practice the 
exchange of self for others, reflect on the two abbots, upholders of the teachings, and the 
monastic community.”669 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reincarnate Lama Sobha affirms that “it 
is extremely important to genuinely practice Buddhist principles in order to benefit the 
Tibetan cause.” That cause, however, extends beyond Buddhism through cultural 
connections laying deep within Tibetan national identity. 
 Tibetans have responded to the prohibitions of China by destroying their bodies in 
self-immolation. Jamphel Yeshi, whose self-immolation on March 26, 2012 in New Delhi, 
India was one of the few to take place outside the borders of traditional Tibet, affirms that the 
struggle requires the fullest measures of devotion:  
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Freedom is the basis of happiness for all living beings. Without freedom, six million Tibetans 
are like a butter lamp in the wind,670 without direction. My fellow Tibetans from Three 
Provinces, it is clear to us all that if we unitedly put our strength together, there will be result. 
So, don’t be disheartened. What I want to convey here is the concern of the six million 
Tibetans. At a time when we are making our final move toward our goal – if you have 
money, it is the time to spend it; if you are educated it is the time to produce results; if you 
have control over your life, I think the day has come to sacrifice your life.671 
Yeshi implores all Tibetans to use whatever means they have to act toward the goals of 
freedom for Tibet, and his words suggest that only a coordinated and combined action will 
bring about the hopes of Tibetans. Every Tibetan, his act shows, has control over his or her 
own life, and he hopes his death inspires others to feel empowered to use those lives as 
resources in their struggle.  
 
 
Constructing the Tibetan Sovereign Imaginary 
 Tibet’s history has been peppered by shifts in foreign policy and contests over 
authority, but throughout the Tibetan people have maintained a common identity based in 
their language, cultural traditions, and brand of Buddhism. With the programs of the PRC 
being seen as aimed precisely at those institutions and practices, Tibetan self-immolators 
have construed the conflict with China as an attempt to utterly eliminate their identity. Pawo 
Sonam Topgyal who self-immolated on July 9, 2015 is one among many to aver that “the 
[PRC] government is carrying out policies to stamp out our religion, tradition and culture.” 
The Dalai Lama has likewise signaled that understanding, lamenting in a 2009 speech that 
“the religion, culture, language and identity, which successive generations have considered 
more precious than their lives, are nearing extinction.”672 As this system forms the basic 
structures by which Tibetans understand and experience the world, its loss is literally 
inconceivable. At least as far back as 1997 the Dalai Lama expressed his concerns about PRC 
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policies that “aim to systematically undermine and destroy the distinct cultural and national 
identity of the Tibetan people.”673 This system of order has defined Tibetan life for hundreds 
of years, and it is now in danger of being lost. 
 Repeatedly, self-immolators have spoken directly to the necessity of maintaining this 
identity. In her last statement, nun Sangye Dolma (self-immolated November 25, 2012) 
expresses a common worry that the coercive powers and structural violence of the PRC will 
effect a fundamental shift in Tibetan self-understanding, pleading “children of the Snow Lion 
[a common term for Tibet] / Do not forget that you are Tibetan.” Her concern is echoed by 
Nangdrol who explicitly links his fiery death to his hope that Tibetan identity will be 
maintained: 
 By giving up my life to fire, 
 Men and women of Tibet, 
 I hope you all will keep unity and harmony, 
 Dress Tibetan if you are Tibetan, 
 Moreover, you must speak Tibetan. 
 Never forget you are Tibetan.674 
 
Behind these concern lie a simple premise: without individuals who see themselves as 
Tibetan and enact their Tibetan-hood in their bodies and actions, Tibet as they know it will 
cease to be. Even if we hold the position that “Tibet” will continue as long as there is a 
geographic area designated by that name, the cultural and political institutions of Tibet that 
have defined life on the plateau would (and perhaps is already beginning to) vanish. More 
than a geographic label, Tibet is what Elaine Scarry calls a “fictive reality,” a way of 
perceiving the world in accordance with a belief about what should be. Without people 
dynamically creating their particular understanding of “Tibet” in their actions, it would 
remain a fiction. 
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 In this way we can understand the reasoning behind insistences to maintain Tibetan 
culture, language and religion. These three poles of Tibetan identity are consistently 
mentioned together, and usually interchangeably like in the Dalai Lama’s 2009 speech 
quoted above. In his “Appeal to the Chinese People” in March of 2008, he likewise 
expressed his “primary concern, as I have repeated time and again, is to ensure the survival 
of the Tibetan people’s distinctive culture, language and identity.”675 In the same speech he 
notes that Tibetan culture is based in the values of universal compassion, and elsewhere 
affirmed that “religion constitutes the source of Tibet’s national identity, and spiritual values 
lie at the very heart of Tibet’s rich culture.”676 Self-immolators routinely refer to the need to 
maintain these modes of being as well, conflating the spheres of culture, religion and nation. 
 Multiple pawo speak to the need to save this complex identity of Tibet. Of those who 
left statements, 58% mentioned their desire that Tibetans uphold Tibetan religion or culture 
(often both), and 42% insist that Tibetans continue to speak the Tibetan language. The 
statement of cousins Choephag Kyab and Sonam, who self-immolated together in April of 
2012, can serve as a representative example. The two begin their statement by noting: 
The Tibetan nationality is distinct from others as it has its own religion and culture. It is also 
unique as it shows compassion and love and serves the well-being of others. But the Tibetan 
Nation was forcibly occupied, oppressed and cheated by China… So we set ourselves on fire 
for freedom in Tibet, for the development of Buddhism, so all sentient beings can prosper, and 
for world peace… show loyalty and affection for your people, diligently preserve your culture 
and do not lose your dignity.677  
Their words identify but make no distinction between Tibetan culture, religion and identity, 
but see all as an essential part of what it means to be Tibetan, just like the Dalai Lama’s 
discourse.  
 Many self-immolators communicated their hope that Tibetans put aside the petty 
struggles that divide them and act in unity for the Tibetan cause. Calls for unity are included 
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in 70% of statements left behind by pawo, suggesting that division among Tibetans is part of 
the problem or that the solidarity of Tibet’s people is part of the solution. Later in their 
statement, Choephag Kyab and Sonam write: 
If you feel sad for us, follow the advice of the learned Abbots and Tulkus so that if you learn 
and keep alive our culture and traditions in the right direction, sustain loyalty and affection for 
our brethren, make efforts for our culture and remain united, our wishes are realized.678 
The pleas for unity are linked to pleas that the people of Tibet act and speak like Tibetans, 
and hopes that the community maintains their traditional forms of life. They show it to be 
incumbent upon all Tibetans to act in accordance with the customs that give Tibetan life 
meaning. Toward that end, in the 21st century Tibetans have begun to celebrate ‘White 
Wednesdays’ (lhakar) where only Tibetan food is consumed (though no meat is eaten in 
accordance with Buddhist ethical injunctions), Tibetan garb is worn and the Tibetan language 
alone is spoken.679 The loss of Tibetan practices would equate to the loss of Tibetan identity, 
precisely what the Tibetans fear will result from the PRC programs.  
While cultural practices and traditions are central to their construction of Tibetan 
identity, the symbol of the people, their country and its plight is the grinning figure of Tenzin 
Gyatso, the XIV Dalai Lama, a Nobel Peace Prize recipient and global symbol of compassion 
and nonviolence. If there is a central symbol of the Tibetan conflict, it is the exile of the 
Dalai Lama. Prayers for the XIV Dalai Lama’s return or his long life have become a kind of 
slogan for the Tibetan issue,680 and cries for the Dalai Lama’s return have been reported to 
accompany a great percentage of pawo who left no notes behind.681 Of the proportionally 
small numbers whose intentions were recorded in audio or writing, a full 85% reference the 
Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet. His absence from Tibet creates a world out-of-order, and no 
end to the conflict is seen to be possible without the return of the Tibetan leader.  
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The PRC, in contrast, sees him as a separatist and rebel authority, and has prevented 
his return. The CCP has colored the Nobel Peace Prize winner as a cult leader comparable to 
David Koresh of the Branch Davidians, brainwashing young Tibetans into committing 
suicide at his command, and he and his cohorts have been derogatorily named the ‘Dalai 
clique’ by Chinese media, charged with inciting riots and encouraging violence against 
China.682 For the Tibetans, however, his absence is the absence of the Bodhisattva of 
Compassion, the agent of the dharma who is believed to embody the essential character of 
the nation.  
Such a belief extends backwards into history to Tibet’s very beginnings. Tibet’s 
political system has long been inextricably bound with the religious beliefs of its subjects, 
where some political leaders are understood as incarnations of bodhisattvas and are therefore 
simultaneously objects of religious devotion. Songsten Gampo was not only Tibet’s first 
political leader, he was also retrospectively understood to be the physical incarnation of the 
Bodhisattva of Compassion, Chenrezig (Skt: Avalokiteśvara). The Dalai Lama is another 
such field of devotion, and like Gampo he is believed to be an incarnation of Chenrezig. 
Likewise, the Panchen Lama, who Tibetans believe was kidnapped, imprisoned and replaced 
by China when he was only six years old, is thought to be an incarnation of the Amitabha 
Buddha. This is why Tibet’s political system is called chösi nyindre, politics and religion 
joined together.683 Even following the separation of political power from the Dalai Lama in 
2011, any sense of a “secular” legal structure isolated from sacred concerns is unfitting for 
Tibetans.684 Religion does not occupy a sphere separate from social life, but it rather fully 
integrated into Tibetan experience. As opposed to the buffered selves of Western secular 
experience and the perception of being resistant to extra-physical sources, in Tibet “the 
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boundary between the human and the nonhuman worlds is permeable” as Jose Cabezón puts 
it.685 
The physical presence of the Dalai Lama and other spiritual masters within the 
boundaries of Tibet is believed to result in a blessed existence for Tibetans, and prayers for 
their long-life and well-being ask that the blessings of the bodhisattvas will continue. Prayers 
for the Panchen and Dalai Lama are understood as pleas for guidance and requests for 
teachings, acts of devotion as well as statements of the individual’s desire.686 Bodhisattvas 
are beings who are committed to attaining enlightenment in order to assist all sentient beings 
along the path. Distinctive of Mahāyāna Buddhism which itself is defined by compassion for 
others above all,687 bodhisattvas are the exemplary models of Tibetan life, whose actions are 
reflective of the central texts, practices and knowledges of Tibetan Buddhism. These celestial 
beings exemplify and expound the teachings that can lead people out of the samsaric cycle of 
suffering, thereby enjoying a top place in the Tibetan hierarchy. The hopes that two 
emanations of divinity soon return to Tibet suggests that their presence in their sacred 
homeland can alleviate the suffering of Tibetans.  
Here is the background needed to understand statements like that Tsultrim Gyatso 
(self-immolated December 19, 2013) where he states “The immolation of one’s precious 
body was for the return of Gyalwang Tenzin Gyatso [the Dalai Lama] to his homeland; for 
the release of the Panchen [Lama] Nangwa Thaye from prison; for the welfare of the six 
million Tibetans. My body has been offered to the fire for these.” His hope is not only justice 
for leaders wrongly exiled or imprisoned, but rather to secure the spiritual means to ensure 
happiness on the Tibetan plateau. Other pleas for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet often 
follow a formula similar to that of pawo Gudrub (self-immolated October 4, 2012), who 
226 
 
began his final statement with the line “The people of the Land of Snow share a common 
goal of bringing His Holiness the Dalai Lama back to an independent Tibet.”688 Sonam 
Topgyal’s echoes that assertion, saying the pawo’s “chief goal is for His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama to be able to return to the Potala Palace.” Some frame their fiery act as a means by 
which to bring about his return, such as Tsultrim Gyatso above or Rikyo (self-immolated 
May 30, 2012) who affirms her act was meant to “ensure His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s 
return to Tibet.” Others, however, offer prayers for the Dalai Lama’s long life in their 
statements. This last is exemplified by Nangdrol, who said “May His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama live for many ten thousand years. / May Lamas and Tulkus [reincarnate Lamas] of 
Tibet live for ten thousand years.”689 Such prayers litter statements of both laypeople (e.g. 
Jigji Kyab, Tamdin Thar) and religious elites like Lama Sobha, who said “I offer this 
sacrifice as a token of long-life offering to our root guru His Holiness the Dalai Lama.” His 
khachem, delivered as a dharma-talk (a kind of Buddhist sermon) also contains numerous 
prayers, including a traditional prayer for the Dalai Lama’s longevity: 
Circled by ramparts of snow-mountains, this sacred realm, 
This wellspring of all sustenance and happiness. 
Tenzin Gyatso, bodhisattva of compassion. 
May his reign endure till the end of existence. 
May his great deeds spread across the space. 
More than mere pleas for the return of their leader, these prayers function as acts of devotion 
to divine entities, using a traditional formula meant to gain merit and add to the overall 
karmic reserves of the community.  
This conflation of the political and religious spheres has resulted in complications for 
outsiders trying to understand the conflict, due to an implicit expectation of differentiation 
between these spheres of experience.690 Bhuchung K. Tsering, Vice President of the 
International Campaign of Tibet, notes the problem of the assuming such a differentiation of 
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spheres when it comes to Tibetan life: “The CCP’s programs seem intent to separate Tibetan 
identity from Tibetan religion and culture, and those programs are continuing to fail to do so. 
The Party seems to see adherence to traditional mores and allegiance to the CCP as mutually 
exclusive.”691 Attempting to treat religious belonging and practice as something separate 
from political allegiance and activity has been an inherent aspect of the sovereign system of 
nation-states since the system’s inauguration in the Westphalian peace of 1648. Since then, 
the modern international nation-state system has treated political belonging as distinct, while 
also recognizing a governmental obligation to respect citizen’s freedom of religion.  
China’s Constitution does provide for a level of religious freedom, but those 
freedoms explicitly distinguish a religious sphere separate from political activity. Article 
Thirty-Six of the PRC Constitution holds:  
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not 
believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not 
believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use 
of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or 
interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are 
not subject to any foreign domination.692  
The article makes it clear that religion must conform to public order, meaning religious 
practices that transgress PRC laws are not protected. The language used, that no persons 
“may make use of religion” to disrupt order tacitly sees religion as naturally aligned with that 
order, thereby creating an avenue to mark off degenerate religion that can be penalized. 
Excluding any religious practice that interferes with the biopolitical care of the PRC 
maintains their monopoly on the ability to sanction suffering, and in terms of Tibetan 
religion, religious bodies being “not subject to any foreign domination” means that the Dalai 
Lama’s leadership is not protected by religious freedom. Excluding him from the religious 
sphere marks him as a political leader, thereby supporting the accusations of his separatist 
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inclinations. It is important to note that this explicit cordoning off of religious experience 
from political allegiance is itself novel for China, coming from the influence of the modern 
West and overtaking the close relationship between the two that had existed throughout 
previous dynasties. 
 Through his extensive education in the scene of international politics, the XIV Dalai 
Lama learned how the freedom of religion supported by the international community uses the 
language of separate spheres, and perhaps partly in an attempt to adhere and adjust Tibet’s 
situation to those expectations he relinquished political power in 2011. He has held that it had 
been his intent to do so for many years, and has explained his reticence to speak on the self-
immolations based in part on that fact.693 In one interview he stated “If I get involved in 
[speaking about the self-immolations], then the retirement from political power is 
meaningless. Whatever I say, the Chinese government they immediately manipulate.”694 It 
also may explain his habit when pressed on the subject to speak only to the role of intention 
in determining whether or not self-immolation was a positive act. Open support may be read 
as articulating a political stance, while examining right mindset is firmly in the religious 
realm. 
 Anti-religious sentiment prevalent in and largely initiated by the Maoist version of 
socialism resonates throughout the PRC’s policies. The PRC has outlawed many religious 
institutions beyond the banned images of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan flag. Tsering Shakya 
explains that religious freedom aside, “the lives of monks and nuns are seen as incongruous 
in modern China, economically unproductive and refusing to fit into the current state’s neo-
liberal belief that market capitalism and consumption will liberate everyone. Since the 
beneficent exemption of minorities from the one child policy is irrelevant for them, their 
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lives negate the biopower of the state and they therefore are subject to surveillance and 
particular kinds of discipline that must bend their subjectivity to the will of the state.”695 
Shakya’s point is that the celibacy pursued by Buddhist clergy removes them from enjoying 
what the PRC conceives of as a benefit specific to ethnic minorities, the right to have 
multiple children when other Chinese citizens are held to a single child. Unable to enjoy the 
perks of ethnic life under Chinese rule means they are less likely to abide by the PRC’s 
dictates out of gratitude or a sense that the country provides a just life for them. That concern 
is compounded by their separation from the economic modes of production.  
 That being the case, it would be a terrible mistake to think that the intent of the PRC is 
to make Tibetan lives worse. After all, Marx’s oft quoted declaration that religion “is the 
opium of the people” is preceded by the designation that “religion is the sigh of the oppressed 
creature,” and followed by the belief that “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness 
of the people is the demand for their real happiness.”696 Mao saw in religion a stumbling 
block to true liberation of the masses, whatever fault may be found with his methods of 
procuring such deliverance. Like so many colonial projects, China’s projects are aimed at 
“improving” Tibetans; religion especially is seen as a block to modernization and the 
improvement to life the PRC brings, as the Dalai Lama himself noted above.  
 Robbie Barnett accurately explains the contrasting views on the Chinese influx of 
money since the late 20th century into projects meant to modernize Tibet, saying “one side 
sees the investment as a kind of cultural levelling, eroding Tibetan language and culture; the 
other sees it as a beneficial modernization that is an overall advantage to Tibetans.”697 
Medical anthropologist Vincanne Adams noted a similar paradox, noting “the enforcement of 
Chinese policies in Tibet leads to cultural and physical genocide in contrast to the 
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enforcement of its policies in the rest of China where they are seen in many accounts as 
enabling the survival of China’s people.”698 Barnett is surely correct in asserting that “mutual 
incomprehension and sensitivity is rife at every level of discussion on the Tibet issue.”699 
While it is impossible to not have a position on what is happening in Tibet, any easy 
villianization of the PRC is bound to unproductively perpetuate such misunderstandings.  
   By exclusively focusing on the political aspects of Tibetan authority as something 
distinct from religion, the PRC’s policies have severely misconstrued Tibetan religion. 
Restrictions in Tibet are attempts to silence shows of deference to an authority other than the 
leaders of the CCP, and in a sense they are correct; praying to an image of the exiled Dalai 
Lama is an act that symbolically communicates loyalty to an outside authority. But 
expressing devotion to the Dalai Lama and identifying the reincarnations of spiritual masters, 
are actions required by the Buddhist conception of reality that lays at the core of the 
imagined world of Tibetans. Some middle ground must be found. 
 Attempts to differentiate spheres of experience in Tibet notwithstanding, Tibetan 
identity, belonging and authority are all based in the conception of cosmic order vouchsafed 
in the Buddhist dharma. From the very beginning, the nation of Tibet was perceived as a 
sacred construct. Tibet first came into existence with the early spreading’ (nyingma) of 
Buddhism from India during the 7th-9th century C.E., and was first unified as a coherent 
nation under a Buddhist king. In fact, the popular Tibetan origin myth holds that the Tibetan 
people (known as bod-pa) are direct descendants of Chenrezig, the Bodhisattva of 
Compassion who married a demoness (brag sin-mo) and created Tibetans in order to spread 
the dharma.700 For generations it was not uncommon to have numerous young men and 
women don monastic robes prior to turning eighteen, and social status was long linked to 
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religious education. The Tibetan people and in particular Tibetan religious specialists (chos-
pa) are understood to be “carriers of the doctrine,” responsible for maintaining the essential 
teachings of the dharma as explicated by Tibetan masters.701 Likewise, monasteries in Tibet 
are not simply places of worship. Historically they have served as the central place of cultural 
life and Tibetan authority, and the lamas supply jobs, education, loans and a legal hierarchy 
for Tibetans.702 As opposed to the retreat from the world brought to mind by Christian 
institutions of the same name, Tibetan monasteries are points of connection between the 
physical world and the source of reality beyond, aimed at replicating on earth the ‘pure lands’ 
where enlightened being dwell and the dharma is expounded continuously. 
 Buddhism is fundamental to Tibetan identity, authority and morality. It provides the 
“main idiom” of Tibetan identity, according to Kolas and the moral basis of the Tibetan 
order.703 Moreover, as Goldstein puts it, “Buddhism in political Tibet also had profound 
meaning as the raison d’etre of the Tibetan state, and it was the main source of Tibetans’ 
pride in the culture and country. Tibetans traditionally considered their country unique 
because of its theocratic form of governance in which politics was intimately intertwined 
with religion.”704 It should be noted, as Vincanne Adams puts is, that recognizing Tibetan 
culture and nationality “has been historically formulated within a culture of Buddhism is not 
the same as the idea that Tibetans are uniformly religious.”705 Tibet constitutes a sacred 
symbol, one that represents the collective and locates the individual’s responsibility in 
service to that group. It has been suggested that membership in the Tibetan collective relies 
less on the geography of birth, and more on adherence to the Buddhism of the plateau; 
similar to the conflicts around North Africa and the Middle East between Sunni and Shi’a 
Muslims, religion serves on the South Asian plateau as a marker for identity.706  
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 Each aspect of Tibetan identity is placed in relation to the central pole of the dharma. 
In one speech the Dalai Lama noted the Tibetan language alone preserved “the entire range 
of the Buddha’s teachings.”707 For many, the need to preserve Tibetan heritage is not for its 
own sake, but for the sake of the set of knowledges that provides the means by which all 
beings can escape the cycle of samsara. It is what gives Tibetan identity its distinctive 
nature. As this is the religio-political context for the self-immolations, any examination 
should be guided by the religious frames that orient these fiery acts, and should provide an 
analysis of how religious acts can serve the cultural amalgam to which the pawo refer.708 At 
the same time, the conflation of nationality and culture with religion cannot be ignored, and 
attempts to understand the situation on the plateau must be careful to not treat any apart from 
the others. 
 The dharma, a term that refers to the essential reality of experience and to its 
deliverance through the teachings of the Buddha Shakyamuni, the first enlightened being, lies 
at the core of the Tibetan imaginary. It gives form to Tibetan culture and defines appropriate 
actions on earth; it gives shape to the nomos of Tibetans, defining right and wrong and 
providing a way to understand individual experience in the world.709 Buddhist narratives give 
the community meaning, supplying the obligations laid on members of the collective with 
“history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose.”710 In this system Tibetan 
tradition, language, religion and identity are wholly intertwined, and as it includes the final 
standards by which to judge, celebrate and punish action in the world, this amalgam forms 
what I term the Tibetan sovereign imaginary.  
 It is the wholeness of this imaginary that is referenced by the self-immolators. 
Restrictions of the PRC go directly against what is expected of Tibetans; taking down and 
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replacing images of the Dalai Lama appears as a kind of idolatry for Tibetans, who see in the 
Buddhist leader a bodhisattva on earth and whose authority far exceeds matters of politics. 
Denouncing the Dalai Lama in speech or writing has been described in Christianity-laden 
terms as “the most cardinal of sins, condemning one to countless eons of ‘vajra hell’.”711 
There is an obvious connection with the situation of the ancient Christians, who found 
themselves ordered to ‘curse Christ’ or be killed; to deny such authority would be to deny the 
truth of their faith, an unimaginable transgression. That said, we should not treat the Tibetan 
self-immolations as a death “for religion” as Christian martyrdom is so often classified. We 
must appreciate both the role of Buddhism in the issue without neglecting the political 
aspects of authority and order resonant in the Tibetan’s sovereign imaginary. A situation has 
been created where Tibetans must choose to disregard the very structures that give meaning 
to Tibetan life or lose that life altogether. Death appears on both sides. Like the early 
Christians, many Tibetans have chosen their own deaths rather than denounce their own core 
identities. 
 
Self-Immolation as Sacrificial Offering 
 Considering this, it is unsurprising that the context of sacrifice largely shapes the way 
Tibetans speak of these acts, describing self-immolation as an offering of the body (lüjin), a 
lamp offering for the Buddha (chömé), and a giving of one’s body (lus sbyin).712 As we have 
seen, the phrases many commentators use describe the act as an offering, such as “lighting 
one’s body as a lamp-offering” (rang lus mchod mer bsgron pa), or “making a fire-offering 
with one’s body” (rang lus me mchod).713 Buddhist sacrifice clearly provides a significant 
pole for understanding the significance of self-immolation in Tibet.  
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 Ultimately the discourse of sacrifice serves to turn individual loss into the group’s 
gain; it makes the loss sacred in line with the terms Latin origin sacrificium, to make holy or 
sacred.714 In their well-known work on sacrifice, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss argued 
sacrifice marked the sacrificed as set apart from the everyday, and what is lost becomes a 
symbol for the greater social framework, providing a moment of connection with its 
structures of power.715 Understanding a death as a sacrifice, then, serves to identify the death 
as performed on behalf of the collective interest. We will see this articulation will be 
important in discussions of the self-immolator’s intentions. 
From the early days of the conflict with China, Tibetans have celebrated those who 
have made the “ultimate sacrifice” for the dharma and Tibet, with the XIV Dalai Lama 
honoring them in each of his annual March 10th speeches marking the anniversary of his 
exile. From 1993-2005 he ended each of his speeches with some version of “Today, we 
remember those brave Tibetans who fought and died for the cause of our nation.”716 
Beginning in 2006 these memorials open, rather than close, his addresses, perhaps suggesting 
a keener focus on the need for sacrifices in service of Tibet and her people. This increased 
emphasis is further reflected in a speech he made in 2007, when he labeled the struggle for 
Tibet a “sacred duty of all Tibetans.”717 
This framework was also extant during the British invasions into Tibet in the early 
20th century, when Tibetans took “blood oaths” to defend their country embracing similar 
sentiments of commitment. One such read: “At present this Buddhist holy land of Tibet and 
its sacred religion face a hostile foreign enemy who harbors ill intentions, and the danger of 
invasion. All Tibetans reasonably swear to death to protect their magical homeland, and to 
bravely keep out the foreign invasion.”718 Moreover, that period is kept alive in the Tibetan 
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imagination by media like Feng Xiaoning’s 1997 film Red River Valley (Honghegu), which 
all Tibetan schoolchildren were required to view and glorified the opposition to the attempted 
colonization.719 That film concludes with a Tibetan herdsman burning himself alive rather 
than surrendering to British forces, creating one precedent for the symbolic act of self-
immolation in the Tibetan imaginary and helping create a culture of self-sacrifice that places 
the group above the individual. It may be that this shift which responded to the increased 
focus in China on self-sacrifice for the Cultural Revolution (that resulted in sprawling 
“Martyr’s Memorial Cemeteries” which can be found in urban centers like Shanghai)720 
linked ancient Buddhist teachings to a modern national issue, with the result of a self-
sacrificial program that bore direct connections to the modern nation of Tibet while 
maintaining significant connections to the sacrifice of life for the dharma and well-being of 
all sentient beings. 
This perspective is supported by Tsering Shakya who notes that the context and frame 
of sacrifice is complemented by reference to traditional acts with religious meaning, “as in 
the tradition of offering one’s body for the benefit of others.”721 Such symbolic acts of self-
sacrifice appear in Buddhist texts as the pinnacle of compassionate action. Tibetan self-
immolators and commentators alike have drawn on the narratives of Mahāyāna Buddhism, 
especially the Lotus Sūtra, a text that prominently features the act of self-immolation, and the 
jātaka tales which recount the previous lives of the Buddha.722 The jātaka stories are 
regularly part of public religious lectures and find expression in murals painted on the walls 
of Tibetan monasteries, providing them an accessible place in the popular Tibetan 
imagination, while the Lotus Sūtra is one of the most popular Buddhists texts in Tibet and 
elsewhere. 
236 
 
This latter contains the story of the Medicine King, where the eponymous character 
(also called Sarvasattvapriyadarśana, the Bodhisattva Seen with Joy by All Living Beings) 
learns that of all the devotional offerings one can make to progress on the path to 
enlightenment, the offering of the body through fire is the highest. Having benefited greatly 
from the lessons in the Lotus Sūtra, he burns his body in an act of devotion to his teacher and 
the religious text itself (a common practice in a religious tradition that gives special honors to 
texts that teach the dharma). In terms that closely resemble descriptions of the Tibetan self-
immolators’ process, he “doused himself in fragrance and oil, drank scented oil, and wrapped 
himself in an oil-soaked cloth. He made a vow and then burned himself.”723 The close 
alignment of the phenomena would make the Medicine King seem to be a direct model for 
the Tibetan performances. 
His act of devotion was aimed at spiritual development toward meriting nirvana, and 
on account of this was celebrated by the celestial Buddhas who called his act a “true Dharma-
offering” and affirmed its supreme character by acknowledging “even if one were to give 
realms and walled cities, wives and children, they would still be no match for it.”724 In his 
Burning for the Buddha, James Benn argues that the story’s interpretation has historically 
seen the body’s destruction as a means to attain Buddhahood, as it provides a marker for the 
requisite detachment from the concept of the self.725 Focusing his research specifically on 
early forms of Chinese Buddhism in the first millennium of the Common Era, he shows that 
by burning themselves alive, Chinese monks turned the Lotus Sūtra into a kind of 
performative speech whereby they “incorporated themselves into one of the most important 
and beloved scriptures of the Mahāyāna”726 and “literally became bodhisattvas by enacting 
the role of this hero.”727 According to Benn, various social and political situations instigated 
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this performance, including persecutions of Buddhism, restrictions on monasteries, and the 
perceived risk to the dharma.728 Where this risk was understood to be the result of bad karma 
(a common perception in Buddhist texts), self-immolation was seen as providing a “ritual 
force for social and cosmic renewal” and a way to correct the situation by generating 
merit.729  
It is the textual interpretation by the Chinese monk Daosheng which perhaps speaks 
most directly to the Lotus Sūtra’s significance in the current Tibetan context: “What does 
burning one’s body signify? When it comes to what a man treasures and values, nothing 
exceeds bodily life, and when one burns it oneself, it is because there is something as 
treasured as much as the body.”730 The body’s burning marks its purpose, its telos, as 
something that exceeds the individual, something sacred. The model of the Medicine King 
provides one narrative frame to experience suffering through and interpret the loss of the 
body as beneficial to the self and the community. In the case of the Tibetans, their statements 
make it clear is that Tibet, its cultural traditions, people and divine leaders are understood to 
exceed the individual life. References to the Sūtra serve to frame the act of self-immolation 
as one of compassion and great merit (in part serving as an argument against selfish suicide), 
and to reiterate the sacred nature of the Tibetan collective and imaginary. 
While the Lotus Sūtra has the most direct textual precedence for the phenomenon, it 
is the jātaka of the hungry tigress (Stag mo lus sbyin) that claims the most references in the 
context of the self-immolations.731 This parable tells of the Buddha who, while incarnated as 
a Prince, came upon a tigress and her cubs in a barren forest. When he discovered them, the 
tigress was emaciated and her hunger had driven her to the verge of eating her cubs. As doing 
so would bring vast negative karma upon the mother, the Buddha elected to give his own 
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body as sustenance to the family to aid the mother and save her from the consequences of 
such an immoral act. The Buddha goes as far as to open his veins to tempt the tigress when 
she hesitated in consuming him. When her and her cubs are sated, the merit generated by the 
self-sacrificial act of compassion results in the revitalization of the forest, which once again 
provides life for its creatures. 
Several other jātakas revolve around the theme of the Buddha giving his body, like 
the Hare’s Sacrifice, when as a rabbit the Buddha likewise gives himself up for sustenance of 
others, or the narrative of the Buddha’s incarnation as the Monkey King who gives his body 
to allow his subject to escape death at the hands of a human hunter.732 His heroism and self-
sacrifice is applauded by the gods in each of these jātakas, however it is the hungry tigress 
which has garnered the most attention, as “the most dramatic example of self-sacrifice.”733  
Jātaka tales function like fables, relating ethical teachings through stories about the 
Buddha’s many past lives, and have played a significant role in the development of Buddhist 
subjectivity since the religion’s early days in India, as they are not aimed only at spiritual 
specialists but the lay Buddhist as well. The spectacular tales are easily remembered and 
transmitted, and explore the ethical expectations for all followers of the dharma, playing 
them out in symbolic ways.734 Reiko Ohnuma argues that jātakas of self-sacrifice “provide a 
concrete manifestation of an abstract Buddhist ideal, locating this ideal within a dramatic 
character and allowing it to unfold within a recognizable human context replete with personal 
and social consequences.”735 Stephen Jenkins also saw this as the usefulness of these 
narratives which seek not to expound philosophically on the abstract nature of such actions, 
but to explicate Buddhist ideals in all of their complexity.736 These narratives have a wider 
audience than philosophical treatises, likely making them more influential within Tibetan 
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society. Compounding that is the “pervasive influence” exerted by the texts on account of 
their being learned through intimate circles of relationships like family.737 
Chung Tsering found that this narrative (along with the Lotus Sūtra) is frequently 
used on Tibetan message boards to argue whether or not self-immolations should be 
construed as “violent,”738 and it is directly referenced in the last statement of Lama Soepa, 
one of the few Buddhist tulkus (reincarnate Lamas) who have self-immolated.739 Prior to his 
act on January 8, 2012, he left a recorded statement in which he said:  
I am sacrificing my body both to stand in solidarity with [the other pawo] in flesh and blood, 
and to seek repentance through this highest tantric honor of offering one’s body… I am 
taking this action neither for myself nor to fulfill a personal desire nor to earn an honor. I am 
sacrificing my body with the firm conviction and a pure heart just as the Buddha bravely 
gave his body to a hungry tigress. All the Tibetan heroes too have sacrificed their lives with 
similar principles.740  
Nun Sangye Dolma likewise mentions the tale in her poetic final statement, even suggesting 
that it stand as a symbol of the changing fortunes of Tibetans: 
Look, my Tibetan brothers and sisters, look at the 
fortress in the forest look at the beauty of the 
turquoise, plain my tigress has come back. 
Look, my Tibetan brothers and sisters look at the 
land of snow, our destiny is on the rise.741 
Her words link the destiny of the Tibetan people to the forest returning to life as a result of 
the Prince’s sacrifice, suggesting a significant link between the tale and the situation of Tibet. 
Repeatedly this narrative is linked to the auto-cremations, and its relationship has significant 
consequences for the perceived purpose of the act itself and its alignment with Buddhist 
ethics. 
Ohnuma has thoroughly examined “gift-of-the-body” jātaka stories like that of the 
tigress in Sanskrit literature.742 In her work Bodily Self-Sacrifice in Indian Buddhist 
Literature, she contends that these stories are used to illuminate the ‘perfection of generosity’ 
(dāna-paramita), the most important bodhisattva practice, by recounting a gift that refuses 
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reciprocity. This aspect separates mere generosity from ‘perfect’ generosity, as the latter 
designates gifts that “must never be reciprocated,”743 and are therefore instructive in learning 
to transcend the ego. The altruistic nature of the act “result[s] in an ‘unseen’ and transcendent 
reward in the form of karmic merit (punya)” rather than a quid pro quo.744 Stories of self-
sacrifice for others are the apex of the hierarchy of altruistic tales, as they demonstrate the 
most meritorious religious ideal in Mahayana Buddhism, compassion for others. 
By associating the act of self-immolation with this jātaka, the altruistic nature of the 
act and the compassion inherent in these fiery spectacles are brought to the fore. While the 
altruistic nature of an act that can only bring extreme pain and death to the performer may 
seem self-evident, it is important to remember that the counter-discourse of the PRC labels 
them suicides, an (albeit ironic) self-serving act. Seeking escape from a desperate situation 
through self-killing without concern for others who are impacted by the suicide is an act in 
service to the self, even though it ends in the extermination of that self. If they are suicides, 
then, they are not moral acts in the Buddhist framework. However, if the same act is 
understood as an attempt to somehow benefit the situation of others, like the Buddha’s act 
sought to aid the tigress and her cubs, then it is a compassionate act worthy of praise. 
Alignment with the Buddha’s action assures the act’s complicity with the laws of the dharma. 
The phenomena itself is understood through the discourse used to explain it.  
Still we are confronted with a problem in the contrasting teloi of these narrative 
sacrifices and the self-immolations. To what extent can the auto-cremations of the 21st 
century accurately be seen as part of such a lineage when it is an explicit nation, defined by 
cultural complexes, that is sought, rather than the good of all beings in the universe? 
Religiously the new sacrifices would seem to be opposed to the more universal hopes of the 
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past; after all, nations are explicit ways of disconnecting humanity from itself, forming 
political groups that are exclusivist by nature. In that way sacrificing for one group 
(necessarily separate from another) could be seen as neglecting the Buddhist belief in the 
common struggle of all seeking to end suffering, and the necessity of working together in 
hopes of overcoming the woes of samsara. While these self-immolations can no less be 
separated from their nationalist context than they can be from their Buddhist roots, it should 
be recognized that although Tibetans are but a part of a broader humanity who needs saving, 
it is their cultural traditions that provide the means of universal salvation. The Dalai Lama 
has repeatedly acknowledged that Tibetan Buddhism contains the salve for suffering, and it is 
only thanks to the particular form Buddhism took on the plateau that nirvana for all is even 
possible. Moreover, a society explicitly formed on the basis of these doctrines itself must be 
a force for good in the world, providing another reason to defend it by whatever means. The 
overlapping status of Buddhism and Tibetan society has resulted in a blending of purpose and 
meaning that inculcates Buddhist cosmic dynamics as a means of national defense. Both are 
available to self-immolators who see their act as one means left to them to oppose the 
travesty they see occurring. 
This brings to light an obvious problem that comes with the self-immolations that has 
already been noted about martyrdom in general: how do we determine the actor’s intent? 
While earlier I tried to deal with the question by separating aspects of intention from direct 
causation, the actual cause behind the self-killing is essential in knowing how to understand 
the act of self-immolation. In this case, if self-immolators are understood to not be acting 
“for Tibet” and rather in response to personal situations the act would effectively be de-
sacralized.745 Toward this end several reports have come out accusing Chinese officials of 
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trying to coerce family members of self-immolators or even self-immolators who survive into 
“confessing” their suicidal intent.746 The families of pawo Sangye Gyatso and Dolma Kyab 
were both reported to have been bribed by Chinese officials to say their family member’s 
death was unconnected to Chinese policies in Tibet and were rather in reaction to family 
problems.747 These means treat it as a battle over discourse.748 
Returning to the issue of establishing intention, for Buddhists whether or not an 
action is in line with dharmic teachings depends entirely on the actor’s motivation (künlong). 
While this is a common concept across cultures (the legal determination of mens rea along 
with the multiple degrees of murder or manslaughter for example highlight intention’s role in 
determining the character of an action), Tibetan Buddhism makes a distinction between three 
levels of motivation; that which seeks happiness in this life, that which seeks relief from the 
cycle of suffering, and that which seeks the benefit of all sentient beings. This last is 
bodhisattva motivation, displayed by those who have come through long years of spiritual 
training to understand the true basis of compassion and thus achieved bodhicitta, the mind of 
enlightenment. Whoever has attained the mind of enlightenment has a full understanding of 
compassion, as well as the realization of egolessness and the illusory nature of reality, and 
therefore possesses a full understanding of the dharma. 
As the emanation of the Bodhisattva of Compassion, the XIV Dalai Lama is one who 
can claim bodhicitta. The few statements he has made about the self-immolations all directly 
revolve around the issue of the self-immolator’s motivation. It alone, he holds, can 
distinguish an act of suicide from an act of sacrifice, something both Christian and Muslim 
theologians have likewise asserted in their own ideologies of martyrdom. In one interview 
the Dalai Lama said “if the motivation is anger, hatred, [something] like that, then negative. 
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If the motivation [is] some different thing, more positive motivation, then more difficult to 
judge.”749 When pressed to elaborate on the means by which to distinguish positive from 
negative intention, the spiritual leader said “I am quite certain that those who sacrificed their 
lives with sincere motivation, for Buddhadharma and for the well-being of the people, from 
the Buddhist or religious viewpoints, is positive.”750 The Dalai Lama’s statements align with 
the focus on compassionate altruism central to Buddhist ethics, and he sees the actions as 
“positive” if they are aimed at serving the people or the dharma.  
As a recognized Buddhist master, Lama Soepa can confirm that his own action 
springs from compassionate roots “just as the Buddha gave his body to a hungry tigress,” but 
it poses a challenge in terms of the pawo who are not as spiritually advanced. While the 
many monks and nuns who have self-immolated could possibly claim at least the beginnings 
of bodhicitta, the laypeople cannot be expected to understand the true motivations behind 
their self-inflicted deaths. This concern drove Lama Soepa to voice his worry that “their lives 
seemingly ended with some sort of anger.”751 Without the requisite understanding, again 
from the Buddhist perspective, they may think they are serving others but they may in fact be 
acting out of self-interest.  
The same concern may be behind the affirmations of other Tibetan religious leaders, 
like Ogyen Trinley Dorje, the 17th Karmapa Lama, head of the Kagyu Buddhist school,752 
who unequivocally praised the “pure motivation” of the pawo.753 Geshe Kalsang Damdul of 
the renowned Institute of Buddhist Dialectics in Dharamsala likewise designates their acts as 
stemming from the “pure motivation for the well-being of six million Tibetans.”754 These 
religious authorities guarantee that the performances are done for the sacred community of 
Tibetans and, like the model of the Buddha’s sacrifice to the tigress and the devotional 
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offering of the Medicine King, are meritorious actions rather than suicides driven by despair. 
These spiritual masters echo a sentiment that is already well-established in the communities 
of Tibetans inside and outside Tibet.755 While speaking solely from a Buddhist-centered 
perspective, the mechanisms to firmly establish intention are ritualized and based on 
advanced learning. However, such is not necessary to “believe in” what the self-immolators 
are doing for Tibet. That decision is one given to each individual witness. The preceding 
discussion was intended to demonstrate certain dynamics happening high on the religious 
spectrum, but it should not be construed to be the only way to determine if these auto-
cremations are “sacred” deaths. 
In fact, another mechanism exists for such determinations, one that Reiko Ohnuma 
proposes in her study of the “super-jatakas” of self-sacrifice and one that likely forms an 
undercurrent for our discussion:  
The close association drawn between the gift of the body and the absolute purity of the 
giver’s intention is perhaps explainable by the fact that the former would seem to constitute a 
stark and obvious signifier of the latter. In other words, whereas the purity of the donor’s 
intention is a purely mental quality – invisible and unverifiable to the outside observer – its 
existence seems to be vouchsafed by the dramatic spectacle of bodily self-sacrifice, which is 
clear for all to see. Indeed, one of the underlying assumptions at work here is that nobody 
would give such a difficult and painful gift – such an extreme gift – if his intentions were not 
completely pure.756 
The self-immolations could thereby be self-verifying; the extreme lengths the pawo go in 
performing their deaths demonstrate their pure intent and literally make real the narratives 
that guide their actions. Tenzin Paldron sees the same dynamic operating in relation to the 
self-immolations, noting that pain’s “presence suggests a certain kind of virtuous action in 
which an intimate encounter with pain is integral to the virtue of the deed. It is important to 
remember in these cases that a painful act is not being assigned virtue merely because 
suffering is taking place. Virtuous pain here is an act that manages to shift structural patterns 
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in unexpected ways.”757 Pain becomes positively experienced when it serves as a means to 
change the status quo in a beneficial way for the actor’s interests. In sacrificing that which is 
held to be most dear in an act of devotion prefigured by the Buddha’s offering to the tigress 
and the Medicine King’s offering his body to fire, the self-immolators act in a meritorious 
way. 
 I would argue that such an understanding guides most discussions of martyrdom. The 
public, painful spectacle that accompanies all such acts are meant to make people take notice; 
through the act, they direct attention beyond the act, to those experiences and structures 
which incited the act. If self-extermination was the sole goal, there are certainly more 
painless and certain methods.758 Spectacular deaths point beyond the individual. The 
selection of locations for self-immolations support such an assertion. All have been 
performed publicly, usually on streets or busy intersections, but a large number were 
performed either in front of monasteries or local government offices (including security 
stations). Both of these institutions are responsible for the establishment of social order and 
legitimacy, providing a meaningful setting for the self-immolators’ objections to Chinese 
rule.  
Some schools of Buddhism also incorporate a Sanskrit tradition of the four yugas, 
epochs that mark off stages in the life cycle of the universe. These eras progressively 
degenerate in terms of time and sacred character; the first known as the Satya Yuga is said to 
last for four thousand divine years,759 and is known as the age of truth, where life on earth 
most closely reflects the divine teachings of the dharma. Currently, we are believed to be 
living in the final age, the Kali Yuga, which is not only the shortest of epochs but also the 
most morally deficient, and is thought to end with the utter destruction of the dharma itself. 
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At that point, when humankind no longer recognizes our connection with our divine basis, 
the universe will (again) be utterly destroyed before being reborn (again) into the Satya 
Yuga. Jan Nattier has pointed out that while there is a set timetable for each yuga, human 
factors play a large role in the degeneration of the dharma and its ultimate elimination.760  
Even though we find ourselves in the Age of Ignorance, the Kali Yuga, we still 
maintain agency in our ability to maintain the teachings of the dharma. Making that point, the 
XIV Dalai Lama laments the mindset that says “all is lost, times are getting harder, the world 
no longer knows where it’s going. It’s the Kali Yuga taking over, after all. So let’s retreat 
into our corner, let’s profit from the little good we may have accumulated, let’s forget the 
rest, and then we’ll see.”761 Moreover, the ultimate disposition of the dharma is believed to 
be driven by outside, secular forces in most texts, either through their support or persecution 
of Buddhism.762 Such a temporal understanding provides a template by which to understand 
the programs of the PRC as participating in a slide into ignorance, which will end with the 
ultimate loss of the dharma that guides appropriate life on earth. This does not necessarily 
result in impotence for individuals, quite the opposite. Acting in accordance with the dharma 
and thereby supporting its continued existence become increasingly important during such a 
period.  
In the Buddhist spiritual economy, karma is the currency of action, incurred when 
acting meritoriously (read, in line with dharmic doctrine) and lost when acting selfishly 
(read, out of line with the purpose of our existence). A Sanskrit term referring to the basic 
principle that actions have some kind of ultimate result that bears back upon the actor, karma 
is one of Tibetan Buddhism’s central concepts that offers Buddhists a way to control their 
fate and is accepted as a part of the fundamental dynamic of cause and effect in Tibet.763 
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Karma or its lack can be seen as the cause of looming death and misfortune, and Irmgard 
Mengele has shown that some see a buildup of merit as a way to avoid impending death.764 
Not fully attending to the place of karma in Tibetan action could amount to a mistake on the 
same level as assuming separate spheres of political and religious experience in Tibet.  
Although karma is generally considered to be an individual matter, where one’s moral 
actions are balanced against their immoral actions and the net result determines the 
individual’s form in their next rebirth, there is also a belief in the collective karma of a 
people. The physical manner of karma’s dynamic intimately connects individuals, and 
reaffirms the body as not only anatomical materiel but ultimately a social body, embedded in 
relations with others.765 Such an idea has precedence in Tibetan death rites, where the family 
of the deceased is given time to bulk up the virtue (dge-ba) of the deceased through family 
“assistance” (rogs-ram), where merit (dge-ba btang) is sent to the departed. This is intended 
to ensure enough merit for the deceased’s next rebirth to be as high as possible, but operates 
on the foundation of “shared merit” (dge-ba pi-ma) between relations.766 
Moreover, the doctrine of reincarnation holds that through thousands of lives we have 
all been in numerous configurations with others. Vincanne Adams articulates this concept in 
a medical meditation on the origin of the sems, the Tibetan idea of the sentient mind that 
migrates through rebirths: 
These beings – who were not flesh, bone, blood, the same as ‘you’ – are now present in you 
in the sense that it was their actions that produced your physical existence. Their lives make 
up your life. Collectively, they are the physical foundations of the self. The most subtle mind 
is thus inseparable from the body and it is a collectivity of bodies. This most subtle mind 
must be seen as the expression of the accumulated karma that derives from these body forms 
in past lives.767 
This relationship, Adams holds, is particularly visible in moments of deep suffering and pain, 
when “a theory of karma becomes a basis for understanding Tibetan subjectivity and might 
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be seen as operating at the level of epistemology in Tibetan culture.”768 Karma is not only a 
metaphysical assertion about the consequences of acting contrary to the accepted ethical 
system. Its function in the Tibetan milieu far exceeds that, and should be appreciated as a 
significant dynamic at work in the Tibet issue.  
Tibetan Buddhist clergy and self-immolators alike use language that seems to 
reference such a state of interconnectedness, such as the Kirti Monk Lobsang who affirmed 
“the energy of the Tibetan people is totally linked like a bracelet of prayer beads.”769 Pawo 
Phuntsog, second to self-immolate after Tabey, says something similarwhen he asked 
Tibetans to remain united “like malas (prayer beads) on a string, linking every Tibetan.” The 
XIV Dalai Lama has likewise spoken of a collective karma in terms of Tibet: “That is an 
intimate part of our classical teaching. What is true for an individual – who will feel in one of 
his or her existences the effects, favorable or not, of his or her karma – is true for groups, for 
a family, say, and also for a nation, for a people… And we wonder in fact if our collective 
karma didn’t lead us to that confrontation [with China in the 1950s], which ended in 
disaster.”770 If it is the lack of karma that led to this degenerate state of affairs, he intimates, 
then the correction of the political situation is dependent upon upholding and abiding by the 
dharma.771  
In his final statement, Lama Sobha plead that all Tibetans “genuinely practice 
Buddhist principles in order to benefit the Tibetan cause and also to lead all sentient beings 
towards the path to enlightenment.”772 The tulku saw the potential for acts of altruistic 
compassion to positively affect the situation in a causal manner in line with Buddhist 
conceptions of karma and sacrifice. In other words, “a practice of offering does not make the 
same move as resistance… the offering is an act that seeks to intervene in that suffering, 
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much as the Buddha intervened in that of the tigers.”773 The cause of Tibet is aided by people 
acting in accordance with Buddhist ethics, which lay at the heart of the Tibetan social, 
political and theological imagination.  
Several other statements of pawo support this interpretation. Nyingkar Tashi, whose 
self-immolation on the 12th of November 2012 took place during a service for pawo Tamdin 
Tso, assured his family that “there is no need to worry and feel sad. Instead, engage in 
spiritual activities and accumulate merits.”774 Pawo Lobsang Tsultrim who self-immolated at 
the beginning of 2012 likewise hoped his sacrifice would “make all who belong to humanity 
open wide their eyes of mercy, examine things with a loving heart, and heed the law of 
karma.”775 Rikyo, the mother of three who self-immolated at the end of May 2012 hoped that 
people would not fight or steal or “indulge in slaughtering and trading of animals,”776 which 
echoed Nangdrol’s hopes that people “be compassionate to animals” and “restrain from 
taking the lives of living beings.”777 Tulku Athup likewise was said to have asked his 
students to engage in meritorious activities like saving animal lives in order to honor his 
sacrifice.778 Mentioning the welfare of animals in what would appear to be a political action 
seems out of place, unless understood as inspiring conformance to a central Buddhist ethical 
tenet with hopes that it could positively affect the political situation through a karmic 
dynamic.779  
In his analysis of the self-immolator’s last words, Wang Lixiong showed that most 
self-immolators spoke of their self-sacrifice as actions aimed at solving the situation directly; 
by his estimation approximately 38% of the last words left behind by self-immolators 
referenced this idea. Reading such a preponderance within the context of Buddhist Tibet, he 
averred these acts are meant to develop positive karma, while recognizing the difficulty 
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people in non-Buddhist settings have in understanding “setting one’s own body on fire as an 
offering for nothing else but merit.”780 What we are faced with is the possible inspiration of 
the self-immolation act being at least somewhat informed by a sacrificial logic that aims at 
building and deploying merit through its performance.  
Suh an understanding shows that the personal benefits promised to those who act 
meritoriously are intimately linked to the political benefits enjoyed by the community. Any 
merit gained by the performers that helps their progression along the Buddhist path is earned 
on the basis of their compassion to others, and such contributes to the collective karma of 
Tibetans that helps improve their political situation. Furthermore, it is only actions done with 
the proper compassionate motivation that earn merit, meaning actions that are explicitly 
intended to help others (and not those that do so as an unintended byproduct). Those 
performed out of an intent to live in line with the dictates of the dharma provide such benefit, 
and therefore meritorious acts are those that speak to the guiding principles of the act beyond 
the act itself. It is not the personal benefit that is celebrated by the community however, but 
rather the benefit ascribed to the community.  
By interpreting the acts of self-immolation and the words accompanying them in their 
religious context, these acts of devotion could be imagined to positively affect the situation in 
Tibet through a karmic dynamic that is an essential part of the Tibetan social imaginary. Such 
an understanding would offer a theological solution to the political situation Tibetans are 
experiencing and counter the harm caused by the actions of the PRC by putting their injured 
bodies to use toward their own ends.  
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Suffering, Coercion and Sovereignty in Tibet 
The harm inherent in the PRC’s programs in Tibet is intended to coerce adherence to 
and acceptance of their normative system. As the internationally recognized sovereign state, 
the PRC claims the monopoly on legitimate violence within their territory, where physical 
suffering can be imposed as a means to their ends alone.781 As Max Weber, who first made 
this point, noted, “the state represents a relationship in which people rule over other people. 
This relationship is based on the legitimate use of force (that is to say, force that is perceived 
as legitimate).”782 To “rule over” is to codify “allowed” and “forbidden” actions in law, and 
enforce that law by inflicting suffering upon those who do not abide by their designations.  
Dmitris Vardoulakis likewise begins his work exploring the nature of sovereignty 
with “the axiom that the operation of sovereign power consists in the justification of 
violence.”783 Echoing Weber’s focus, Vardoulakis points to the ability of the sovereign to 
determine when the imposition of suffering is seen as justified, that is, in line with the 
conceptions of justice based in wider ideological structures. Sovereign legal orders are 
ultimately codified systems of actions sanctioned and forbidden in line with perceptions of 
reality and supported by regimes of violence.784 Carl Schmitt’s oft-cited discussion of 
sovereignty also revolves around this conception, as the sovereign is able to determine the 
exception to legal machinations of violence, because they are seen as able to suspend its 
operation.785 The state of siege has been understood as a state of exception, where law is 
suspended over a certain area, but the suspension of law’s operation should not be confused 
with its complete absence. The swift recourse to violence that characterizes such a state aims 
at only allowing sanctioned activity, and letting all know that illicit activity will be met with 
the imposition of intense suffering. Sovereignty has been treated nearly exclusively in terms 
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of where violence can legitimately be applied as means toward appropriate ideological ends, 
and who is able determine those ends. In the current situation, Tibet has been internationally 
recognized as under the sovereign jurisdiction of the PRC at least since the Seventeen Point 
Agreement, meaning the authorities of the Chinese state can determine what actions Tibetans 
can engage in, and how to punish those who do not.  
These pawo demonstrate that their action cannot be forced by violence. If it could, the 
omnipresent violence evident in Tibet would have resulted in willing subjects of the Chinese 
state, not celebrated spectacular self-killings connected to an alternate locus of authority. The 
actions of these pawo highlight another insight of Weber: “If the state is to survive, those 
who are ruled over must always acquiesce in the authority that is claimed by the rulers of the 
day… this compliance is the product of interests of the most varied kinds, but chiefly of hope 
and fear.”786 Be they born out of optimism for a better tomorrow or the dread of a worse, 
actions that recognize and abide by authority perpetuate the state. To acquiesce is to 
ostensibly approve the dominant authority’s ability to determine sanctioned action. For 
Tibetans, such an acquiescence would appear to make them complicit in destroying the 
culture and traditions of Tibet. 
Pain and suffering can influence, but not determine action in the world. Likewise, 
those Christians who chose to suffer the most extreme lengths of pain at Roman hands rather 
than act in ways forbidden by doctrine demonstrated this premise in their bodies. Like these 
Tibetans, their resistance perpetually remained an option, though it cost their lives. Both sets 
of martyrs remind us that death is always an alternative when faced with actions that 
contradict the foundation of our lives. Sovereignty, the ability to decide upon the proper 
course of action free of outside influence, ultimately resides in the bodies of the individuals 
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who subscribe to it. As the pawo show, this is always a free act, unable to be forced, because 
there is always another option for those willing to pay the cost. For that reason, martyrdom 
simultaneously challenges the dedication of others, asking ‘are you dedicated enough to 
choose death rather than act against the truth?’ The Tibetan poet and commenter Woeser 
notes this power (and unknowingly echoes Ayatollah Khomeini), saying “when I think of the 
heroes and heroines (pawo) who have committed self-immolation I am ashamed of my 
inherent weakness, cowardice and uselessness.”787 The sovereign bargain relies on the fear of 
suffering to function effectively – were there no fear to direct action, authority would be 
without a central means to legitimate itself. States may claim the only legitimate violence, 
but that violence is also fundamental to that claim. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault showed that public executions were not only a 
means by which to create sovereign power through fear. Suffering and its possibility was 
used to procure the confession, where subjects recognized and verified the judgment of the 
sovereign, implicitly participating in the sovereign’s power to establish truth.788 The 
confession is an admission that the sovereign has the true ability to determine right and 
wrong, not as an extension of his violence but as a product of his sacred stature. It is beyond 
mere infliction of injury, as the rituals surrounding the execution produce awe in the face of 
the sovereign’s sacrality, his connection to a cosmic truth. What Foucault describes is not 
only that the state truly can impose suffering, but that it is seen to have a right to impose 
suffering, that it alone can give meaning to suffering.  
This has lead anthropologist Ralph Litzinger to pose what is perhaps the most crucial 
and least examined question about the Tibetan self-immolations: 
how the self-immolating body, the body that protests through flames and charred tissue, a 
body that is often wrapped in barbed-wire so it cannot be saved (cared for) by the Public 
Security or Health official on the ground, is not just giving itself to a greater cause. It is using 
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fire to steal from the state its foundational relationship to violence. It is denying the state, if 
only for that singular moment when the body ignites in flame, its sovereign claim to 
determine how individuals, in this most precarious of times, will be cared for, how they will 
live, and how they will die.789 
Acts of self-sacrifice in opposition to oppression demonstrate that individuals retain the 
ability to determine for themselves the systems which will guide their action. Such cannot be 
forced by intimidation and pain, but again require acquiescence. Speaking about the self-
immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi that set off the Arab Spring, Didier Fassin remarked that 
the act showed “the violence of the state and the resistance of the individual are embodied in 
one person.”790 However while Litzinger’s quote is accurate, it only highlights one side of the 
equation. In exterminating themselves, these pawo are indeed denying China’s legitimate 
authority, but simultaneously they are affirming the sovereign imaginary they do subscribe to 
through the form and function of their protest. Voluntarily suffering in order to declare with 
their entire being the truth of their sovereign imaginary, the self-immolators demonstrate that 
sovereignty depends ultimately on the free actions of individuals. 
The Dalai Lama, the embodiment of compassion on earth and symbolic head of Tibet, 
demands obedience not because of the violence he can direct, but the promise he signifies as 
a symbol of the Tibetan sovereign imaginary. That imaginary cannot be subordinated to the 
PRC’s ideology, these self-immolators seem to say, because the former contains the truth of 
who they are and how they are obliged to act in the world. Such a truth does more than 
accurately reflect reality; it determines the proper way to be in the world and gives assurance 
and pride to those who form their subjectivity in accordance with its principles. It appears as 
the “true” determinant of identity and morality. 
Their fiery sacrifices are shaped by and perpetuate social constructs of meaningful 
belonging and action, indicating what is meaningful for the actor; in Juergensmeyer’s terms, 
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symbolic acts of self-sacrifice bring in an “alternate view of public reality.”791 The alternative 
offered by such acts challenges those power structures that fought to be taken for granted. 
They demonstrate that the dominant ideology is a construction, rather than a reflection, of 
reality. This is not to suggest that the symbolic world of the self-immolators is less real than 
that of the PRC, but rather to insist that both are equally fictive, existing only abstractly until 
they are called into existence by those who enact them into the world. 
For these pawo and sympathetic Tibetans, to do nothing would make them complicit 
in destroying the reality of Tibet. Not being complicit means being unlawful, and a vast 
network exists throughout Tibet to discover and punish all unlawful activity. The PRC has 
international legitimacy to create their world by force, and to allow the fear of that force to 
prevent actions essential to Tibetan life is to allow them to dictate how the world will look. 
Such activity includes dissenting speech, noted by pawo like Lobsang Tsultrim, who 
lamented that the PRC has “deprive[d] us of the rights of expression, movement, 
communication, assembly, religion and so on, but they do not allow the slightest word of it to 
reach the outside world, and even if it does, they cover it up with lies, and allow no one to 
see the real situation, and anyone who does show the real situation they shamelessly slander 
with false accusations, and secretly murder or secretly imprison.”792 If they do not act in 
ways perceived as assisting the destruction of the cultural institutions that have given their 
lives form, then, they would die. Dr. Lobsang Sangay, Sikyong (Prime Minister) of the 
Tibetan Government-In-Exile since 2011, asserts that “Tibetans seem to be saying [self-
immolation] is the only form of protest left, because any other form of protest the 
consequences are similar – you get arrested, tortured and often die.”793 To live rightly 
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therefore means to risk your life, but these self-immolators demonstrate a belief that a just 
existence – living appropriately in the world – will ever remain above mere existence.794 
Since they are not provided with any means of making known their convictions and 
attachment to their concept of Tibet, self-immolators have been led to creating their own 
public spectacles, a loudspeaker made with their lives. The arenas for those spectacles are not 
accidental, they are nearby agents of sustaining social structure. Spectacles like self-
immolation make public a violence that would otherwise remain secret. By exposing 
themselves to the limits of pain and suffering, the self-immolator “illustrates the violence 
done by an ‘other’.”795 The secrecy surrounding detention and the “disappearances” 
attributed to the PRC are buttressed, as Tsultrim noted above, by a lack of reporting and 
smear campaigns for many who speak out. By creating a self-verifying spectacle of their 
deaths linked to their speech, Tibetans make their own means of exhibiting the violence to 
which they are subject.  
Rather than acting in conformance with China’s dictates, these self-immolators 
perform their death in a way that is modeled in some of the most popular religious narratives 
of Tibet, and show their willingness to suffer and die for what they believe. Aligning the 
current situation with such cultural scripts serves as a way to make Tibetans’ negative 
experiences meaningful, confirming as sacred both the individual and the fields of their 
devotion. Moreover, the alignment of self-immolation with well-known Buddhist models of 
ethical actions not only serves as a reminder of those models (and their morality) but 
provides a moment where those abstract tales are given witnessable reality.  
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The Truth of Tibet 
 On the 4th of October 2012, a 43-year-old Tibetan writer named Gudrub walked into 
the marketplace of Nagchu Town, a small hamlet about 300km northeast of Lhasa, and set 
himself on fire. In his note composed prior to his self-immolation, Gudrub explained: 
We are declaring the reality of Tibet by burning our bodies to call for freedom in Tibet. Higher 
beings, please see Tibet. Mother earth, extend compassion to Tibet. Just world, uphold the 
truth. The pure Land of Snow is now tainted with red blood, where military crackdowns are 
ceaseless. We as sons and daughters of the Land of Snow will win the battle. We will win the 
battle through truth, by shooting the arrows of our lives, by using the bow of our mind.796 
The insight behind this statement is profound, and helps clarify both what is at stake in the 
conflict between Tibet and China and the potential efficacy of these auto-cremations and 
similar self-sacrifices. Ostensibly the conflict is over the actions of Tibetans, and their 
unwillingness to act in accordance with the authorities and laws of the PRC. Prohibiting 
actions like paying homage to the Dalai Lama and interfering in religious practices are 
attempts subordinate the symbolic systems of Tibetans to those of the PRC. Forcing 
submission makes the PRC’s systems ‘real’ in their effects upon Tibetan bodies; what 
publicly happens looks like what the PRC says should happen. It effectively creates the PRC 
in Tibetan borders and bodies. 
 What Gudrub articulates is a method of fighting against this imposition. Like all 
battles, lives are placed on the line, but rather than sending arrows into the bodies of others, 
Tibetan bodies themselves are the arrows, driven into the hearts of those who witness their 
spectacular deaths. They expose themselves to the suffering that results from acting rightly, 
using it to transform pain into “a space for moral action that articulates this-world-in-the-
next.”797 The need to suffer or cause others to suffer in service to the dharma has a long 
tradition in Tibet. Examples include tantric capital punishment for crimes against the 
dharma798 along with sanctioned murders of those who posed a threat to the Buddhist 
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teachings (most notably that of Langdharma and the Compassionate Ship’s Captain of the 
Upāyakauśalya Sūtra).799 As compassion grounds the bodhisattva ethics of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, and the dharma contains the means by which to end the suffering of all beings, 
any harm in support of its existence is dwarfed by the procured benefit for all beings. For that 
reason, the dharma has been placed above human life. Though the first of the Five Precepts 
that form the core of Tibetan ethical codes is to harm none, suffering in service of upholding 
the dharma is sanctioned, even celebrated, because it is seen to benefit the group and by 
extension, all people everywhere. Narratives mobilized around the conflict with China and 
the self-immolations reinforce this, as do the statements of Tibetan leaders which participate 
in creating the frame for interpreting these narratives.800  
Suffering in itself is therefore not a problem in the Buddhist tradition.801 It has a 
central place in the doctrines and systems of Tibet, and there is an innate link between 
willingness to suffer on behalf of that which guides life and the enactment of a fictive reality. 
By voluntarily subjecting themselves to the immeasurable agony of burning alive, the self-
immolations link their speech about their guiding cultural construction to their bodily 
suffering and death, making real on earth an ideological construct that otherwise would 
remain abstract. This is the “reality-conferring” function of injury described by Elaine 
Scarry: “instead of the familiar process of substantiation in which the observer certifies the 
existence of the thing by experiencing the thing in his own body (seeing it, touching it), the 
observer instead sees and touches the hurt body of another person (or animal) juxtaposed to 
the disembodied idea, and having sensorially experienced the reality of the first, believes he 
or she has experienced the reality of the second.”802 Belief is given substance in the body, 
and these bodies literally become a moment of the witnessable reality of their sovereign 
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imaginary.803 That which gives their life meaning exists is given form and made visible 
through the body.804  
The self-immolators witness the truth of their organizing construct through their own 
suffering and death. By accepting and even seeking the pain that is meant to deter them from 
their obliged activities, they assert a base of reality beyond the perceivable world. As Fassin 
has it, “the body is not only the site where power is exerted or resisted, it is also the site 
where truth is sought or denied.”805 Their act is a dual sacrifice and a dual witness: they make 
the body sacred in its destruction, and set that which directs their performance apart in its 
evidenced truth. At the same time they give witness to the true perception of reality in their 
bodies and provide the means for others to witness that truth for themselves in the 
performance of their deaths. 
Truth appears regularly in the statements of pawo. Like Gudrub, Lobsang Tsultrim 
said the freedoms Tibetans demand belong to a people with truth on their side, and that it was 
“in testimony and for the sake of truth”806 that he self-immolated, while Jamphel Yeshi 
explicitly linked loyalty to a cause to the knowledge of truth:  
My fellow Tibetans, when we think about our future happiness and path, we need loyalty. It 
is the life-soul of a people. It is the spirit to find truth. It is the guide leading to happiness. My 
fellow Tibetans, if you want equality and happiness as the rest of the world, you must hold 
onto this word ‘LOYALTY’ towards your country. Loyalty is the wisdom to know truth from 
falsehood.807 
To know the true from the false is to recognize your legitimate obligations as opposed to 
those which are being forcefully imposed. Loyalty is not only a promise to act in accordance 
with the directives of rightful authority, but to further recognize that such authority extends 
from the true bases of reality. It is a consistent and reliable confession.808  
 In this same vein the Dalai Lama has spoken of Tibet’s conflict with the PRC as “a 
struggle between the power of truth and the power of guns. For the short term, the power of 
260 
 
gun is much stronger, but in the long run, the power of truth is stronger than the power of 
gun. That is my fundamental belief.”809 Lama Sobha also paused in his final statement to say 
the Mandala prayer, a popular Tibetan meditation that includes the verse “those who bear 
hostility towards the Buddha dharma / May all of them be found and defeated / by the three 
jewels and the power of truth.”810 One nun who had been imprisoned by the PRC likewise 
pointed to the power of the truth, saying of the demonstration that resulted in her 
incarceration “When we went to demonstrate we were ready for death. We are fighting for 
truth and for this we must be ready to die. The truth will find its way. We never doubt this. I 
felt no fear. I felt strength from all the people who were killed before me.”811 In situations of 
conflict and states of siege, for the truth to find voice it must do so through the bodies of 
those who are willing to suffer for it. The self-immolations are taking up a long lineage of 
others who prefer the truth of traditional Tibet to their own well-being. 
The ethical obligations of any ideological structure of justice are based in a 
conception of cosmic order and its dynamics, including how to appropriately shape our life in 
conformance. This perspective remains in the abstract until it is given reality, literally made 
real, in human bodies and actions. Loyalty, fides, fidelity, is the assurance that your actions 
will give only one ideological construct reality in your body. However, loyalty is not 
something that can simply be stated; saying you subscribe to a political authority is only 
meaningful if your actions align with that statement. How we act, and what structures we 
enact, determines what we make true. Speech must be substantiated by action, and loyalty is 
the label for those who consistently perform actions in service to a basis of speech and 
identity regardless of the consequences. 
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Conclusion 
The First Noble Truth of Buddhism is that to live is to suffer. All Buddhist doctrines 
take their cue from this basic fact of existence that determines how to live in the world. The 
way these determinations were elaborated within Tibet resulted in a collective identity based 
in a common language, cultural traditions and religious character. Together, these form an 
understanding of what it is to “be Tibetan.” And it is precisely these practices that are under 
threat of eradication by the PRC, which has long held Tibet to be part of their Great 
Motherland and therefore claim the right to determine the shape of Tibetan identity. The 
PRC’s claim has resulted in a perceived state of siege within the traditional lands of Tibet 
that deploys normative suffering against those who act in ways understood to negate that 
claim. Those same programs of action are perceived by Tibetans as obliterating their identity, 
and thereby destroying Tibet itself. Acting in accordance is therefore rendered as 
participation in the project to destroy the social structures that gives their lives meaning. 
All Tibetans therefore face a choice: act in ways that contribute to the destruction of 
your core identity or suffer torture, incarceration and perhaps death at the hands of the CCP. 
For many Tibetans death appears on both sides, and not risking their physical existence 
would result in a cultural death, eliminating that which gives their lives meaning.812 In 
response, self-immolators have chosen a form of self-killing that goes beyond suicide by 
marking it as an act for the collective, placing the good of their community above their 
personal good. The collective’s benefit first comes through the spectacle itself, performed in 
public places to highlight the violence being deployed on Tibetan bodies. Within the state of 
siege, no avenue for dissenting speech is offered and inflictions of harm take place secretly. 
As protest, these auto-cremations link the speech that would otherwise be silenced with the 
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willingness to suffer for the truth, resulting in a powerful act of testimony that communicates 
the actor’s perception of the situation they are facing.  
At the same time, religious labels of sacrifice are also applied to these fiery deaths. 
Religion stands at the center of the programs of the PRC, partly because of the particular 
religious character of Tibetan identity, partly because Buddhist leaders and institutions have 
long been incorporated into Tibet’s political administration, and partly because of the 
negative place religion occupies in communist ideology of Marx through Mao. The Dalai 
Lama, the symbol of Tibet and for over fifty years its spiritual and political leader-in-exile, 
draws most of the PRC’s vitriol, and remains at the center of their repressive programs. 
Restrictions aimed at a separatist authority simultaneously prohibit acts of devotion central to 
the practice of Tibetan Buddhism.  
What we see over and again is a setting where religious devotion cannot be separated 
from cultural and political institutions. Speaking of religion in Tibet is to speak of 
nationality, identity, language and the cultural traditions that define life on the plateau. In 
contrast to Talal Asad’s argument that spheres such as religion and nationalism need be 
treated separately, any such hueristic would misrepresent the Tibetan setting.813 As evidenced 
by the self-immolators own words that reflect the dominant themes within the Dalai Lama’s 
speeches since his exile, religion is a fundamental part of Tibetan existence, and provides the 
means of understanding ethics, purpose, and even politics in Tibet. 
 Religion provides a sacred frame through which to understand the conflict and to 
connect the current struggle with those of Tibet’s history; the country’s mythologized past 
begins with the creation of the Tibetan people as guardians of the dharma, and rhetoric used 
by self-immolators and commentators continue such a perspective. Such a discourse connects 
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Tibetans to their honored ancestors and provides a means to gain dignity during a desperate 
time, while also providing scripts of action for those who seek to correct a world out-of-
order. Cosmic order is vouchsafed in the teachings of the dharma, and the perception that 
China seeks to empty or utterly eliminate those teachings not only aligns with the perils of 
the Kali Yuga, but connects to a long tradition in Tibet of sanctified suffering in defending 
the font of truth. 
Such a frame not only assures the morality of such actions, but also shapes them as 
meritorious acts that incur karma for oneself and the larger community. With an embedded 
concept of collective karma and a religious tradition that focuses on gaining escape from 
suffering through meritorious actions, aligning these acts with Tibetan models of ethical 
action serves to encourage and sanctify them. The Buddha’s offering himself to the tigress 
and the Medicine King’s offering himself for enlightenment both provide an interpretive 
mechanism that affirms self-immolation’s compassionate base and meritorious nature. As 
such, the act intercedes directly in the conflict by accruing karma for both the individual and 
the community. Concurrently it serves to mark these auto-cremations as supported by an 
ethical system that can legitimately determine justified suffering (as opposed to the 
illegitimate violence utilized by the PRC), and thereby denying the potential of that violence 
to determine their behavior when it is at odds with the true moral system. Right defeats 
might, or in the idiom of the XIV Dalai Lama, the power of the truth is victorious over the 
power of a gun. 
Those who declare these pawo to be martyrs for the cause of Tibet thereby connote 
their acceptance of the same truth and participation in the same project as the self-
immolators. That project seeks to create a Tibet that reflects their conception of true cosmic 
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order supporting life on the plateau. Self-immolation in support of such a project appears as 
the Tibetan sovereign imaginary made real in their broken bodies; these pawo become 
symbols of the reality of the order that supports true authority and provides the guidelines for 
right action in the world. By linking their suffering to their speech, they also bolster the 
resolve of others by becoming an observable example of the limits of commitment to such an 
imaginary, unwilling to forsake it even amidst the direst of circumstances. These martyrs 
give testimony to their conception of true life while providing a spectacle for others to 
witness that conception made real before their eyes. 
The martyr’s self-sacrifice is both a devotional act, aimed at effecting an 
improvement of their situation, and a political statement, publicly identifying the means by 
which their ontological and existential truth is made real. Both the PRC and the Tibetans seek 
to create a Tibet that aligns with their understanding of what life should look like in the 
region. Both would forever remain only a possibility unless they are enacted by willing 
bodies. The ultimate character of the country is still being negotiated, and by spectacularly 
taking their own lives these pawo are frozen forever in the act of creating their Tibet.  
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Chapter 5 
Theorizing Martyrdom:  
Self-Sacrifice, Sovereignty, and Truth 
 
 
Comparing Discourses of Martyrdom 
In the previous three chapters, I examined the words attributed to martyrs within their 
active context. This chapter will seek to draw these analyses together into a comparative 
frame, looking to identify what congruencies they share and what, if anything, might be 
made of such similarities. To begin then, it should be remembered that while the Islamist 
martyrs of Hezbollah and Iran possess a direct doctrinal connection with the second-century 
Christians, no such connection is extant with the Buddhists of Tibet. Moreover, although 
Islam considers Christianity, especially the Christianity prior to the seventh century when the 
Qur’an was revealed, as a direct predecessor, the martyrs brought to trial in Asia Minor saw 
the world in very different terms than those who martyred themselves through human bomb 
attacks. Both differ radically from those Tibetan Buddhists whose lives were given in fiery 
protests. In what follows I will not seek to obfuscate these differences, but rather attempt to 
elucidate what lessons can be drawn from the common ways they employ the discourse of 
martyrdom. Centrally I will contend that martyrdoms are performed within specific socio-
political contexts as attempts to fix an interpretive frame about the purpose of and 
circumstances surrounding these deaths.  
 Such an attempt must begin with an axiom that martyrdom is a way of talking about 
and making meaning from death. (While historically some traditions of martyrdom and even 
more colloquial uses also apply the term to prolonged or acute suffering, such references 
depend on their connection to death and the natural aversion to both.) Forms of death differ 
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radically between cases, but death, and a suffering death, appears as the common 
denominator between executions, bombings and self-immolation. In all, the painful loss of 
life was linked to something that exceeded the individual who perished, and recognizing such 
a link commends the explanation provided by the martyrs themselves, as opposed to 
competing assertions provided by other institutions. Speaking of martyrdom as a discourse, 
then, recognizes it as an interpretive act that endows a death with meaning by connecting it to 
wider symbolic complexes. 
 That act of interpretation is not a private one. While the extent to which one accepts 
the reading offered is an individual decision (and we have already seen that there is certainly 
no consensus about the meaning of these deaths), these acts are performed publicly and their 
stories are spread widely. Moreover, whichever version is accepted has consequences for 
public behavior. The reach of these stories seems to be a consequence of the spectacular and 
painful nature of the deaths. Martyrs’ deaths are rarely if ever peaceful, and of those 
examined here the bomb’s dismemberment may appear as the least painful merely on 
account of its immediacy, but few would call death by explosion a serene death. Those 
Christians who were Roman citizens could expect a swift death by beheading, but those who 
were merely Roman subjects faced torturous deaths brought about by a gladiator’s steel or a 
beast’s teeth. Perhaps the most excruciating form would be the auto-cremations of the 
Tibetans; a fiery death is an agonizing death and modern media allows people to experience 
every horrific moment firsthand. Pain is not epiphenomenal to martyrdom, but necessary in 
its very structure.  
Pain appears essential to martyrdom in two key ways; first, these martyrs and their 
fellows exist in situations where institutions of power use spectacular and covert violence in 
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hopes of forcing alignment with a system of action. Martyrs saw such aggression aimed 
specifically at their group, putting them in a defensive mode and leading to a defining 
experience of tyrannical oppression. No negotiation or mediated détente appeared possible, 
only a forced choice between conformance or suffering. Such experiences were constructed 
and compounded through reference to past moments of similar repression extant in the 
group’s collective memory, making the program appear directed at their “kind.” The degree 
to which that was the case is disputed, as the dominant group deemed such activity to be 
legitimate enforcement of the law while the martyr’s group rejected it as in service to 
injustice. (For ease of understanding, going forward the dominant political power 
administering these areas will be referred to as “the state,” while recognizing the 
oversimplification inherent in such shorthand.) At the same time, since those of the martyr’s 
clique could not hope to avoid being afflicted, suffering began to be seen as a duty required 
of group members, and perseverance incumbent upon true adherents. In doing so they 
converted oppressors into their accomplice by reading the state’s infliction of pain as 
enabling a necessary expression of devotion. 
This need to persevere through torment is the second way pain appears central to 
martyrdom. The suffering wielded by the state is coercive, and the martyr’s constancy often 
takes the shape of continued control over voice in the midst of anguish. Christian and Tibetan 
sources both have scores of tales where their martyrs endure torture silently, and the silence 
required for the covert actions of the istishhadi serves the same role. More generally, genres 
of martyr tales share a trope where the martyr refuses to produce any sound that could be 
read as capitulating to the state’s authority. Confessions, admissions of guilt and even 
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guttural cries all become a symbol of the oppressor’s power, and the function of martyrdom 
seeks to deny them any such power based in mere violence. 
A natural aversion to pain and death is expected of any living creature, but in all cases 
of martyrdom a decision to suffer and die is made. If any of these martyrs chose, they could 
have avoided their deaths, particularly the Islamists or Tibetans who simply could have 
chosen not to light themselves on fire or blow themselves up. The Christians too had ample 
opportunity to avoid death; every martyr acta included the imperative to sacrifice to the 
emperor, and made clear that doing so would result in freedom. Many stories relate Roman 
authorities going to great lengths in hopes of convincing Christians to sacrifice and avoid 
execution. And yet in each case individuals intentionally sought out their painful deaths, 
transforming the negative experience of pain into something positive. Talal Asad referred to 
this as passionate engagement, an intensity of the relationship to an ideology or group.814 
While the specific reasons martyrs give are not and could not be the same on account of the 
disparate settings, the manner in which their last words frame their deaths share a number of 
similarities that can help us understand why people seek their own martyrdom or honor those 
who do. 
 Each case sees a conflict around a series of practices. Traditional cultural practices 
understood to be paying homage to an opposing authority are seen to pose a challenge to the 
state, who in turn demands their cessation. Jesus Christ, the Dalai Lama and the Ayatollah 
Khomeini all anchor oppositional political hierarchies promoting a different system of order. 
Resistance to foreign rule crystallized around these charismatic individuals whose authority 
stemmed from religious doctrine and narratives that also determine the group’s guiding 
ethics. Condemnations of such leaders put the state on the wrong side of morality, and 
269 
 
suddenly their reliance on violent means of enforcement began to look like the machinations 
of evil powers seeking the destruction of the religions that promised salvation. 
Two conceptions of right disagreed over whether certain actions are forbidden or 
necessary. One side has more access to technologies of force than the other, but that does not 
mark them as ontologically different; they are both perceived by some to have legitimate 
authority over people’s lives. Here I have used the term sovereign imaginaries, but the same 
is at stake in Juergensmeyer’s “ideologies of order” or the nomos of Peter Berger.815 On 
account of this, settings that produce martyrs are often characterized by an expanding 
colonial power coming into contact with an extant cultural group. During the second century, 
Rome’s influence was being more keenly felt than ever before, and it was only decades prior 
to the Tibetan self-immolations that the PRC began more firmly tamping down on Tibetan 
religious practices. For all that discussions of Islamists today tend to look back to early days 
of Islam, the situation faced by the Shi’ites of Iran and Lebanon stemmed from the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and the role Western powers played in determining the subsequent political 
boundaries of the Middle East. This provided shuhada with a cultural amalgam symbolized 
by Israel and Western imperial agents to fault for threatening traditional ways of life. A new 
landscape of power is being worked out in these periods, and the martyrs saw their deaths as 
a means of participating in the struggle. 
 Some level of cultural preservation was promised by the colonizing group in all these 
cases, meant to allow for continued religious expression and not disrupt the lives of their 
subjects. None saw their programs as intentional attempts to eliminate the religions of those 
under their rule, but each took steps to determine the shape of religion and separate it from 
the political sphere. The result was a common practice of privatization, firmly placing 
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religion in a personal sphere where faith would not interfere with political duty.816 Perhaps it 
was seen to be necessary, as a number of different religious orientations existed side by side 
in within the jurisdictions of these states, presenting a challenge for powers that sought 
peaceful administration of a multicultural populace. It also gave a feeling of discrete cultural 
groups that must look out for themselves. When faced with individuals who not only refused 
to accept their authority, but persisted in recognizing a separate authority, the states were 
compelled to employ violent means in reaction. That meant more violence, and more 
evidence of an evil oppressor. 
 The inherent connection between the martyrs’ religious and political expressions 
translated into an experience of being asked to deny that which made them who they are. 
Denial was another consistent trope between cases, where it meant both denying the authority 
of these leaders and the denial of their own true selves. Peter denied Christ when confronted 
by the crowd, the Islamic doctrine of enjoining right and forbidding wrong defines wrong by 
denying the Prophet, and Tibetan pawo plead with their compatriots not to deny their 
heritage. Doing so would be to speak against themselves, against the truth, and the martyrs 
boldly refused to do so. The state tries to impose its own identity, but by going to their deaths 
refusing to deny who they are, martyrs show that identity is a choice, one that cannot be 
abrogated. 
 This conflation of spheres and the attacks upon them led to the increasing salience of 
religious frames as a means of understanding how to face such dangers. The martyrs and 
their factions read their contemporary situation through the lens of a sacred past, replete with 
“imagined” causes of the state of affairs and its solution. Religious narratives promised an 
ideal existence to which reality did not measure up, and the martyrs saw it as their 
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responsibility – and often their destiny – to transform the real into the ideal.817 It was only 
sensible to look to the same traditions that provided the vision to provide the means of 
transformation. Interestingly Christian, Muslim and Buddhist traditions all pointed to the 
need for sacrifice, a cosmically sanctioned loss, as the mechanism to bring about a just 
existence. Though sacrificial forms varied, all saw willing suffering as an act of devotion and 
dedication to the social group and sovereign imaginary.  
 Showing dedication in these moments meant following a different set of laws than 
those of the state. Everywhere a conflict between legal structures is evident, the statist 
institution confronting religious doctrines that promise individual salvation and future social 
utopia. People are forced to choose between directing action according to religious law in 
hopes of promised salvation, or the worldly power in order to avoid immediate physical pain. 
Fervent religious devotion was countered by increased violence, which played right into the 
story told by the religious leaders. Religious affect provides a basis for judging the state’s 
assertion that their forceful means are legitimate punishments for moral transgression. The 
result is the perceived creation of a kind of state of exception where the line distinguishing 
law from violence (an unjust infliction of harm) becomes blurred.818 The force supporting the 
state’s laws becomes seen as separate from the practice of justice.  
 Conceptions of justice moor and exceed mere legal statutes. Positive systems of law 
lay out explicit guidelines of behavior oriented around ideas of fairness and right existence. 
Justice relies on a theory about order, about what the world should look like. Modern systems 
base such views in equal treatment between peers, coming out of an Enlightenment heritage, 
while religious structures rely on divine imperative and will. Moreover, different systems of 
ethics are activated depending on the context. What is allowed in theaters of war is not 
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allowed in civilian settings. The killing of soldiers in war is not murder. Valid legal 
punishment is not torture. These labels helps shed light on how varying perceptions come to 
be applied to a single act, precisely what occurs in these settings. The Shi’ite Islamists of the 
1980s saw themselves using their lives in acts of war, not acts of murder. The PRC saw 
afflictions of the Tibetan body as just recompense for legal transgressions, not torture. The 
Christians knew that the death sentences they faced were the activities of evil forces that 
would bring about the end of the world, when God’s kingdom would bring about a truly just 
rule. The ability to determine which evaluative structure aligns with reality depends on 
personal experience and the testimony of others, and by giving their lives in an expression of 
commitment to their perspective on a just world, the martyrs become some of the most 
convincing witnesses to aid such a decision. 
 What the martyrs contribute to, then, is a battle between dueling imaginaries, 
coherent ways of understanding the world and one’s place therein. These imaginaries are 
political in that they engage in practices of power seeking to determine behavior, but are also 
religious or theological in that their juridical structures are based on projected visions of 
order. Whatever the source of such visions, both make equal claims on the lives of the 
subjects over whom they have jurisdiction. As Paul Kahn notes in his analysis of sovereignty, 
"Political theology understands politics as an organization of everyday life founded on an 
imagination of the sacred."819 The administration of daily life depends on a certain imagined 
organizing principle, one that often remains unquestioned but becomes exposed when 
opposed by an equally situated claim.820  
When such challenges occur, a decision about which imaginary presents the “right” 
vision of the world is incumbent upon all affected persons. Both legal orders cannot 
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simultaneously be appeased, since abiding by one means transgressing against the other. In 
making that decision, many rely on their own safety as determinant, willing to behave in 
whatever way ensure they will not suffer injury. Others reassess the basis and source of their 
commitments, often leading to an increased inward attention evident in Shi’ism prior to 
Khomeini’s ascension. That allows a balance to be struck between powers through a certain 
interpretation of divine law. But some firmly adhere to the sovereign imaginary based in their 
culture and threatened by a foreign power, and become willing to use their lives in its 
support. The deaths of martyrs are both reactive and proactive: reactive in their response to a 
set of circumstances they are thrown into, and proactive in that they adhere to and perpetuate 
mytho-historical models believed to present the way out of their predicament. Those who 
witness acts of martyrdom are directly or indirectly provided with a symbol of resistance and 
evidence that others are so committed to their decision that they are willing to refuse any life 
apart from it. In legal theorist Robert Cover’s words, they “insist in the face of overwhelming 
force that if there is to be continuing life, it will not be on the terms of the tyrant’s law.”821 
Martyrdom serves as both strategy and symbol; it is a performance of suffering. 
 
Performance Suffering 
 In his analysis of religiously inspired terrorism, Mark Juergensmeyer noted that those 
acts of violence operate on two registers simultaneously: first, they serve as a performative 
act that seeks to actively change the situation on the ground. On that level, acts of terrorism 
are strategic in that they contribute to the situations that inspired them, usually by attempting 
to inspire fear in others to make them cease offensive activities. The other side is the 
performance event, seeking to draw attention to how the terrorist perceives the world. This 
latter aspect operates on the symbolic level, channeling the focus of onlookers beyond the 
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literal target and persuading participants to see the conflict through a religious frame. The 
impact of religious terrorism relies on this dual dynamic. 
 The same duality is evident in acts of martyrdom. Attempting to understand them as 
merely strategic acts aimed at achieving a political goal or ignoring the symbolic elements 
that dictate the form of the act err by neglecting the close connection between both fields in 
the performance. Martyrs and their cohorts use these deaths in a strategy based in and 
determined by their worldview. As the situations faced by these various communities are 
understood through religious frames, actions that are likewise guided are fully symbolic in 
that they seek to make a statement about the source and aim of the conflict, and fully 
strategic in that they are believed to be part of solutions vouchsafed in the same traditions. 
The awe and revulsion they inspire encourages others to experience reality according to their 
symbolic model. Moreover, as these spectacular deaths are connected to stories that in part 
form a shared memory of their collective, they serve to rally people around such an identity 
and unite them against a (thereby constructed) common enemy. 
 For this reason, martyrdoms must be public events. Such deaths must be 
demonstrably in service to a goal. Every martyrdom discussed in these pages occurred in 
settings that are not only public, but determinant of political life. Iranian martyrs gave their 
life on an established battlefield, the place where the question of political rule is being 
worked out, and their Hezbollah comrades initially aimed at military installations where the 
same was at issue. The amphitheaters where Christians were executed served as legal arenas 
where law was made evident on bodies. Where the battlefield sought to determine which 
system of law would govern, the law court makes law’s administration real. Tibetan self-
immolators preferred to perform their fiery acts in areas connected to local governance – 
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such as monasteries which were where the local governance was based, or the police stations 
of the PRC – but even elsewhere they took place on street corners where their flames could 
be seen and their voices heard. The public square is as much a place where social order is 
constructed as those sites of institutionalized power, particularly for the marginalized voices 
seeking to reshape society. They are the same spaces where demonstrations are violently put 
down, and riots disturb the peace. While the self-immolations have been commended for 
their nonviolent nature (in that they do not cause harm to any who did not invite it), the 
specter of violence hovers in the background. Angry disturbances have not been unknown in 
Tibetan streets in past years, and some promise more if their conditions of autonomy are not 
met.  
 Such violence mirrors the routinized violence deployed against those who break the 
state’s laws. Both are seen to be legitimate deployments of force on account of their 
connection with justice which makes the suffering imposed appear appropriate and deserved. 
Pain is a universal experience, but how pain is experienced varies radically depending on its 
perceived purpose, whether or not it has a fitting reason behind it. Such a dynamic is most 
evident in settings where one faction interprets the harm as sanctioned penalty while the 
other as tactics of oppression. Robert Cover made it clear that the state’s routinized violence 
demands simultaneous action and interpretation, as to be coercive suffering needs direction 
and explanation for both the victim and the witnesses.822 This pain is inflicted as a 
consequence of wrongdoing, rather than mere cruelty. It marks it as in service to the whole, 
rather than satisfying an individual (or collective) penchant for malice. How suffering is 
couched directs both the experience of pain itself, and what that pain communicates.  
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 Pain marks a person’s most intimate relation, that between the self and the body.823 
The sheer physicality of humanity is both necessary and troublesome, as we are embodied 
beings often required to put aside the demands of the body in order to act towards social 
ends. Freud called the internal voice demanding the compromise of our base desires in 
consideration of social mores our ego, determining actions in reference to the body’s needs 
but not fully controlled by them.824 Torturers look use the immediate and inescapable nature 
of pain to overpower the ego and act only in consideration of physical comfort, forsaking all 
social and political commitments. In seeking to determine action, institutions demanding 
people forswear their bodies’ demands rely on narrative frameworks to give reason for 
afflictions by providing them with purpose, history and future. Explaining pain’s source and 
purpose creates, in the words of Talal Asad, a space of moral action that articulates this-
world-in-the-next.825 Asad looks to a next world in attention to religious frames promising 
existence after death, but the same function is fulfilled by the utopia promised by states. Only 
an interpretive move allows for pain to move beyond something instinctively avoided, and as 
these martyrs show it can even result in the explicit courting of an experience that the vast 
majority of humanity assiduously avoids. 
 In spectacles of suffering, pain and the body are conjoined in the production of 
meaning. The meaning is contested since all sides look to make the afflicted body speak their 
own vision of world order into existence. With their testaments, martyrs sought to provide 
the final word on their act and understanding of their context, making it clear what meaning 
they made out of their sacrifice. At the same time, the state sought to impose its own 
hermeneutic structure, coloring the martyr’s death as suicide, separatism or psychosis. Ariel 
Glucklich helpfully distinguishes between disintegrative pain like torture, which aims to 
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disrupt life and its associations, and the integrative pain of an experience like childbirth, pain 
that strengthens connections to the natural, social and spiritual world.826 There is no objective 
criteria to distinguish the two; it is rather a matter of how pain is experienced by those 
suffering or witnessing the suffering. Neither order is fully able to determine how others 
perceive these deaths, but both look to make of the spectacle an example of their worldview 
which perpetuates the struggles of which they take part (according to the martyrs and their 
communities).  
During this contest over interpretation, the statist institution may be considered to 
have an edge in that their power to make such determinations is taken for granted by a good 
percentage of the populace. In their analysis of the martyr’s mind, Eugene and Anita Weiner 
contend "Established, accepted beliefs are readily reinforced through the use of ritualized 
validation ceremonies. This, however, is not true of non-conventional beliefs. The 
extraordinary or non-conformist belief requires a more powerful validation in order to be 
considered plausible. In order to get a hearing, it must sound an octave higher than the 
regular chorus of societal validations."827 Both sides of the conflict seek the exact same thing, 
but for the martyr’s beliefs to gain traction it requires a higher octave, and more impactful 
means of communication. The spectacle of the martyr’s death provides that. These are not the 
docile bodies of Foucault, waiting to be subjected and used by power structures through 
disciplinary technologies, but rather a means of appropriating the power that supports 
structures of governance.828 By enlisting their very being in service to speech we do not 
simply hear their words, but resonate with the harm on their bodies and feel their testimony, 
making for greater persuasive power. 
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By offering testaments before they ended their lives, martyrs made of their deaths a 
speech-act, linking their speech and being in a spectacular act of communicative defiance. 
Explaining their suffering through reference to a sovereign imaginary they sought to 
manifest, the performance of their suffering makes evident the perspective to which they 
were utterly committed. The only way such abstract structures could claim the status of truth 
is to have actions explained by them, and by accompanying such assertions with acts of 
extreme suffering martyrs intensify their charge. Spoken communication exists on a field of 
give and take, where accepting the truth value of statements depends upon numerous factors 
including, but not limited to, what is known of the speaker, the relative variance of the 
information from common knowledge and experience, and the nature of the content being 
communicated. One of the most significant determinants is the relative gain or loss the 
speaker faces for expressing their claims. For instance, when a legal witness gives testimony 
that would benefit them, like removing a competitor or escaping their own legal troubles, 
their testimony is suspect. Where the individual stands to gain, their voice could be seen to be 
in service to their own desires, but when they risk all by speaking their claims become that 
much more credible.829 The creation of martyrs confronts the state with a troublesome and 
potent voice of dissent, and the number of such voices is in proportion to the difficulty they 
have in controlling the interpretation of the acts. 
This is the very dynamic of martyrdom that was recognized by the Christian and 
Islamic traditions of martyrdom as bold speech, and the concept of parrhesia discussed in 
chapter two. Just as self-control endows individuals with an apparent ability to govern others, 
as Foucault showed, those so committed to their value systems that they gave their life were 
thereby seen as possessors of a truth.830 When Foucault elaborated on parrhesia in his 
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Courage of Truth and elsewhere, he argued that truth-tellers were identified on account of the 
harmony between their speech (their logos) and their lives (their bios). His focus on the 
Cynics of antiquity stressed how their system of action flew in the face of accepted behavior, 
and their commitment to such a form of life in the face of ridicule and mockery signaled to 
others the high regard they had for their system of thought, and convinced many that there 
was something worthwhile in the Cynic philosophy.831  
In distinction to the persistent deviant behavior that marked the Cynics, martyrs 
appear to have found a shortcut to the same level of esteem by linking their logos to their 
death, their thanatos. Both modes communicate a core connection between the martyr’s life 
and its guiding system, and their devotion marks them as truth-tellers. They tell a truth about 
how to perceive the world and their place within it, and the dignity and nobility that stems 
from their discipline showed their confidence in such assertions. This led legal scholar 
Jonathan Simon to see parrhesia as expressive of the whistleblower’s act of speaking truth to 
power, where the speaker risks all in their commitment to making the truth known.832 What 
Simon’s work reveals is that such activity exists on a spectrum that permeates nearly every 
social relation. Willing to speak truth regardless of penalties defines the good advisor, leader 
and good citizen as much as the good. Telling a friend a truth that they do not want to hear, 
and in doing so risking their anger and possibly the loss of friendship entirely is a risk a true 
friend must take. We rely on the honest testimony of others in order to make decisions on 
things that are not immediately available to our senses, such as who should be in charge, 
people’s intentions behind their actions, and what is morally right. To be an authentic 
member of a collective – no matter the form of that collective nor one’s position within it – 
always requires a willing risk of loss in service. It requires a willingness to sacrifice. 
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Sacrifice is legitimated loss, necessitating an authority able to make such affirmations of 
legitimacy. Therefore, in the cases of these martyrs they not only tell a truth to power, but 
they tell the truth of another power.  
This other power is not only made evident in the words they leave behind (though it 
does permeate those texts), but more potently in the symbolic statement made by aligning 
their contemporary situation with a mythicized past. Conflating the real and imaginary by 
associating self and other with characters from cultural narratives results in what Gavin 
Flood calls an internalization of a tradition or “entextualization of the body,” where the 
acting body is formed in conformance with the narrative models and doctrines.833 The same 
process is present in acts of intentional martyrdom, giving traditional narratives form in their 
own bodies through an act of subjectivity, a literal subjection of their lives to their religious 
ideals. We should not assume a too close identification between subject and model, however. 
Imitation is not duplication, and the narratives sought in such times present sets of available 
strategies toward a goal rather than rules to be blindly observed. They are not following 
directly in their footsteps, rather than traveling the same path to the same purpose. 
All cases see that purpose as the establishment of an earthly order that reflects their 
sovereign imaginary, with moral leaders administering a just state. It marks full victory, the 
final outcome long promised. Narratives that present the ultimate value structure defining the 
collective are called “sovereign dramas” by Ivan Strenski, as they connect to a perception of 
ultimate authority in the cosmos, and also connects to Roger Friedland’s discussion of 
political institutions as regimes of valuation.834 The same is at stake in Bruce Lincoln’s 
determination of myth as ideology in narrative form, along with Robert Cover’s description 
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of narrative as the literary genre for the objectification of value.835 The myth is not real, but it 
is true. 
In pointing to the parable of the hungry tigress, Tibetan self-immolators expressed the 
system of moral values they bound themselves to, where any single person’s significance – 
even the Buddha himself – pales in relation to the welfare of others. At the same time the 
reference links themselves to others who recognize the story and see in it the expression of an 
existential truth. With Buddha as the protagonist, each personal willing to perform the same 
sacrifice is equated with the divine, seeking what they sought, participating in the same 
struggle. The same would go for Christ or Imam Khomeini who is the descendent of Ali, as 
both are enabled to bestow divine consent onto the political struggle, signaling that the 
struggle is right and aligned with cosmic order. Unlike doctrine which explicitly delineates 
structure, tales of a mythicized history carry explicit and implicit hierarchies that appear as 
taken for granted and can at times be more effective in instilling a cosmology. They are also 
generally more open to interpretation and redescription; after all, every narrator can highlight 
one act over another, or marginalize a part of the story considered crucial by another 
storyteller. Most importantly, these legends carry an explanation for a) how things came to be 
in such disorder, and b) what steps are necessary in order to bring order to the world.  
Since these narratives carry suggestions and models of behavior, Hans Kippenberg 
refers to them as scripts, recognizing that these accounts are not simply fascinating tales but 
contain paradigms of performance.836 While I am in full agreement with such a label, I am 
less convinced by Kippenberg’s focus on a salvific orientation, where such scripts are 
followed explicitly because they promise salvation. We have seen that these narratives do 
direct their audience’s attention to benefits that exceed this world, however I would argue 
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they are followed not simply because they assure profit for the actor, but because they appear 
as the right way to be in the world. Ultimately the outcome is the same, as the joys of nirvana 
or eternity in God’s presence beside God are approachable only through right action that does 
not seek personal gain. Rather we must appreciate that the power of these scripts comes 
because they are recognized as the right thing to do.837 Duty must be the primary driving 
factor, duty over desire. Here again we can sense charges of suicide lurking at the margins; if 
taking one’s own life is done to fulfill our desire to be done with life, we classify it as a 
suicide. If it is done because the collective must take precedence over self-preservation, we 
have a sacrifice. We cannot sacrifice for ourselves, we can only sacrifice for another that we 
thereby place above the self. 
The difficulty in establishing an individual’s motivation has provided a looming 
backdrop to this study. Again and again we encountered vying interpretations applied to the 
same action or set of practices. Taking one’s life can simultaneously be read as a holy act of 
devotion, a selfish escape from suffering, and an insidious strategy to corrupt and kill. As a 
consequence, contributors to discussions of martyrdom routinely speak of the importance of 
intention.838 Such a concern appears in the issue of niyya, true purpose, in Islam being 
ultimately judged by God who decides whether the individual qualifies for the holy death.839 
The martyrs’ communities act as though God will agree with their estimation, but also allow 
for the possibility that they have been deceived, in which case God will know a person’s true 
heart.  
Lama Soepa likewise expressed concern about those Tibetan self-immolators who 
gave their lives without having advanced training in Buddhism. He laid it out explicitly: 
I am taking this action neither for myself nor to fulfill a personal desire nor to earn an honor. 
I am sacrificing my body with the firm conviction and a pure heart just as the Buddha bravely 
gave his body to a hungry tigress [to stop her from eating her cubs]. All the Tibetan heroes 
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too have sacrificed their lives with similar principles. But in practical terms, their lives 
seemingly ended with some sort of anger. Therefore, to guide their souls on the path to 
enlightenment, I offer prayers that may lead all of them to Buddhahood. 
According to his brand of Buddhism, if their lives ended with anger they could not hope to 
achieve their goal, nor would they make any spiritual progress. Only those who have 
cultivated self-knowledge and self-discipline through Buddhist practices are able to 
confidently sacrifice themselves because they are fully aware of their intention. The intention 
of martyrs therefore must be to place the truth over their own self-preservation, and if the act 
is seen to serve the self (in the expanded sense that goes beyond life on the physical plane) it 
is not for the group, and therefore does not qualify for martyrdom. 
I suggested elsewhere that the extreme nature of martyrdom marks them as somewhat 
self-verifying in terms of intention, and the willing participation of those not religiously 
trained demonstrates a diversity of ideas around how to establish intent. Those who apply the 
label of martyrdom to these deaths are clearly confident about the martyr’s intention being in 
line with what is expected, and that what they have witnessed qualifies as a sacrifice. Within 
that sacrifice the infinite – that which gives form to the collective and the cosmic order – is 
realized through the destruction of the finite body.840 The sovereign imaginary is made 
present in the broken flesh of the martyr, visible to all. Any behavior that explicitly abides by 
the imaginary’s guiding principles make the ideology apparent, but in spectacles of suffering 
the lengths of commitment make it more manifest and more widely witnessed.  
What we see in these acts of martyrdom is a performance of suffering, where the 
afflictions to the body are given context and used to communicate a truth about the world. 
Whether through the Christian’s bold speech before Roman authorities, Islamist wartime 
acts, or the Tibetans’ spectacles of fiery protest, each sees their act as a contribution to the 
struggle that provides the context for their performance. At the same time, these acts make a 
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symbolic statement about a) the nature of the conflict, b) the nature of the collectives taking 
part, c) what the world should look like, and d) the means by which to achieve such a state. 
Such contests require the submission of the body to the ideology, and the conformance of 
behavior to the guidelines of action that are most vividly evinced by mytho-historical figures 
who provide the martyrs’ scripts. Such scripts place the current moment of suffering and 
dejection at the middle rather than end of the story, while laying out the next act of the 
drama. Subjectivity, the social group, structures of authority and a concept of justice all join 
together in these performances, which impress with their drama and communicate with their 
symbolism. The power of martyrdom lies in its ability to change minds and perspectives, and 
ultimately change how these events are interpreted. 
 
(Per)Forming a Fundamental Ontology 
 Martyrdoms occur in discrete moments in time, when life’s routine is disrupted by 
forces wielding violence in an attempt to determine the shape of social and political life. 
Where questions of sanctioned behavior are at issue, means of enforcement always lurk. It is 
not a coincidence that the term “sanction” is used to mean both approval and the penalties 
imposed for misbehavior, which often takes the form of physical pain (even the deferred 
punishment of hell, whose torments are spoken of in physical terms). Threats of physical 
harm as consequence of certain actions are meant to coerce; if you do not want to suffer, you 
must not act in these ways. Such programs are based on the simple premise that humans want 
to avoid suffering, and will always act to preserve their life. Martyrs dissent to that assertion. 
 In fact, most people only want life under certain conditions. Those conditions are 
often so few, so basic that they are assumed to be intrinsic to any understanding of “life.” 
Attempting to appreciate the mindset of those whose voices fill these pages, however, 
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requires that we move beyond a binary idea of life/not life, and begin to examine the 
contours of acceptable life. Most people would not want a life where every day brings 
excruciating pain without hope of relief, which has led to modern debates around physician 
assisted suicide. Those who would still cling to life in such a state, dismissing personal 
welfare as determinant of acceptable life, might balk at an existence where their friends and 
families are targeted for daily indignity and torture. Correcting such a horrid state of affairs 
might be worth one’s life. And what of an existence that sees the government supporting acts 
of theft, assault and murder, while those trying to do right are subjected to horrific deaths by 
the state’s institutions. A daily experience of wrong dominating right, evil prevailing over 
good, defines the experience of the martyrs and their contemporaries. The martyr declares 
that mere life, mere existence, is not enough. Life must be possessed of a certain quality for it 
to be desired and maintained. For each of these cases the life available has as its price the 
forsaking of structures that give life meaning. The result is popular resistance hoping to 
reinstitute forms of life in line with sacred values. The risks of the martyr and other 
participants serve to reinforce the importance of those qualities for members of the martyr’s 
collective. If the martyr is willing to die rather than live without X, then X becomes 
fundamental to the group’s self-identity. 
Accusations of torture appearing in all these contexts – particularly the Christian and 
Tibetan – are not coincidental, but rather serve as an articulation of coercive pain seeking to 
determine life. Both Elaine Scarry and Paul Kahn press for the destructive power of torture 
coming to bear not only against the physical body, but the speech of the tortured.  The 
screams that produced by the torturer’s craft are certainly evocative of that “state anterior to 
language,” but it is the content of the victim’s speech that is the focus, those dangerous or 
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subversive ideas they had vocalized.841  Language is a learned cultural complex, and to cause 
a person to revert to a pre-social state eliminates cultural considerations that define their 
identity and interactions with others. One is reduced to brute animality, both in psychological 
processes (fight, flight or freeze), and in primacy of goals (the first of which becomes to stop 
suffering). The goal of the torturer, then, is to see all relationships forsaken, all goals shifted, 
and all identity lost.  In Scarry’s words: “in confession [as a result of torture], one betrays 
oneself and all those aspects of the world – friend, family, country, cause – that the self is 
made up of.”842 What one was, one confesses no longer to be.  
If, however, in the midst of acute suffering the victim maintains control of their voice, 
either in silence or by affirming the doctrines and discourses that led to their suffering, then 
those doctrines and discourses are determined to be at the core of their very being, as 
defining who they actually are. There is no state prior, no animality underneath. There is only 
a Christian, a Muslim, a Tibetan; nothing exists outside of that. It demonstrates what I would 
term their fundamental ontology, the core self that defines their existence. It is fundamental 
in that it marks the point where no more excavation is possible, where nothing lies beneath, 
and ontological because it defines their very being. They are this and nothing else, and it 
supersedes responsibilities to their state, their family, even their body itself. This is the claim 
made by martyrs, that their life is utterly and completely determined by being 
Christian/Muslim/Tibetan. They will always act as is expected of such a person no matter the 
consequences, because they cannot do otherwise. Where a state wields harm to coerce them 
to behave as though they could be something else, compliance becomes a dismissal of this 
ontology in obedience to those seeking the destruction of Christianity/Islam/Tibet. The 
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martyr’s act reveals that no one can be made to do anything, that there is always a choice to 
be made when confronting such a situation. 
This fundamental ontology is internalized on account of one’s belonging to a social 
group. The “I” is always embedded in a “we.” Furthermore, the ontology is defined by 
certain practices expected of all group members, and demanded by authority figures who are 
empowered to determine the shape of group life. Such authority in turn is determined based 
on conceptions of cosmic order.843 All such contentions are based in a central ideal that this 
system of order alone is sovereign over the individual, and discloses guidelines for right 
behavior in the world. Understanding the martyr then requires that we come to some 
understanding of how these fit together in a coherent whole. 
  Primarily what I have sought to elucidate then is the martyr’s subject formation, by 
which I mean the way the “I” comes to be filled with cultural content and an experience of 
subjection to a power.844 Our lives become meaningful when we can express that meaning to 
others and be understood, which requires others be familiar with and base their own 
subjectivity in the same meaning-generative narratives as we. Meaning is eminently social. 
By interiorizing traditional cosmologies, a subjectivity is developed in conformity to the ends 
the traditions promote about what the individual can do with their life and what life’s very 
purpose is. Determining one’s own life on such bases transcends individuality – which sees a 
human first in their isolation (symbolized primarily by the body) – through subjectivity, a 
literal subjecting of oneself to pursuits that extend beyond the self. Subjectivity leaves space 
for agency because the individual still freely chooses to act, but the spectrum of options are 
conditioned by concerns about right action. Someone in the second century brought up on 
charges of being a Christian and faced with the demand to sacrifice could choose to make an 
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offering or not, but that choice is conditioned by the extent to which a Christian subjectivity 
has been developed. Anthropologist Victor Turner referred to these as social processes, 
where actors are guided by subjective paradigms of action that affect their behavior.845 
Martyrs have developed such a complete subjectivity in line with their sovereign imaginary 
that all actions are shaped on the basis of that commitment.  
Determining behavior on the basis of such an imaginary leads to its approach as a 
matter of belief – how much someone believes in an ideology – but there is no necessary 
connection between belief and action. Calling oneself a Muslim/Christian/Tibetan signifies 
adherence, but requires action in order to have that assertion be considered “true.” Moreover, 
the fiercer the conditions surrounding the pronouncement, the more veracity conferred. 
“True” Muslims will act as befits a Muslim no matter the consequences, “true” Tibetans will 
maintain that identity in the face of all opposition, “true” Christians will act as Jesus 
commanded though it costs their life. Martyrs perform their identity in the direst 
circumstances in order to show their commitment to their identity. The performative aspect 
of identity has been recognized by philosophers like Judith Butler and anthropologists like 
Roy Rapaport, and here finds its highest expression.846 Claiming an identity is an act of 
voluntary submission to an ordering system, and requires accompanying action to be granted 
truth status. Claims like these are always open to contestation, but certainty is proportionate 
to the difficulty of the circumstances wherein the claim is made. Where identity claims are 
met with physical, emotional or social repercussions, only those truly committed dare to 
make them, and when they do, they confirm their claim on the basis of the act itself. 
In the contexts of martyrdom examined here, each martyr sought to publicly link their 
statement of identity to their sacrifice. Apart from their testaments, Tibetans shouted slogans 
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while they burned, demanding onlookers recognize the identity to which they were 
committed (or at least the particular shape they believe that identity takes) and that they were 
willing to die in its name. The testaments left by Shi’ites of Lebanon and Iran serve the same 
goal, making it clear they understood their act as being demanded of true Muslims (again, of 
their particular kind). These are acts of confession, confessing the self and its attachments, 
confessing who one is, and thereby what they are compelled to do. The performance of 
suffering is always a performance of identity. 
 Our identity is also defined by who we see as members of our social group, which 
belies a shared character and intimation of who comes first in our concerns. We exist as part 
of a vast number of groups simultaneously and attach varying levels of importance to 
different social configurations.847 Nationalities, ethnic orientations and religious membership 
often dominate the conversation, but any means of organizing ourselves socially produces an 
identity. For many, blood relatives provide the core social configuration (and therefore the 
fundamental ontology), resulting in assertions that “blood is thicker than water.” Attachment 
to any social configuration carries responsibilities related to bringing about the good of the 
whole, even when it conflicts with personal desire. During most times we can maintain a 
plurality of identities simultaneously as long as their obligations are compatible. However at 
times these responsibilities come into direct conflict. Civil war is perhaps the foremost 
symbol of such a state of affairs, where “brother fights brother” at the intersection of filial 
ties and political belonging. To refrain from fighting out of respect for the family connection 
is to act for your family and against your political collective, or vice versa. It is to act qua 
family member rather than qua citizen. Such times demand one identity be subordinated in 
favor of another.  
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 Identities are never static, but are conjured in part through reference to narratives that 
identify common ancestors or origin stories. Bruce Lincoln has shown the “invocation of an 
ancestor [is] simultaneously the evocation of a correlated social group.”848 When these 
martyrs recall central figures of the past, they conjure a social configuration based in the 
recognition of those figures. Consistently we see martyrs calling for unity among their 
collectives, be it the drive for unity that characterizes early Christian theology, the appeals to 
work together to bring about the rule of the Mahdi for the Islamists, or pleas to maintain 
Tibetan cultural dress and practices of consumption. All cases see the repeated cry to remain 
united, and not subordinate that identity for the one being imposed by the imperial power.  
Scholars like James Aho have recognized that identifying a common enemy is one of 
the most effective means of establishing unity amidst a group.849 Seeing what they are not 
reminds members of what they are, specifically not what their enemies embody. Rene Girard 
extends this idea in another vein by seeing in sacrifice a means to push the violence lurking 
at the center of collective life onto a safe surrogate, thereby defusing a potentially explosive 
challenge to group unity. During what he calls “sacrificial crises,” moments when social 
hierarchies and differentiations – distinctions between “we” and “they” – are disturbed, a 
sacrifice is required to reaffirm the character of the community.850 Such reaffirmation 
requires a scapegoating mechanism, where all the woes of the community are attributed to 
one individual who is then executed or banished, expiating the guilt of the community and 
solidifying their social ties. The result is, according to Girard, these deaths being valorized as 
sacred and integrated into the symbolic fabric of the community, since “the most profound 
state of peace known to any community” follows the sacrifice.851 
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In spite of his methodological problems and universalizing tendencies, Girard here 
recognizes some significant attributes of collective life, including the security in solidarity. 
By revealing some of the violence inherent in social systems, he has illuminated some of 
what would otherwise remain hidden in our political arrangements. Perhaps one of his 
keenest insights comes with his recognition that anyone able to serve the sacrificial role must 
resemble the community enough to serve as a surrogate for the whole, but differ enough to 
enable the whole of the collective to unite against them and approve of the violence 
employed.852 Therefore groups look to sacrifice “exterior or marginal individuals, incapable 
of establishing or sharing the social bonds that link the rest of the inhabitants.”853 Only by 
uniting against such liminal characters can the rest of the collective feel confident in their 
own standing. 
However, when violence is not imposed but willingly accepted as in the case of 
martyrdom, it inverts the relationship between individual and collective. Rather than being 
someone on the margins, the martyr becomes a symbol of the collective’s core character 
which people compare themselves to rather than defining themselves against. By welcoming 
the violence deployed explicitly against members of the collective (a frame evident in each 
case), the martyr’s death accomplish the same end as Girard’s scapegoat: an enhanced feeling 
of unity within the community. The astonishing discipline shown in maintaining constancy 
through suffering and death, and their symbolic connections to sacred paradigms evoke the 
sentiments that form the group. The group is literally represented in the martyr’s torn flesh, 
because they suffer for acknowledging the primacy of such values above any life without 
them. Martyrs are an embodiment of the community, and applying the label of martyrdom to 
a death is the affirmation that such a person does in fact reflect the community’s character. 
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 We see here that the self cannot be approached in isolation from the social 
configurations that contextualize it. Neither can that community be separated by the 
structures of power and authority that shape members’ lives. In their testaments, the men and 
women examined here repeatedly pay homage to their leaders, and encourage others to do 
likewise. In some cases leaders are considered incarnations of the divine themselves, but in 
all they are seen to be the representative of the source of sovereignty with the goal of 
bringing life into conformance with the true cosmic order. Leaders are often represented as 
possessing the qualities that characterize members of the collective, which is what allows 
them to speak on behalf of – and more importantly direct force in the name of – their guiding 
sovereign imaginary. Imam Khomeini is as much a representative of God as Jesus (at least 
before an ecumenical council declared him to literally be God), as much as the Dalai Lama. 
Their relative divinity varies with the nature of the religious tradition, but all share the ability 
to speak in the name of the true sovereign. 
 During such times that voice is articulated within a setting where another institution 
commands a greater proportion of force. That force threatens to wipe out the martyr’s group, 
or at least restrict their practices to such a degree that their traditions are unrecognizable, 
reduced to a “blind faith” in the Dalai Lama’s words or an “empty religion” in Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s. Such is the condition of many religions existing within countries of the Global 
North, as the reduction to a personal concern is a prerequisite for admission, leading to the 
privatization discussed above. That is why the PRC can claim to abide by a statute of the free 
practice of religion, and why the Romans were so baffled at the Christians’ refusal to make a 
small display of loyalty before continuing to practice their traditions. This clash of 
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perspectives drove the experience of oppression as it was aimed explicitly at the traditions 
that formed the martyr’s subjectivity.  
 But while the state possesses the greatest recourse to violence, they do not have the 
only recourse to violence. The ability of an institution to wield force depends on individual 
persons acting as directed, either because they recognize the authority’s legitimacy or fear 
that the violence would then find its way onto them. Organized violence then is an extension 
of power, not its basis. Power resides in the willingness of individuals to sacrifice their own 
will and allow something outside them to direct their action. So while the state enjoys this 
privilege, other social groups have the ability to direct violence on their own behalf. We see 
this in cultural initiation rituals, which regularly contain some mechanism of marking the 
body. Rituals in many parts of the world with strong statist presences have shed such 
connections, but they continue in many other places where a central power is less effective. 
Even in Western countries where a strong centralized government maintains a tight rein, 
street gangs regularly require their members to endure painful processes before they are 
admitted into membership. Groups like MS-13 or Hell’s Angels have their own ideas about 
who is qualified to wield justified violence, and the tight unity of these groups combined with 
their brutal tactics results in an ability to operate relatively autonomously from the state.  
Central American drug cartels operate in ways as statist as any internationally recognized 
government. In one of sociologist Max Weber’s most quoted lines he stated that the state is 
defined by its claim upon the monopoly of violence. However, the majority of citations 
ignore its precise formulation. Weber does not say the state possesses the monopoly on 
exercising legitimate violence, only that it claims it possesses it.  Other collectives take it 
upon themselves to exert violence legitimized through ritual and wielded in accordance with 
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their systems of behavior, and such groups are those most likely to come into conflict with a 
state. 
At least part of the friction such groups have with the state stems from their assertion 
of an opposing system of order carrying its own system of practices members are obliged to 
follow. They possess their own laws, replete with mechanisms of judgment and systems of 
physical and symbolic punishment. They carry their own ideas of what is obligated and 
forbidden for their members. They each articulate a normative world, described by Robert 
Cover as an integrated world of obligation from which the rest of the world is perceived, 
meaning we understand the world in terms of our own responsibilities to ourselves, to those 
around us and those powers to whom we owe obeisance.854 When obligations diverge, a 
decision must be made about which (if any) to follow. A host of variables influence such 
decisions, one being the potential penalties that accompany disobedience (as the very 
purpose of penalizing transgressions is to dissuade people from acting in particular ways). 
Those who transgress against statist systems out of obedience to a different order state 
through their action that their identity as group member is more important than as a citizen or 
subject.855  
Religious orientations find more success in inspiring such transgressive action in part 
because the penalties they wield go beyond the physical world, but also due to their hold on 
morality. Religiously based systems of ethics are based in metaphysical assertions about the 
order of the cosmos, which surpass the more pragmatic foundation of statist legal systems. 
Moreover, since most religions see membership based in the acceptance of a complex of 
doctrines and narratives, they have an ability to be universally available. The combination of 
these aspects results in a significant challenge to the hegemonic hopes of any national or 
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imperial governments, which in part leads to martyrdom being spoken about in a religious 
register when the dynamic of self-sacrifice itself is inherent in any social institution. 
Believing in a guiding moral system does not always translate into action, else there 
would be no need for doctrines of sin or karma that contain punitive mechanisms. Doctrines 
like those operate through a sense of having erred, a feeling of transgression that necessarily 
links to an experience of being subjected to a moral law and translates as guilt when that 
code is transgressed. Durkheim saw the formation of the soul itself being the result of this 
very internalization of the system of injunctions that lies at the core of a group’s existence, 
which is echoed in Peter Berger’s idea of the nomos and the way Pierre Bourdieu spoke 
about the development of the unconscious.856 It is an incorporation of the ethical system into 
the body, a literal taking in of the corporate subject of which one is part.  
When we say martyrs die for their beliefs, this is what we mean. They give their body 
over to what they perceive to be the true order, accepting judgment according to its ethical 
system, and recognizing that personal suffering is sometimes a necessary part of social 
belonging. In moments when the community and its guiding structures are under threat of 
oblivion, it becomes the responsibility of all group members to resist no matter the cost. They 
are dying in support of the way they believe the world should be, in sharp contrast to what 
they experience it as. Their ideal can only become real by people willfully enacting it, acting 
according to those precepts of justice irrespective of the consequences.  
Every case here sees discussions of martyrdom based in narratives of redemption and 
holding some idea of the atoning nature of these deaths. Martyrs are purified through their 
performance, evident for instance in the Islamic doctrine that exempts them from the ritual 
washing after death because the martyr’s blood is the most purifying agent (Christians 
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likewise possess such a tradition). The benefits awaiting the martyr after their death likewise 
imply their accumulated sins or negative karma are negated by this glorious act of devotion. 
Most traditions see that atonement overflowing the martyr him or herself onto others. Writing 
to the congregation at Smyrna, Ignatius not only reminded his flock of how the sacrifice of 
Jesus served to free all his followers from sin, but also made it evident that the martyr’s death 
could likewise serve to atone for the sins of those who accepted the martyr.857 Something 
quite similar exists in the Tibetan idea of collective karma that the self-immolators seek to 
correct, and in the Islamic sunnah that recognizes the ability of martyrs to intercede for 
family members and friends on the day of judgment. This sacred act of self-sacrifice results 
in a surfeit of redemption, purifying the martyr, their families, and perhaps even their 
communities. Such rectification is necessary because our base nature leads our desires to 
conflict with the divine systems of behavior to which we are obliged. We follow laws when 
we forsake our individual desires in favor of our duty, which always has at its core the 
welfare of the collective.858  
When a martyr gives their life in a performance of their fundamental ontology, 
suffering and dying because that is what is demanded by their circumstances, they 
demonstrate to all immediate and future witnesses their willingness to suffer for a group and 
an ideology that exceeds them. Rather than dying for the group, which implies a necessary 
separation between the martyr and the group in which they are embedded, it might be more 
illuminating to speak of these deaths as a dying into, since in their spectacular deaths they use 
their bodies to become a symbol of the group. By internalizing the moral structures 
understood to have a divine source, they perform a public act of devotion just like the sacred 
models that guided the martyr’s performance. They are martyrs because they gave all of 
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themselves for the good of the group, and in recognition they become the most revered 
members of the collective who continue to exert influence beyond the grave. They perform 
the grandest act of atonement, an at-one-ment, forever and in all ways fusing themselves with 
the group.859 
This becoming-one-with shows their self to be utterly determined by one social 
configuration, forsaking the usefulness of the body and person in all other venues, be it as a 
productive member of a political society or a family member that has certain obligations to 
parents, siblings and often children. At the same time, it curtails any possibility of future 
transgressions against their sovereign imaginary. As long as there is more life to live, the 
possibility of change, of sin, of failing in the eyes of the divine and acting in ways forbidden 
to members of the collective, remain. While Judith Butler argued that identity is called into 
being through a “stylized repetition of acts,”860 the act of martyrdom freezes the performer in 
an act that marks them as a member of a social group. They are forever fixed in an act that 
maintains their loyalty in the most difficult of circumstances. They can never be otherwise, 
and hence establish their fundamental ontology. Martyrdom serves as an illocutionary act, 
fully accomplishing the identity of the martyr through their performance. Martyrs validate 
publicly that their personhood is fully determined by their sovereign imaginary, that they are 
a loyal adherent, a true representative, and a model for all other members.861  
By creating a material moment of the values and ideals of the collective, martyrdom 
serves to engender further acts of subscription to authority by others who likewise self-
identify.  Affect is generated by creating a spectacle that resonates with the models extant in 
the group’s collective memory, which reminds other members in the collective of their 
common project and character.  The performance of bodily harm and death does that 
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particularly well, as it causes the ambivalent reaction of awe and horror leading people to 
hear and feel the truth in their bodies. 
 
In Testimony to the Truth 
 Understanding the social significance of martyrdom requires appreciating its 
relationship to the concept of witnessing and the abstract nature of our social orders. During 
periods like those considered here, multiple assertions of order come into conflict along with 
competing systems of normative law. Two or more sovereign imaginaries impose 
contradictory requirements on a person regarding the recognition of authority. Even within 
such disparate times, geographies and traditions the same issue repeatedly appeared: a 
demand that individuals understand themselves as obligated to a system governing their 
behavior. One’s self-understanding is fundamentally connected to ways of being in the 
world. If Christians are Roman subjects, they are subject to the same demands as their 
“pagan” neighbors, including the ritual of devotion that was the sacrifice to the emperor. If, 
on the other hand, they are Christians first, their ultimate allegiance is to the risen Christ who 
has forbidden sacrifice as an affront to the true God.  
The same dynamic has slightly different contours in Tibet, where the Buddhist culture 
of the plateau recognizes the Dalai Lama as an emanation of divinity propagating the way to 
true happiness. The PRC, on the other hand, views the man Tenzin Gyatso as a separatist 
leader threatening their country’s cohesion, and therefore prohibits his images along with 
expressions of support. If Tibetans are subject to PRC rule, then they must reimagine what 
practices of Buddhism are essential and what can be left behind in order to abide by the laws 
of China. Tibet’s contested self-determination is reflected in the other modern case of the 
Shi’ites of Lebanon and Iran, where a particular interpretation of Islamic doctrine promoted 
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the legitimate rule of the jurisprudent whose authority rested on his perceived ability to 
understand divine law. For the contemporary secularist governments, that figure posed a 
threat to their own sovereignty anchored in a Western-led international political system. If 
Shi’ites were principally Iranians or Lebanese, then it would be right for them to maintain the 
patient quietism that had previously characterized them. Establishing who these people are – 
what their true identity is – determines right action. 
 Competing political and legal institutions rely equally on imagined ideals of what the 
world should look like, and by what means peace, stability, fecundity and order can be 
established. That ideal is promoted as the solution to life’s uncertainty, if only all people 
worked together to bring it about. Herein lies the core of the sovereign imaginaries that seek 
to determine life’s shape and why force seems appropriate in its support. When 
unchallenged, such structures by and large enjoy a hegemonic status where their legitimacy is 
assumed.862 Pierre Bourdieu spoke of this in terms of doxa, where “there is a quasi-perfect 
correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principle or organization… 
[with] the natural and social world [that] appears as self-evident.”863 This apparent 
correspondence between an asserted ideal of order and the experienced shape of existence is 
what engenders an experience of truth – what is said to be true is true because the evidence 
presented aligns with the vision expounded. This is certainly what Eugene and Anita Weiner 
had in mind when expressing their view that  
the martyrological contest can be viewed as a contest about what is true, or, more exactly, 
what should be true. It is about the questions: who defines what people should regard as truth, 
which 'folk knowledge' should prevail. Since folk knowledge is the belief system that is taken 
for granted by the members of the community, successful martyrdom makes a different set of 
convictions plausible and transforms them into an acknowledged reality of life.864  
Contests between sovereign imaginaries have nothing less at stake than the determination of 
the truth, and the martyr is a decisive player in such a contest. 
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While Weiner and Weiner focus their analysis on the level of knowledge (which 
translates into their unfulfilling reliance on conviction), there is a need to go beyond mental 
structures. The truth at issue certainly requires systems of knowledge, but is perhaps more 
concerned with the ability to sanction and penalize action in the world. At stake is a 
sovereign truth about who can determine behavior and why they are empowered to afflict the 
body.865 The power of doxa lies in its ability to engender action along its lines without 
recourse to forceful means that expend energy and risks the exposure of its own arbitrariness. 
Suffering itself is not the central concern, but rather what suffering is seen to be 
productive.866 Legal penalties, self-defense, and acts of war are but a few situations where the 
violent deployment of harm has been endorsed. When multiple institutions claiming that 
power disagree, the distinction between true authority and mere violence becomes a matter of 
individual interpretation.867 
Individuals facing such situations must decide which system possesses the true claim. 
The violence that rampages throughout their worlds is meant to convince people that it has its 
source in the true power, or at least instill such fear of opposition that people behave in the 
same way as those who do believe in its truth. The focus on knowledge and conviction that 
colors so many studies of martyrdom neglect that it is behavior, not belief that can be 
administered by legal forces.868 Belief’s importance stems from its sponsorship of action; 
belief in an opposing order results in greater likelihood of transgressing the state’s legal 
order. The repeatedly encountered link between the martyr’s act and their hopes for an ideal 
government based in religious doctrine illustrates the need for an alignment between the 
dominant legal codes and the ethical code that determines good and bad behavior. The true 
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order that martyrs seek is where the laws that govern align with the cultural ideals of what 
the world should look like. 
Ultimately, then, this truth is an interpretive one. It is a question of the frame by 
which the world is perceived to be moral or immoral, aligned or at odds with cosmic order. It 
is a question of whether the martyr’s collective is engaged in self-defense (which marks their 
suffering as appropriate) or separatism (which marks it transgressive against the state’s law). 
It is a question of whether their death is a suicide or a martyrdom. It speaks to both the 
individual and their motivation – the why of their act – and the sovereign imaginary that 
shapes their action. In many ways the truth of reality itself is at stake, as it is a matter of what 
frames determine how to interpret events and how we understand the actual world to be 
aligned or out of sync with the ideal world. This sheds light onto why martyrdom always 
appears as a religious category: these principles of cosmic order transcend locale and culture 
by being accessible to any who accept them as representing the true order. Its religious nature 
stems not from its operation within a personal sphere separate from power – far from it, as 
we have seen it participates in the question of power over bodies – but because the 
acceptance of such a normative frame is all that is required for membership in the collective, 
inverting traditional political orientations that see one's membership as a matter of 
geographic location.  
The martyr’s death then witnesses the reality of an interpretive truth. Its foundation in 
the concept of the witness reflects this relationship: witness testimony is presented to the 
court as part of the procedure by which the truth of a contested situation is determined. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines witnessing as giving testimony, and defines testifying as 
giving proof of, asserting or manifesting the truth.869 The prosecution and defense offer 
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contrasting accounts of an event, and in order to determine which story is “true” witnesses 
give their account before the judge, whose ruling establishes the truth of what happened at 
least as far as the state is concerned.870 When the judge enters a ruling, the official 
interpretation of what happened is established, and cannot be undone save by the appeals 
process that relies on the same legal procedures. Martyrs make a similar interpretation using 
their suffering and death as a means of convincing others of their ideas about true power in 
the world. Different collectives affirm different authorities anchored in different perspectives 
on reality, and individuals rely on the testimony of others – from political agents to friends to 
family members – to determine right behavior. The link between the martyr’s testimony and 
their suffering and death makes it more persuasive than other voices, particularly when it is 
about the validity of suffering. 
Pain and death must be central to any understanding of martyrdom’s significance. 
What truth it seeks to establish has the body as its central referent, as it is a matter of 
legitimate administration of activity by means of physical affliction. Moreover, martyrdom in 
every case is characterized by its performance of suffering, the spectacle of agony that 
concurrently attracts and repels us. We relish stories of constancy in the face of anguish 
while shuddering with horror in its face. The connection between speech and being that is at 
issue on all levels of the phenomena is a consequence of a structural relationship between the 
stakes of the contest and the means of establishing the outcome. What is sought by the vying 
institutions is the ability to dictate behavior, and the very existence of those institutions is 
utterly contingent upon individuals acting as though they have that power. 
This is the dynamic evident where these martyrs are created. People in second century 
Asia Minor, the twentieth century Middle East and twenty-first century Tibet all share an 
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experience of an illegitimate power oppressing them, violently imposing rule and trying to 
prevent compulsory practices. Those living in such times are confronted with the choice of 
either obeying the unjust order out of concern for their personal well-being, or resisting it at 
all costs, aware that such resistance exposes them to injury and possibly death. Pain 
permeates the setting as both the consequence for transgressing law and the risk incurred in 
resisting the state. The actions of the martyr are performed within a context where violence 
and death appear on all sides, and the recognition of that fact poses a significant challenge to 
those institutions that seek legitimacy exclusively through force; if suffering is inevitable no 
matter how they act, then why allow a threat of suffering to cause them to give up traditional 
practices?  
Martyrs exemplify a further consequence, namely where individuals are willing to 
give all in support of what they see as the true order the state’s monopoly on violence is 
rendered impotent. As Paul Kahn has noted, the state can demand, but not force a sacrifice, 
be it of will or of life.871 Martyrs can only hope their act inspires others to see the world as 
they do, and act correspondingly. Any victory of the martyr’s group depends upon the spread 
of such commitment, as without an equal recourse to violent means all they have is their 
level of devotion.  
By consistently recalling narratives of moral exemplars in discussions of their 
contemporary conditions, audiences are reminded that suffering is sometimes necessary, but 
worthwhile where it productively serves others and the true sovereign power. It shapes 
experiences of injustice as stemming from antagonistic forces seeking the collective’s 
destruction for generations, thereby linking contemporary resistance with sacred models. One 
becomes Christ in his imitation, one comes to Husayn’s aid where her ancestors did not, and 
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one shows the compassion of the Buddha by offering her life for others. These deaths 
sanctify the individual along with the collective that is demarcated as an appropriate locus of 
sacrifice. All this serves to encourage the martyr’s voluntary personal loss and its 
interpretation as on behalf of the community (as opposed to a suicide serving a personal 
desire for oblivion). 
 Dying in a way modeled in the exemplary life and death of Jesus, Husayn or Buddha, 
the martyrs literally made their sovereign imaginary real in their body. By explaining their 
actions through reference to a normative system of action they align themselves with, a 
previously abstract system becomes real in the actions of the martyr. Robert Cover notices 
this dynamic where he reflects on martyrdom’s function “as a re-membering when the 
martyr, in the act of witnessing, sacrifices herself on behalf of the normative universe which 
is thereby reconstitutes, regenerated, or recreated.”872 What Cover misconstrues is that the 
constitution, generation or creation inherent in the martyr’s performance is not a repetitive 
act, but rather something new that references a mythicized past. Whether or not this 
normative order was ever ascendant, whether or not the mytho-historical narratives recounted 
in these settings ever “actually happened,” they are given reality through enactment. The 
martyr’s extreme act of witness aligns reality with the narrative structures they believe 
accurately reflects true order. When imagined structures orienting our reality are seen to 
accurately reflect our experience of reality, they become true.  
In the language of Elaine Scarry, through their deaths martyrs are “frozen in [a] 
permanent act of participation,” locked in their attempt to literally realize the system of 
governance that fundamentally adheres to cosmic order through their activity.873 In her view, 
all political systems operate on the basis of a fictive reality, a tale about world order that is 
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fictional in that it is not true, but it is also not false as reality can be shaped in accordance. 
They are potentially true, but could never achieve a static existence where they are always 
and constantly true, because their truth status has its basis in people acting as if they were 
true. Every action conforming to a law makes that law concrete, removing its abstractness 
and making it real in the world, but if no one allows the law to guide their action it would 
have no existence until the moment penalties were enacted on the body, there again acting it 
into existence. Political and legal systems cannot be real, they can only ever be in a state of 
becoming real. Paul Kahn argues that the state – though we must allow that it is true for any 
self-governing collective whatever the form – “requires energy – dunamis in the classical 
sense. It must continually will itself into being. Absent that will, it may find itself simply 
brushed aside by other political organizations that assert themselves in the same space and 
time."874 Without people choosing to enact the state, it would and could not exist. When 
people become so keen to act according to religious law they transgress state law, they create 
that religious law in their body for all to behold. The public nature of the martyr’s 
performance is crucial because their act of witnessing must be witnessed.  
Scarry’s use of “frozen” stems from the impossibility of ever participating in the 
enactment of any other order, since martyrs forsake any future life in order to manifest their 
sovereign imaginary. No matter how many times a person follows a system of law, as long as 
they have life they have the potential for future transgression. By dying, the martyr denies 
any such possibility. On account of its extreme nature, their act of witness proves superior to 
other acts by creating a vivid material moment of the reality of the values and ideals of the 
collective in their broken body. Martyrdom serves to engender further acts of subscription to 
their authority by demonstrating that others believe in the system, and do so zealously. The 
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courage on display is something the audience aspires to, and the lengths of commitment 
connects the character of the courageous man or woman to the system to which they 
commend themselves. When two sovereign orders come into conflict, the martyr can inspire 
action in ways consistent with but opposite to the fear that stems from coercive measures. By 
giving rather than taking life, they provide an example of productive power, as opposed to 
the repressive systems that often claim scholarly focus.875 
Their performance of sacrifice speaks to the truth of their guiding sovereign 
imaginary, making martyrs a piece of material evidence for a symbolic system. Their 
willingness to define their entire being by that imaginary marks their connection to truth, 
cementing their identity forever and locking them into a generative act of order. Middle 
Eastern Shi’ites, Christians of Asia Minor and Tibetan Buddhists all demonstrate this 
dynamic, and equally attribute great significance to these deaths. By applying the label of 
martyrdom individuals attach themselves to the same imaginary that motivated the martyr, 
claim the dead for their own, and reinforce the symbolic power of the narrative frames 
seeking to shape their experience. Spreading the tales of these deaths broadcasts the 
interpretive frames that see them as martyrdom, and hopes to engender more action along 
their lines with the ultimate result of creating a just rule in accordance with divine law and 
cosmic order. Wherever martyrs are created, a dispute rages over the nature of reality itself, 
and these deaths show a means of participating in that contest when no other means are 
available. 
 
Epilogue: Martyrdom and Political Theology 
 In perhaps the most routinely cited passage on the subject of political theology, Carl 
Schmitt argues that “he is sovereign who decides upon the exception,” meaning the one who 
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can suspend law’s activity must be considered the highest authority.876 Through Giorgio 
Agamben, Paul Kahn and others, the focus has become placed on the ability to kill but not be 
considered murder, something as evident in Agamben’s homo sacer as it is on Foucault’s 
scaffold. In most works the impetus is placed on the ability to wield force, which often links 
with Max Weber’s assertion that the state claims the monopoly on legitimate violence. There 
is no single form of sovereignty, and recently Dmitris Vardoulakis has traced multiple levels 
of sovereignty operative over the years.877 Without overriding those distinctions, I would put 
forth a different frame of sovereign power that relies not on the deployment of violence, but 
rather the willing acceptance of suffering, an acceptance that is understood as a form of 
sacrifice. 
 Such an insight links individual self-understanding to maintenance of a just legal 
order.878 How one defines themselves carries with it understandings about what actions are 
appropriate and encouraged, and which transgress and therefore deserve a level of suffering. 
Accepting that bodily harm could be an appropriate consequence of action extends beyond 
notions of punishment. In the circumstances considered here, we see that suffering can also 
be a corollary of acting as befits certain people in hostile conditions. When the alternative is 
acting in accordance with a worldly power’s laws but in ways expressly forbidden by divine 
law, it becomes better to suffer at the hands of injustice rather than voluntarily acting unjust. 
Martyrs demonstrate that action is always voluntary, and that the mere wish to avoid 
suffering does permit transgression. Doing so allows martyrs to transform the violence of the 
one into the power of the other.879  
 By confiscating the potency of coercive tactics, martyrdom shows that rules are not 
enough to determine behavior. Inspiring action can have farther reaching effects than 
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deterrence through the threat of punishment. The repeated reference, representation and 
engagement with sacred models serves to stimulate action by tapping into people’s desire to 
consider themselves good, to feel confident that they are respectable people deserving 
approval and acceptance by others. Modern scholarship’s focus on repressive modes of 
power has largely obfuscated the limits of coercive power, and how behavior can come from 
a desire to help and care for others.  
 It also shows that true sovereignty, the ultimate ability to determine the shape of 
collective life necessarily depends on the willingness to sacrifice. At the least, the possibility 
of suffering is a necessary complement of deploying violence. The risk of vengeance – both 
immediate in reactive violence and deferred retribution served after a period of time – is a 
necessary complement to harming others. Rene Girard recognized this dynamic at the core of 
the cycle of vengeance that can threaten to destroy social cohesion in social groups. He saw 
the scapegoat mechanism as one means of solving the problem, but in “modern” societies he 
believed that role was filled by systems of justice. The state claims the final and definitive act 
of vengeance, and the legitimacy it boasts allows its decision to be seen as just and 
appropriate, evading an outbreak of violence while also determining the shape of justice 
governing the collective.880 What Girard neglects is that although part of that ability stems 
from the overwhelming force the state commands, every step along the way necessitates a 
willingness to sacrifice. Policemen, bailiffs and correction officers are all open to violence 
even though the weight of the state is behind them.  
 Likewise, any ability for states to engage in war necessitates populations who are 
willing to invite suffering and death on behalf of that which exceeds them and gives their life 
meaning. The sacrifice of soldiers is honored by state rites when they perish, and their 
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willingness garners respect and serves as a recruiting mechanism for those who wish to prove 
their own merit. Paul Kahn said “the subject whose will would negate the state is the enemy,” 
and Carl Schmitt marked the decision on the enemy as the core expression of state power.881 
Giorgio Agamben too, by averring that the exceptions to law result in those who are declared 
vulnerable to violence and exempted from the protection of the sovereign ban, identifies the 
determination of the enemy as the definitive sovereign act. However, if the one whose will 
negates a state is the enemy, the one who uses their will to enact a state must be considered 
the friend. The martyrs who locks themselves permanently in willing enactment is the 
paradigmatic friend, demonstrating that both ends of the political spectrum of belonging are 
inherently based in suffering. In their efforts to create an oppositional political community – 
a counter-state – in the face of the oppressive state, the martyrs use their will and body in an 
act of reactive creation. Since the deployment of violence first requires those willing to risk 
injury, the efforts and very existence of any state depend on the number of friends acting it 
into reality. Not only do martyrs demonstrate the central dynamic of collective life, but they 
also serve as the primary source of sovereignty.   
 Martyrdom’s consistent appearance in varied cultural contexts points to the central 
importance such figures play in human social organization. They contribute to and perpetuate 
a symbolic system that molds the shape of justice forming the basis of authority. Martyrdom 
links the political and the religious by establishing that both spheres are necessary in order to 
understand the ways we attach ourselves to a law and link our identities to an order seen to 
have a legitimate claim upon our life. Our ambivalent reaction to martyrdom, awe in the face 
of such commitment and horror at the spectacle of suffering, stems from our recognition that 
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belonging to social collectives entails an inherent promise that we ourselves could find 
ourselves faced with the need to perform our own deaths in the same spectacular way. 
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Notes for Chapter 1 
1 In most discussions of martyrdom, two cases are pointed to as preceding the act that Christians will reinvent 
and then define. The first is the religious antecedent found in the Jewish text the Maccabees, especially book 
four. The other is the model of Greek philosophy, Socrates, and his nobility in choosing to die in line with the 
dictates of Athenian justice rather than escape when given the opportunity. The two are occasionally referred to 
together, but often one or the other is used in asserting a kind of theoretical lineage for their approach to 
contextualizing martyrdom. Glen Bowersock, for instance, points to the Maccabees as illustrating a common 
sentiment in the period of the early Christian martyrs, based in a religious affect and sentiment. See his 
Martyrdom and Rome (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. chapter 1. Joyce Salisbury instead 
chooses Socrates, focusing on the voluntary aspect of willing to die for philosophical reasons. See her 
discussion in The Blood of Martyrs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 75-80. Rather than choose, I want to briefly 
examine why both seem to resonate with the modern conception of the martyr. 
 The Books of the Maccabees relate the activities of Jewish models during times of oppression, 
persecution and war.  Although they are not technically canonical, they have exerted a great amount of 
influence, especially in the Eastern areas of Christendom.  While the work ostensibly relates a situation in the 
second century B.C.E., they were likely written in the first century C.E., and numerous parallels are evident 
with the burgeoning Christian martyrology at the same time.  Still, they are often pointed to as precursors for 
the kind of martyrs who died in Christian circles in the first few centuries. 
 While the discourse of dying for a faith or a religion is rife throughout, the stories are couched as 
arguments for the dominance of reason over emotion. The tales of Eleazar and the elderly women with her 
seven sons contain gory imagery of the tortures suffered, but unfailingly returns to the issue of reason’s 
sovereignty over emotions.  In each case, the emperor is commanding them to transgress Jewish dietary laws, 
and in each those affirmed they preferred death to disobedience. Their ability to remain constant to those laws 
amidst suffering and death is used to show how the emotions (such as fear and, one could take from the 
description, pain) cannot dictate behavior.  The true sovereignty of God is taken as a premise in an argument: If 
god dictated the true law, then obeisance to or transgressions of those laws is what is truly at stake in human 
behavior.  If one refuses to follow the laws out of fear, an emotion, then emotion would seem to be dominant.    
 For the Greek example, Plato’s Phaedo recounts the final days of Socrates after being convicted of 
atheism and corruption of the youth.  After delivering an eloquent, but ultimately ineffective speech in his 
defense, Socrates is locked in a cell to await execution by imbibing a draught of hemlock. He remains deaf to 
the pleas of his family and friends, saying he will continue to abide by the laws of the polis, which in this case 
demand Socrates’ life. As he was innocent of the charges that put him in prison, he will remain innocent of any 
opposition against the state that has a claim over his life. Like the Maccabees, obedience is preferred to 
continuing life. Truth, Socrates holds, is the supreme goal of the philosopher’s life (63e), and that truth is one 
that will come when the body is separated from the soul (65b). He contends, “who removes himself, so far as 
possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship 
disturbs the soul ad hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom?  Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to 
attain the knowledge of reality?” To which Simmias responds: “That is as true as true can be.” (66a) For a good 
discussion of the perception of Socrates’ martyrdom see Hendrik Adrianus Bakker, “Beyond the Measure of 
Man: About the mystery of Socratic martyrdom,” Church History and Religious Culture 95:4 (2015), p. 391-
407; also Lacey Baldwin Smith, Fools, Martyrs, Traitors (New York: Knopf, 1997) 24-38. 
 While the noble quality of death is often pointed to as the common variable, what I find more 
provocative is the relationship they maintain with the law. Both ostentatiously choose death over disobedience, 
and reflects a concern with living right over mere living. That, we will see, will repeatedly return in 
considerations of martyrdom in all contexts. 
2 Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 19, see too George Heyman, Power of Sacrifice: Roman and Christian 
Discourses in Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 175. 
3 Paul Middleton, “What is Martyrdom?” Mortality 19:2 (May 2014), 117-133. 
4 Joyce Salisbury, for instance, makes a common statement in martyrological literature, “martyrs accept death 
rather than give up their religious beliefs; they are witnesses.” See her The Blood of Martyrs (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 148. 
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5 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993). See too Craig Calhoun, Mark 
Juergensmeyer and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, eds., Rethinking Secularism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
6 Time and again in the modern study of religion we have seen that religion itself is a constructed category, a 
creation of the scholar which risks normative classifications about what can be labeled “religion.” This was 
perhaps best displayed in Talal Asad’s critique of Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion, but the boundaries of 
religion have become fuzzy in the works of myriad scholars, many of whom will be engaged with here. See 
Wilfred Cantwell-Smith The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: New American Library, 1964), and 
Jonathan Z. Smith Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982) for only two studies that deal with this level of construction, along with the Asad text quoted above. 
7 OED (2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), op. loc. Also mentions the definition as “Simple 
attribution… martyr complex, an exaggerated desire to sacrifice oneself for other and to have the sacrifice 
recognized.” 
8 The OED also notes the term’s provenance from the Indo-Aryan root ‘smer-’ and its correlate Sanskrit ‘smar-
’.  Both roots are concerned with memory and remembrance, strengthening the more commonly referred to 
Greek root’s relationship with the recalling of that which was experienced.  The Sanskrit term smara (स्मर) not 
only refers to remembering and recollection, but has explicitly religious references as well, including an 
interpreter of the Vedas and the god of love. In fact, love provides the context for a great many words building 
on that root (Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, last revised 2008, http://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-
koeln.de/monier/). 
9 Martyrdom has a variety of meanings, not all of which are political and not all of which suggest physical 
death. For the cases under consideration here, martyrdom is a label applied to a certain kind of death. Some 
demand that it is a nonviolent death only, while others allow for a more active role. Some scriptures even 
delineate death by drowning qualify as martyrdoms, in traditional Islam for instance. The kind of death varies, 
but its characteristics and the meanings that are attached to it bear significance resemblances in disparate 
contexts.  
10 This is not to give over to popular usage the ability to determine the landscapes of the term, but rather to 
appreciate that in these phenomena the term has purchase for the collective.  Since ‘martyr’ is a term stemming 
from a particular Greek root, the exact term is unavailable in the multitude of languages of communities that 
seem to make use of such an idea, which would seem to give more power to the translators. 
11 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, & Sexual Renunciation (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998). 
12 Islamist is used intentionally here, meant in reference to groups who seek to remake the world under the 
banner of Islam. Such a drive can appear in radically different contexts, and those examined here will be both 
nationally based and transnationally. The use of this word is inspired by the excellent work of Roxanne Euben 
and Muhammad Qasim Zaman in their Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), where they designate this category on the basis of the common core of jurists and “new religious 
intellectuals” that form a genealogy for a wide spate of groups formed on the basis of an Islamic character. 
Euben and Zaman define Islamist as “contemporary movements that attempt to return to the scriptural 
foundations of the Muslim community, excavating and reinterpreting them for application to the present-day 
social and political world” (“Introduction,” 4). I will rely on their designation, and even in places where I will 
use the more general “Muslim” or “Islamic” it should be very clear that such groups do not get to determine 
what counts as determining Islam.  
13 These are sometimes referred to as auto-cremations rather than self-immolation (see, e.g. James Benn, 
“Political Self-Immolation in Tibet: Causes and Influences,” in Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 25 (December 2012), 
pp. 41-64) in order to recognize the specific form of death, since self-immolation general means self-
destruction, not necessarily via burning. I will here use the more widely employed term self-immolation but 
may resort to other such designations without asserting any interpretive commentary about the form of the act. 
14 Ludwig Wittgenstein. As he shows for concepts like games, many things count as a game but no single 
attribute is shared by all activities referred to as game. 
15 Moreover her mother, Misty Bernall, published a book titled She Said Yes: The Unlikely Martyrdom of Cassie 
Bernall. Elizabeth Castelli also went into detail of her martyrdom by Christian standards in her Martyrdom and 
Memory: Early Christian Culture Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.), showing how the 
delineations I am making are certainly open to contestation. 
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16 According to Cohen, The Holocaust was not a challenge to Jewish martyrdom but, on the contrary, an attempt 
to destroy martyrdom forever.  Hadrian had decreed death for the crime of practicing Judaism and thereby 
inspired the martyrdom of such as Rabbi Akiva, which in turn inspired countless Jewish generations.  Hitler, 
like Hadrian, sought to destroy Jews but, unlike Hadrian, was too cunning to repeat the ancient emperor’s folly.  
He decreed death for Jews, not for doing or believing, but rather for being – for the crime of possessing Jewish 
ancestors. See his entry “Holocaust,” in Arthur A. Cohen and Paul Mendes-Flohr eds., 20th Century Jewish 
Thought (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2009). 
17 Sands opposed England treating him and other Irish revolutionaries as criminals, as such a designation denied 
that they were agents of an opposing sovereign nation at war by constructing them as British subjects who had 
transgressed against the crown. 
18 Here of course I have in mind the methodological move of Max Weber, who looks to ideal types as a basis for 
analysis. See his Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), and Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968). 
19 Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin, eds. Dying For Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the 
Contemporary World (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), xviii. 
20 Carole M. Cusack and James R. Lewis, eds. Sacred Suicide (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 3. 
21 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Sociological Analysis (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1951), 44. 
22 Interestingly, Durkheim focuses this last discussion largely upon socially and economically successful 
members of the group for whom there are no more goals to pursue, and are thus led to despair. See book 2 
chapter 5. 
23 Durkheim, Suicide, 151. 
24 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
25 The work of Ivan Strenski on the changing concept of sacrifice through Durkheim and his famous students 
Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, support this interpretation, as he sees them instituting a Protestant 
understanding of giving some up as opposing the traditional Catholic interpretation of giving all. Ivan Strenski, 
Contesting Sacrifice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
26 Heidegger? Benjamin? 
27 Gavin Flood, The Ascetic Self (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
28 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), esp. chap. 7. 
29 Eugene Weiner and Anita Weiner, The Martyr’s Conviction (Lanham, MD: University Press of America 
2002) p. 7, n.1 
30 See Turner’s The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), and 
Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 
31 Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 67. 
32 Kippenberg, Violence as Worship, 98. 
33 Ibid., 200. 
34 Flood, Ascetic Self. See too John R. Hall et.al, Apocalypse Observed which carries similar ideas regarding 
eschatology. 
35 I use the designation sacred narratives over scripture intentionally. Scripture is an important and inherently 
religious conception, though all of the narratives under examination cannot be classified as such (considering 
the implications of orthodoxy and canon, which some traditions exceed and some do not recognize at all), but 
the role of such tales in influencing self-understanding cannot be understated.   
36 John R. Hall, Philip Daniel Schuyler, Sylvaine Trinh, Apocalypse Observed (New York: Routledge, 2000), 
50. 
37 Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
38 Not only does not appreciating martyrdom within its political context risk radically misunderstanding 
martyrdom, but as Daniel Gilman has shown it may result in a reaffirmation of the status quo, serving those 
who want to celebrate the act of self-sacrifice as an ideal but not recognize it as laudable in its particular 
instantiations. See Daniel Gilman, “The Martyr Pop Moment Depoliticizing Martyrdom,” Ethnos: Journal of 
Anthropology 80:5 (Dec. 2015), p. 692-709. 
39 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991). 
40 Max Weber asserted that the economy of power is depleted by constant recourse to force; any institution 
seeking stable domination, Weber points out, requires voluntary obedience through the evocation of hope and 
314 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
an acceptance of the ideological structures supporting claims to authority. See Weber, Economy and Society, 
especially volume II. 
41 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in Max Weber, The Vocational Lectures edited by David Owen and 
Tracy B. Strong, Translation by Rodney Livingstone, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004). 
42 This placement of a means-ends relation at the center of such questions comes from Dmitris Vardoulakis’ 
exceptional treatise on sovereignty. 
43 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1985). 
44 See Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), and 
Vardoulakis, Sovereignty and Its Other (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). 
45 His actual quote reads “sovereign power consists in the justification of violence,” however as I have argued 
based in part on the work of Georges Bataille, violence should be understood as transgressive force, and the 
determination of what force can be seen as sanctioned and transgressive is precisely the distinction here at issue. 
See Vardoulakis, Sovereignty and Its Other, 1 for his citation, George Bataille, The Accursed Share Vol. III 
(New York: Zone Books, 1991), and my own “Violently Peaceful,” Open Theology 1 (2015) as well as chapter 
4 here. 
46 Symbolic frames that provide the meaning for experiences in the world have been approached in a number of 
ways, from Peter Berger’ concept of nomos to Mark Juergensmeyer’s “ideologies of order” to Ninian Smart’s 
“worldview.” On nomos see Berger, Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1967) and his and Thomas Luckman’s Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). On ideologies of order see Mark Juergensmeyer, 
Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
On worldviews see Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
All look to a manner of perceiving the world and our place within it that includes aspects both secular and 
religious. These categories have been roundly shown to be co-constituting, where the secular is constructed 
through an intentional exclusion of religion. While I refer to these as distinct categories, the frame of political 
theology will repeatedly complicate any such distinctions. On these concepts see Talal Asad, Formations of the 
Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), and the edited volume 
by Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan van Antwerpen, Rethinking Secularism.  While I am in 
line with the need for such a perspective, the term nomos is not especially descriptive, ideologies of order place 
the emphasis on mentality over activity, and worldviews lack any relationship to the legal structures of power 
and authority that are central to the cases under discussion. 
47 Beginning with Charles Taylor’s explanation of a social imaginary in his Modern Social Imaginaries 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), through Paul Kahn’s recent analysis of political imaginaries in his 
Political Theology (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), to the work of Mark Juergensmeyer and 
Manfred Steger in exploring the development of global imaginaries in various entries of the Encyclopedia of 
Global Studies, Helmut Anheier and Mark Juergensmeyer, eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012), the focus 
on an imagined conception that gives shape to life has become academically in vogue. Such a category not only 
reminds us that concepts outside the realm of economic exchange are important, but also that such structures are 
fundamental for any understanding how people determine their action in the world and the ways they are related 
to others. Manfred Steger and Paul James have rightly identified the “pre-reflexive” nature of imaginaries in 
that they are the grounds upon which reflexivity occurs (see their “Levels of Subjective Globalization: 
Ideologies, Imaginaries, Ontologies,” in Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 12:1-2, 23). 
They also provide the ideal to which reality is held against and found wanting, which inspires actions that 
promise to bring around such an ideal. This dynamic is especially evident in the discourse of second century 
Christians and jihadist Islamists, and inherent in the ways Tibetan Buddhists frame their situation.  
48 This second maybe considered similarly to the habitus of Pierre Bourdieu, the structured structurings.  
49 Wendy Doniger, “Post-Modern and –colonial –structural Comparisons,” in A Magic Still Dwells: 
Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, edited by Kimberly C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2000), p. 66. 
50 Theorists who took over the comparative mantle leveled three standard critiques: insufficient attention to 
difference, insufficient attention to change over time, and insufficient attention to the particular contexts 
wherein these phenomena were embedded. Barbara Holdrege lays out these three critiques, as well as giving 
suggestions to correct them methodologically, in her “What’s Beyond the Post?: Comparative Analysis as 
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Critical Method,” in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, edited by Kimberly C. 
Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 77-91.  
Scholars like Jonathan Z. Smith and Bruce Lincoln were able to both acknowledge these shortcomings 
while demonstrating the continuing usefulness of comparison. In his groundbreaking “Prologue: In Comparison 
a Magic Still Dwells,” Jonathan Z. Smith interrogates the project of comparison, broken down under four 
headings: the ethnographic, the encyclopaedic, the morphological and the evolutionary. Through a concentrated 
analysis using Judaism as a test case, Smith declares that only the morphological which traces the development 
of hierarchical terms in terms of complexity and increased organization (28). While he admits all of these fall 
short in the ideal of comparison, only this he believes has continued promise and recognizes the existence of 
religious studies relies upon the change. The University of Chicago program in religion has become well-known 
for advancing the comparative phenomenological study of religion, while programs like those at the University 
of California, Santa Barbara have taken up the comparative banner in attending to religious violence and violent 
contexts.  
By looking at processes of change over time in lieu of creating ahistorical, apolitical, general 
constructs, the dynamics of difference have become central to comparative work. At the same time, the 
theoretical reflection brought about by these critiques have led to a much more effective reflexivity on the part 
of the scholar who undertakes them. Aspects of comparison must come organically from the material engaged, 
but at the same time be employed toward a theory that is the decision of the scholar. Jonathan Z. Smith is most 
well-known for this insight, not only pressing on the need for scholars to be clear on the theory their comparison 
serves, and moreover that religion itself is a creation of the scholars. What they choose to extract from the wider 
cultural context to be held up to a likewise selected phenomenon determines what counts as religion. See his 
Imagining Religion.  
51 David White makes this point nicely in his “The Scholar as Mythographer: Comparative Indo-European Myth 
and Postmodern Concerns,” in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, edited by 
Kimberly C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 47-54. 
52 Flood, Ascetic Self, p.21. 
53 Mark Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God is perhaps the model of this type of scholarship, looking at 
the ways religious symbols uphold and make possible terrorist activities. By comparing the dynamics 
supporting violent action, he is able to both see a common experience of cosmic war, which inspires acts of 
violence to be perceived not as transgressive but valorous and aligned with divine laws. Hans Kippenberg’s 
Violence as Worship looks to a series of modern expressions of religious violence to show that the way an 
individual and group perceives the situation they encounter. Using the Thomas-Theorem – which contends that 
the way people define their circumstances thereby makes them real in their consequences – Kippenberg’s 
comparison resulted in a new understanding of the ways violence becomes experienced as religious. Gavin 
Flood’s comparison of ascetic subjectivity not only mirrors my own study in multiple ways which will become 
clear throughout these pages, and Flood deserves special mention as he alone of these three compares 
subjectivities across time, whereas the others rely only on contemporary traditions. Not only do I believe that is 
a feasible project, but by taking into account the historical power relations that define the situations of those in 
the past parallels can be drawn that make the past more understandable and relatable, shrinking the distance of 
us with our forbearers. 
54 Mark Juergensmeyer and Mona Sheikh, “A Sociotheological Approach to Religious Violence,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and Violence, 622-644, Mark Juergensmeyer, Michael Jerryson and Margo Kitts, ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
55 Sheikh and Juergensmeyer identify five aspects of a sociotheological approach: 1) demarcating an epistemic 
worldview, 2) bracketing assumptions about the truth of a worldview, 3) entering into an epistemic worldview 
and conducting informational conversations, 4) identifying narrative structures, and 5) locating social contexts. 
The first step will become evident through my description of the cases, and the second step is crucial to any 
investigation into such actions (as Ninian Smart pointed out with his discussion of the need for epoche in 
religious studies, discussed in his Dimensions of the Sacred). I will alter and expand upon the final three 
conditions to broaden their gaze and make them appropriate for this particular study which both looks to 
understand those already deceased without easy access to their communities in order to hold in-person 
conversations. 
56 Ibid. See also Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), and Bourdieu, 
Outline of a Theory of Practice. 
57 Juergensmeyer and Sheikh, “Sociotheological,” 642. 
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58 Cecelia Lynch, “A Neo-Weberian Approach to Studying Religion and Violence,” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 43:1 (2014) 273-290, 273; see also her “A Neo-Weberian Approach to Religion in 
International Politics,” International Theory 1:3,(2009), 381-408. 
59 Lynch, “Neo-Weberian Approach to Studying Religion and Violence,” 280. While Lynch separates herself 
from the sociotheological turn by encouraging a need to deal with “particular temporal and spatial contexts” 
(289) in order to appreciate the particularities of interpretations that lead to violence, such is not excluded from 
socio-theology and I would argue is essential to and implicit in Juergensmeyer and Sheikh’s discussion. 
60 Kippenberg, Violence as Worship, 16-17. 
61 Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice. Bruce Lincoln has shown that such tales not only encode hierarches, leading to 
his assertion that myths are ideology in narrative form, but also that reference to such tales are essential in 
establishing the boundaries of social groups. See his Discourse and the Construction of Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), and Theorizing Myth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).61 Both will 
be crucial for understanding how martyrs use such tales as determinants of action, and are themselves used to 
call up and bolster particular social configurations. 
62 Lynch, “Neo-Weberian,” 282. 
63 While theological etymologically retains a relationship with theistic thought, I will here take theology to refer 
to the internal structures of any order considered divine, cosmic, metaphysical or other such categories. 
64 A few exceptions include Lorenz Graitl’s exceptional analysis of the communicative logics of “sacrifice 
notes,” in his “Dying to Tell: Media Orchestration of Politically Motivated Suicides” (Sacred Suicide, eds. 
James R. Lewis and Carole M. Cusack, 190-200) where he derives provocative insights while keeping a critical 
methodological eye on the difficulties such data presents. Meir Hatina too acknowledges the usefulness of what 
he refers to as “ego writing” in his Martyrdom in Modern Islam: Piety, Power and Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). There he echoes much of what Elizabeth Castelli does in her Martyrdom 
and Memory, examining the self-writing practices of late antiquity through the martyr acts. See especially 69-
78. 
65 John R. Hall, “Religion and Violence: Social Processes in Comparative Perspective,” in Handbook of the 
Sociology of Religion. Michele Dillon, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 369. 
66 Adam Lankford for one warns against taking these words at their face value. See his Myth of Martyrdom 
(New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2013), chapter 1. 
67 See for instance Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, W.H.C.Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early 
Church (New York: New York University Press, 1965), or Candida Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). Even in studies that take seriously these texts, such as Castelli’s 
Martyrdom and Memory or Moss’ The Other Christs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), they are used 
to delineate the construction of a collective memory rather than seen as accurate representations of the 
individual. 
68 See for example Ronald Pape Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 
House, 2005), David Cook Martyrdom in Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), or Farhad 
Khorsokavar Suicide Bombing (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005). 
69 Wang Lixiong for instance has a detailed analysis in his “Last Words Analysis of Self-Immolators,” and 
many of the special volume in Cultural Anthropology contain similar ideas. 
70 See James R. Lewis, “The Mount Carmel Holocaust: Suicide or Excution.” in Sacred Suicide, 233-252 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press, 2015) and Jonathan Z. Smith “The Devil in Mr. Jones,” in Imagining Religion, 
102-120 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). 
71 While it does provide a means of self-transformation by taking up certain disciplinary practices, as Foucault 
showed, even without that transformation such forms of writing make it possible to create a persona. See 
Michel Foucault, “Self-Writing,” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 
72 Apart from the texts examined in chapter 2, see Anna L. Peterson and Brandt G. Peterson, “Martyrdom, 
Sacrifice and Political Memory in El Salvador,” Social Research 75:2 (Summer 2008): 511-542; Okuyama 
Yoshiko, “Christian Martyrdom in Japanese Contexts: The Amakusa-Shimabara Revolt and Christian Martyrs,” 
International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society 5:3 (Sept. 2015), p. 33-41. 
73 On martyrdom and the Nazis, see Jesus Casquete, “Martyr Construction and the Politics of Death in National 
Socialism,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10:3-4 (Sept.-Dec. 2009), 265-283; see too John 
Harris, “Forgotten and Remembered: The martyrdom of Charles Christopher Godden,” St. Mark’s Review 229 
(September 2014), 61-79;  
317 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
74 This approach is most notable in the work of Arthur Droge and James Tabor A Noble Death: Martyrdom and 
Suicide Among Jews and Christians in Antiquity (San Francisco: Harper, 1992) along with Jan Willem van 
Henten and Friedrich Avemarie, Martyrdom and Noble Death: Selected Texts from Graeco-Roman, Jewish and 
Christian Antiquity (New York: Routledge, 2002). These works look to cultures in a way similar to Judith 
Perkins in her The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Christian Era (New York: Taylor & 
Francis, 2002), though less critically. Droge and Tabor are followed closely by the collection edited by 
Margaret McCormack, Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) which relies on the five-fold designation of martyrdom of the former. Other works that 
follow this mold include Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, “The Return of Martyrdom: Honour, Death and 
Immortality,” in Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur eds. Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism 
(New York: Routledge, 2004); Mohammed Hafez, “Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide 
Terrorism,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, Amy Pedahzur, ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2006); Gay Gullickson, “Emily Wilding Davison”; Mario Ferrero, “The Cult of Martyrs,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 57:5 (2012): 881-904. 
75 See for example Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) 
particularly chapters 5 and 6; Perkins, Suffering Self; Paul Kahn, Sacred Violence (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2008); Ariel Glucklich, Sacred Pain: Hurting the Body for the Sake of the Soul (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Geoffrey Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987); Elain Scarry, The Body and Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).  
76 Beit-Hallahmi, “The Return of Martyrdom: Honour, Death and Immortality,” 23. 
77 Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin, “Introduction,” Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in 
the Contemporary World (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), xix. 
78 Lacey Baldwin Smith, “Can Martyrdom Survive Secularization?” Social Research 75:2 (Summer 2008), 457. 
See also her Fools, Martyrs, Traitors. 
79 Apart from the authors mentioned, others that fall under this category include Assaf Moghadam, The 
Globalization of Martyrdom (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Lacey Baldwin-Smith Fools, 
Martyrs, Traitors; Michael P. Jensen, Martyrdom and Identity: The Self on Trial (New York: T&T Clark, 
2010); C.C. Pecknold, “The End of Martyrdom, Religious Liberty in Liberal Orders,” Nova et Vetera 12:2 
(April 2014), 415-431;  
80 Gay Gullickson, “Emily Wilding Davison: Secular Martyr?” Social Research 75:2 (Summer 2008), 461-484. 
81 Eval J. Naveh, Crown of Thorns: Political Martyrdom in America From Abraham Lincoln to Martin Luther 
King Jr. (New York: New York University Press, 1990).  
82 See Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice. 
83 See too Michaela DeSoucey et.al. “Memory and Sacrifice: An Embodied Theory of Martyrdom,” Cultural 
Sociology 2:1 (2008), 99-121; for the place of martyrdom in reference to Maoism see Marie Lecomte-Tilouine, 
“’Kill One, He Becomes One Hundred’: Martyrdom as Generative Sacrifice in the Nepal People’s War,” Social 
Analysis 50:1 (Spring 2006): 51-72. Craig Hovey could also be seen to operate on this distinction, though with a 
particular theological bent that distinguished witnesses from martyrs on the basis of the latter being willing to 
forgive those who are responsible for their death. See his “Being and Witnessness: Minding the Gap between 
Martyrs and Witnesses,” Anglican Theological Review 97:2 (Spring 2015): 265-280. 
84 See Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Carolyn Marvin and 
David W. Ingle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
85 Of the many that could be referenced here, noteworthy are David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, eds. 
Morality of Terrorism: Religious Origins and Secular Justifications. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989);George Kateb, “Morality and Self-Sacrifice, Martyrdom and Self-Denial,” Social Research 75:2 
(Summer 2008): 353-394; Moshe Halbertal, On Sacrifice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); N. 
Verbin, “Martyrdom: A Philosophical Perspective,” Philosophical Investigations 35:1 (January 2012): 68-87. 
86 Pape, Dying to Win; Charles Selengut, Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008); Ami Pedahzur, ed. Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The 
Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006); Domenico Tosini, “A Sociological Understanding 
of Suicide Attacks,” Theory Culture Society, 26 (2009), 67-97; Leonard Weinberg, “Suicide Terrorism for 
Secular Causes,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom Amy Pedahzur, ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 2006); Neil L. Whitehead and Nasser Abufarha, “Suicide, Violence, and Cultural 
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Conceptions of Martyrdom in Palestine.” Social Research, 75:2 (Summer 2008), 395-416; Anne Speckhard and 
Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
29 (2006): 429-492. Many of these discussions often only peripherally touch on understandings of martyrdom I 
need not go into them here; I will simply note that in Terror in the Mind of God Mark Juergensmeyer explores 
these ideas of military stratagems and shows that they are often ineffective or counter-productive to the causes 
of the attackers.  I follow his lead in arguing the focus must be placed on the symbolic worlds of the attackers to 
gain an understanding of their actions. 
87 Diego Gambetta ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Dominic 
James and Alex Houen eds., Martyrdom and Terrorism: Pre-Modern to Contemporary Perspectives (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014); see also Brian Wicker, ed. Witnesses to Faith: Martyrdom in Christianity 
and Islam (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006). 
88 Gullickson too employs these labels. 
89 Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, “The Return of Martyrdom: Honour, Death and Immortality,” in Religious 
Fundamentalism and Political Extremism, Amy Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg, eds. (Portland: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2004); Yuval Neria et.al. “The Al Qaeda 9/11 Instructions: A Study in the Construction of Religious 
Martyrdom.” Religion, 35 (2005) 1-11; S. Byman “Suicide and Alienation: Martyrdom in Tudor England.” 
Psychoanalytical Review, 61:3 (1974), 355-373; Geoffrey Galt Harpham, “Trading Pain for Knowledge, or, 
How the West Was Won,” Social Research,  75:2 (Summer 2008), 485- 510; Speckhard and Ahkmedova, 
Making of a Martyr;” Donald Riddle’s The Martyrs: A Study in Social Control (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1931) bases itself in social analysis but serves to return to the question of how mental attitudes are 
manipulated. This argument is revisited in Ramona Houmanfar and Todd Ward, “An Interdisciplinary Account 
of Martyrdom as a Religious Practice/Una Vision Interdisciplinaria del Martirio Como Practica Religiosa,” 
Revista Latinoamericana de Psicologia 44:1 (2012): 65-75. 
90 See Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, Christian Persecution, Martyrdom and Orthodoxy, edited by Michael Whitby 
and Joseph Streeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Glen Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. p.6-7; Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 197. 
91 Rona Fields, Martyrdom: The Psychology, Theology and Politics of Self-Sacrifice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2004), pp.25, 36. This resonates with the focus of Eugene and Anita Weiner in The Martyr’s Conviction. 
92 Neria et.al., “9/11 Instructions.” Similarly, Belanger and her colleagues who sought to create a psychometric 
tool that could appraise the willingness of potential martyrs, with measurements based on “readiness to self-
sacrifice” and a “passion scale” along with “depression” and “suicidal ideation.” Belanger et. al. While the 
desire for such an isometric is certainly understandable, saying you are willing to die for a cause is a long way 
from actually dying for a cause. Knowing the high value placed upon the willingness to sacrifice for something 
– in essence the very significance of martyrdom – would likely result in over reporting of a significant degree. 
Moreover, sitting comfortable in a climate-controlled room filling out a questionnaire is perhaps the opposite 
circumstance to those most martyrs find themselves in. How far can their imagination carry them into the depths 
of despair, degradation and oppression that seems to characterize political contexts that beget martyrs? 
93 Adam Lankford, The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and 
Other Self-Destructive Killers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
94 Lankford, 83. 
95 Zubair Qamar provides an excellent overview of the methodological problems, such as his convenience 
sampling and projected conclusions, Lankford’s work suffers in Qamar’s review of Lankford’s book in 
Perspectives on Terrorism 7:1 (2013), accessed at 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/249/html. 
96 Lankford., 22. 
97 Paul Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). This is also a 
common discussion in the realm of universal human rights, another place the Western concern for the individual 
is assumed to be ubiquitous. In many areas of the world the person first becomes a rights-bearing subject in the 
context of a group. 
98 Ibid., 8. 
99 Georges Bataille was one theorist that acknowledged this concern. See his The Accursed Share, Volumes I-
III. 
100 Paul Kahn makes this point in his Political Theology, chap. 1. 
101 Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (New York: HarperCollins, 1997) chapter 8. 
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102 Stark, Rise of Christianity, 169. Stark sought to treat religion as a complex of rewards and compensators, 
arguing that in seeking immortality people who follow a single religion’s program have accepted a compensator 
(168). The more valued the reward, the more effective the compensators. 
103 See for example Mohammed M. Hafez, “Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide 
Terrorism,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, Amy Pedahzur, ed. 
(NewYork: Routledge, 2006). 
104 While the work of Pierre Bourdieu may have taken a step in this direction by discussing social action in 
terms of multiple forms of capital, a useful analytical tool in many cases, I worry that such models operate on 
the basis of an equal exchange, requiring only that we determine the appropriate “value” of any “good” being 
sought or lost and from there look to an equality of exchange. Heaven is valued over life, therefore the martyr 
sacrifices their life in hopes of gaining heaven. 
105 Here is Immanuel Kant’s understanding of morality in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
106 Robert J. Brym, “Religion, Politics and Suicide Bombing: An Interpretive Essay,” The Canadian Journal of 
Sociology / Cahiers candiens de sociologie 33:1 (January 2008): 89-108; Robert Brym and Bader Araj, “Suicide 
Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada,” Social Forces 84:4 (June 2006), 
p.1969-1986. 
107 Catalina Kopetz and Edward Orehek “When the End Justifies the Means,” Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 24:5 (Oct. 2015): 386-391. 
108 David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Michaela DeSoucey, et. 
al. “Memory and Sacrifice: An Embodied Theory of Martyrdom.” In Cultural Sociology, 2:1 (2008), 99-121., 
Hall et.al. Apocalypse Observed; Joyce Salisbury, The Blood of Martyrs, esp. chap. 5. 
109 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Daniele Hervieu-
Leger, Religion as a Chain of Memory (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000). 
110 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 34. 
111 DeSoucey et.al., “Memory and Sacrifice,” 113. 
112 See Desoucey et.al. “Memory and Sacrifice;” Weiner and Weiner, The Martyr’s Conviction. 
113 Lacey Baldwin Smith, “Can Martyrdom Survive,” and Fools, Martyrs, Traitors: The Story of Martyrdom in 
the Western World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999); Cook, Martyrdom and Islam; also 
Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), chap. 4 esp. p.113; Salisbury, Blood of Marytrs. 
114 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution; Herbert Musurillo, The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972). On the problems of conversion as a category, see Paula Fredriksen, “Mandatory 
Retirement: Ideas in the Study of Christian Origins Whose Time has Come to Go,” Studies in Religion / 
Sciences Religiueses 35:2 (2006): 231-246. 
115 See Weiner and Weiner, The Martyr’s Conviction. David Cook makes a similar argument in his Martyrdom 
in Islam. As Cook himself recognizes, there is very little impetus for conversion among Jewish peoples, and yet 
there are Jewish martyrs, both in the current political context of Israel and the occupied territories and 
historically, such as the Maccabean martyrs (Cook Martyrdom, 5).   
116 Lacey Baldwin Smith for instance argues that tales of martyrs portray an evil executioner upon which the 
audience can focus their disgust, and unite against. Baldwin Smith, Fools, Martyrs, Traitors. The requirement 
for an executioner, however, along with her insistence upon using categories derived from Christian discourse, 
disallows the possibility of the 'suicide attackers' being authentic martyrs, as they execute themselves and 
Smith's argument explicitly calls for an outside force to end the martyr's life. 
117 See her excellent discussion on 19-24.  We should be sensitive to the critique of Roger Bastide who charges 
a Durkheimian problem of a disembodied collective consciousness existing above all individuals that ultimately 
serves to consume them, see Castelli’s discussion at 19-21. 
118 Apart from Castelli’s work I’m thinking of Shelly Matthews Perfect Martyr: The Stoning of Stephen and the 
Construction of Christian Identity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Boyarin, Dying for God; on 
martyrdom’s boundary maintenance between genders see Gail C. Streete Redeemed Bodies: Women Martyrs in 
Early Christianity (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009). 
119 Juergensmeyer , Global Rebellion, 432. 
120 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 172. See too his “Martyrdom and Self-Sacrifice in a Time of 
War,” Social Research 75:2 (Summer 2008): 417-434. 
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121 Christopher Catherwood, Why the Nations Rage: Killing in the Name of God (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2002); Terry Eagleton, Holy Terror (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); William R. Garrett, 
“Religion and the Legitimation of Violence,” in Prophetic Religion and Politics, 103-122, Jeffrey K. Hadden 
and Anson Shupe, eds. (New York: Paragon, 1986); Jennifer Jefferis, Religion and Political Violence: Sacred 
Protest in the Modern World (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
122See Al-Rasheed and Shterin, Dying for Faith, chap 2. 
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unable to explain those mass murderers who acted under a nationalistic framework, like the Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka who account for a large number of suicide attacks in the 20th and 21st century, without resorting to some 
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124 Hall, et. al. Apocalypse Observed; see too Cusack and Lewis, Sacred Suicide, several of which deal with 
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125 Such a situation stems not only from the fervent religious devotion according to Hall, but rather is a 
consequence of particular social conditions where movements of an apocalyptic bent are confronted by a state 
institution seeking to control such ‘cults’ (an innately derogatory term in the context). See Hall, “Religion and 
Violence,” 378 
126 This is also a main point of James R. Lewis, “The Mount Carmel Holocaust” in Cusack and Lewis’ Sacred 
Suicide. 
127 See Mark Juergensmeyer, “Martyrdom and Sacrifice in a Time of Terror,” Social Research 75:2 (Summer 
2008): 417-434 where he makes the argument that war provides the context for all sacrifice. 
128 Schmitt, Political Theology, 12. 
129 Dimitris Vardoulakis, Sovereignty and Its Other, 1. 
130 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, chap. 3. 
131 Paul Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (),10. See especially 
chapters 1-3. 
132 Ibid., 22. 
133 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998), esp. part 2 sections 1, 3 and 5. 
 
Notes for Chapter 2 
134 It could serve the reader to remember that the same author is believed to have penned both the Gospel of 
Luke and the Book of Acts, which likely were circulated together as a work scholars referred to as Luke-Acts. 
See Helmut Koester, Introduction to the New Testament, Volume 2: History and Literature of Early 
Christianity, 2nd ed. (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), op. loc. 
135 Not only is Stephen sometimes referred to as the “protomartyr,” but there is some question as to whether 
Jesus himself qualifies as a martyr. Revelations (1:2) speaks about the testimony of Christ, and the second 
century Martyrdom of Lyons says the title of martyr was reserved for Christ alone (M. Lyons 2.3). Moreover, 
the fifth century Gelasius of Cyzicus refers to Jesus as “protomartyrus” in his Historia Concilii Nicaeni 
(2.19.26). This indistinction continues today (at a 2015 conference in Germany I was faced with this question 
by an audience member), but for this study I will abide by the common usage of referring to Stephen as the first 
martyr and retain Christ’s unique status rather than discussing him as a martyr for the Christian truth. This 
decision is sponsored largely on the basis that Christ himself, as he so oft repeated, is the Christian truth, and 
therefore speaking of him as dying in relation to the truth he is remains problematic. That decision is 
emphasized by the regular perceived importance of the faith martyrdom showed demonstrated, a trusting of that 
which could never be completely assured. (Speaking of Jesus in such a way recalls the troubling cry from the 
cross “My God, why have you forsaken me” [Mt. 27:46, Mk. 15:34], but continuing down this path would bring 
us into the realm of theology, which I wish to avoid.)  
136 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 15. 
137 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 33. 
138 Salisbury, The Blood of Martyrs, 131. 
139 Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 17. 
140 Boyarin, Dying For God, 94. 
141 G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, “Aspects of the ‘Great’ Persecution,” in The Harvard Theological Review 47:2 (Apr. 
1954): 75-113; E.R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience 
from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965). See too Donald W. 
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Riddle, The Martyrs: A Study in Social Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931) which speaks to 
the ways institutions manipulate such death drives. 
142 Here I particularly have in mind the studies that confront martyrdom solely in the context of Islamic 
terrorism, which I elaborate upon in a future chapter. 
143 Stark, Rise of Christianity, chap. 8. Also compare the discussion of Salisbury, The Blood of Martyrs chap. 3 
to Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, chapter 2. 
144 Stark, Rise of Christianity, 167. 
145 Ibid., 174. 
146 Arthur J. Droge and James D. Tabor, A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among Christians and Jews in 
Antiquity (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco Press, 1992). 
147 Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, chap. 3. 
148 Ibid., 72. 
149 Talal Asad’s discussion on this point in his Genealogies of Religion, chapter 1 remains foundational for the 
subject.  
150 Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 13. 
151 Friedrich Avemarie and Jan Willem van Henten, Martyrdom and Noble Death: Selected Texts from Graeco-
Roman, Jewish and Christian Antiquity (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
152 It is this problem that leads to misleading statements by Salisbury who avers “the modern world has little 
opportunity for martyrs as witnesses to the strength of their conviction, but it has all-too-many chances for 
martyrs as sacrifices.” Salisbury, Blood of Martyrs, 147. 
153 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, chaps. 1, 2 and 5. 
154 Boyarin, Dying for God, esp. chap. 2. 
155 Ibid, 44-51. 
156 Ibid, 64. For the larger discussion see chapter 2, and p. 93. 
157 Ibid, 96. 
158 Matthew Recla, “Autothanatos: The Martyr’s Self-Formation,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 82:2 (June 2014): 472-494; “Homo Profanus: The Christian Martyr and the Violence of Meaning 
Making,” Critical Research on Religion 2:2 (2014): 147-164. See also Agamben, Homo Sacer, esp. part 2 chap 
1. 
159 Judith Perkins Suffering Self helped inaugurate this approach. Other scholars within this paradigm include 
Kate Cooper, “Martyrdom, Memory and the ‘Media Event’: Visionary Writing and Christian Apology in 
Second-Century Christianity,” in Martyrdom and Terrorism: Pre-Modern to Contemporary Perspectives, ed. 
Dominic Janes and Alex Houen, 23-39 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Carlin Barton, “Honor and 
Sacredness in the Roman and Christian Worlds,” in Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and 
Religion ed. Margaret Cormack, 23-38 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), and Carole Straw, “’A 
Very Special Death’: Christian Martyrdom in Its Classical Context,” in Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on 
Martyrdom and Religion, ed. Margaret Cormack, 39-57 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
160 Brown, Body and Society, l. 
161 The term “sociohistorically grounded ideologies” comes from Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 20. 
162 Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 5. 
163 See for instance Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 49. 
164 Incidentally, John of Patmos tells the Christians in Smyrna, the town of Polycarp, “Do not fear what you are 
about to suffer. Beware, the devil is about to throw some of you into prison so that you may be tested, and for 
ten days you will have affliction. Be faithful unto death, and I will give you the crown of life.” (Rev. 2:10). 
165 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 178. 
166 Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 17. 
167 Latin translations are my own, in consultation with the translations of Musurillo’s The Acts of the Christian 
Martyrs. Greek translations were all developed in collaboration with Dr. Don Adams at Central Connecticut 
State University. In some places extant translations formed the base of the translation I provide: for the letters of 
Ignatius, I relied on J.B. Lightfoot’s 1891 translation in his Apostolic Fathers, in conjunction with the Roberts-
Donaldson translation collected in the Early Church Fathers found at http://www.ccel.org. Most of the acta 
martyrum quotations come from Don Adams, though in some places I relied upon Herbert Musurillo’s 
translation.  
168 The question of the reliability of Ignatius’ epistles was largely settled by Theodore Zahn and J.B. Lightfoot, 
but has recently been reexamined by Candida Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 52-57, R.M. Hübner 
322 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Thesen zur Echtheit und Datierung der Sieben Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochen,” Zeitschrift für Antike 
Christentum 1 (1997), 44-72, and his students T. Lechner Ignatius versus Valentinianos? Chronologie und 
theologiegeschichtliche Studien zu den Briefen des Ignatius von Antiochen (Leiden: Brill, 1999). While the 
author remains convinced by the persuasiveness of the evidence put forth by Lightfoot and the weakness in the 
critical arguments by Hübner and associates, these questions will not have a significant place here. (For a good 
summary of arguments regarding the dating and authorship of Ignatius see John-Paul Lotz, Ignatius and 
Concord: The background and use of the language of concord in the letters of Ignatius of Antioch (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), 4-10. See also Vall, Learning Christ, chap. 2.) What is important for the present 
discussion is the familiarity at least by Eusebius’ time that these ideas had a home in 2nd century Asia Minor, a 
point that both sets of scholars agree, even if they disagree on the particular author. Whether or not Ignatius 
wrote them, people thought he wrote them, and acted accordingly. Any significant theological novelties in the 
three ‘inauthentic’ letters will be noted. 
While the corpus of Ignatius of Antioch’s epistles has aroused significant scholarly debate, I will here 
use the Middle or Eusebian recension, which can be dated to at least the beginning of the 4th century and are 
evident in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History (III:36). Those letters include the 4 so-called ‘authentic’ letters – To 
the Romans, Magnesians, Trallians and Ephesians along with those of more questionable authenticity – To the 
Philadelphians, Smyrneans, and Polycarp. Although these latter may not have been penned by Ignatius himself, 
there is reason to allow for the possibility, and their attribution to the martyr by Eusebius suggests that in the 
centuries following they were seen to possess his charism and authority. Moreover, as this study does not intend 
to declare the final word on the epistles’ authenticity, but rather delves these texts for their understanding of 
martyrdom and the social function it was seen to fulfill, a text that was seen to be authoritative on such subjects 
deserves analysis, whether or not it can be ultimately attributed to an individual. 
Ignatius is generally thought to have been martyred under Trajan at the beginning of the second 
century, though there is some evidence for a late first century composition. See Helmut Koester, Introduction to 
the New Testament, Volume 2: History and Literature of Early Christianity, 2nd ed. (New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2000), 282-291, places them in the second decade of the second century, which this work accepts. J.B. 
Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers, II/2 (London: MacMillan, 1885) and Adolf von Harnack, Geschichte der 
altchristlicken Literatur bis Eusebius, II Chronologie vol. 1 (Leipzing, 1958/1897) place them between 100-118 
C.E., while Joseph Ruis-Camps, The Four Authentic Letters of Ignatius the Martyr (Rome: Pontificium 
Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1979) argues for the earlier dates prior to the turn of the second century. A 
good general discussion is available in William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters 
of Ignatius of Antioch, edited by Helmut Koester (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).  Bowersock recognizes 
that Ignatius and IV Maccabees stem from the same area and time, based largely on linguistic evidence, see 
Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, Appendix 2. 
169 On his role in defining the Christian/Jewish boundary, see Thomas A. Robinson, Ignatius of Antioch and the 
Parting of the Ways: Early Jewish-Christian relations (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2009). For a good 
discussion on his role in developing Christian authority, largely in terms of his perspective on martyrdom, see 
Peter Iver Kaufman, Church, Book and Bishop: Conflict and authority in early Latin Christianity (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1996) and John-Paul Lotz, Ignatius and Concord: The Background and Use of the Language 
of Concord in the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch, (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2007). A good general 
discussion of Ignatius in his religious and social context is available in Gregory Vall, Learning Christ: Ignatius 
of Antioch and the Mystery of Redemption, (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013) 
and William R. Schoedel, “Theological Norms and Social Perspectives in Ignatius of Antioch,” in Jewish and 
Christian Self-Definition, Volume I, edited by P. Sanders (London: SCM Press, 1980), 30-56. 
170 Koester, Introduction to the New Testament, 286. 
171 See Origen’s “Exhortation to Martyrdom.” 
172 Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 26. 
173 Frend, Rise of Christianity, 184. 
174 For those interested a comprehensive list of bibliographies and original sources for these texts, see Candida 
Moss, Other Christs, 177-201. 
175 Polycarp had long been heralded in the scholarly literature as the most important martyr act in the early 
centuries C.E. It is clear by the time Eusebius writes the passion of Polycarp in this Ecclesiastical History (iv.1) 
it has an established place in the Christian imaginary. However, as academic commentators have recently begun 
noting, led by Candida Moss, the importance traditionally attributed to the narrative may be more a reflection of 
scholarly interest rather than historical accuracy. As Millar points out, outside Eusebius the earliest complete 
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manuscript of the acta is of the tenth century (Millar, “Review,” 241), and Moss spent a great deal of time in 
recent works formulating a persuasive argument for the dating of M. Poly. In the third century, in part on 
account of the paucity of evidence that the text was widely known prior to the second half of that century 
(Moss, Other Christs, 196-198; Moss, Ancient Christianities, chap. 3). On the other hand, T.D. Barnes offers a 
good sourcing of material that supports a second century dating (“Pre-Decian,” 510-514), and Musurillo echoes 
his conclusions while zeroing in on a compositional date of 155/6 C.E. based largely on the appearance of 
proconsul L. Statius Quadratus in the text, who governed the area around 142 C.E. (Musurillo, Acts, xiii). While 
I find Moss’ account convincing, I cannot discount the evidence presented by those holding to a second century 
dating, and am struck by the thematic and symbolic similarities visible between Polycarp’s narrative and the 
others of this era, particularly that of M. Lug. many of which will be examined below. The proposed link with 
Irenaeus, and the status of Polycarp’s martyrdom for his and Ignatius’ theologies compels me to treat it as a 
second century text. It is likely, I believe, that the tale as Eusebius transmits it was edited in the third century to 
bulwark Christian souls against Decius’ persecution, but I believe it is more likely that the core of the tale was 
being circulated earlier; or rather, I find it difficult to accept that such a famous death did not have its story told 
until a century after the event, particularly when the protagonist was so often referred to by his contemporaries. 
In the end, even if Moss is correct in her analysis (which again is entirely possible), many of the tropes and 
symbolic constructs are attested in other second century martyr acta either echoing or being echoed by the 
passion of Polycarp. 
176 The narrative that is given the title The Martyrdom of Ptolemaeus and Lucius (while recognizing Millar’s 
charge that it was not circulated under such a title in the early centuries C.E., see Millar, “Review,” 241) comes 
from the Second Apology of Justin Martyr through Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History, iv.17 (though Eusebius 
inaccurately attributes it to Justin’s First Apology, HE iv.17.1). The eponymous martyr Ptolemaeus is believed 
to have been a friend of Justin in Rome (Moss, Other Christs, 199), and on the basis of that familiarity the 
martyrdom is dated to around the middle of the second century (Barnes, “Pre-Decian,” 515). Musurillo goes as 
far as to offer a dating of 150/60 C.E. to accord with its being prior to the death of Antonius Pius (Musurillo, 
Acts, xvi). Candida Moss, on the other hand, generally accepts the second century dating of the acta while 
allowing for the possibility that it has a later date, based on the work of Paul Parvis who contends that the 
Second Apology was in fact constructed after Justin’s death and circulated posthumously (Moss, Other Christs, 
199; cf. Paul Parvis “Justin, Philosopher and Martyr: The Posthumous Creation of the Second Apology” in 
Justin Martyr and his Worlds ed. Paul Parvis, 23-37, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007). While I find the work 
of Parvis provocative, I side with the majority of scholars averring the second century composition. 
177 The Martyrdom of Carpus, Papylus and Agathonicê exists in both Greek and Latin versions, while the Greek 
version would appear to be the earlier text and the Latin possibly a fourth century recension (Moss, Other 
Christs, 182). Carpus is said to have been contemporary with Polycarp according to Eusebius (HE iv.15), Boeft 
and Bremmer suggest a terminus ad quem for the text of 215 C.E. (“Notiunculae II,” 384-5), and scholars like 
Guilbert have looked to the command to sacrifice that forms a central part of the narrative to argue the 
martyrdoms must have occurred during the reign of Decius in the mid-third century (Joseph de Guilbert, “La 
date du martyre des SS. Carpos, Papylos et Agathonicé,” Revue des Questions Historiques 83 (1908): 5-23). 
However it is instructive that many works that share such a means of dating merely point to others holding this 
view without promoting it as their own conclusions (e.g. Moss, Other Christs, 182; Musurillo, Acts, xv n.8). 
Pliny’s missives with Trajan show that the command to sacrifice was an established part of Christian trials by 
the end of the first century, which would seem to remove this rebuttal to Eusebius’ dating. Barnes hesitantly 
accepts the Decian dating on the basis of the question put to Papylus as to whether he was a senator (M. Carp. 
24) and the “development of the [Roman] curial class” (Barnes, “Pre-Decian,” 515). Even Barnes himself 
recognizes the fragility of such an argument and readily allows that this text could come from the second 
century. I here follow suit, approaching it as a second century text while stipulating Candida Moss’ argument 
that the command to sacrifice that serves other scholar’s dating shows that the text as we have it may be 
oriented for a third century audience facing the persecution of Decius (Moss, Other Christs, 182). 
178 The second century dating of the story of Justin’s martyrdom coming through Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical 
History (iv.16) enjoys a somewhat rare consensus among scholars. Moss highlights the presence of Rusticus, a 
famous Stoic teacher of Marcus Aurelius, as the Roman voice of the text which places it during the second 
century (Moss, Other Christs, 188) and Barnes follows suit (Barnes, “Pre-Decian,” 515-17). Musurillo concurs, 
noting the date of 165 C.E. has been appended to Justin’s death since the Chronicon Paschale, and further 
argues that the speech he delivers suggests it was penned at the beginnings of the formulation of the tradition 
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Justin champions (Musurillo, Acts, xix). Millar adds another supporting piece of data in the presence of 
references to Justin’s accusations in Tatian’s second century Oratio ad Graecos (19; Millar, “Review,” 241). 
179 The Martyrs of Lyons, alternatively known as the Martyrs of Lyon and Vienne or the more historically 
accurate Martyrs of Lugdunum (which does not anachronistically apply the name of the modern French city 
onto the Roman city in Gaul; see Barnes, “Pre-Decian,” 517 n.3) comes through Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical 
History (v.1-3), but is commonly attributed to Irenaeus who was the second century bishop of the area. Irenaeus 
was born in Smyrna and was said by Eusebius to have heard Polycarp himself speak (HE v; see Barnes, “Pre-
Decian,” 517), and the letter begins with an address to the churches in Asia and Phrygia which would both 
support its usefulness in discovering the sentiments around martyrdom in Asia Minor, but also connects with 
Irenaeus’ origins. Eusebius himself gives the date of 177 C.E. to the text, and Candida Moss supports both the 
dating and its likely relation to Irenaeus (Moss, Other Christs, 189). Musurillo generally concurs, though he 
cautions against ignoring the possibility of a third century editor, particularly in reference to the treatment of the 
Christian dead (1.59-60), the references to the Devil as the ultimate agent responsible for the deaths (1.5, 42, 57; 
2.6) and the references to the virgin mother (1.45, 2.7) (see Musurillo, Acts, xxi; none of these moments will be 
treated within this study). Two interesting notes on this text are the common consensus of the text’s ideological 
reliance on 4 Maccabees (see Moss, Other Christs, 189), which was penned in the first century and will be 
treated below, as well as Musrillo’s assertion that the “disturbances” that led to the trials and executions 
stemmed from an influx of immigrants from Asia Minor, the very area of Irenaeus’ birth and that concerns us 
here (Musurillo, Acts, xxi). 
180 The Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs appears to be one of the earliest extant records of court cases during the 
second century (Moss, Other Christs, 200; Musurillo, Acts, xxii-xxiii). While some are uncomfortable in the 
variations in the lists of those martyred, its authenticity is widely agreed upon. I here follow Barnes who 
believes the text to be a (yet incomplete) record of a trial at Carthage in 180 C.E. that was disseminated to other 
Christian centers (Barnes, “Pre-Decian,” 519-20). 
181 Moss, Other Christs, 177. 
182 Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdoms, 9. 
183 As G.W. Bowersock put it, “despite all the differences in form, the kernel is the authentic documentation of 
the legal hearing.” Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 27. 
184 One legend holds that soon after becoming Caesar he gave the head of his Praetorian Guard a sword and 
commanded him to use the sword for the emperor when the rule was just, and against him when it was not. See 
Stephen Dando-Collins, Nero’s Killing Machine (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2005), appendix C. 
185 Frend, Rise of Christianity, 164-7. 
186 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, chap. 5. 
187 See Edwards, Religion and Power, 15-27, and MacMullen, Social relations, 101-120. 
188 Edwards, Religion and Power, 24. 
189 Robert Grant, “The Social Setting of Second-Century Christianity,” in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, 
ed. EP Sanders, vol. 1 (London, SCM Press, 1980). 
190 Grant, “Social Setting,” 21. However Harry Gamble contends that literate Christians made up closer to ten 
percent of the community. See Harry Gamble, Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Christian 
Texts (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 5. See too D.J. Kyrtatis, The Social Structure of the Early 
Christian Communities (London: Verso, 1987) and A.J. Malherbe, Social Aspects of Early Christianity, 2nd ed. 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983). 
191 See Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire: A.D. 100-400 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1984). 
192 Grant, “Social Setting, “25. In our modern perspective, slaves are usually seen as the bottommost of the 
social ladder, without any agency whatsoever and excluded from political life. The chattel slavery of the U.S. 
south and the kind practiced across the world during the colonial period can leave us with the impression that 
slavery always appears the same. However, in the period under discussion, a large proportion of slaves had 
stable domestic situations and were able to purchase their freedom after reaching middle age. (See MacMullen, 
Social Relations, 92). In the Roman world, the free poor occupied the very last rung on the social hierarchy. 
Perhaps one in three were habitually poor, with no means of accumulating property or ascending the social 
ladder. 
193 Ramsay MacMullen, Roman Social Relations: 50 B.C. to A.D. 284 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1974), 61. 
194 Frend, The Rise of Christianity, chap. 5. 
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195 Edwards, Religion and Power, chap 1. 
196 Katsari, “Money and Proto-Identities” gives a good analysis of this process through a numismatic analysis of 
the first two centuries of the Common Era. 
197 Edwards, Religion and Power, 5. 
198 Boyarin, Dying For God, 17. This is at odds with and problematizes the work of such scholars as Bowersock 
and Frend, but will become central to later scholars like Castelli and Moss. 
199 Many texts could be suggested, but one of the best is surely Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 
200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
200 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 192. 
201 There has been some debate in recent scholarship on the question of the extent to which the Temple was the 
core of Jewish life at the time, or whether it had already begun to be marginalized by the first century. The 
author remains convinced of the former as opposed to the latter, more ‘revisionist’ histories. See Seth Schwartz, 
The Ancient Jews from Alexander to Muhammad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 85-89 for a 
good discussion on the subject. 
202 For a good discussion on how the historical evidence of the Sicarii differs from the myth that develops in 
Israel, see Nachman Ben-Yahuda, “The Sicarii Suicide on Masada and the Foundation of a National Myth,” in 
Sacred Suicide, James R. Lewis and Carole M. Cusack, eds. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 11-28. 
203 This calm period was significantly interrupted by the Kitos War of 115-117 C.E. However, that conflict 
largely took place outside the state of Judea, and therefore did not have the impact of the First Jewish-Roman 
War. 
204 Michael Birnbaum and Reuven Firestone, “The Theology of Martyrdom,” in Fields, Martyrdom. Birnbaum 
and Firestone note that death must be chosen before idolatry, incest and murder. Those three, they contend, 
transgress against the core of being Jewish and therefore are acts of Chillul Hashem, where when confronted 
with those death is a sanctifying, a Kiddush Hashem. Suicide is interestingly absent from this list, but could be 
implicit in the prohibition against murder (as in the murder of oneself, which is the context of suicide), since the 
sanctity of life is central to the Jewish tradition. 
     It is not entirely clear who first labeled the text as the “The Story of the Ten Martyrs.” It is a midrash text 
that speaks specifically to the execution of ten teachers during Hadrian’s reign, which would put it later than the 
period under study here and therefore likely influenced by the establishment of the idea of martyrdom during 
this period (see Boyarin). That story itself is also found in a more ancient text, the Midrash on Lamentations, the 
dating for which is less clear. Ra’anan Boustan’s discussion on the subject (From Martyr to Mystic: Rabbinic 
Martyrology and the Making of Merkavah Mysticism [Leiden: Mohr Siebeck, 2005], 30-45) is exemplary.  
205 The official rules for martyrdom were said to be formulated at a council in Lydda during the second century. 
They declared death as obligatory rather than violating the commandments against idolatry, unchastity and 
murder. If any of these was performed even under coercion it was an act of hillul ha-Shem, defamation of the 
divine name, the complementary antonym of martyrdom. See Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, “Kiddush Ha-Shem and 
Hillul Ha-Shem,” Jewish Virtual Library, 2008, 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0012_0_11109.html. 
206 Frend, Martyrdom, 211. 
207 Polycarp was said to have been a Christian in Smyrna for eighty-six years at the time of his martyrdom (M. 
Poly. 9.3), which would necessitate the early establishment of the Christian community in the area. See too 
Frend, Martyrdom, 178, and chapter 5. 
208 For a long period, the gradual replacement of traditional Greek deities by more salvation focused cults (e.g. 
Christianity, Mithraism, Isisism) was thought to speak to a developing need for “religious belief.” Robin Lane 
Fox has soundly discredited this overly broad understanding of the process (see her Pagans and Christians in 
the Mediterranean World from the Second Century A.D. to the Conversion of Constantine [New York: Knopf, 
1986]), but the fact of the shift to more salvation centered groups in the first centuries of the Common Era 
remains. A good discussion of the impact of foreign cults on the development of Christian martyrdom is 
available in Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 104-120. 
209 See George E. Mylonas, Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1961). 
210 David Ulansey,The Origins of the Mithraic Mysteries: Cosmology and Salvation in the Ancient World (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
211 This term is the accepted means by which to refer to schools of Christian thought that would later be 
affirmed as “orthodox” teachings without reading such a position backwards in time. During the second 
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century, these school were one of a multitude, all seeking influence in Christian circles. Their eventual success 
should not cause us to treat them differently than we would the “heretical” schools of the same period. 
212 Boyarin, Dying for God, 59. 
213 The idea of the parousia is basically, as Walter Wagner put it, “with-ness” or “being there” (After the 
Apostles [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994, 8). While this resonates interestingly with Martin 
Heidegger’s designation of human existence as da-sein, literally being-there, the concept of being in-company-
with is provocative. The end times were conceived of as the period when God was (again) with man, able to 
exercise unchallenged sovereignty.  
214 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 115. 
215 Frend, Martyrdom, 114. However, it is important to acknowledge the kind of devotional practices demanded 
by Pliny and reiterated in the Christian acta were particular to a specific moment in history, and not 
omnipresent throughout the Roman Empire. 
216 Ibid., 114. 
217 Beard, North and Price, Roman Religion, 360. 
218 See for instance Livy Ab Urbe 24.10.6-11.1. 
219 Beard, North and Price, Roman Religion, 360. 
220 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 113. Under Trajan, this concern might have extended to the discomfort 
even around social clubs which provided an identity  
221 Kate Cooper, “Martyrdom, Memory and the ‘Media Event,’” 29. 
222 Frend, Martyrdom, 106. 
223 See Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 163. 
224 For a succinct discussion of Pliny’s rise and position within the empire, see Cook, Roman Attitudes, 138-146. 
225 Beard, North, and Price, Roman Religion, 225-227. L.F. Janssen, however, sought to affirm the charge of 
superstitio was not trivializing but rather labeled beliefs that were fundamentally in opposition to the religio of 
Rome. I am attracted by that perspective, but am hesitant about such generalization into a small bit of 
terminology. See L.F. Janssen, “’Superstitio’ and the Persecutions of the Christians,” Vigiliae Christianae 33:2 
(June 1979): 131-159. 
226 George Heyman makes the distinction between proper “religion” rather than proper “belief,” which seems an 
accurate use of the term religion as it would have been understood by the Romans, but I believe the 
orthodoxy/orthopraxy distinction works better as it does not exclude belief from religion which Heyman’s 
words would suggest. See his The Power of Sacrifice: Roman and Christian Discourses in Conflict 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Press of America, 2007), xi. 
227 The eminent scholar of early Christian martyrdom Candida Moss recently provided the most in depth 
examination of the rhetorical creation of persecution in her The Myth of Persecution: How Early Christians 
Invented a Story of Martyrdom (New York: HarperOne, 2013). 
228 Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 50. 
229 Though some French and Italian scholars continue to assert evidence for a centralized persecution based 
around precise legal statutes, a general consensus has developed among American, British and German scholars 
that the charges against Christians lacked an official legal basis. This point has been made with the most force 
recently in Moss, Myth of Persecution, esp. chap. 2. See too Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 221 n. 32. 
230 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 181. 
231 See Thompson, “Polycarp,” 33, and Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 39. 
232 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 41. 
233 See Jill Harries, Law and Order in the Roman World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) chap. 2 
for a good discussion of the criminal legal process. 
234 Thompson, “Polycarp,”27. Huge swaths of the public were routinely brought together in these locations and 
inculcated into the cultural sensibilities, social distributions and political ideology of Rome. See Alison Futrell, 
Blood in the Arena: The Spectacle of Roman Power (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997). In this 
context see especially chapters 3 and 5. She uses sacrifice as an explanatory mechanism for the dynamics of the 
arena, and her work has echoes of Rene Girard’s concept of human sacrifice in the reminder but sublimated 
transcendence of violence into the controlled (though never fully controlled) staged expiation of violence from 
the community. The violence contained within the walls of the amphitheater is a way to drive the violence of 
the community into a container. 
235 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 107. See also Paul Plass’ The Game of Death in Ancient Rome: Arena 
Sport and Political Suicide (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) for the symbolic importance of the 
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arena in maintaining and reinscribing social order. See Gail Streete, Redeemed Bodies: Women Martyrs in Early 
Christianity (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2009) and Castelli chapter 5 and Boyarin chapter 3 for the 
arena’s role in instituting and maintaining gender roles. For the place of the maternal body in the developing 
discourse of martyrdom, see Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities in the Early Christian Era (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 164-169. 
236 Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 35-37. 
237 On the necessary awe that changes violence into power, see Foucault, Discipline and Punish chap. 2, and 
Kahn, Sacred Violence esp. chap. 1. 
238 In the words of Roland Auguet, quoted in Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 122. 
239 See Andrew Lintott, “Crime and Punishment,” 326. For a good look at the evidence for such influence 
during the second century, see De Ste. Croix, “Why were the early Christians Persecuted?” 15.  
240 MacMullen, Social relations, 104, 112-113. See too Grant, “Social Setting,” 25. 
241 Elias J. Bickerman, “Trajan, Hadrian and the Christians,” Rivista di Filogia e di Instruzione Classica 96 
(1968), 312. See Harries, Law and Crime, chapter 3 for a good discussion of the cognitio. 
242 For a good discussion see John Richardson, “Roman Law in the Provinces,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Roman Law, David Johnston, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 45-58. 
243 Andrew Lintott points out that at other times the wronged parties themselves, or even other private citizens 
with a stake in the proceedings could also serve as the prosecutorial party. See his “Crime and Punishment,” 
301. 
244 Friedrich Vittinghoff concluded that the mere public profession of Christianity amidst its social segregation 
was enough to merit a death sentence, cutting against the grain of the social fabric. See Friedrich Vittinghoff, 
“’Christianus sum’: das ‘Verbrechen’ von Aussenseitern der römischen Gesellschaft,” Historia 33:3 (1984), 
331-357. Peter Garnsey went so far as to argue Christianity was a special case, the only capital crime undefined 
in Roman law, a difficult stance to accept considering the argument maintains a unique status for Christians 
rather than locating them in their larger context. See Garnsey, “The Criminal Jurisdiction of Governors,” 53. 
245 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 168. This sentiment is echoed by den Boer and Fergus Millar, see the 
latter’s “Imperial Cult and the Persecutions,” 170. 
246 See his rescript to Caius Minucius Fundanus. 
247 This approach is mirrored in the works of Justin Martyr, whose texts written in Rome likewise took a 
philosophical, ethical approach to try and convince the authorities of the legitimacy of the Christian doctrine. 
248 Beard, North and Price, Roman Religion, 225. 
249 Riggsby, Roman Law, 201. 
250 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 167-8. 
251 D. Rankin, “Tertullian and the Imperial Cult,” 213.For the troubles in establishing the legal basis for 
persecution of Christians before Decius’ reign, see Timothy D. Barnes, “Legislation against the Christians,” The 
Journal of Roman Studies 58:1-2 (1968): 32-50. 
252 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 10. 
253 On the parallel of sacriligium to atheous, see G. de Ste. Croix, “Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted?” 
Past and Present 26 (1963), 10 n. 34. On the dual threat of such charges, see Frend, Martyrdom and 
Persecution, 221. 
254 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 37. 
255 See Thompson, “Polycarp,” 44-5 for a good examination of the historic charges of atheism in the Roman 
republic and early empire. 
256 Quoted in Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 105. 
257 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 46-7. 
258 See his Apology, 4.11, also 2.10, 11. See also Cook, Roman Attitudes, 166-7. 
259 See too Frend, Martyrdom, 236. 
260 Divorce is an anachronistic term for the practice of giving a repudium, a declaration of dissolution, in ancient 
Rome. The text itself says the woman “gave him what you call the repudium [rhepoudion] and left him” (M. 
Ptole. 6). For more on divorce in Rome and the practice of repudium see Thomas A.J. McGinn, “Repudium” in 
The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, Roger Bagnall et.al., eds. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) and 
Susan Treggiari, “Divorce Roman Style: How Easy and How Frequent was it?” in Marriage, Divorce and 
Children in Ancient Rome, Beryl Dawson, ed., (New York: Clarendon Press, 1991), 7-30. 
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261 Judith Perkins finds the central premise that the courts and justice system are unjust is linked to the growing 
divide in experiences with the law between elites and non-elites during the period, which is supported by the 
situation in the provinces noted above. See Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 95. 
262 See Plato’s Apology, esp. sections 24b-28a. This rhetorical alignment was especially important for Justin 
Martyr, the philosopher in Rome who wrote at length to Marcus Aurelius on the sound philosophical basis of 
Christian morality. 
263 For a good discussion of the sense of “genius” used, see Jan Den Broeft & Jan Bremmer “Notiunculae 
Martyrologicae III: Some Observations of the Martyria of Polycarp and Pionius,” Vigiliae Christianae 39:2 
(June 1985): 110-113. 
264 Beard, North, and Price, Roman Religion, 225-227. 
265 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 256. 
266 See also Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 219. 
267 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 50. The sacrifice that was required was apparently simple enough: a 
libation of unmixed wine and incense was performed before a statue of the emperor. While the image of the 
contemporary emperor watched over the proceedings, what was being worshipped was the genius of the 
emperor, that immortal aspect that was transferred between mortals who sat upon the emperor’s throne. It was 
not only the emperor whose genus was supplicated with sacrifice; the genius of a Roman household also was 
regularly attended with sacrifices of flowers, unmixed wine and incense, marking the Empire as one household, 
with the Emperor as paterfamilias. (See Heyman, Sacrifice, xviii. Cicero’s De Domo Sua goes on at length 
about the creation of the sacred space of the home, its altars and sacrifices.) Such actions gave up something 
useful to the sacrificer in hopes that the target would be pleased by the actions and would maintain order in the 
sacrificer’s favor. Incense ranged in quality and cost, and was used as an odor purifier as well as some spices in 
foods. Wine also varied in quality, but the qualifier that the wine be unmixed refers to the contemporary 
practice of mixing water with wine (Pliny the Elder, uncle of the abovementioned Pliny, recorded that the 
appropriate mixture was eight parts water to one of wine [Natural History, XIV.vi.54]). Requiring ‘unmixed 
wine’ was a way to assure the purity of wine, and be more costly and dear to the Romans. For both, while 
undoubtedly a minimal amount, we have the literal and symbolic voluntary giving up of something of personal 
value for the benefit of oneself and ones relations. In doing so, it recognizes that which the sacrifice is directed 
towards controls the well-being of the sacrificer. It is no surprise then that the ruling hierarchies were reaffirmed 
during these rituals, as discussed above. 
268 See John Schied, Roman Religion, 79. 
269 Richard Gordon, “The Veil of Power,” in Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society, 
ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997), 126-139. See too Scheid, Roman 
Religion, 95-97. Scheid’s assertion should again direct us away from approaching religion during this period as 
something that depends on a mental activity or state. Sacrifice was a participatory act governed by belief but not 
only reflective of it.  
270 Cook, Roman Attitudes, 176-9. 
271 See Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 8. 
272 See Katherine McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence: A Comparative Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 2008), and Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972). 
273 Edwards, Religion and Power, 64. See too Frend, Martyrdom, 118. 
274 Frend, Martyrdom, 213. 
275 Frend, Martyrdom, 236-238. 
276 As Elaine Scarry has it, “in confession, one betrays oneself and all those aspects of the world – friend, 
family, country, cause – that the self is made up of.” See Scarry, Body and Pain, 29. 
277 In fact there will be years of debate and discussion over what to do with the so-called lapsi who performed 
the sacrifice but later sought readmission to the Christian community once the persecutions abate. Several 
classifications of lapsi were determined depending on the transgression committed: Sacrificati were those who 
had performed a sacrifice to idols (Roman gods) but later sought reunification with the church. Libellatici were 
those who procured, often through bribery, a certificate from Roman authorities declaring they had sacrificed. 
Because they did not actually sacrifice they faced a less stringent path of atonement to rejoin the ranks of 
Christians, but were still considered outside the faith. Those who had burnt incense in accordance with the 
Roman decrees were known as thurificati, the third group. Cyprian of Carthage, who faced persecution under 
the Emperor Valerian and refused sacrifice saying “I am a Christian,” would write “De Lapsi” in the mid-third 
century supporting the readmittance of these semi-apostates into the Church. 
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278 The Greek reads loidorēson ton Christon. 
279 See too Frend, Martyrdom, 219. 
280 I am indebted to Don Adams for his assistance in working out the relative meanings and potency of the term.  
281 Interestingly, Paul goes on in that same verse to affirm that “no one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except by the 
Holy Spirit.” Hence whoever was able to hold to their confession, especially in the midst of coercive measures 
thereby showed their possession of (or by) the Holy Spirit. When we turn to the nature of the kind of speech 
performed by these martyrs, we’ll see an ambiguity about who is speaking – the martyr or the Holy Spirit 
through the martyr. At a conference where I previously presented this material, Kate Kirkpatrick raised the 
question of who was actually seen to be speaking in the martyr’s confession, the martyr themselves or the Holy 
Spirit. The acta give no intimation at all that it is any but the martyr who directs their speech, and even demand 
it as part of the martyrs’ exceptionality. However within the New Testament, such language is clearly imagined 
to be inspired by the Holy Spirit. Apart from Paul’s quote here, see below on the ‘mini-Pentecost” of Acts.  
282 Scarry, Body and Pain, 37. 
283 This is another common theme throughout the acta, e.g. Polycarp himself (M. Poly. 15-16); Agathonice (M. 
Carp. 46-48); and those in Lyons and Vienne who were reinvigorated by torture (M. Lyons 24 ff.). It is also 
interesting considering the influence of the Docetist doctrines that held Christ could only have appeared to 
suffer because God could not actually feel pain. Coming from the same tale that celebrated Ignatius’ hero is 
interesting, and likely stems from a later attempt at hybridization. 
284 If, as Elaine Scarry has it, torture makes voice absent by reducing vocal output to screams signifying 
regression to an animalistic state, the martyrs refuse any such prior state is possible. They are declaring that the 
entirety of their person is essentially Christian, that fundamentally, ontologically they are defined by their 
Christianity. See Scarry, Body and Pain, 41-50. 
285 Reinforcing this, some acta portrayed the Christian body as something fundamentally different from others. 
Polycarp could not be burned in the fires of the arena, instead remaining untouched by the flames and being “as 
bread being baked, or like gold and silver being purified in a smelting furnace” (M. Poly. 15.2). Such metaphors 
both reinforced the fundamental difference of the martyr’s body, and linked to images of the purification of sin. 
The martyr Sanctus not only did not suffer from the red hot pincers that were applied to his flesh, but he was 
“cooled and strengthened by the heavenly fountain of the water of life that flows from the side of Christ” after 
his confession of faith. (M. Lyons 22). Under a second round of torture, “his body unbent and became straight… 
he recovered his former appearance and the use of his limbs. Indeed, the second trial by the grace of Christ 
proved to be not a torture but rather a cure” (M. Lyons 24). Here again the Christian tale utterly inverts the 
Roman intent. 
286 When I speak of “relational identity,” I refer to the means by which social identity is constructed in terms of 
one’s position in a relational matrix. National identity is determined on the basis of a relational matrix 
determined by the institution of the nation, parental identity established on the basis of a relationship with 
children, etc. 
287 The Greek reads “theophilous kai theosebous genou tōn Christianōn.” 
288 See Denise Kimber Buell, Why this New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), Judith Lieu, Neither Jew Nor Greek? Constructing Early Christianity (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2002), 49-68, Judith Perkins, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World, 
239-268, David Horell, “Ethnicity, Empire and Early Christian Identity: A social-scientific reading of 1 Peter,” 
in Reading 1-2 Peter and Jude: a resource for students (Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2014), 135-149. 
I support the conclusions of these scholars, however I believe the context of race not only varies widely 
between historical periods and geographic areas, but it also falls short of an accurate description of early 
Christians on one important basis – the question of power and authority. 
289 See Gerhard van den Heever, “Space, Social Space, and the Construction of Early Christian Identity in First 
Century Asia Minor,” Religion & Theology 17:3/4 (2010), 205-243. 
290 Judith Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 1. 
291 Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 28. 
292 For some good discussions on the multiple identities held by Romans during the time under consideration 
see Constantina Katsari, “Money and proto-national identities in the Greco-Roman cities of the first and second 
centuries AD” National Identities 8:1 (March 2006) 1-20. For a more general discussion see Louise Revell, 
Roman Imperialism and Local Identities, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
293 However Jesus’ command to hate (misei) is interpreted, it is clear that love of and obedience to Christ must 
come first – above family, nation, even self. Interestingly, it seems to cause less of a stir when the self is 
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exceeded (the relation between the individual and her own body) than when more deeply ingrained social 
institutions like the family are. Consider Agathonicê, an onlooker who became a martyr and in doing so 
orphaned her son. While it is unlikely the Roman authorities would have actually allowed such an act, the 
transgression of what is taken to be a fundamental relational identity leads the crowd to plea for her to have pity 
on her child, to which she replies “He has God who can take pity on him; for He has providence over all” (M. 
Carp. 44). The crowd responds to such an inconceivable act by lamenting not her action, but the Roman decrees 
leading to her sentence of death (M. Carp. 45). There is some ambiguity in the text as to whether their claim of 
injustice is aimed at the Christian or Roman decrees, but the Christian context certainly suggests Roman 
injustice. 
294 See Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 211. 
295 Candida Moss, Other Christs, 49. 
296 While the many vagaries to that battle to control Christian discourse towards a single orthodoxy are well-
beyond the scope of this paper, the means by which authority was being determined as early as the 2nd century 
are instructive. One could hardly be better served than by consulting W.H.C. Frend’s magisterial The Rise of 
Christianity for perhaps the most thorough discussion, or the equally erudite The Birth of Christianity by John 
Dominic Crossan (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998) which is particularly good for the 1st century. 
Jaroslav Pelikan’s multi-volume work The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (3 
volumes, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) is equally as instructive, though it largely remains on the 
level of doctrinal developments over social issues. Paul Johnson’s History is perhaps better for the more casual 
reader who still wants a thorough analysis. The author acknowledges he is neglecting a great series of others as 
well.  
It is fairly well established that Christ himself is the primary authority, he is succeeded by the disciples 
and apostles who had direct experience of His teachings and miracles (with the exception of Paul, who never 
had any direct contact with Jesus). From there the question of spiritual authority is open, but the martyrs are 
widely seen as the next link in the chain, followed by the ascetics whose “white martyrdom” of bodily 
deprivation lend them authority. See Edward E. Malone, The Monk and the Martyr: The Monk as the Successor 
of the Martyr, Johannes Quasten, ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Press of America, 1950). Athanasius of 
Alexandra’s writing of the Vita Antonii and relationship with the anchorite Antony in the fourth century is 
perhaps the best argument for this succession. See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the 
Development of Doctrine, Volume 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1971), 207-218. 
297 It should be noted that various churches at this point in history held different beliefs about the relative status 
of Christ and God. While the Council of Chalcedon will attempt to instill a normative understanding of Christ 
as “truly man and truly God,” this will only come about after centuries of diverse understandings of Christ’s 
divinity that ranged from him being merely man to him being God on earth. The synoptic Gospels of Matthew, 
Mark and Luke seem to favor the former, while the Gospel of John is well-known for his high Christology. 
During the second century, there was no consensus on the issue, and therefore I mean to suggest none, using 
“divinity” here as a shorthand for discussion. 
298 Wagner, After the Apostles, 151. 
299 See also John-Paul Lotz, Ignatius and Concord: The Background and Use of the Language of Concord in the 
Letters of Ignatius of Antioch (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2007). 
300 Here of course I am thinking of the erudite critique of the category of religion provided by Talal Asad in his 
Genealogies of Religion. 
301 Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 34. 
302 This is a major failing of the translations Herbert Musurillo provides for the martyr acta. (See further 
discussion below.) Even speaking of Constantine’s “conversion” in the fourth century as being the moment that 
Christianity became the “religion of the empire” maintains a break between religious ideology and political 
doctrine. Better to understand it as the moment the empire became Christian, when the Christian sovereign 
imaginary supplanted the Roman as the sacred backbone of Roman imperial policy (such is far too simplistic a 
description for the events around Constantine’s “conversion” of course). The separation of a religious sphere 
from a sphere of power comes especially from Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (). 
303 Lucius’ statement translates basilea tōn ouranōn. Speratus’ text reads imperatorem regum et omnium 
gentium; cf. to Rev. 1:5 where Christ is referred to as the “ruler [archon] of the kings of the earth.” 
304 The idea of the Parousia is basically, as Walter Wagner put it, “with-ness” or “being there” (After the 
Apostles [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994], 8). While this resonates interestingly with Martin 
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Heidegger’s designation of human existence as da-sein, literally being-there, the concept of being in-company-
with is provocative. The end times were conceived of as the period when God was (again) with man, able to 
exercise unchallenged sovereignty. It was at this time that judgment would occur, determining who would 
reside in the presence of God for all eternity and who would be cast forever from His sight. 
305 The Greek reads, “Blasphēmountes tēn hodon, toutestin hoi huioi tēs apōleias.” 
306 The Greek here reads, “Blasphēmian ēgagon tōn theōn kai tōn Sebastōn.” 
307 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 221. 
308 In the passages of this paragraph sacrifice translates thysia, save for 1 John 2:2 where the word translates 
hilasmos, an appeasing. 
309 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 51. 
310 Candida Moss has an excellent delineation of the variety of sacrificial discourses in her The Other Christs, 
76-77. For her discussion of the particular constellation that informed Christian martyrdom in general, see ibid. 
77-87, and Heyman, The Power of Sacrifice, 161-218. 
While these will be the main streams of analysis for this section, I heartily agree with Candida Moss 
that promoting any singular conceptions of sacrifice in this period reflects the conception of sacrifice in the 
scholar’s mind more than reflecting the understandings of their subjects. See Moss, Other Christs, 83. The 
dynamic of sacrifice that I will focus on here does reflect my own interests in the way sacrifice served as a 
marker of identity and allegiance to a sovereign power. 
311 The Passover sacrifice recalls the moment of Israel’s salvation from Egypt, when the blood of a lamb was 
smeared on doors of Jewish families so God would “pass over” those households while dealing death to their 
Egyptian neighbors. Inherent in the story is the importance of a kind of public marking of identity and loyalty, a 
trope that continues in Christian reimaginings. 
312 See John Downing, “Jesus and Martyrdom,” Journal of Theological Studies, n.s.14 (1963), 279-93. Also 
Candida Moss, Other Christs, 243 n.20. 
313 See the discussion of the date of 4 Maccabees in D. A. deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Introduction and 
Commentary, Septuagint Commentary Series (Leiden: Brill, 2006), xiv-xvii. 
314 It should be remembered that the Jewish and Christians communities were still closely related at this time, so 
speaking of “Jewish” influence may communicate a too firm distinction between the two groups; Christians at 
this time would not have seen themselves appropriating Jewish ideas, but rather seen these as their own 
sacrificial lineage, which of course it was. 
315 Heyman, Sacrifice, 2. See too Moss Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 76 where se elaborates upon how Ignatius 
in particular styles his death on the model of imperial based sacrifice, and Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 
28, where he argues that the mores of the Greco-Roman world is central to the Christian system of martyrdom. 
316 Moss, Other Christs, 82. 
317 The Greek text in the Martyrdom of Polycarp is: “aiōniou kai epouraniou archiereōs.” 
318 Moss, Other Christs, 32. 
319 For Christians, the cosmic order relied on the God of Abraham, and the concept of sacrifice was based in 
Jesus’ death, which served as a counterpoint to the original sin of Adam and Eve. The progenitors’ actions led 
to the penalty of death for all who followed from them, but Jesus died that death for all, so those who participate 
in that death with him are not subject to that penalty and gain life everlasting (this conception comes especially 
from Paul, see in particular Rom. 5:12-21). See Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, chapter 3 on the 
development of this doctrine in the New Testament period. 
320 Moss, Other Christs, 33. Moss of course points out that this was not something novel of the Christians, but 
rather tapped into long standing means of ethical pedagogy in both the Greco-Roman world and the Jewish 
world. See Moss, Other Christs, 19-24. Moss’ overall argument convincingly shows how that understanding (by 
both the martyrs themselves and the Christian audiences that perpetuated the stories) resulted in early martyrs 
being seen by their contemporaries as “other Christs” whose mimetic suffering both held similar promises to 
and whose concomitant trials helped shape the understanding of Jesus’ own ordeal. Although Christ was said to 
be “reincarnated in the tortured flesh of the martyrs” (Moss, Other Christs, 6), Christian martyrs did not attempt 
to directly take on the status of Christ. However there is provocative evidence that suggests the rhetorical 
separation of Christ and martyr aimed to address a popular (mis)understanding. Christ’s sacrifice was seen as 
expiatory, and there is good evidence that in the second century Asia Minor the martyr’s death was as well, 
especially in the epistles of Polycarp and Ignatius. (For a sound argument against seeing the expiatory nature of 
martyrdom as a common strand throughout the early Christian world, see Moss, Other Christs, 85-87. For the 
opposing side, and an argument that places it central to Christian ideas of martyrdom, see Francis Young, The 
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Use of Sacrificial Ideas in Greek Christian Writers from the New Testament to John Chrysostom (Patristic 
Monograph Series 5. Cambridge: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979), esp. 107-111, 129-134, and 223-
238.) Pothinus was said to cause a stir as though he was Christ (M. Lyons 1.29), and Polycarp’s story directly 
relates a popular concern that the martyr would replace Christ, setting up the explanation that martyrs are only 
loved because of their imitation of and loyalty (M. Poly. 17.2-3). The martyrs of Lyons goes as far as to suggest 
Christ alone deserved the title of martyr, as he was the “faithful and true witness” (the text reads: “tō pistō kai 
alēthinō martyri”;M. Lyons 2.3). Giving voice to such concerns discloses the ongoing determinations of these 
martyrs’ status during this period, but also should warn us away from any easy reading of the relationship 
between Christ and his imitators. What is clear, however, is that these texts aimed to explain to their audience 
that the martyrs are not Christ, and that which imitates a model is necessarily inferior to the model. Moss makes 
this point early on, and proceeds to illustrate that those who imitate the model still seek to garner the authority 
of the model for themselves. 
321 Moss, Other Christs, 43. Emphasis in original. 
322 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 54. 
323 See too Frend, Martyrdom, 199. 
324 The Greek reads “holokautōma dekton tō theō hētoimasmenon.” 
325 Polycarp, like Ignatius, use the word thysia in reference to sacrifice, while the martyrs of Lyons prefer the 
equally common etythēsan. 
326 Moss, Other Christs, 59. 
327 See Guy Stroumsa, The End of Sacrifice: Religious Transformations in Late Antiquity (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2009), esp. chapter 3. The move of some scholars to aver a more ‘spiritual’ substitution for 
the Roman visceral sacrifice seems ideological weighted, but the solution to such an issue is not necessary to 
understand the ways the Christian communities of the 2nd century manipulated a sacrificial discourse familiar to 
them in the cultural milieu. See Robert J. Daly, Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background Before 
Origen (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America, 1978) esp. 378-88.  
328 For more on this, see Moss, Other Christs, 245 n. 51. 
329 This translation is taken from J. B. Lightfoot, the Greek reads: “di’ odontōn thēriōn alēthomai, hina katharos 
artos heurethō tou Christou.” For more on the Eucharistic overtones of sacrifice in martyrdom, see Heyman, 
Power of Sacrifice, 185, and for more on the role of sacrifice in the Eucharist see Moss, Other Christs, 78-82. 
330 On this point see especially Robin Darling Young, In Procession Before the World: Martyrdom as Public 
Liturgy in Early Christianity (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2001). 
331 McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence, 26. McClymond in that place refers to the act of killing specifically, 
but the context of her overall discussion merits the contextualization of the quote I have here. 
332 Agamben, Homo Sacer, part 2 section 6. 
333 See Perkins, Suffering Self, 104, 119. 
334 Everywhere martyrdom is linked to direct ascent to heaven. See M. Poly. 2.3, 4.2; M. Carp. 7; M. Justin 5.1-
3l; M. Lyons 1.36; Ig. Magn. 5; Ig. Poly. 2. 
335 See Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Max Weber, The Vocational Lectures edited by David Owen 
and Tracy B. Strong, Translation by Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 
2004). 
336 Robert Cover, “Violence and the Word,” The Yale Law Journal, 95:8 (July 1986), 1605. 
337 Recla, “Homo Profanus,” 152. See too Foucault, Discipline and Punish chap. 2. 
338 See Foucault’s discussion on “docile bodies” in Discipline and Punish, part 3 section 1.  
339 This point was excellently made by Paul Kahn, Sacred Violence, 25. 
340 Perkins, Suffering Self, 117. 
341 Quoted in Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 99. 
342 This is one of Rene Girard’s central points in Sacred Violence. On misrecognition, see Pierre Bourdieu.  
343 Legal theorist Paul Kahn has argued that in torture, the power of the sovereign is reproduced through the 
confession. Kahn, Sacred Violence, 25. 
344 See his Discipline and Punish, part II. See also Kahn, Sacred Violence, chap. 2. 
345 Leonard L. Thompson, “The Martyrdom of Polycarp: Death in the Roman Games.” The Journal of Religion 
82 (2002), 39. While Thompson does not account for why the cry of pain legitimates the coercion, I will suggest 
elsewhere that it was the control over speech that enabled the martyrs to help create and establish the truth they 
preferred. 
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346 Tertullian’s text in Latin reads: “ut negantes nomen pariter utique negemus et scelera, de quibus ex 
confessione nominis praesumpseratis.” 
347 The question of the tyrant’s ability to make them turn translates dūnētheiē, from the same root which is used 
by Polycarp and Sanctus to explain their inability to blaspheme against Christ (M. Poly. 9.2-3; see above). 
348 This reading is in opposition to that René Girard gave to Peter’s denial (René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. 
Yvonne Freccero [Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986], chap. 12, esp. 149-159. See also René Girard, 
“Peter’s Denial and the Question of Mimesis,” Notre Dame English Journal, 14:3 [Summer 1982], 177-189.) 
Girard looks to Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein – being-with – to discuss Peter’s association with Jesus. As an 
apostle, Peter was defined by being-with Jesus, a state that Girard sees as impossible following Jesus’ arrest. As 
the apostle followed the Messiah, he was surrounded by the others of the mob, and his denials of being-with 
Jesus constitute, Girard believes, an attempt to be-with others. When the cock crows twice (a symbol which 
Girard extrapolates at questionable length), Peter realizes that being-with the mobs is not only being untrue to 
who he truly is (a Christian), but it is ultimately impossible for him (his accent and language marks him as a 
Galileean, marking him irrevocably as something other). 
From this point Girard proceeds to use Peter as but one more proof of his scapegoat meta-hermeneutic. 
Not only does he rely heavily on a very literal reading of Mitsein (where physical absence results in an inability 
to be-with, a point that Heidegger would be troubled by, since when Heidegger discusses Mitsein in Being and 
Time, it links to the voice of ‘them’, the Das Man, the unidentified ‘ones’ who influence and direct the 
inauthentic form of being. Doing something because that is “just what people do” in no way requires the actual 
presence of others pressing their interpretation upon the person. See Being and Time, chapter 3, esp. §25-27), he 
also asserts that Peter’s denial stemmed from a desire to participate in the scapegoating efforts of the crowd. 
Upon Jesus’ arrest, Girard argues that Peter “lost all memory of having been” with his Messiah (Girard, 
Scapegoat, 150. Emphasis in original). He proceeds to go to fairly extensive imaginative lengths to assert that 
Peter ‘switched sides’ for the period of his denial. The dynamic is so powerful that “even the disciples cannot 
resist of the scapegoat… we must count the group of disciples among the forces that are united in condemning 
Christ” (ibid., 105). Such a radical interpretation is surprising considering the high place Girard holds for the 
Christian myth. Moreover it is unnecessary. 
349 Here too I am grateful for the conversation and erudition of Don Adams, who provided much needed context 
for vthis discussion of arnēsis/homologeo. 
350 Paul Kahn, “Torture and Democratic Violence,” Ratio Juris. 22:2 (June 2009), 247. 
351 Kahn, “Torture,” 250. 
352 Herbert Musurillo, The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), op. loc. 
353 For an excellent study comparing the concept of fides and pistis in the Roman Empire, see Teresa Morgan, 
Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and the Early Churches (New 
York: Oxford, 2015). 
354 Kahn, “Torture,” 248. 
355 There is a sense that it is simply a matter of balancing penalties; that since the other fire will last longer it is 
worse and therefore it should be feared more than the present one. This is true, but at the same time I think 
obvious that it is not the entirety of the Christian argument. Most importantly, to weigh those two options is to 
necessarily accept the accuracy of the Christian representation of reality; namely that there is a judgment that 
leads to punishment afterlife. So to accept the eternal fires as a worse fate is to inherently accede to the fact that 
such a state of affairs is real, or true. To accept the part necessarily entails accepting the whole. More 
importantly, by using reference to the one to belittle the other, there is a communication of the validity of one 
over the other. You have to try to avoid one, but can find your way out and through the other. 
356 Any understanding, therefore, that the greater penalties of hell are responsible for the actions of martyrs 
misses the fundamental dynamic of martyrdom. In the face of some of the most coercive measures the state can 
wield, the martyrs respond through an act of fierce freedom. 
357 Emphasis mine. The whole passage reads: “Quam pulchrum spectaculum deo, cum Christianus cum dolore 
congreditur, cum adversum minas et supplicia et tormenta componitur, cum strepitum mortis et horrorem 
carnificis inridens inculcat, cum libertatem suam adversus reges et principes erigit, soli deo,cuius est, cedit, cum 
triumphator et victor ipsi, qui adversum se sententiam dixit, insultat! Vicit enim qui, quod contendit, obtinuit.” 
358 Chris Frilingos, “’It Moves Me to Wonder’: Narrating Violence and Religion under the Roman Empire,” in 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 77:4 (Dec. 2009), 829. While Frilingos sees the re-inscription of 
power through asymmetrical power relations as separate from challenges to “global” regimes of knowledge, I 
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would say it is precisely the contest between ascendant regimes of cosmic order that these bodies are read 
against, see 825-852. 
359 Perkins, Suffering Self, 41. 
360 See Castelli’s discussion in Martyrdom and Memory, and Bowersock who contends that the term retains its 
legal sense by being transliterated into Latin, which effectively establishes a new category apart from the legal 
witness which is referenced by the Latin “testis” or “arbitra.” (Martyrdom and Rome, chap. 1) I concur with the 
point, but we should be careful about the contingent nature of the category before moving, like Bowersock does, 
to assert a novelty in Christian martyrdom on this basis. 
361 For a good discussion of this point, see Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” and Paul Kahn, Sacred 
Violence. 
362 The U.S. Department of Justice identify three kinds of witnesses: lay witnesses, “a person who watched 
certain events and describes what he/she saw,” expert witnesses, “someone who is educated in a certain area” 
and “testifies with respect to his specialty area only,” and character witnesses, “someone who knew the victim, 
the defendant, or other people involved in the case.” Taken from The Offices of the United States Attorney, 
“Discovery,” retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/discovery. 
363 However, this was rarely exercised against Roman citizens – and then only those of low status, reiterating 
the disparity of legal experiences. There was ongoing debate around the value of torture for such assurances, 
similar to that which exists in most cultures. See Keith R. Bradley, “Roman Slavery and Roman Law,” 
Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques, 15:3 (Fall 1988), 477-495, esp. 486-7. 
364 Such approved venues of force and harm include athletic contests or self-defense. See my “Violently 
Peaceful: Tibetan Self-Immolation and the Problem of the Non/Violence Binary,” Open Theology 1 (2015), 
146-159. 
365 This is what leads Elizabeth Castelli to hold that Christian martyr narratives create both truth and violence. 
See Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 195. 
366 Peter Brown has shown that this form of speech was one of the modalities of truth-telling during this period 
of history. Analyzing parrhēsia in his seminal study of authority in late antiquity, he links it to the gravitas 
earned by self-possession, criticism and learning, and he notes that “a primal awe surrounded those who were 
known to have withstood torture” (Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion [], 64). Although he notes the 
connection with perseverance and suffering, Brown like Foucault focused on the fourth century ascetics who 
displayed parrhēsia, likely on account of his focus on a time that no longer produced Christian martyrs. 
367 Foucault, Fear-Less Speech (New York: Semiotext(e), 2001), 12. 
368 Ibid., 19. 
369 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 11. 
370 Foucault, Fear-Less Speech, 106. Italics mine. 
371 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 332. 
372 See his discussion of Christianity, 173-181, 315-335. Foremost is Foucault’s assertion that Christianity 
fundamentally changes the focus of the truth, removing it from a truth aimed at the political activity of 
individuals to their relationship to God. While I admit the relationship to God alters the discussion, I believe 
Foucault relies too much on Christianity as a religion, understood as a sphere separate from the sphere of 
politics and power. I have developed this idea more fully in my “Parrhēsia in Early Christianity,” forthcoming. 
373 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 173. 
374 Ibid., 185. 
375 Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 14. 
376 “Apostolic charisma” is a direct translation of apostolikou charismatos. Max Weber’s discussion of charisma 
authority seems to be a good model for understanding what they are speaking to. See Max Weber  
377 The translation used blends the traditional approach with a close reading of the Greek. Many scholars, like 
Herbert Musurillo (Acts, op. loc.), have taken the παρρηεσιας to refer to the means of speech, here in reference 
to Polycarp’s statement. Παρρηεσια does have a context more appropriate for speech than for hearing, leading 
some patristic lexicons to offer a correction ascribing the παρρηεσια to the speaker and not the hearer. At the 
same time, the text seems explicit, linking μετα παρρηεσιας to ακουε, literally meaning that Polycarp asks the 
governor to listen with parrhesia. This led a few scholars like Judith Lieu to translate it as “listen publicly” 
(Lieu, Christian Identity, 253), a technically correct translation but one without context, or the simpler “listen 
plainly” of Kirsopp in her translation of Eusebius’ text for the Loeb Library (op. loc.) or that of Frend in his 
translation of the line (Rise of Christianity, 182). What does it mean to listen publicly or plainly? I have instead 
here tried to focus on Polycarp’s hope that the governor will listen openly, without preconceived notions, to 
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what Polycarp has to say, not only listen for what the Roman authority wants to hear. At the same time, the 
parrhesiastic nature of Polycarp’s speech also seems important, and related to the plea for a certain kind of 
hearing, so I have maintained the common use of parrhesia as a modifier to Polycarp’s statement of identity. In 
Broeft and Bremmer’s work on the martyr acts, they argue that the use of parrhēsia is meant to be definitive in 
this place, the final word on the subject, which comes at the end of being asked to confess three times. Their 
discussion include a brief analysis on the symbolic significance of the number three in Rome, and provides a 
link to the triple denial of Peter discussed above. See Jan Den Broeft & Jan Bremmer “Notiunculae 
Martyrologicae III: Some Observations of the Martyria of Polycarp and Pionius,” Vigiliae Christianae 39:2 
(June 1985): 113. 
378 Parrhēsia was left untranslated here in order to a) point to the variety of meanings given that term, and b) 
show its centrality to the perceived power of martyrdom. I am again grateful to the advice and assistance of Don 
Adams in translating this passage.  
379 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 149. 
380 It is further supported by the regular use of the verb teleioun in reference to a martyr’s death, a term that 
carries a sentiment of fulfillment, as in the fulfillment of a life. See Boeft and Bremmer’s discussion of the term 
in reference to M. Carp. 47 in their “Notiunculae Martyrologiae II,” Vigiliae Christianae 36:4 (Dec. 1982): 385-
387. 
381 Boyarin, Dying for God, 56. 
382 W.H.C. Frend’s characterization of the conflict as a culture clash between universal claims articulated on 
metaphysical bases is an apt description. See Frend, Martyrdom, 20. 
383 Quoted in Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 67. 
384 As Thompson nicely puts it, “There was a latent contest over whose religious reality was revealed in the 
wounds of martyrs and whose identity was inscribed on their bodies. Lions, coercion, and resistance enacted 
simultaneously the Roman and Christian myths and rites of social identity and cosmic reality.” Thompson, 
“Martyrdom of Polycarp,” 49. See too 40-1. 
 
Notes for Chapter 3 
385 For a few good discussions on the creation and distinction between the “terrorist” and the “martyr,” see 
Muhammad al‐ Atawneh, "Shahāda versus terror in contemporary Islamic legal thought: the problem of suicide 
bombers,” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, 10:1 (2008): 18-29, and Mattias Gardell, “So Costly a Sacrifice 
Upon the Altar of Freedom: Human Bombs, Suicide Attacks, and Patriotic Heroes,” in Sacred Suicide, James R. 
Lewis and Carole M. Cusack eds, 151-172 (New York, Routledge, 2014).  
386 By origin here I mean the moment when the tactic appeared to first be used in struggles for Islam in the 20 th 
century. 
387 Roxanne Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. Princeton Readings In Islamist Thought: Texts and 
Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4. Meir Hatina holds 
the term is meant to refer to those movements of dissent against modern Western secularist principles that 
sought to apply Islamic principles to all spheres of life. See Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, 11. This 
opposition to modern secularist regimes comes from Mark Juergensmeyer’s Global Rebellion. See too 
Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers, 31-34. 
388 In spite of all the recent work on suicide bombings, the most referred to work on the perspective of suicide in 
Islam continues to be the appropriately named “On Suicide in Islam” by Franz Rosenthal, Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 66:3 (July-Sept. 1946): 239-259. While much is still noteworthy in Rosenthal’s 
work, Meir Hatina’s Martyrdom in Modern Islam also contains a succinct exploration of the concept’s religious 
significance, see pp. 39-43. 
389 On Nasir al-Din al-Albani, see David Cook and Olivia Allison, Understanding and Addressing Suicide 
Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 
15. Arata Takeda has tried to offer new terminology to attend to this disjunction, suggesting these acts be called 
“sacrifice bombing” in order to appreciate the sacrificial nature with which they are imbued. See his "Das 
regressive Menschenopfer: Vom eigentlichen Skandalon des gegenwärtigen Terrorismus" Zeitschrift für 
Bürgerrechte und Gesellschaftspolitik 51:1 (2012): 116–129. 
390 For a good discussion see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islam (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 538. 
391 Quoted in Meir Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 96. 
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392 Farhad Khosrokhavar extends this distinction into the category of martyrdom itself, delineating “playful 
martyrs” who seek their death out of a “desire for ecstasy and effervescence” (terms that bring Durkheim’s 
work on religious affect to mind) from the “martyropath” who acts from hatred ad desperation. See his Suicide 
Bombers, esp. 84-90. While I believe the distinction is important, the dual use of “martyr” at the root obfuscates 
a larger point about the possibility of being considered a self-sacrifice. Islamic thought would not admit 
“martyropaths” qualify as martyrs, and I hold that the term’s use must be determined by the group that claims 
the martyr. In seeking such commendation, the group may mask the “true” source of motivation, but we can 
never truly know, only hurl interpretations back and forth. Moreover, hatred can appear outside desperation and 
can link to the ecstasy felt destroying foes. See his Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). 
393 See Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 74. 
394 This comes from the popular tradition communicated by Ibn al-Mubarak, Jihad, pp.63-64; al-Bukhari Sahih 
iii, p.278 (nos. 2829-30). David Cook provides an excellent typology of early forms of martyrdom, see his 
Martyrdom in Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 21-30. See too Asma Afsaruddin, Striving 
for God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 281-3 and 
chap. 4. 
395 Cook, Martyrdom In Islam, 33. See too Meir Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, 16. 
396 Cook, Martyrdom in Islam, 35. This well-known promise is not found in the Qur’an, but in a weakly attested 
hadith where Muhammad said “In the sight of God the martyr has six qualities: He [God] forgives him at the 
first opportunity, and shows him his place in paradise, he is saved from the torment of the grave, he is safe from 
the great fright [of the Resurrection], a crown of honor is placed upon his head – one ruby of which I better than 
the world and all that is in it – he is married to seventy-two of the houris, and he gains the right to intercede for 
seventy of his relatives.” Quoted in Cook and Allison, Understanding Suicide Attacks, 10. 
397 See Afsaruddin, Striving for God, 282. 
398 On Fahmideh see Afsaruddin, Striving for God, 231-235, and Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs: Innocence, 
Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 45-66.  
399 Technically Qasir recognized himself as part of a different group, as Hizbollah did not yet officially exist. 
However when Hizbollah solidified Qasir’s group was dissolved into the new organization. 
400 Kippenberg said the same, Violence as Worship, 83. 
401 Lara Deeb, “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’: Hizbullah’s Nationalist Narratives in Transnational Political 
Context,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50:2 (2008): 369-399 (374 for quote, and see 374 n. 17); 
see too her An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi‘i Lebanon (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). Deeb focuses specifically on the experiences of Shi’a in Lebanon, but I would argue the same 
motivation are evident in the Iranian Revolution, and that the hala islamiyya should extend to both groups. On 
the common ground in the charism of Musa al-Sadr see Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, 90, as well as 
Kippenberg, Violence as Worship, 83. 
402 Diego Gambetta, “Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, Diego 
Gambetta, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 288. See too 80-81. And Luca Ricolfi “Palestinians, 
1981-2003” in the same volume. 
403 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 
see also Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick. “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack.” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004): 243-281. For an excellent discussion of the shortcomings of Pape’s work 
especially and the paradigm in general see Assaf Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the 
Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 707-
729. 
404 Robert J. Brym and Bader Araj, “Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second 
Intifada,” Social Forces 84:4 (June 2006): 1969-1986; Robert J. Brym, “Religion, Politics, and Suicide 
Bombing: An Interpretive Essay,” Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 33:1 (2008): 
89-108. 
405 Assaf Moghadam’s work has done a good job showing how such an approach can illuminate what is 
otherwise missed. See e.g. his . “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide 
Attacks.” International Security 33:3 (Winter 2008/2009): 46-78. While I support much of the ways Moghadam 
looks at the issue, I take issue with the sharp distinction he draws between national based movements and 
transnational based movements, seeing the two as ontologically distinct. Though I would agree the shape of the 
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goal can affect the manner of the tactic, I believe more is revealed if the two are taken together rather than 
approached separately. Farhad Khosrokhavar likewise holds such a stance, and I will engage with his rationales 
below. 
406 See Adam Lankford, The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and 
Other Self-Destructive Killers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Ariel Merari et.al. ““Making Palestinian 
‘Martyrdom Operations’/’Suicide Attacks’: Interviews with Would-Be Perpetrators and Organizers,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 22 (2010): 102-119. 
407 Quoted in Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2011), 100. 
408 Despite the volumes written on this topic, few delve into the texts left by martyrs, believing that they are a 
product of brainwashing or social pressure rather than an expression of conviction. For an examination of this 
problem see my discussion in chapter one. One exception is Farhad Khosrokhavar, a leading scholar on suicide 
bombers, who like Mark Juergensmeyer conducted a host of interviews with people who conducted failed 
suicide bombings, and whose conclusions will be engaged with throughout this chapter. Such scholars provide 
the foundation for my own methodology here. 
409 Euben, “Killing (for) Politics,” 7. 
410 See his “A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks,” Theory, Culture & Society 26:4 (2009): 67-96. 
411 Michael Roberts, “Suicide Missions as Witnessing: Expansions, Contrasts.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
30 (2007): 876. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Those taken from al-Manar include Ali Munif Ashmar (d. 10/15/95), Samir Mohammad Mattout (d. 
6/15/86), Assaad Berro (d. 8/9/89), Ahmad Qasir (d. 11/11/82) as well as Qintar (d. 2015). All translations are 
theirs. Texts of the final interview with Wadji al-Sayegh (d. 3/12/85) and the last testament of Sanaa Mheydleh 
(d. 4/9/85) were procured thanks to the Chicago Project of Security and Terrorism which was kind enough to 
allow me access to their translations. Jamal Sati’s last testament is a special case, as the original recording was 
discovered by Elias Khoury and Rabih Mroue, who published them in a media performance and concurrent 
article “Three Posters: Reflections on a Video/Performance,” The Drama Review 50:3 (Autumn 2006): 182-
191. Salah Ghandour’s last testament cam in part from al-Manar and part from Hala Jaber, Hizbollah: Born with 
a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). Shadi Sleyman’s last will was quoted in 
Mohammed M. Hafez, “Dying to be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism.” In Root Causes 
of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, Ami Pedahzur, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 70. 
414 For the name and where most wills came from – Nader Nazemi, “Sacrifice and Authorship: A Compendium 
of the Wills of Iranian Martyrs,” Iranian Studies 30:3/4 (Summer-Autumn 1997): 263-271. Translations of 
Iranian wills come from Nazemi, except where noted otherwise. 
415 Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, 165-166. 
416 Quoted in Hans Kippenberg, Violence as Worship, 69. 
417 Briefly, it is important to note the difference between the Iranian and Lebanese actors under discussion here, 
and the Salafist jihadis that characterize the transnational actors like al-Qaeda or ISIS. Apart from the nature of 
their goals – a nation governed on shar’iah versus a world dominated by Islam – the Salafist are based on an 
interpretation of Wahhabist Islam coming out of Saudi Arabia. They share the connection with thinkers like 
Qutb and Maududi, and those like Abdullah Azzam certainly interpellated some of the ideas discussed here into 
the global terrorist organizations, but they differ significantly on the relationship with modernity. The brand of 
Salafism that ideologically sponsors demands for long beards and living a ninth century lifestyle, celebrating 
what Khosrokhavar calls archaeo-Islam, an “inverted modernity in which freedom is transformed into a logic of 
absolute taboos.” See Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers, 86. In a line typical of his eloquent style he contends 
“Those who could no longer be consumers began to consume themselves. The desire to consume was projected 
onto a deadly form of the sacred. The outcome was a necrophile neo-asceticism.” (87) This strand is on the 
whole absent from Iran and Lebanon of the 1980s.  
Fadlallah puts it explicitly when he avers “we [Hizbollah] are not fundamentalists (‘usuliyin) in the sense of 
wanting to live like people at the time of the Prophet or the first Caliphs or the time of the Umayyads.” From 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Mahmoud Soueid, “Islamic Unity and Political Change: Interview with 
Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25:1 (Autumn 1995): 63. Fadlallah’s 
keenness to distance himself from those Wahhabist Salafists he clearly aimed at in this speech was returned in 
kind; after pronouncing that women could serve in high clerical positions several Wahhabist jurists accused him 
of heresy. See Abisaab, Shi’ites of Lebanon, 202. While all these share a concern about the moral destitution of 
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modernity, writers from Qutb to Khomeini were not opposed to technological advancements of the modern age; 
it was only the ethical system that guided their use that took their focus. See, for example, Qutb, Milestones, 10. 
Maududi also repeatedly praises science and its advancements in his Understanding Jihad, e.g. 13, 179.417 That 
is not the case for those in ISIS, who demand like look as much like the life of Muhammad and his companions 
as possible. Such a distinction is not marginal, and should be recognized in order to appreciate the particular 
context that first inspired martyrdom operations. See Euben and Zaman, “Introduction,” 19-23 for a good 
discussion. 
418 Cook argues that only the Imami’s have remained as a distinct group, while all others have been 
amalgamated through their adherence to an Islamist ideal of Islam (see his Commanding Right, 505).That may 
be, but as will become clear I would argue that these groups also recognized and referenced thinkers like Qutb 
and Maududi, and other Islamists would look back with approbation on the success of the Iranian Revolution 
and the movements of the Shi’a. Moreover, with the martyrdom operations becoming such a significant tactic in 
modern Islamism, Sunni groups too could be said to relate to Shi’ism. Labels and belonging appear at various 
levels of abstraction and vary accordingly, so I would caution against such blanket statements about religious 
typologies. 
419 On the quietism in Sunnism see Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion, 49.  
420 Moreover, they are governed by the doctrine of taqiyya, where they can conceal their faith to avoid 
persecution and injury at the hands of an unjust government. On the practice of taqiyya see Kippenberg, 
Violence as Worship, 66-67. 
421 See Cook, Martyrdom in Islam, 47-52 for a discussion of the Sunni relationship to martyrdom. Rola El-
Husseini argues that the lack of martyrdom tradition in Sunnism led to suicide attacks being “justifies ex post 
facto by religious scholars who needed to give it the legitimacy of Islamic law.” (411). See her discussion in 
“Resistance, Jihad, and Martyrdom in Contemporary Lebanese Shi’a Discourse,” Middle East Journal 62:3 
(Summer 2008), 409-412. 
422 See Ivan Strenski, “Sacrifice, Gift, and the Social Logic of Muslim ‘Human Bombers,’” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 15:3 (2003): 13.  
423 Ali Shariati, “Shahadat,” in Jihad and Shahadat, Mehdi Abedi and Gary Lehenhausen, eds. (North Haledon, 
NJ: Islamic Publications International, 1986), 194-199. 
424 It is this reinvigorated ideal of jihad that Gambetta believes best explains the inter-sectarian communication. 
See his “Making Sense of Suicide Operations,” 287. 
425 Maududi occasionally spent time in religious schooling, but his charisma is not a result of such training, but 
rather reinterpreting Islamic doctrine in light of contemporary political experiences. 
426 Quoted in Christoph Reuter, My Life as a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 42. 
427 On the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih see Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, 46-50, and Imad Salamey 
and Zanoubia Othman, “Shia Revival and Welayat Al-Faqih in the Making of Iranian Foreign Policy,” Politics, 
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829 Rodney Stark recognized this fact specifically when it comes to the testimonials of martyrs, leading him to 
contend that “martyrs are the most credible exponents of the value of a religion, and this is especially true if 
there is a voluntary aspect to their martyrdom.” See Stark, Rise of Christianity, 173. 
830 Foucault, History of Sexuality., vol. 3 (New York: Pantheon, 1986). 
831 See Foucault, Courage of Truth esp. chap. 3-5, and Fear-Less Speech, esp. chap. 1. 
832 Jonathan Simon, “Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in an Age 
of Terror,” Yale Law Journal 114 (2004): 1419ff. 
833 See Flood, Ascetic Self, 212 and elsewhere. We will see below that this “internalization of the tradition” 
aligns very closely with sociological ideas of religion promoted by Emile Durkheim. 
834 Roger Friedland, “Institution, Practice and Ontology: Towards a religious sociology,” in Institutions and 
Ideology, 45-83, Renate E. Meyer et.al. eds (New York: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd., 2009). 
835 Lincoln, Discourse, myth; Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” 45. 
836 Kippenberg’s work has been formative for this study, however his focus revolves around an eschatological 
orientation, where such models only serve because they illustrate the correct means to gain salvation. He is 
certainly correct, and the focus on ends beyond the physical world absolutely serve to inculcate action in a way 
perhaps more strenuous than otherwise. However, only allowing for those types of scripts unnecessarily 
excludes a variety of such narratives that do not direct themselves only to salvation. While the particular 
political theological blend I examine here do nicely fit into Kippenberg’s description, I would encourage a use 
of cultural scripts to avoid overdetermining what kinds of narrative scripts  could feasibly guide action. 
837 An echo of the old paradox questioning whether an act is holy because God loves it, or God loves the act 
because it’s holy can be heard in this challenge. 
838 See Nathan French, Weiner and Weiner, Joyce Salisbury, ?? 
839 See Bonner, Jihad in Islam; also see Khosrokhavar who quotes Motahhari demanding a preparatory practice 
of achieving agahneh – the right state of mind – before proceeding on a martyrdom operation. 
840 These are the terms Paul Kahn uses in his Sacred Violence. 
841 Scarry, Body and Pain, 4. 
842 Ibid, 29. She says that what this shows is the inaccessible nature of physical pain to others, but what it might 
show is the challenge that the suffering of others, in the particular context of torture or involuntary suffering, 
poses to us.   
843 Not only is theological all too often discussed as a Christian conception, but it also figures routinely in 
religious ideals that exclude political considerations. Here I mean it only to refer to extraphysical 
considerations, of which come a wide variety between traditions. To do theology under such guise is to seek an 
understanding of the basic form of the cosmos. 
844 This closely resembles the way Gavin Flood determined subjectivity, see his Ascetic Self, 20 and elsewhere. 
845 Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors. 
846 Roy Rappaport, Enactments of Meaning, Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
847 By social configurations I mean the networks of relationships that take on a particular shape depending on 
the extent to which other individuals are part of “us”, many of which overlap to great extents. This term applies 
to every group culturally and socially determined by any number of factors. It can be as narrow as a couple or as 
broad as the human race, however an individual perceives themselves to be bound with others by choice or by 
virtue of birth. 
848 Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society. 
849 See Aho, This Thing of Darkness, see Juergenesmeyer, Global Rebellion as well. 
850 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 49. 
851 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 103. 
852 Ibid., 102, see also 269. 
853 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 12. 
854 Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” 31. 
855 Cover likewise explained that abiding by laws communicates something about the individual. See his 
“Nomos and Narrative,” 8. It is important to note that such communication requires a statement that clarifies the 
reasoning behind action. I follow the precept not to kill simply because I am sitting at my computer alone, I 
cannot be said to act according to a law though my actions align with the law. On the other hand, if I hold off 
from a deep desire to kill someone because I do not want to transgress a law, then I would be acting according 
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to duty. In short, if I act against self-interest due to an imposed moral code, then I follow a law and link myself 
to that system of justice. 
856 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, Peter Berger, Sacred Canopy, Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of 
Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78-9. 
857 Smyr. Chap. 2, 6. 
858 To say always is of course an overstatement, but those moral codes that do focus solely on engendering the 
goals of the individual struggle when it comes to sacrality. The capitalist mindset of course comes to mind here, 
but also the Thelemic law enunciated by Aleister Crowley: Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law. We 
can also hear interesting connections to Nietzsche’s will to power that has to be met with demands that others 
be recognized. 
859 Maurice Blanchot discusses this fusing between the individual and the group in his Prey into Hunter (). 
860 Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory." In Feminist Theory Reader, edited by Carole R. McCann and Seung-Kyung Kim (New York City: 
Routledge, 2013), 462. 
861 This means that sacrifice itself lies at the basis of social belonging, preceding and prefiguring acts of 
sacrifice in war. Contrary to Juergensmeyer, it is not war that provides the context for sacrifice, but rather war is 
the extension of the dynamic inherent in all social arrangements. While Clausewitz was onto something when 
he declared war to be politics by other means, we see here that engaging in politics means attaching to a system 
of justice and seeking to enact it in the world, which necessitates sacrifice. 
862 On hegemony see Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 
especially chap. 7. 
863 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 164. 
864 Weiner and Weiner, Martyr’s Conviction, 58. 
865 Sovereignty is usually dealt with as the ultimate form of this relationship, hence its deployment around 
capital punishment, torture and war. However, with this understanding we can see many levels of sovereignty 
operative within various social configurations that claim some right to determining what suffering is legitimate 
and justified toward certain ends, which should reorient us to appreciate a spectrum of sovereignty. A parent in 
the modern U.S. has some amount of sovereignty over their child, as they can impose suffering (e.g. spanking) 
in service to discipline that is deemed to be legitimate; what the limits of that sovereignty are is a matter of 
perspective that varies between individuals, and is not consistent over time. In Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer 
he recognizes this spectrum of sovereignty obliquely. See chapter 2 especially. Where it gets perceived as 
excessive recourse to state authorities comes into play, showing that the state’s sovereignty ranks higher, but 
until such a case is brought to statist agents for arbitration there is no real limitation. 
866 Violence itself, the imposition of suffering, is not the central issue; rather it is the transgression of the 
prohibition of violence that lies at the core of sovereignty, as Georges Bataille noted in his The Accursed Share. 
Giorgio Agamben in his Homo Sacer saw members of a political collective entering into a sovereign ban on 
violence, where individuals bequeath any access to violence to agents of an institution that avows to protect 
them from any violence. It should be noted that such protection can only ever appear in the form of a 
disproportionate level of suffering being deployed against perpetrators of such violence, which only can achieve 
a status of inevitability that would dissuade people from such actions. It is therefore less protection from 
suffering than the promise of retribution of such a level that it serves as a deterrent. Herein lies the very core of 
modern legal systems. Moreover, to move from this reactive state to a more proactive means of protection 
means that the agents of the state must be everywhere at all times, which is why acts of extreme violence lead to 
increases in security and surveillance that have today reached such a peak that they threaten basic liberties. 
867 In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound these are personified in the characters of kratos, the true power that is 
legitimate and dominant and can rightly wield suffering in support of its dictates, and bia, force that is exercised 
apart from structures of legitimacy. The latter is best understood as mere violence, and is descriptive not only of 
the violence implicit in transgressive acts like murder or assault but also of agents acting forcefully on behalf of 
figures who claim authority but have no right to it. Kratos adversely is the label for the force wielded by the law 
that is seen as justice. 
868 In fact Robert Cover holds that it is this very basis in the body that shifts ethic to law; he argues in his 
famous “Violence and the Word” that legal worlds only exist where bodies are placed on the line (1605). If 
there is no chance of bodily suffering as a consequence for transgression such discussions would remain on the 
level of moral philosophy. 
869 OED, op.loc. 
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870 Family members of defendants found guilty may continue to dispute the established truth, and ultimately the 
judge’s determination remains contestable, but the state action follows the legal determination. Families may 
cite their own experiences as informing their perception of the truth, but once the judge enters the decision the 
families have no other recourse against the forces of the state.  
871 See Kahn, Sacred Violence, chapter 1. 
872 Cover, “Violence and the Word,” 1604, n. 9. 
873 Scarry, Body and Pain, 62. 
874 Kahn, Political Theology, 52. 
875 See his interview in Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (New York: New 
Press, 1997) 
876 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, chap. 1. 
877 See his Sovereignty and Its Other, esp. chap. 2. 
878 As Paul Kahn put it, “If sovereignty is grounded in sacrifice, then public life is as much about the realization 
of a transcendent truth of the seld as it is about the maintenance of a just legal order.” See his Political 
Theology, 24. 
879 This connects in part the idea of whoever and their strategic jujitsu or whatever. 
880 Girard, Sacred Violence, 15-16. 
881 Kahn, Political Theology, 52. 
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